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Abstract: During the recent credit crisis credit rating agencies (CRAs) became increasingly lax in their rating of structured products, yet increasingly stringent in their rating of corporate bonds. We examine a model in which a CRA operates in both the market for structured products and for corporate debt, and shares a common reputation across the two markets. We find that, as a CRA’s reputation becomes good enough, it can be optimal for it to inflate its ratings with probability one in the structured products market, but inflate its ratings with probability zero in the corporate bond market. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This paper investigates the incentive of credit rating agencies (CRAs) to bias ratings using a semiparametric, ordered-response model. The proposed model explicitly takes conflicts of interest into account and allows the ratings to depend flexibly on risk attributes through a semiparametric index structure. Asymptotic normality for the estimator is derived after using several bias correction techniques. Using Moody's rating data from 2001 to 2016, I found that firms related to Moody's shareholders were more likely to receive better ratings. Such favorable treatments were more pronounced in investment grade bonds compared with high yield bonds, with the 2007–2009 financial crisis being an exception. Parametric models, such as the ordered-probit, failed to identify this heterogeneity of the rating bias across different bond categories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]