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There are two central theses to this article, the first is that a special kind of governance authority is needed for principles of distributive social justice (‘social justice’ from now on) to be applicable to any sphere of human action. The second is that international law does not and cannot represent that kind of governance authority. It is not ‘social justice-apt’, in my terminology. This is due to the limits inherent in the statist character of international law, a character that underlies the point and purpose of international law in the first place. Putting these together, one can conclude that international law cannot be used to govern the global order according to those principles of social justice that liberal theorists typically defend in the domestic context. This shows that if the cosmopolitan project of extending social justice to the global arena does not find an alternative form of governance for the international order (the problem of ‘cosmopolitan coordination’) it ceases to be a viable project. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

An introduction is presented in which the editors discuss various reports within this special issue on subjects related to global justice, international law, and international relations.

Human rights and democracy have been regarded as a mutually reinforcing couple by many political theorists to date. The internationalisation of human rights post-1945 is often said to have severed those links, however. Accounting for the legitimacy of international human rights requires exploring how human rights and democracy, once they have been decoupled or disconnected, can be recoupled or reunited across governance levels (vertically) and maybe even at the same governance level (horizontally) albeit beyond the state. The article does so in three steps. The first prong of the argument is dedicated to presenting the moral-political nature of human rights and their relationship to political equality and, hence, their inherent legal nature from a democratic theory perspective. The second section of the article then draws some implications for the domestic or international levels of legal recognition and specification of human rights by reference to their legitimation within the domestic democratic community. It explains the mutual relationship between human rights and citizens' rights and where international human rights draw their democratic legitimacy from. In the third and final section, the author discusses potential changes in the nature and legitimacy of international human rights once political structures beyond the state become more democratic, and human rights and democracy are being recoupled again at various levels of governance. The European Union being one of the most advanced examples of post-national political integration, recent developments in the regime of human rights protection within the EU are discussed in this new light. In a final step, the transposition to the global level of the argument developed in the European case is assessed and the author flags issues for further research on what democratic theorists should hope for in the new global order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractThis article applies E. H. Carr?s analysis of utopia and reality, and a Searlean-constructivist analysis of rules and norms, to the concept of ?sovereignty? in general, and Stephen Krasner?s argument in Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisyin particular. In doing this, the article charts a theoretical space that incorporates insights from classical realism, scientific realism, and philosophical (social) constructivism. To view ?utopia? and ?reality? as distinct yet equally important planes of International Relations (IR) inquiry, thereby treating ?sovereignty? as a single concept with descriptive and normative elements, highlights both the merits and the shortcomings of Krasner?s approach. Furthermore, this type of analysis suggests a fruitful way to continue a contemporary normative discussion about what sovereign entities ought to do. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that, in contemporary political circumstances, we should think of political toleration not as toleration that a government extends to those it rules but as a political ideal that governments can uphold and promote. We should substitute a conception of the tolerant society or the tolerant political order for that of the tolerant ruler. Toleration so conceived is consistent with the idea of a neutral state, although it need not entail a commitment to political neutrality. However, if we are to make sense of the idea of a tolerant society and, in particular, of the assumption that one political arrangement can be more tolerant than another, we need to place limits on what can count as toleration and intolerance. I use a distinction between agents, observers and patients to argue that point. I also argue that the presence of compossible options is a precondition of political toleration so that, if an issue requires a choice between incompossible options, it should not be conceived as an issue of toleration at all. The general message of the article is that, while we should reject claims that toleration has become obsolete as a political ideal, we need to revise our thinking on what constitutes political toleration if we are to apply that idea to liberal democratic arrangements ideally conceived. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I reconstruct and defend John Rawls' The Law of Peoples, including the distinction between liberal and decent peoples. A “decent people” is defined as a people who possesses a comprehensive doctrine and uses that doctrine as the ground of political legitimacy, while liberal peoples do not possess a comprehensive doctrine. I argue that liberal and decent peoples are bound by the same normative requirements with the qualification that decent peoples accept the same normative demands when they are reasonably interpreted and from their comprehensive doctrine, not from political liberalism. Normative standards for peoples appear in a law of peoples in two places: as internal constraints carried forward from political liberalism which regulate domestic affairs and as principles derived from a second original position that provide the normative ground for a society of peoples. This first source of normative standards was unfortunately obscured in Rawls' account. I use this model to defeat the claim that Rawls has accommodated decent peoples without sufficient warrant and to argue that all reasonable citizens of both liberal and decent peoples would accept the political authority of the state as legitimate. Although my reconstruction differs from Rawls on key points, such as modifying the idea of decency and rejecting a place for decent peoples within a second original position, overall I defend the theoretical completeness of political liberalism and show how a law of peoples provides reasonable principles of international justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What may the Third World expect from international law? To answer this question, one must begin by interrogating the meaning of the terms ‘Third World’ and ‘international law’. This article argues that the meaning of the term ‘Third World’ has historically had layers of complexity to it, and it crucially includes not only states but also peoples. On the other hand, grand narrative traditions of the rise and growth of international law remain typically concerned with its ‘lawness’, the changing nature of its subjects, and its sources. Arguing against such an understanding from a sociological perspective, the article argues that no longer can the re-make of contemporary international law be understood as the exclusive law of the West. It must recognise the authorial role played by the Third World in all its complexity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the role of the European Court of Human Rights in interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights and attacks the standard image in the literature that pictures judges as having, by default, a great amount of discretion in interpretation and a power to create new law. The Court's notion of 'autonomous concepts' is presented and analysed thoroughly, to show that substantive disagreement is widespread in law and that judges must necessarily make choices precisely out of respect for what the ECHR grants. The paper draws resources from Ronald Dworkin's philosophy and shows the affinities between the theory of 'autonomous concepts' and Dworkin's 'semantic sting' argument. It is argued that all concepts in the ECHR are autonomous, in the following two senses: first, people do not share the same linguistic criteria on how to identify their meaning; second, the correct meaning may radically transcend the way the ECHR concepts are classified and understood within the national legal order. Judges therefore have to construct substantive theories that aim at capturing the nature or purpose of the right involved and of the ECHR more generally. The paper concludes by urging scholars and judges to stop raising the threat of judicial discretion and work out general theories of adjudication for the ECHR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]