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Power and its distribution have always been the central themes of international law, yet international lawyers have paid limited attention to the correlation between power shifts and legal change. Notably, international law effectively operates when balance of power is sustained. With this qualification, this paper examines the relationship of international law with the change in power distribution, arguing that international law should proactively attend to power in order to contribute to the peaceful reconfiguration of the international system. Furthermore, this paper explores the mechanism of power shift being transmitted to law shift and specifically adduces the process and effectiveness of hegemonic international law change centered on UNCLOS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's interaction with the international financial system is driven by its growing economic importance in the world. However, China's financial influence has been much under-presented compared with its economic power. This mismatch provides an opportunity for China to promote greater inclusiveness and better balance of power in global financial governance. The accelerated financial opening-up, exchange-rate flexibility, and deepened domestic reform also nourished the ambition of internationalization of the renminbi that would have impact on the global reserve currency system. This paper investigates the motivations behind China's engagements with the international financial system, the approaches China adopted to achieve its goals, and the key domestic policies required for China to gain more weight in the global financial market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Demography is one of the factors determining and influencing the geopolitical balance of power in international relations. Politicians are the main actors in international relations, but powerful human dynamics are at work behind them. The study of geopolitics describes these dynamics, linked to human and physical geography. In the evolution of great power competition, economic, military and technological factors are taken into account, but the importance of demographic trends, which will play a key role in the struggle for world power, is often underestimated as a political and geopolitical factor. Demography works over long periods of time, i.e., over generations. The aim of this paper is to illustrate the importance of the above theory by looking at the demographic shock that France experienced in the 19th century and the geopolitical resulting consequences. As a result of this demographic shock, France lost its supremacy as the most populous country in Europe and was definitively overtaken by Germany. It is a scenario that can be useful for understanding the evolution of demographic competition in the 21st century, such as that of China versus India. In 2023, China will lose its supremacy as the world's most populous country to India. This will be the first time that China has lost its primacy since the United Nations began tracking global demographic trends in 1950. China, like France in the past, is in danger of never catching up with its demographic disadvantage. History suggests that once a country crosses the threshold of negative population growth, regardless of the differences in national experiences, there is little that its government can do to reverse it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has been visualized by political scientists as a structural change in the balance of power of the world. The corridor has far-reaching economic and geopolitical impacts on Southwest Asian countries in general and Pakistan in particular. CPEC, being a transnational project, may face challenges in geographic as well as human terrain during its implementation phase. It would involve extra ordinary engineering resources to execute, massive funds to realize, and political acumen to manage social elements of Southwest Asian countries. This paper, therefore, explores China's evolving relationship with the international system to achieve accelerated infrastructure development and boosted socio-economic growth through regional integration and liberal institutionalism. It is a multilateral strategy that will help Pakistan realize its true potential in the economic and strategic domains. It also endeavors to find linkages between China's multilateralism with regional integration under the framework of CPEC based on liberal values of connectivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research paper investigates the evolving defense cooperation between India and Japan in the context of the strategic landscape in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly considering China's rise. The existing literature recognizes China's increasing influence as a significant factor in India-Japanese security cooperation, but tends to overlook the dynamics behind India's shifting stance. The study reveals that India initially hesitated to actively engage in anti-China security cooperation with Japan until the mid-2010s, but later adopted a more proactive partnership. An analysis of policy documents, political speeches, and government records attributes India's initial reluctance to its commitment to non-alignment and strategic autonomy, its desire to balance relations with both China and Japan, and its domestic political priorities favoring economic development over military expansion or strategic alliances. However, growing concerns over China's assertiveness, military modernization, a change in political leadership, and the Quad's development as a regional security platform have prompted India's attitude shift. The research's recommendations not only offer a roadmap for India, Japan, and other Indo-Pacific countries with deep economic ties to China, but also help combat China's military threats to contribute to regional stability and security, address common challenges, and foster a peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the changing geopolitical landscape with the Covid-19 pandemic scenario, the China-India tussle and scale of regional and global exposition has begun to display with certain consequences, which seems to shake the existing regional balance of power. A mounting political and military confrontation between these two powers as experts suggested could create a hurdle on regional-global stability and can strike on the path of globalization. With historical and existing context analysis, this paper explores that putting genuine differences aside, China and India being responsible stakeholders of the global community, can cooperate and contribute to regional and global peace and prosperity. This paper is based on qualitative research and explorative form in a pattern. This paper concludes that to reduce protracted political and border-related tensions, continuous institutional dialogue, regular communication, and formal-informal exchanges could be effective tools for a peaceful resolution. At this juncture, the competition and cooperation approach could be useful for fostering China-India bilateral relations, and this situation will help to address common challenges of the global community, restructure the global order, and re-adjust regional and global scenarios crippled by the Covid-19 pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Currently, the confrontation between two global giants, the United States and China, in trade and technology advancement and hegemony in international politics is escalating. The possibility of a Sino-U.S. economic "war," or the so-called "new Cold War," not only indicates the escalation of this confrontation but also symptomizes the international order's transformation as a result of the change in power balance and rise of a challenger against the existing United States–led international liberal order. Most IR specialists focus on the prospects of this confrontation and its uncertain worldwide circumstances and are concerned about its impact on East Asian/Asia Pacific regional circumstances. Among them, prospects regarding regionalism and regional institutions in Asia seem pessimistic. However, Asian regionalism was activated following the decline in United States' power and rise of China as a global power, and the international liberal order's retreat became visible toward the end of the 2000s. Furthermore, even under the uncertain situations created by the Sino-U.S. confrontation, regional powers, including China, Japan, and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), are promoting their multilateral approach by proposing and advancing various regional frameworks. This indicates that each regional power is adopting the "institutional hedging" strategy to ensure that their individual interests are satisfied and the regional order is comfortable for themselves. This paper verifies that regionalism and regional institutions have become important as measures of regional power for countries' institutional hedging strategies to overcome the challenges posed by the beginning of regional uncertainties and that Asian regionalism is more active today than ever before. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relying on the linkage and leverage theory, the paper aims at reviewing critical issues related to China's economic, cultural and political expansion in EU's Central and Eastern member states. Through the "17+1" format and "One Belt, One Road" initiative, China became an assertive competitor in Europe, acting on a "divide et impera" strategy through bilateral or multilateral negotiations, undermining the EU's cohesion. Also, the European Union is facing a movement of illiberal, nationalist or populist policies that occurred in the former Warsaw Pact countries which are trying to avoid Brussels' norms and therefore they are opened to other alternatives. In order to find out a pattern or relevant arguments for advancing a set of competing hypotheses or scenarios, a structured analytical technique will be applied, respectively "indicators or signposts of change", for the following countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. In this regard, the key indicators will refer to: economic factors, the strength of the civil society, the force of the opposition or of pro-European parties and the degree of Europeanization in the analysed states. Thereby, the article will advance three important questions: 1) Is EU in competition with China and how the confrontation takes place? 2) Which are the EU's countries more likely to strengthen the partnership with China? 3) Which are the EU's own linkages and leverages in its Eastern part and how they can be used for stopping China's advancement? The results will strengthen the idea that China became a real competitive actor, trying to expand in Europe, where the peripheral ex-communist states have been placed in the core of the confrontation. Also, the article will demonstrate that EU facing a real economic rival has the capabilities to stand up and therefore act as an international power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since in the early seventies after the Japanese economy had been rebuilt from the destruction of WWII and had become competitive based on preeminent manufacturing and infrastructure, high technological advancement, networked production and distribution networks, Japan has been considered the leading power base in Asia from the early 1970’s. After an initial competitive phase with the US, Japan and the U.S. have maintained a long standing economic and political relationship. However, the continued outsourcing of US manufacturing to low cost countries, specifically to China, an evolving balance of power can be clearly observed since China’s opening up to foreign trade and investment and implementing free-market reforms in 1979. This article examines the economic developments over the last two decades (2000-2019), coincident with China’s joining the World Trade Organization (as well as the dot.com bubble and the 2008 Recession) and its rise in economic and political might to determine how Japan’s role may develop in the future. The article begins with an examination of political power theory and moves to specific economic indicators over the time period in question (2000-2019) as well as drawing on current political and economic developments from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to the lackluster Japanese economic growth and development and increase in debt/GDP. The text contrasts the US theoretical model (Kindleberger, Krasner & Gilpin), which represents a field balanced by hegemonic stability, as opposed to the UK model (Cohen, Strange) which is based more on a framework of cooperation and a more theoretical examination of power. It is posited that national power has increasingly ceded to global corporate power (Stopford, Henley, Strange). Against this theoretical background the economic indicators of the region are examined from 2000-2019. The analysis carried out in the study is based on several research methods: a critical analysis of the literature, a descriptive method, and a method of inference based on statistical data. Trade and FDI flows in the region are presented and examined to make assumptions on the waxing or waning influence of the players. It was found that there is neither specific evidence that Japan will recede in relative importance nor garner increased relevance. Finally, there is an ensuing discussion of geopolitical factor which are analyzed within the current developmental context, which have the potential to greatly influence future economic and political power in the region, and beyond. Specific policy measures are beyond the scope of this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Grand Strategy determines the ultimate goals and interests of a state. It has long-term effects on state policies. With the advent of the 21st century, China has emerged as a regional and global power. After entering the new era of development, China set specific goals and decided to achieve them, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. These goals are to convert China into a prosperous society, increase per capita income at par with developed states and realize modernization. In 2013, Xi Jinping announced China's Grand Strategy, while stating that the period extended to 2020 (and beyond) is the era of strategic opportunity for China. This article discusses China's Grand Strategy in the Asia- Pacific region. First, it conceptualizes Chinese strategy by focusing on its main objectives and interests. Secondly, it analyses its components while identifying how China is utilizing its economic, political, diplomatic, and security means to secure its interests in the region and maintain regional order. It also examines Chinese foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region according to the institutions of international society described by Hadley Bull. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Central Asia, the hub of natural resources, has been the battleground of international power politics among the big powers since long. In order to have influence in the region, the Russian and the British Empires indulge in the "Great Game". However, it ended with the collapse of the Russian empire. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 created an unexpected power vacuum in Central Asia followed by a fierce competition between the big three, Russia, China and US. This competition is commonly known as "The New Great Game" in the present day international politics. The rich energy resources are usually considered the main reason of the renewed interests in the region and provide principal motivation for Russia, China and US. However, the role of energy resources is usually overstated. This paper will identify which other factors along with energy resources should be considered in order to have a broader and comprehensive understanding of the present Geo-political scenario in the Central Asia. Using the Neo-Realist approach, this paper will first analyze the significance of the Central Asian states, how they provoke strategic competition between great powers and how pipeline politics translate it. Finally, the paper will analyses the competing interests of Russia, China and US and the strategies adopted by each for the achievements of its objectives. It will be concluded by stating that how Russia, China and US struggle to attain, keep and enhance power and that energy resources are just a mean to this supreme objective. It will also conclude by asserting that although the great powers behave aggressively and self-interestedly they may find a minimum degree of cooperation to tackle common concerns such as a growing radical Islamism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China’s economic resurgence augurs the possibility of a recalibration in the global balance of power. Many contend that this process is already underway in East Asia – specifically in relation to the South China Sea. In other parts of the world, China’s growing footprint is discernible through infrastructure projects, under Beijing’s Belt and Road initiative. Does China leverage its economic power to realise its interests by forcing smaller nations to accept conditions and agreements which are not in the latter’s interests? This paper examines whether evidence to this effect is visible through a case study of Sri Lanka. The island’s geographic location – astride the Indian Ocean Sea Lanes of Communication – continues to draw the attention of regional and extra-regional powers. Sri Lanka’s constraints in size and poor pace of economic development also grants leeway for India (the regional hegemon) and China to leverage bilateral ties in their interest. Is there evidence to suggest that China has utilised port infrastructure to realise its national interests at the expense of Sri Lanka? Or, has Sri Lanka managed to thread a fine line between the two Asian powers: the neighbouring regional hegemon – India; and the resurgent great power – China? Does the truth lie somewhere in between? This article delves into these questions by examining the approaches and stances which Sri Lanka has adopted towards both nations, particularly during President Gotabaya Rajapakse’s government, from 2019 leading up to the end of 2021. By doing so, it aims to shed light on how Sri Lanka handled bilateral ties with both Asian powers as well as the degree of Sino-Indian competition visible within the island’s port infrastructure landscape. It concludes that the decisions reached with regard to port infrastructure projects represent a mixed picture. A key finding is the ability of domestic interest groups to shape Sri Lanka’s foreign policy during this period, which has significantly dented the island’s ties with other regional allies such as Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the foreign policy strategy that has changed world politics. It has compelled states to revisit their foreign policies either in favour of BRI or countering it. BRI has created a difficult situation for international power structure and status quo states due to transitioning power from west to east and emerging geopolitical reconfiguration. However, in September 2021, President Xi Jinping announced China's Global Development Initiative (GDI) at the opening session of the UN General Assembly, which renewed debate about the impacts of China's strategy. As China has a strong foothold in the Indian Ocean region through BRI, the undertaken research is an endeavour to study the effect of shifting China's foreign policy from BRI to GDI over the maritime geopolitics of the region. This research aims at determining GDI's role in supporting UN Agenda 2030 through focused efforts on sustainable development goals in the maritime domain. It is an exploratory and qualitative research conducted through deductive reasoning to seek an explanation of the core proposition. This research has used secondary sources for determining these upshots with potential changes in the maritime geopolitics of the Indian Ocean region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Currently, the debate about Sino-Russian relations is on the rise and draws the attention of many international analysts and policy makers. With bilateral cooperation increasing in recent years, an evident rapprochement is now occurring. This article aims at emphasising the common economic and geopolitical interests behind this new-era relationship, taking into account the recent economic and security pressures coming from the U.S. that created a common ground for the two countries, as well as the historical key-role played by trade and investment and by the energy link. Furthermore, the paper will argue the implications that this strategic economic and political partnership has on the transition in the balance of power in a unipolar world (currently led by U.S.) towards a more complex alignment. Having large natural resources, huge territory and a numerous population, both countries remain geopolitical forces in today's world. After the sanctions, Russia is currently building a strong economic partnership with China (through the Far East Initiative). It is our opinion that this new global power dynamics that sees China and Russia increasingly supporting each other on the world stage could moderate U.S. global influence leading to a new international equilibrium. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Janus.Net: e-Journal of International Relations is the property of Universidade Autonoma de Lisboa, Observare / Observatorio de Relacoes Exteriores and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Contexto Internacional is the property of Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro, Instituto de Relacoes Internacionais and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The research paper explores the regional implications of the interaction between China and Iran. The factor of U.S antagonism faced by Iran and China as basis of the formation of their alliance and concerns of the United States of America regarding it are also taken under consideration. The concept of China and Iran regarding United States as its competitor is the root cause behind their alliance. The research examines their alliance in the contemporary era and affects of regional and International development on their relationship. The research paper reveals the influence of western policy and economic security on their relationship. The alliance between the two nations is formed by factors like identities, values, and interests. The study will focus on the nature and drive of their relationship taking under consideration factors that motivated such a relation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present the strategic hedging framework as a structural theory of interstate competition. Strategic hedging extends the logic of traditional balance of power theory in order to account for a wider range of foreign policy behavior, while maintaining a strong emphasis on structural incentives that critics found lacking in the soft balancing approach. We provide a four-step identification mechanism that allows the analyst to spot potential cases of strategic hedging and then to filter out behavior that is better categorized as hard balancing, normal diplomatic friction, or simple power maximization. We use the case of Chinese energy security strategy as an illustrative case study and employ the identification mechanism to demonstrate its viability as a strong example of strategic hedging. Given the importance of energy security within the context of Sino-American relations, this paper not only contributes to the development of new structural theory in international relations, it presents a new interpretation of an important policy issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper the authors discuss China's strategic interest in expanding its relations with Cambodia. The authors note that China believes Cambodia is important for China to project greater influence in the Southeast Asia region and to act as a buffer between China's rivals. The article also notes that a relationship with Cambodia could also weaken the United States' hegemony. Such diplomacy on China's part and its increasing regional power could cause some concern for other traditional hegemonic countries.

Despite the position of the United States as de facto global hegemon, China is a rising power in the world. As Chinese power grows, the projection of Chinese influence will be felt most acutely in Southeast Asia. Whether to accommodate, contain or resist China will depend on future developments that none can foresee, including Chinese ambitions, the policies of other international players (the U.S., Japan), and the cohesion or fragility of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). This paper argues that in deciding how best to deal with China, two factors that will influence the countries of Southeast Asia are their own long histories of bilateral relations with China and their own differing conceptions of how foreign relations should be conducted. This is to argue that history and culture are central to any understanding of the likely future shape of China-Southeast Asia relations. Only by taking history and culture into account will analysts be in a position to predict how the mainland and maritime states of Southeast Asia are likely to respond to a more powerful, confident and assertive China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growing India-Japan engagements are not only focused on economic issues, but also cover a wide range of interests, including regional security, political, and maritime security concerns. Both countries are consolidating strategic partnerships to address the risks and vulnerabilities posed by the evolving regional balance of power. Through their embeddedness with China, both India and Japan form an intrinsic part of the Indo-Pacific geopolitical security architecture. The key transformation of relations between these two states in the region is in response to the geopolitical change brought about by China's rapid ascension. In this regard, the article further explains how both countries are systematically strengthening a strategic partnership and gradually reinforcing economic, political, security, and strategic cooperation against China. This article seeks to address how both states would restrain rising China's strategic maneuvering in the Indo-Pacific region through an analysis of the India-Japan alignment, with the main focus of this study being on analyzing how both India and Japan are now investing in a long-term strategy to balance China's hegemonic policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years between 2013-18, Pakistan-China relations witnessed a qualitative transformation as the bilateral ties expanded from defence to the economic sphere. The cooperation under the framework of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is increasing Chinese investments in Pakistan's energy and infrastructure sectors. Expanding avenues of bilateral cooperation has led to emergence of new dynamics in the bilateral relations. With increased inter-dependence, both countries are also navigating major power international politics. Beijing and Islamabad have increased their coordination for peace and stability in Afghanistan as well as at the multilateral forums including the United Nations (UN) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Traditional strategic cooperation is deepening to meet new geo-strategic challenges. Beyond CPEC, closer strategic engagement will determine the future direction of bilateral relations. Thus, it is crucial to take stock of the evolving geo-political dynamics and their impact on strategic dimensions of the bilateral relations. This paper aims to move forward from this standpoint and seeks to explore what developments have taken place in bilateral relations beyond CPEC during past five years (2013-2018). Most crucially, it explores how Pakistan-China relations have evolved in an era of geo-political tensions. It analyses how CPEC dynamics have influenced the course of broader relationship. Similarly, the growing coordination of two countries at the multilateral forums is also explored as they attempt to navigate the major power politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the National Defense Strategies of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) in order to verify how the four countries evaluate the strategic landscape of this century, especially regarding the balance of power between the Great Powers, their immediate geographical surroundings and their relationship with the US. This work addresses specifically the similarities and differences among them and how these differences reflect in their respective defense policies. Among the four cases, the Brazilian one will be in especial focus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has been working on a modernization plan for its military. Particularly, the People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) has been the focus of modernization due to China's seaward economic growth and development for protecting its maritime economic interests. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an example of strategic envisioning which has multiple facades besides dividends. Since China has a massive trade volume transiting Indian Ocean Region, PLAN has increased engagement in this region. Its modernization including its naval capabilities, surface and underwater vessels, unmanned maritime vehicles (UMVs), acoustic systems for information, and other technological advancements has made China's strategic posture in IOR dynamic and is threatening India's intrinsic naval supremacy in the region with certain implications over regional peace and stability. This is exploratory research conducted to determine the nature of naval competition and the resulting balance of power to identify implications for regional peace and stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since Martin Wight's famous LSE lectures in the late 1950s, the English School scholars have brought China into the conception of international society. As the English School scholars have been ‘inventing’ an international society, China's status in the conception, or conceptions of international society has also been invented and reinvented. The Chinese case vividly demonstrates how a non-European (or non-Western) country, as one of ‘the others’, has been dealt with and brought into the conceptualisation of international society by the English School. China's status in the conception of international society, to a great extent, has been invented by some of the English School scholars with Eurocentric bias. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article presents an overview and analysis of the foreign policy stance taken by China since the mid-1990s. Various outside perceptions of China's power and influence are reviewed. The nation's deliberate adherence to a "middle power" strategy of fostering a global image of caution and pragmatism in security issues is introduced and explained. Further analysis is offered relating this doctrine to those of Australia and South Korea, showing where their respective approaches to the region's geopolitics are in agreement and in conflict.

The Taiwan policy of China's third leadership generation focuses primarily on the hope that the Taiwan issue will not delay or undermine the progress of China's economic development. China's Taiwan policy is founded on two basic pillars: "utilizing the U.S. to suppress Taiwan" and "appealing to the Taiwanese public." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Geosul is the property of Geosul and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The global order was facing multiple challenges even before the pandemic, so it is very likely -- based on the evolutions recorded since the beginning of 2020 -- that these challenges will further amplify. On the impact of COVID-19 on the world order, opinions of political scientists vary greatly, from reserved optimism to worst-case scenario, from treating it as a simple inflexion point to forecasting the transformative changes it will entail. In this article we argue that this current pandemic will only accelerate previous trends by deepening international power competition, thus accelerating the transition towards a more realist world order. This working hypothesis disregards potential non-linear events that might occur from this point on and that could impact all forecasts1. In this article we discuss the structure of the current international system and we analyse recent developments, thus trying to determine which specific trends will be accelerated. Furthermore, we examine the „lessons ” learned so far and try to determine what can be done to limit the consequences of the pandemic, at least at the national level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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While India is internationally acknowledged as a rising power, there is a surprising lack of responsive ideas and discussion about India's rise within the country. This stands in sharp contrast to China, the other rising power, where domestic discussions of China's rise are expansive and broad ranging, and often seek to shape international perceptions of China. This article argues that India does not respond to international discourse about its rise as prolifically as China because of the benign content of international ideas about its changing status, as well as a statist domestic structure that is resistant to ideational diffusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What impact will the rise of China have on the existing international system? This article attempts to provide some clues for a better understanding of this issue by examining China's views on and policy toward international multilateralism in general and some of the newly emerging multilateral mechanisms in particular, including the Group of 20 and the BRICS. The article concludes that while China will become more proactive in its multilateral diplomacy, in many cases selectively, and increase its influence in global multilateral settings, various concerns and constraints will make it unlikely for China to completely overhaul or even dramatically reshape the multilateral architecture at the global level. China is likely to repeat its pattern of the past decade in East Asian regional multilateralism: participation, engagement, pushing for cooperation in areas that would serve Chinese interests, avoiding excessive responsibilities, blocking initiatives that would harm its interests, and refraining from making grand proposals. In addition, China is stuck in defining its identity, and caught up between posturing as a leader of the developing world on some issues and siding with the developed countries on other policy issues. Given all of these constraints, China's involvement in global multilateralism is likely to be guided by pragmatism rather than grand visions. The article also argues that China will most likely strive to rise from within the existing international order. Washington should be prepared to plan its China policy on this basis and Sino-US relations will be shaped largely by the dynamics of contentions for power and interest as well as cooperation and coordination between China and the United States in various multilateral institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses a theoretical transition from unipolarity to multipolarity from the perspective that emerging powers such as China will join the U.S. as poles of influence in the international political system. The theory of hegemonic war, effect of redistributed power on international security issues, and five phases of establishing a new world order are discussed. Topics include balance of global power, legitimacy of and resistance to a hegemonic government, China's ambitions at the international level, law of uneven growth among nations, and outlook for the development of bipolar and nonpolar governance structures.

This article argues that Vietnamese co-operation with China's principal enemy, the Soviet Union, was the necessary and sufficient cause for the termination of China's alliance with Vietnam in the second-half of the 1970's. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article employs fieldwork research and literature analysis to examine contemporary perceptions of China's emergence in popular and elite opinion in Russia and the Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan. It initially establishes a framework for understanding China's emergence, emphasizing a trilateral dynamic between the hegemonic position of the US in Asia, the evolution of the strategic choices of China's neighbours and the development of strategic regionalism as a mechanism for managing regional spaces. Choosing to take the Commonwealth of Independent States as a particular case of this framework, it argues that the interaction between Russia, China and the US remains highly fluid, particularly under the conditions ‘of re-setting’ the US-Russian relationship. This means that regional contexts are highly significant; and it establishes Central Asia as an important new strategic region for working out relations between Russia, China, and the US through their interactions with regional states. The second part of the article examines Russian and Central Asian responses to China's emergence. It looks at three categories of motivation in China's regionalism: its system for accumulative growth; its problems with weak constitutionality and transnational security in its western regions; and its concern with US/NATO encroachment on its western frontier and the US attempt to turn Central Asian elites away from their traditional alignments. The third part looks at China's promotion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as its mechanism for strategic regionalism in Central Asia. The article questions the SCO's significance in terms of its capacity for governance and functionalism, and points to the problem of institutional competition, notably with Moscow's preferred structure of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The article concludes that China will be an unconventional superpower that presents different facets of itself in different regional contexts. There will not be a single model of China's emergence and it will continue to develop its international role through a mix of adaptation and experimentation. However, China's strategy will pose a problem for Russia and Central Asia since it seeks to create a strategic space that does not challenge the West, but exists substantially outside the West. Russia, in particular, has to decide whether it will be able to maintain its current stance of independence between Europe and Asia as China's rise shifts the frontiers between East and West. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As one of the fastest growing economies in the world, many wonder what kind of international behavior an increasingly powerful China will demonstrate in the future. Will it be a responsible state on the world stage? The article aims to understand Chinese foreign policy making from a comparative perspective. By using the neoclassical realist approach, key features of Chinese foreign policy as well as possible future alternatives for its implementation are outlined. The essay concludes that significant changes in Chinese foreign policy in recent years are remarkably similar to those of other major powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an overview on how the Japanese portrayed China in their histories written in the decade after World War II. The author asserts that a group of Marxist, or radical left, historians sought to represent China's Communist revolution as an Asian symbol of power and identity which should inspire Japan's politics and culture and would also help the Japanese distance themselves from American and Western hegemony. The article also considers Japanese nationalistic attitudes, their sense of Asia's balance of power, modernization, imperialism, and social Darwinism.

Recent developments in Chinese politics and defense policy indicate that China will soon embark on an ambitious maritime policy that will include construction of a power-projection navy centered on an aircraft carrier. But just as nationalism and the pursuit of status encouraged past land powers to seek great power maritime capabilities, widespread nationalism, growing social instability, and the leadership's concern for its political legitimacy drive China's naval ambition. China's maritime power, however, will be limited by the constraints experienced by all land powers: enduring challenges to Chinese territorial security and a corresponding commitment to a large ground force capability will constrain China's naval capabilities and its potential challenge to U.S. maritime security. Nonetheless, China's naval nationalism will challenge U.S.-China cooperation. It will likely elicit increased U.S. naval spending and deployments, as well as politicization of China policy in the United States, challenging the United States to develop policy to manage U.S.-China naval competition to allow for continued political cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Commentators and policymakers have articulated growing concerns about U.S. dependence on China and other authoritarian capitalist states as a source of credit to fund the United States' trade and budget deficits. What are the security implications of China's creditor status? If Beijing or another sovereign creditor were to flex its financial muscles, would Washington buckle? The answer can be drawn from the existing literature on economic statecraft. An appraisal of the ability of creditor states to convert their financial power into political power suggests that the power of credit has been moderately exaggerated in policy circles. To use the argot of security studies, China's financial power increases its deterrent capabilities, but it has little effect on its compellence capabilities. China can use its financial power to resist U.S. entreaties, but it cannot coerce the United States into changing its policies. Financial power works best when a concert of creditors (or debtors) can be maintained. Two case studies--the contestation over regulating sovereign wealth funds and the protection of Chinese financial investments in the United States--demonstrate the constraints on China's financial power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why has South Korea accommodated China, instead of fearing its growth and balancing against it? This article makes two central arguments. First, concepts of balancing and bandwagoning are fundamentally difficult to test, and to the extent that the theory can be tested, it appears to be wrong in the case of South Korea. In fact, we observe many cases in which rising powers are neither balanced nor "bandwagoned" but are simply accommodated with no fundamental change either way in military stance or alignment posture. Second, the factors that explain South Korean foreign policy orientation toward China are as much about interests as they are about material power. South Korea sees substantially more economic opportunity than military threat associated with China's rise; but even more importantly, South Korea evaluates China's goals as not directly threatening. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent changes of government in Australia and Japan, and a pending one in the United States, signifies a historical crossroads in these three allies' security politics in the Asia-Pacific region. In recent years, all three countries have tended to rationalize their strategic collaboration on the need to build innovative and competitive-oriented "strategic geometries" as a means to counter China's growing power and to meet new types of threats in the region. Yet the Australian Government under John Howard simultaneously pursued a hedging strategy, exploiting its growing economic relationship with China while strengthening its diplomatic and strategic profile with the United States. Despite Tokyo's own substantial economic relationship with Beijing, recent Japanese leaders were unable to pursue the same type of "dual track" strategy to the same extent as Howard. With Kevin Rudd's election as the new Australian Prime Minister and Yasuo Fukuda's ascent to power in Japan, prospects for Australia and Japan to cultivate more independent politico-security ties with Beijing have strengthened. If so, the evolving regional security postures of both these US allies may compel the United States to reassess its own traditional skepticism towards multilateral security groupings in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Few would have predicted in 1969 that the new Republican administration of Richard Nixon would initiate a rapprochement between the United States and communist China during his first term as president. That he succeeded in doing so was helped by the severity of the Sino-Soviet dispute, which erupted into armed clashes in the spring and summer of 1969. By the end of 1970 China made it clear that it would not only be willing to receive a presidential envoy, but also the president himself. Two missions to Beijing by Nixon's national security adviser, Henry Kissinger—one secret in July 1971 and the other public in the following October—paved the way for a presidential visit in February 1972. The talks in July and October 1971 and February 1972 covered a whole range of issues including the war in Indochina, the potential threat from Japan and relations with the Soviet Union. The most dif cult problem, however, proved to be that of Taiwan, where the American-backed Nationalist government not only laid claim to be the legitimate government of the whole of China, but occupied the Chinese seat in the United Nations. A modus vivendi was eventually reached in February 1972, helped perhaps by the United Nations General Assembly vote in October 1971 which unseated the Taiwan regime in favour of mainland China. The US negotiating position was not made any easier by the intense rivalry between Kissinger and the State Department and the latter's exclusion from much of the negotiation process led to a last-minute crisis which threatened the success of the entire project. While neither the United States nor China achieved all that they had hoped, Nixon's visit to China had an enormous symbolic impact and contributed to a reconfiguration of the global balance of power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Southeast Asian states as a group employ two general strategies to protect themselves against domination by a strong China: engagement and hedging. The hedging includes maintaining a modest level of defence cooperation with the United States, which may be called low-intensity balancing against China. This is most clear in the cases of the Philippines and Singapore, and more subtle in the cases of Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia. Thailand appears to practice simple hedging, while Myanmar has no alternative to cooperation with China. The region bandwagons with China only to the extent that it desires trade with China and seeks to avoid the costs of alienating the region's rising great power. These findings suggest the region is far from passive, the United States is still a relevant player, and acceptance of China is premised on Beijing's adherence to the promises made in its recent diplomatic campaign. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the importance of the Legislation Law passed by the National People's Congress (NPC) in China in March 2000. Attempt of the NPC to rationalize the country's legal system; Role of law in creating balance of power in China's lawmaking arena; Analysis of the importance of citizen participation in the legislative process.

Focuses on the international security in Asia. Attempt of the Asian states' to balance a rising China; Pathway of Asia to national sovereignty and regional order; Impact of hierarchy to international security.

Every major event in history has unintended consequences. A major unintended consequence of the U.S.-led war on terrorism has not only been to checkmate and roll-back China's recent moves at strategic expansion in Central South, and Southeast Asia but also to tilt the regional balance of power decisively in Washington's favour within a short period of time, thereby highlighting how tenuous Chinese power is when compared to that of the United States. In this sense, II September 2001 should be seen as a major discontinuity or non-linearity in post-Cold War international politics. New strategic and political realities emerging in Asia put a question mark over Beijing's previous assumptions and beliefs. This article provides an assessment of China's tactical gains and strategic losses following the 11 September attacks on the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information on a study which determines the civil military relations in Cuba and China. According to the study, corruption is seen not only as an economic vice in China, but also as an indicator of poor or weak character that can breed political unreliability. In the study, researchers examine the civil-military relations in Cuba and China an addition to the literature. The study findings suggest that Cuba seems to have been more successful in containing the political and institutional consequences than China.

Assesses the ability of China to pose a threat to American overall security interests without catching up with the United States in terms of military power or technology. Problems in the debate on the peer competitor status of China; Reasons why a weak China might use force on Taiwan and other U.S. forces in the region; Strategies China might use to force Taiwan and U.S. into a political settlement.

The article authors discuss the comparison by economist Liu He of two global crises such as the Great Depression of 1929 and the Great Recession of 2008. They say that Liu's study reveals China as the only country to achieve global economic growth during the 2008 crisis. They cite other findings of the study including the common features of the crises such as technological revolutions, laissez faire policy, and income gap, populism, and the influence of such crises on global balance of power.