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Fundraising through leadership PACs, or political action committees associated with members of Congress, became increasingly prevalent during the 1990s. Such fundraising has become a critical component of how senators market themselves to colleagues, party leaders, constituents, and journalists. This paper first analyzes what motivates senators to form PACs to test the theory that senators are rational, self-interested actors who use PACs to achieve four major goals: reelection, good public policy, influence within the Senate, and higher office. These goals do not conflict with regard to PAC creation, and results show that creation is influenced by seniority, ideology, electoral margin, leadership candidacy, and presidential candidacy. The article then asks why some senators distribute most PAC funds for their own travel and administrative expenses while others donate primarily to colleagues. Although member goals may conflict, analysis of disbursement patterns indicates a relationship between goals and PAC behavior. Presidential candidates spend relatively more on administrative expenses, while majority party members donate a higher proportion of funds to colleagues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under proportional representation, New Zealand has frequently been governed by minority governments backed by a support party on matters of confidence and supply. This article seeks to analyze the 'policy influence differential' - the influence a party in government may exert, as opposed to the influence exerted by a support party in the context of New Zealand coalition politics. While individual personalities clearly influence the performance of minority coalition governments, parliamentary institutions and informal political norms shape New Zealand's policy influence differential. This article examines this topic in the context of the 1999-2002 Labour-Alliance government and analyses enactment of one particularly important piece of legislation. The policy influence differential remains substantial in New Zealand due to the persistence of first-past-the-post institutions and political culture. As a result, small parties pay a significant cost in policy influence when remaining outside government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]