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Russia, in its competition with the liberal world for establishing the dominant discourse—alongside hard power military means—deploys soft power, leveraging the allure of illiberal values to forge foreign policy alliances, undermine the credibility of international institutions, and reshape the global order. Russian strategic narratives delineate the political objectives of the Russian government. In a contest for discursive authority with other global actors, Russia presents its vision of a new world order—a world partitioned among major powers—where Moscow holds the authority to determine the fate of peoples in the "Greater Eurasia" region, including Europe [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Balkan states have remained susceptible to Russian influence in the 21st century due to a concurrence of contemporary and historical factors. In Serbia, such factors have contributed to the high favourability of Russia among the general public, despite government leadership attempts to balance between these sentiments and relationships with the West. To best understand these trends, one of the most compelling examples is the role of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the Serbian Orthodox Church in serving as forces to strengthen the shared history of these two nations. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the ROC has served as a vital partner to Putin and to the Russian government in justifying their ideologies, along with the strong transnational presence of the ROC as a soft power. Accordingly, the role of religious institutions as public diplomacy actors is exceedingly important to understand in today’s global setting. For states like Serbia, this presents a setup whereby Russian positions may be shared or reinforced through religious channels. It is, therefore, crucial for scholars, political analysts and public policy makers to better understand the link between religion and public diplomacy, and to formulate policies and programmes that specifically consider activities disseminated by religious institutions [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alleged practices of magical assault and vampirism are a recurrent feature of popular explanations of misfortune in Tuva, South Siberia. Based on a field study of healing practices in an "Association of Shamans", this article analyses rituals of redressing curse afflictions in the context of Russian political domination. A central purpose of this discussion is to foreground the centrality of kinds of parasitical worship and occult threat to structures of political power in—and beyond—the territory of Tuva. Focusing on a "cursescape", which develops from the combative practices of shamans, occult specialists, and office-holders, the article probes a repertoire of shamanic healing symbols. It is argued that healing efficacy is constructed in the process of engaging with hunting symbols and animal spirits, which appear in Indigenous Siberian cosmologies. The analysis shows that ideas of ritual risk underpin the process of symbolic resolution. Whereas shamanic practices provide refuge to spirits evicted from their natural landscapes, Tibetan Buddhism—the unifying religion of Tuva—offers an alternative path of healing the effects of the shamans' propagation of spirits. The article highlights indigenous perceptions of a "cursed" landscape as a space where the agencies of "darkness" and their political sponsors are confronted with an emancipating religious modality emerging from local Buddhist rituals. The analysis displays the unsolved drama of itinerant spirits and shamanic ancestral souls, whose agency is revealed through successive—yet inauspicious—forms of reincarnation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author analyzes Estonia as a case study to explore two interrelated research questions – how exceptions are produced and reversed through the mechanisms of sovereignty and governmentality projected onto geo- and biopolitical domains, and how the new practices of exceptionalization and de-exceptionalization contribute to the emergence of a new spatial order at Europe's eastern margins? Three types of policies unfolded in Estonia as reactions to the Russian war against Ukraine are identified. First, the Estonian government introduced extraordinary measures based on the logic of national interests, which left much space for discretionary power to define risks, threats, and dangers. Secondly, some policy domains were intentionally de-exceptionalized for the sake of their better integration into Estonian normative space and as a reaction to the effects of the war. Third, in some cases there were exceptions from exceptions, which meant certain steps back toward normalization of the previously taken exceptional measures. The theoretical frame of the article consists of two nodal concepts – sovereignty and governmentality to be projected onto geo- and biopolitics treated as spheres in which sovereign and governmental powers operate and expose their political qualities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As Russia's invasion in Ukraine enters its second year, how is the global system continuing to evolve and change? How is the balance of power and influence shifting? And what might be some of the unexpected developments? Orbis turned to Michael A. Reynolds, Sharyl Cross, Dov S, Zakheim, Ronald J. Granieri, Almaz Keshavarz, Kiron Skinner, Jeff D. Colgan, Damjan Krnjevic Miskovic, and Rachel Ziemba for their thoughts, with a final reflection by Orbis editor Nikolas Gvosdev. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine from a postcolonial perspective. It argues that the structure of coloniality in the region is tripartite: besides Russia and Ukraine, the "West" is present as the main significant Other for both sides. With regard to the West, Russia is a "subaltern empire" and Ukraine is a "double subaltern," peripheral to more than one center of power. Within this complex of imperiality and subalternity, Russia is engaging in a "catching-up imperialism" driven by resentment against the West. Russia has subsumed neighboring states, or parts of them, in brutal violation of the existing international order. Its leaders claim it is only mimicking the hegemon's (i.e. the West's) imperialist modus operandi. This geostrategic pattern is captured by Erik Ringmar's notion of "recognition games." Fighting in those "deadly games," Zelensky's Ukraine is breaking out of its place as a mute subaltern. The rhetorical aspect of Ukraine's response to Russian aggression can be called a horizontal "populism of hope." Ukraine has attained global visibility and recognition in the Northern hemisphere as a beacon of grassroots democracy, resilience and freedom. Russia, however, has rebranded itself as the spearhead of a global fight against Western hegemony. The outcome of this military and discursive standoff will largely define a future normative international order displaying new hierarchies of symbolic power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Russian invasion of Ukraine gave rise to discussions of hard power configurations in international politics and challenged peace statuses at a world level. Many countries revised their foreign policy strategies according to major power alliance. The global rhetoric shifted from cosmopolitanism to statism, survival and collective security systems. In the midst of a war, the WB states characterized from still high levels of corruption, flawed democracies and unresolved ethnic conflicts found themselves in rising insecurities. The study aims to address the following research questions: Has the Russia - Ukraine conflict caused a security dilemma in the Western Balkans region? To what extent would the security dilemma contribute to the intensity of ethnic disputes in the Western Balkans? The framework is primarily centered defensive realism as well as the security dilemma and its impact on regional conflicts. Anarchy, fear and misperception are the three variables used to measure state and societal security dilemma. The study concludes that states that do not belong to strong military alliances and organizations find it easier to find themselves in a security dilemma that could quickly escalate into an active conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Key points: Editing a Russian journal revealed differences in scientific behaviour, particularly around plagiarism.All editorial efforts to develop a high quality journal can be rapidly dismantled by external forces and world politics.The Ukrainian invasion is likely to return Russian science to the isolation of 40 years ago.The ability of journals to operate independently is heavily influenced by national and international politics which pose an existential threat to journals.Academic journals can be used as a means of exercising soft political power and the ability of editors to circumnavigate or challenge this are severely limited. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay aims to show how in recent years, a scenario of dispute on a global and regional scale between several States, called "gray zones" - characterized by the use of non-confrontational coercive measures - has been configured In addition, it examines how Russia has apparently become a challenger within this "gray zone", employing mainly political, economic and military measures to consolidate its power and influence, and also to weaken its adversaries in strategic positions in some areas of the African continent. Throughout a review of secondary sources, a state of the art of the theoretical developments of the "gray zone" is presented, and the return of Russia to Africa is analyzed based on these developments. It is concluded that Africa is becoming a scene of dispute in the "gray zone" between Russia and the West with important geostrategic gains for Moscow, and few benefits for the African nations where Russia is intervening. This essay provides an analytical approximation of the role of Russia in the international arena by trying to theorize about its return to Africa from an alternative perspective of the "gray zone", and how this could happen under a logic of indirect struggle against the West and not of direct confrontation as has been approached up to now. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does the rise of China challenge the existing international order? What are the possible outcomes of the interplay between China's rise and the current trajectory of the Russian and Turkish regimes? Based on a qualitative analysis, I find two major dilemmas for the current power dynamics have resulted from China's challenging behavior in the international system. First, while China promotes steady relationships based on mutual interests facilitated by the rule-based international order, it also carries out actions which feed its aspirations for exploiting the current international institutions. Second, while China underlines the importance of a Westphalian style of sovereignty and non-interference, it also takes interventionist actions in both cyberspace and territorial space. Based on identification of China- Russia and China-Turkey interactions through the variations in the most 'central' domestic issues of the current governments in Russia and Turkey, I predict four possible outcomes, shedding light on the future policy directions in Russia and Turkey: 1) a prolongation of Putin's campaign in Ukraine, 2) an acceleration in the process of de-dollarization, 3) lasting Chinese influence on Turkey's Kurdish issue, and 4) an increase in Turkey's tendency toward a Chinese-style 'growth' model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The possession of a large amount of land property acquired during the Middle Ages had allowed the Russian Orthodox Church to enjoy a quasi-autonomous life, which contradicted the logic of the development of the Russian autocracy. The successive church reforms of the tsars Aleksei Mikhailovich, Peter the Great and Catherine the Great aimed at ensuring the state control over the economic power of the Church, thus breaking with the previous lack of clarity and precision which characterized the nature of the relationships between state and church in Russia. The establishment of the supremacy of temporalia over spiritualia liberated the Church from its traditional duties as “ideological department” of the state. This freedom was used by the Church to address the purely church themes. The second half of the eighteenth century is characterized by the intense theological pursuits of the Russian monastics. Being under the constant pressure of the secular power during the reigning of the Romanov monarchical dynasty, the monasteries have lost their status and ceased to be centers of learning. One of the ways of surviving was the return to a forgotten tradition of hesychasm. But in the Age of Enlightenment new rival mystical traditions were capturing the Russian minds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper aims to explore the practical application of "soft power" in "hybrid" countries. The analysis is based on the example of soft power-strategies developed and implemented by the Russian Federation in post-Soviet Central Asia throughout the last two decades. The overarching research questions of the paper are the following -- what are the most interesting features of Russian soft power in the changing geopolitical conditions of the post-Soviet space? How does it address local youth to secure Russian domination in the region and ensure the sustainability of local political regimes? What is the future of Russian soft power and geopolitical influence in the region? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The Western Balkan region has long struggled under extensive pressure and influence from Russia and the West. World developments have occasionally echoed tensions among nations in the region, including a prolonged EU and NATO membership process, which has increased the possibility of Russia's influence, especially after the aggression in Ukraine. This article analyses the increase in Russia - Ukraine tensions and its direct correlation with the increase of tensions in the Western Balkans through hybrid war methods understood through Zhyhlei and Syvak's definition: "a fragmentary and situational combination of different methods and theories of war, their integration into different spheres, especially political, religious, ideological, ethical, economic and informational."5 The higher Russia's aggression in Ukraine, the higher the pressure on Serbia to fuel tensions in the Western Balkans. This pressure comes through direct threats, media propaganda, and influence on parallel structures and financial support for CSOs, through which Russia increases its influence in the Balkans through Serbia as its closest ally. This influence strategy is particularly important for Russia to undermine the power and influence of the West and NATO in former Yugoslav states, especially those with open conflicts which serve as a global distraction from a possible power decline in Ukraine. Methods: Through discourse and thematic analysis, this article analyses local, regional, and international media, data, and publications of international organisations, press releases of international and regional institutions, conclusions of distinguished scientists and heads of state over the current situation in the Western Balkans, and interviews with representatives of CSOs and institutions in Kosovo. The influence of Russian aggression in Ukraine, with Russia's pressure to increase tensions in the Western Balkans, has been analysed in the framework of Western unipolar influence and Russia's attempts to return to multipolarity. Results and Conclusion: Among others, it is concluded that Russian influence is present in the Western Balkans and seeks to destabilise the region by activating passive conflicts from the past or opening new conflicts to defer international attention from the power decline in Ukraine, which did not produce the results that Russia had expected. This is possible through Serbia, Russia's closest ally. The solution to prevent Russian influence and any future conflicts among Balkan states is to accelerate NATO and EU's integration of Western Balkan countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Since the end of the Cold War, Russia and the West have engaged in fierce geopolitical competition over the post-Soviet space. Separatism in the post-Soviet space has become a hallmark of their relationship, even an accelerator of contradictions. This paper analyzes Russia's policy evolution towards separatism in the post-Soviet space from the perspective of the interaction between power and norms to grasp the changes in power dynamics and territorial integrity norms in this region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Seljuk University Journal of Seljuk Studies is the property of Selcuk University Journal of Seljuk Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Purpose: Drawing on follower-centric leadership theory, the study examines the role of perceived homophily between the leader and the follower, follower's individual-level power distance orientation (PDO) and follower's perceived employability in moderating the effects of authoritarian and benevolent paternalistic leadership (BPL) on followers' turnover intentions. Design/methodology/approach: The study analyzes a sample of 403 white-collar Russian employees. Findings: Whereas both leadership styles generally decrease followers' turnover intentions, they operate differently. Authoritarian leadership (AL) is more effective among followers with higher follower-leader homophily and PDO, whereas BPL is effective only among followers with low perceived homophily and PDO, and more effective among followers with higher perceived employability. Originality/value: The study extends research on non-participative styles of leadership, their effects and boundary conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the shaping and transformation of the post-Soviet security thinking of Georgia and Ukraine in the context of the post-Soviet Russian foreign policy in the near abroad, often designated as a legitimate sphere of Russian influence, and the competition between Russia and the EU and the US in the region. After the Rose Revolution of Georgia and the Orange Revolution of Ukraine, these two countries' independent/pro-Western orientation became the main issues securitized by the Russian Federation. Correspondingly, the preservation of territorial integrity became the top security issue for Georgia (since the early 1990s), and it became so for Ukraine after the Crimean occupation (March 2014) and the renewed armed hostilities across the entirety of Ukraine since February 2022. The changes in the internal politics of these countries were transposed into the international competition between Russia and the EU/US, expressed through the clash of "Sovereign Democracy" and "Color Revolution" paradigms for the future of post-Soviet states in the 2010s and transformed into active military measures in Ukraine since 2020s and through the so-called creeping annexation of Georgia since 2010s. Practically, these are the tools of maintaining the Russian influence on the one hand and opposing the Western values and power influence, supported firstly by the European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership projects and secondly by granting candidate status to Ukraine in 2022. Russia's military actions against Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014-2023), a response to the soft power applied by the West, aimed at the creation of buffer zones in the shape of "frozen conflicts," which could be used as indirect leverage in the hands of the Russian Federation to block the Western aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The usefulness of 'realism' in explaining Russia's decision to invade Ukraine has become a keenly contested debate not only in International Relations but in wider public intellectual discourse since the onset of the war in February 2022. At the centre of this debate is the punditry of John J. Mearsheimer, a prominent offensive realist who is a Professor of International Relations at the University of Chicago. This article argues that although Mearsheimer is indeed a realist, his offensive realism is but one of many different realist theories that can forward an explanation of the Ukraine War. Beyond the apparent hegemony of structural realism (the branch of realism to which Mearsheimer's offensive realism belongs), it is argued that classical and neoclassical realist frameworks can provide more nuanced and, ultimately, convincing arguments as to why Russian President Vladimir Putin decided to invade Ukraine. This is because both classical and neoclassical realism can incorporate insights from non-realist studies—such as the concepts of civilization and ontological security—and combine them into an overarching power politics framework. Although neither classical nor neoclassical realism is flawless in their explanations, they demonstrate that realism does not just have to be about international power structures but can offer multivariate accounts of why a state, like Russia, decided to act, such as invading Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article poses a question regarding the importance of judicial dissents emanating from constitutional courts. It examines the power of dissents emanating from the Russian Constitutional Court, given the fact that the Russian government has invested a significant effort in suppressing dissenting voices. The very presence of dissents in the Russian Constitutional Court poses an interesting question regarding their impact on democracy, consensus building, and civil society. This Article argues that while dissents coming from the Russian Constitutional Court may not be binding, they carry a great deal of "soft power." Judicial dissents aid in challenging commonly espoused consensus both inside and outside the courtroom and provide a legitimizing voice to marginalized groups that have frequently been excluded from the dialogue. Due to the possibility of judicial dissents spilling over from the confines of the courts, they aid the democratic process, not necessarily by convincing the majority to change their minds, but by forming a polity where people's rights are the subject of an ongoing political debate. The Article concludes that while judicial dissents are not binding, the true "soft power" of judicial dissents comes from their ability to challenge the permanence of both law and consensus. Judicial dissents show that disagreement matters and is fundamental to democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyze Russia's communication strategies in the period leading up to and following the seizure (2014-2018) of the Crimean Peninsula in the Spanish editions of its digital platforms, Sputnik and Russia Times. Drawing from theories of political communication, we show how Russia used storytelling and framing to build an international image and political brand consistent with, and try to justify, its foreign policy actions. Specifically, Russian messages transmit no room for doubt about the legality of any of its strategies in Crimea. We argue that this communication strategy is consistent with the concept of „sharp power" to describe Russian projection in the world. Cultural and emotional appeals designed to generate positive emotions about Russia, i.e., „soft power", were far less common. In recent years, Russian projection of sharp power appears to have increased in the Spanish-speaking world, particularly in South America. In addition to helping explain Russian foreign policy, our findings contribute to broader debates about political branding and truth in a „post-truth", multipolar world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies / Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi is the property of Sakarya University, Middle East Institute and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The maritime power of a state is not built overnight. That is the result of a long process based on articulated strategies, the needs of a state to defend and promote its maritime interests, and it depends on the economic power as well as the maritime ambition. In this regard, it must be said that the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet has not appeared from nowhere. It has had a step-by-step strategy with relevant presence and military actions having significant strategic influences in the region. As part of this endeavour, a presentation will be made on the emergence, evolution, and modernisation of the Black Sea Fleet, in relation to the geopolitical realities and regional interests of the Russian Federation. Thus, the purpose of this approach is to identify the principles that underpin the promotion of a maritime strategy in the Black Sea region, in relation to the peculiarities of a semi-enclosed sea, and how they influence the development of the fleet. The novelty is determined by some important lessons learned. One of the main tasks of naval strategy in peacetime is to obtain sufficient space for the operations of one’s naval forces and aircraft in times of war, so the size, configuration, and strategic position of the coast in a Narrow Sea do matter. Having this relevant example, we can highlight some characteristics of the centuries-old strategy for the development of Russian maritime power (especially that of the Black Sea) and its projection capacity in the World Ocean. From these conclusions, the Black Sea littoral states, members of NATO, can extract some lessons to be capitalised on. As a result of this analysis, we can underline the fact that, throughout history, the states involved could learn to win more through war than through peace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study analyzes the influence of the political environment on language with a focus on how people address strangers in the country. The study is important to assess how the political environment plays a role in influencing changes in expression and conditions of language. The significance and rationale of the study are provided in detail, explaining the purpose and objectives behind the investigation. Similarly, a comprehensive literature review focuses on the language and its significance, linguistics, a historical view of the Russian language, and Russia's political environment. Previous literature associating politics with the evolution of language in Russia and the impact of political changes on the language are discussed in the paper. The study adopted a pragmatist philosophy with a qualitative method to conduct an in-depth analysis of the research phenomenon. A review-based design was adopted, and secondary data sources were used for data collection. The results revealed that language has undergone various changes due history of political changes in the country and Russian became the means of communication in the country. Last, the strength and limitations of the study are included, along with important recommendations and the scope for future studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Currently, states worldwide are facing new environmental challenges due to climate change and potential increased security threats from terrorism or war. The negative events of recent years have had increasingly strong boomerang effects. Thus, the Covid 19 pandemic, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia are events that generated and are generating profound political and economic effects throughout the world. We are witnessing a multitude of changes in the challenges facing the world's governments in identifying strategies to ensure global well-being and prosperity. Also, there are and will continue to be great differences between developed and developing countries, stemming from their performance and economic power, but globally citizens are pressed by the same concerns, the same needs, to which they increasingly difficult. Sustainable strategies are a true key to success in mitigating the crises humanity may face in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Russian government wants to stimulate the development of cooperatives among private farmers. This study evaluates the competencies of the experts who are to guide potential members. The research team conducted a survey among these experts, measuring three theoretically derived dimensions of competencies: knowledge, skills, and attitudes. The results reveal that the experts' competencies were poor. The respondents overestimated their competencies. Other factors as well indicate that the prospects for agricultural cooperatives are poor in Russia. The large agribusiness firms have a strong market position and much political power. The legal framework for cooperatives is dysfunctional. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper was to identify the nature of hybrid threats posed by Russia in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, subsequently, to identify to what extent the Kremlin is successful in destabilising the political situation in this country. For this purpose, disciplined interpretative case study was employed. This study is primarily based on four expert interviews which were conducted in August 2021, in Sarajevo. The theoretical part of this study introduces the concept of hybrid threats. This concept is then applied to the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Based on a comprehensive analysis, the authors were able to identify three areas where the Kremlin's hybrid threats are the most significant. These are political and economic influence, information space and proxy organizations. This paper may contribute to the understanding of how Russia constructs its hybrid threats and may also lead to further research on hybrid threats in the Western Balkans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both democracy (nowadays known as "global democracy") and war are examples of complexity. Simplification and closing-off (isolation) will never accomplish anything when dealing with either of these kinds of complexity. We have taken for granted that aggression, invasion and war are by definition immoral and illegal and that it is always necessary to distinguish between the "attackers" and the "attacked", between the "oppressors" and the "oppressed"; war itself, in all of its unspeakable trauma, requires, no matter what the circumstances, a systemic approach to complexity, an analysis or explanation from a systemic perspective. Keeping in mind that there are currently a considerable number of conflicts in the world, ignored by the global media system and therefore completely forgotten, this latest war runs the tangible risk of escalating globally, with extremely heavy costs in human suffering and loss of lives, costs that will be "paid", of course, by the civil populations, by the people of the world. The strategy of sanctioning, and even more so, of fostering hostilities towards Russian culture, systematically closing off all that comes from Russia or can be traced back to that country, risks further exacerbating the distances, reinforcing those "logics of separation" which render--and in the future, will continue to render even more impractical, not to say impossible, the (complex) path towards postconflict reconstruction. Creating and fueling further divisions, in this moment, towards a people and a culture with--moreover--extraordinary qualities will end up radicalizing, even more deeply, dynamics that are already bellicose and highly destructive. The pathways of separation and isolation, in other words, run an all-too-real risk of permanently closing everyone off, including those who are struggling--using a range of effective instruments (not only in terms of "soft power")--who are fighting an arduous and complex battle to construct modern democracies, to build societies that are truly open and inclusive. If we cut them off, the sole victims will be the populations, the people, the most vulnerable subjects. It has always been so. One "certitude" can indeed be taken to be certain: we must get ourselves back onto the path of diplomacy (by everyone, for everyone) and politics. These events, so dramatic for the history of humanity, have once again shown us how weak statesmanship is today, and how politics has by now become the "handmaiden" of economic powers. The very concept of an "international community" has laid bare its own incapacity to describe the current multi-polar global context. Let us start over, starting with politics, with diplomacy, "real" on-the-field diplomacy, continuous and systemic: less "theater" and more "backstage"; now is not the time for "simulated diplomacy" and/or media storytelling, which unfailingly leads us in the opposite direction from our expected and desired objectives. Let us start over, beginning with politics and diplomacy, and also with the value of culture and education in mind, for the future: Ukraine's future, Russia's future, humanity's future, the future of our entire planet. Violence has never brought anything other than more violence, more division, more incurable fractures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cereal trade is essential for economic and commercial cooperation among countries along the "Belt and Road" (BRI). It helps ensure food security and contributes to building a community of interests and destinies for the BRI countries. Based on the UN Comtrade database, this study, using a network analysis approach, investigates the structural characteristics and spatiotemporal dynamics of cereal trade networks among the "Belt and Road" countries. Results show that: (1) The cereal trade among the BRI countries has formed well-connected and complex trade networks, and the "Belt and Road" initiative has significantly promoted cereal trade networks among the BRI countries. (2) The backbone structures of cereal trade networks along the BRI are in geographical proximity. India, Russia, and Ukraine are the most important trading partners and absolute core nodes in the trade networks, influencing the entire cereal trade networks. (3) The BRI cereal trade networks exhibit significant core-periphery structures, with considerable power asymmetries between the countries reflecting food supply and demand differences. In general, the BRI cereal trade networks have developed from relatively diversified to polarized. Supply chains in the cereal trade network are dominated by a few large countries and are fragile, with weak resilience and low resistance to risk. Therefore, governments should continue to strengthen regional cooperation, optimize cereal trade network structure, enhance their reserve capacity, and build a stronger system to guarantee food security and prevent risk. All these measures will support the food security of the "Belt and Road" countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista CS is the property of Rafael Silva Vega and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Review of International Affairs (04866096) is the property of Institute of International Politics & Economics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The South Caucasus region has always been an area of interest for major states. It all stems from the geopolitical and geostrategic location of this region. In the 21st century, its role is growing. The political stability of the South Caucasus does not depend only on the three states in the region, but also on regional players: Russia, Turkey, the European Union, the United States, Iran, etc. The main security challenges in the South Caucasus regions are separatist conflicts, which include many unresolved conflicts involving external forces. It should be noted that Russia is the main actor in the conflicts. Turkey also has its own geopolitical interests. It must be said that the growing southern conflicts in the Middle East, which have taken on a permanent character, have a significant impact on the conflicts in the South Caucasus. It must be said that the Russian factor in the South Caucasus region, especially for Georgia, has a very negative impact. As Georgia announced its pro-Western course and began to work quite actively on joining Euro-Atlantic structures, relations with Russia have since become extremely strained. The same can be said for Ukraine, which aspires to become a member of the Euro-Atlantic family. Russia has pursued an aggressive military policy and has also been a major emperor in terms of ethnic conflicts in Georgia. Russia considers the South Caucasus region as its sphere of influence and is quite aggressive in pursuing the policy of new players. A clear example of all this is the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war. With regard to Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022. It is in Russia’s interest to expand its influence in the post-Soviet space, especially in the Black Sea region. Russia is trying to increase its influence and control of the South Caucasus region through its military-political and economic actions. The article discusses the role of Russia’s “soft power” in Georgia’s security and key aspects of economic policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Russia-Ukraine war has become an important geopolitical event in the world, and it affects the formation of the modern world order and international security. The world will not be the same as it was before the war; the West will better understand Russia's tough policies and continue to treat it more cautiously. Russia has used many of the means at its disposal during the war, including hybrid warfare, cyber warfare, soft power, elements of asymmetric warfare, and ultimate rigid power in the context of symmetric threat. Cyberspace in the modern era is an important measure of producing a new generation of war. Russia is actively using its cyber capabilities in the Russia-Ukraine war. It is in Russia's main interest to restore vectors of influence in the territories of the former Soviet Union. For this, it uses various combat methods, cyber warfare, hybrid warfare, information warfare, hard and soft power combined. Russia has carried out and continues to carry out cyber-attacks on Ukraine's strategic facilities, government websites, as well as infrastructure, etc. The article discusses the threats and risks posed by Russia from cyberspace to Ukraine and Georgia; the cyber capabilities of Ukraine and the role of the West in strengthening its cyber security; NATO and EU policy in the development of Ukraine-Georgia cyber security in the context of risk response and management. The paper also focuses on Russian military aggression, the Russia-Ukraine war, and the resulting threats to Ukraine and the world at large. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article argues that states' narratives about themselves and each other, shaped by the foreign policy decision-makers, create filters for the achievement of soft power goals. A state agent can shape narratives that can be rejected by the state's target's society because they would undermine dominating biographical and strategic narratives of the state target. The empirical analysis of the narratives of the president, minister of foreign affairs, and spokesperson of the MFA of Russia illustrates how Russia prevents itself from soft power expansion by "othering" Lithuania. At the same time, analysis of the narratives of presidents and the minister of the foreign affairs of Lithuania illustrates how they shield society from Russia's narratives and, thus, soft power while searching for "sameness" with the Euro-Atlantic partners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper deals with the subject of the strength of the key world powers in the years 1992-2020. These include the G7 group and the Russian Federation, which was suspended from the group, and so far has not been authorized to resume meetings with the G7 group. In this period, after Russia's exclusion, both regional and global rivalry grew in the world. This translated into the global imbalance of power and an overall geopolitical situation. In this paper, the author proposes a quantification of the power to measure power metrics. Based on the data from the World Bank and Military Balance, the general (economic), military and geopolitical potential of the Russian Federation, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Great Britain and the United States was developed. The model of Mirosław Sułek was applied to calculate the power, which reflects the objective reasons for changes in shaping the potential of the aforementioned countries. The purpose of this article was to determine the changes in the power of the G7 countries and the Russian Federation in the years 1992-2020. This translated into the international balance of power and the struggle for influence in the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the life and movements of a well-connected Ottoman Orthodox in the Russian Empire, this article seeks to contribute towards an understanding of the ways in which individuals and groups from the Black Sea region were incorporated into the business and statecraft of empire. Alexander Levantinos, a technician from Gümüşhane, in the Pontus or Black Sea region of Anatolia, serves as a characteristic example of Pontic iterant miners, moving within the Russian and Ottoman Empires and the territories in-between in search of new veins to exploit. Initially intending to search for copper in Russia, Levantinos was eventually granted permission to move to the region of Nerchinsk, where he established silver mines and transferred the necessary skills for silver mining to local workers. Simultaneously, he was engaged in trade with China. Levantinos' biography demonstrates the overlap between state service, craftsmanship, and trade in Russia of the early eighteenth century. The tension between the transfer of skills and commercial transaction as an autonomous sphere, and transfer and exchange as embedded in a range of power relationships is central to Levantinos' achievement. This tension should serve to underline the degree to which actors such as Levantinos contributed to the expansion of the simultaneously "minimalist" and "activist" Russian state, an expansion from which they benefited. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article deals with the main trends of geopolitics of the Russian Federation concerning Moldova and reflects the means of their implementation. Geopolotical and geo-economical interests of Russia presuppose the restrictions on cooperation of Moldova with the NATO and the EU, ensuring the preservation of the neutral and non-aligned status of the country. The Russian Federation's geostrategy aims to strengthen its geopolitical position in Moldova and involve it in Eurasian integration structures. The geopolitical model of Moldova as a pro-Russian =buffer' of the country, which will serve for interaction between Russia and the EU, is in the best interests of the current Russian leadership. The current geopolitics of the Russian Federation regarding the Republic of Moldova uses mainly =soft power' tools. The Russian government exerts its largely latent influence on Moldova through interconnected political, economic, cultural, informational and other means. Pro-Russian political forces and =agents of influence' in Moldova are receiving mixed support from the Russian leadership. Transnistria is very important for Russia, particularly in strategic sense. The Russian government exercises indirect comprehensive control over Transnistria and maintains a military contingent in the region as a lever of political influence over Moldova. The geopolitical interests of the modern Russian Federation correspond to the preservation of the sphere of its latent influence in Gagauzia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the early 2000s, "soft power" has become one of the most popular analytical tools in International Relations scholarship devoted to analyzing the influence of states in the international arena. Although scholars of Russian foreign policy have also embraced the notion of "soft power", they have mainly limited the scope of their analysis to Western countries and the former Soviet republics. In contrast, this article focuses on Laos, Vietnam and Thailand, countries whose history of relations with Russia are fundamentally different from both the West and Russia's "near abroad". By analyzing the images of Russia and its soft power resources in these countries, this article seeks to create a more comprehensive understanding of the ways contemporary Russia is perceived in the world and its potential tools of influence in Southeast Asia. Drawing on the results of a survey conducted among university students, this article examines the ways young educated elites in the three countries perceive Russia. It also explores the degree of correspondence between these images and the self-image of Russia espoused by its political elites. The results of this study suggest that while overall Russia is perceived as a Great Power, and its role in the world is seen as mostly positive, there are also important dissonances between the two images. Based on discernible differences among the three groups of respondents in the ways they perceive Russia, the article also suggests that historical memory plays an important role in shaping these perceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]