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In international cooperation on taxation, countries strive to achieve equality in international taxation and, thus, create the basis for a fair international tax system. Justice exists in an international system of taxation only when states allocate taxing powers among themselves in a manner consistent with dominant views of justice internationally. A fair international tax system will not exist until there is some international consensus on how countries should allocate axing powers among themselves. International cooperation allows countries to improve the coordination of tax policy at the international level. We can talk about several types of coordination. For example, one type aims to make a country's tax system more similar to others - in other words, to harmonize taxes. Other types aim to establish minimum or maximum tax rates to avoid double taxation of cross-border income streams, prevent transfer pricing, coordinate arrangements with competent authorities and limit harmful tax competition. The current official agreements mean business activities through a permanent establishment and give the source country the primary right to tax profits from this operation. The country of residence is obliged to exempt these profits from tax, at least to the extent that they were taxed by the country of source. A tax treaty also often provides for an exemption from taxation of the employee's income from personal services provided the employee is in the country for no more than a specified period of time and the compensation is received by a non-resident employer without a permanent establishment. The treaty usually reduces or eliminates withholding tax on at least some items of investment-type income, such as interest, dividends, rents and royalties, that are not attributable to business carried on through a permanent establishment. The tax treaty also provides that the country of residence can tax capital gains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article explores aspects of the legislative evolution of Australia's general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) in pt IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (ITAA36) and considers how it shapes up after 40 years. It considers the legislative interaction of the GAAR with other parts of the income tax statute and explores the GAAR in an international context, including the Multinational Anti-Avoidance Law (MAAL) and Diverted Profits Tax (DPT) inserted into pt IVA. It concludes with consideration of the role and legitimacy of the GAAR in respect of both domestic and international economic and legal transactions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many large intellectual property owning firms have not paid "fair taxes" in the territories where they achieve sales and licences of their products. Rather, they tend to utilise regimes where they pay as little tax as possible. The international taxation system has allowed this to happen extensively. This is currently under challenge from some governments and the OECD. In this tribute to renowned tax scholar, John Prebble, the territorial nature of intellectual property is explained. Territoriality is a key organising principle of the existence of intellectual property rights, their exploitation and enforcement. At a high-level the territorial nature of intellectual property is not consistent with what happens to the profits of its exploitation, rather at a macro-level the frameworks of the international intellectual property regime and the international tax regimes are in contradiction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tax administration and reform within the digitalised economy is an ongoing global debate. In the study, the global tax response to various elements introduced by the digitalisation of the economy is synthesised, analysed and evaluated. The study is set apart from other studies, as it provides a global and holistic overview of current tax reform of all major tax types impacted by the digitalisation of the economy. The study's results are based on evidence collected for 120 countries worldwide and reflect that while the digitalised economy is regarded as borderless and digitalised, current international responses remain influenced by country borders and traditional tax principles that have led to global tax reform that is complex, expensive and difficult for highly digitalised multinational entities to comply with. The findings further indicate that although the recommended interim tax measures (where applicable) were adopted in principle by the majority of countries worldwide, the application of these measures lacks uniformity. It can further be deduced that international tax response to the digitalisation of the economy does not fully embrace and acknowledge the hybrid nature and digital environment of the business models associated with a digitalised economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The downward trend in capital taxes since the 1980s has recently reversed for personal capital income. At the same time, it continued for corporate profits. Why have these tax rates diverged after a long period of parallel decline? We argue that the answer lies in different levels of change in the fights against tax evasion and tax avoidance. The fight against evasion by households progressed significantly since 2009, culminating in the multilateral adoption of automatic exchange of information (AEI). In contrast, international efforts against base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) failed to curb tax avoidance by corporations. We theorize that international cooperation is an intervening variable, countering the negative impact of tax competition on capital taxation by reducing the risk of capital flight. Under such conditions, domestic political pressures in favor of higher capital taxes can unfold. We confirm our argument in a difference-in-difference analysis and through additional tests with data for up to 35 OECD countries from 2000–2017. Our central estimate suggests that the average tax rate on dividends in 2017 is 4.5 percentage points higher than it would have been absent international tax cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been a decades-long effort to repair an increasingly fragile international tax system. One reason it hasjoundered has been what we identify as the "Liberia problem." In 2000, the powerful Organization, for Economic Cooperation and Development identified Liberia-but not Switzerland-as a tax haven and targeted it for sanctions. It did not go well. During the two decades since, everything has changed; yet seemingly from this lens of inclusion, nothing has changed at all. Awkwardly similar "blacklists" still target "Black" and "Brown" jurisdictions despite the fact that experts mean something quite different when they speak of the "scourge of tax havens" and secrecy jurisdictions. We think diferently in important respects but believe that those real disagreements demonstrate the need for a less insular global tax policymaking apparatus. And we share a conviction that a more inclusive and more level playing field in the international tax arena would benefit all states. To show why, we offer a series of "truths" designed to prompt a long-overdue conversation about perceptions of bias and privilege in international taxation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present international tax rules are typically justified by origin-based theories. These theories align countries' tax entitlements with the geographical location of the economic factors that contribute to the creation of income. Two recent phenomena have rendered origin-based approaches limited in scope. First, the economic integration of multinational corporations and the relevance of intangibles have made it infeasible to precisely pinpoint the factors contributing to the generation of income. Second, the growing disputes between countries about which economic factors should be considered relevant for sharing the international tax base have recently led to increased consideration of distributional consequences, thus moving tax policy discussions away from a clear origin-based rationale toward a consequentialist one. The limitations of origin-based criteria for allocating taxing rights warrant an alternative normative standard. This article puts forth the differential approach as a suitable normative basis. It requires that the allocation of tax entitlements be based on distributive justice considerations, particularly when origin-based approaches fail to provide satisfactory normative support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has recently been argued in the international tax literature that the OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project (BEPS) reflects and effectuates full taxation, namely an international norm that would suggest that all of a company's income should be taxed in places where it has real business activities, representing a modern approach to the single-taxation paradigm. This Article builds upon the concept of full taxation and argues that although rhetorically attractive, the concept is still conceptually inconsistent, particularly because it is incapable of providing any hints as regards where and who should finally be taxed. Moreover, it adopts an overinclusive and instrumental approach, the purpose of which appears to be only to legitimatise the use of coordinated provisions whose rationale attends exclusively to avoid the complete absence of taxation in cross-border transactions. This approach, innocuous at first sight, suggests however the unprincipled purpose of taxation just for the sake of taxation, putting at risk countries wishing to attract real economic activities and stigmatising the outcome of double non-taxation in a permanent way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Crónica Tributaria is the property of Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Ministerio de Hacienda y Funcion Publica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses a new international tax framework as of 2020 which requires transition from the principle of residence for tax assessment in favor of an alternative economic link with regard to OECD and G-20 countries. Topics include global assignment of taxation rights; the identification of link between the state requesting tax and the tax source; the increasing global division of labor and the emergence of platform-based business models; and concerns over possible double taxation.

To combat tax avoidance by multinational corporations, the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development introduced country‐by‐country reporting (CbCr), requiring firms to provide tax authorities with a geographic breakdown of their profitability and activities. Treating the introduction of CbCr in the European Union as a shock to private disclosure requirements, this study examines the effect on corporate tax outcomes. Exploiting the €750 million revenue threshold for disclosure and employing regression‐discontinuity and difference‐in‐differences designs, I document a 1–2 percentage point increase in consolidated GAAP effective tax rates among affected firms. I also find evidence consistent with a decline in tax‐motivated income shifting, starting in 2018. These results suggest that, although private geographic disclosures can deter corporate tax avoidance, so far, the regulations have had a limited effect on tax‐motivated income shifting. My findings have policy implications for the global implementation of private CbCr and extend the debate on public versus private disclosure of tax information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on tax challenges in connection to the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) action plan for digitization of economy of the Organization for Economic Co-operation & Development (OECD). Topics include allocation of taxation rights to the OECD states; aim of BEPS to regulate global minimum taxation; and the allocation of income to the states on the basis of profit sharing of excess profits.

What, if any, are the moral norms governing the international taxation regime if the sceptic is right to think that considerations of distributive justice do not apply beyond the state? I sketch an answer to this question by examining Tsilly Dagan's illuminating recent book International Tax Policy: Between Competition and Cooperation. In her work, Dagan identifies the position of Thomas Nagel, an influential global justice sceptic, as predominant among commentators in legal scholarship and policy debates on international taxation. According to Nagel, multilateral cooperation is appropriately conceived as a bargain between mutually self-interested states. In tracing the implications of his position for international tax policy Dagan argues that even a sceptic like Nagel is committed to identifying some considerations of distributive justice beyond the state to ameliorate the harmful effects of tax competition. In response I argue that Dagan is correct to claim that the global justice sceptic is committed to seeing cooperation in international tax policy as constrained by moral norms, but that these norms are what Nagel calls humanitarian duties rather than duties of justice. I establish that Dagan's argument that Nagel is committed to a duty of justice to promote distributive justice abroad faces some significant obstacles and suggest that Dagan can ground her argument in a humanitarian duty that Nagel does accept. The upshot of the argument is that even if the sceptic is right to think that considerations of distributive justice do not apply beyond the state, multilateral tax cooperation is governed by a duty of states to prevent human rights deficits where they can. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article is about how the world reestablishes international tax order. The Article focuses on the OECD's work on profit reallocation and asks whether this multilateral effort can be successful in stabilizing the international tax system. The analysis centers on the current leading concepts for reallocating profit among jurisdictions under what is known as "Pillar One" of the OECD work programme. To analyze whether any Pillar One concept can be turned into a stable multilateral regime, it is necessary to specify certain elements of what a proposal to reallocate profits might entail. Accordingly, this Article sets out two strawman proposals. One strawman uses a "market intangibles" concept that explicitly separates routine and residual returns. The other strawman may reach a similar result, but does not explicitly attempt to separate routine and residual returns. Instead, in current OECD parlance, it might be described as a "distribution-based" approach. The Article asks whether either of the two strawmen could be agreed upon and stabilized multilaterally given the tools of modern international tax diplomacy. I conclude that the current procedural and institutional architecture for cementing international tax relations among states is inadequate to stabilize either of the strawmen. Nevertheless, with certain changes, reestablishing order may be possible. Moreover, I conclude that there are six key structural decisions that impact the ability to stabilize the international tax architecture of any Pillar One approach and that these decisions are likely to be implicitly made in the course of choosing a political direction for Pillar One work in 2019. The choices made with regard to these decisions determine whether or not it will be possible to stabilize Pillar One. Even if good resolutions are reached along these six dimensions, there are only a couple of paths to stabilize the system. One path would involve using every tool in the current OECD arsenal in new and more expansive ways, and then substantially depoliticizing international tax matters and removing G20 involvement, such that logics of appropriateness developed among tax administrators isolated from political pressures and acting through transnational networks could lend stability to a new set of rules and principles. Even then, only a few Pillar One compromises could be stabilized this way. The alternative path, which could stabilize a broader range of proposals, requires formalizing the new regime in international law through a true multilateral treaty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of FinanzRundschau is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses the court case Commission v. Belgium wherein the Court of Justice of the European Union held that Belgium's tax law prevents free movement of capital. Topics covered include a legal background of the free movement of capital, the two different methods Belgium uses for assessing income from property abroad and income from property at home, and the future of Belgium property tax law.

The research is focused on determining the tax fraud ways and analyzing the amount of tax evasion. The authors stress the need to strengthen the fight against tax frauds and tax evasions in the EU overall and in Slovak Republic in particular. For achieving the aim of the paper the systems and mechanisms of tax carrying out control were investigated. The authors analyzed the activities of tax authorities and demonstrated how these bodies can fight with tax fraud and tax evasions. Analyzing the data from the VIAS and the Eurostat systems the tax evasions in the Slovak Republic, in some other EU member states and their share in the total tax duty were compared. Within this part, the authors proposed the system of international tax information exchange of EU member states and the VIES system which will work with information about intercommunity businesses in EU member states and the Eurostat system. The results of cluster analysis showed that within the EU member states, by the estimated volume of tax evasions (in particular, the value-added tax as a significant share of the total taxes duty) Slovakia takes one of the lowest places among the EU member states. Since value-added tax offers the most opportunities to avoid tax duties and provides the biggest room to make tax frauds and connected tax evasions the authors determine the mechanism of the overall tax administration in the Slovak Republic and some EU member states. Increasing the effectiveness of the fight against tax evasions and frauds can be realized by taking the measures of the compulsory establishment of an equal business accounts, the establishment of the registrar of fines of individual taxpayers, an introduction of a unified valueadded tax rate and in some cases the cancellation of VAT and the introduction of a turnover tax. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In response to a senator's fall 2017 question regarding whether the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) included "somebody on staff that is an expert on treaties to make sure we are not violating any of the treaties", JCT Chief of Staff Tom Barthold acknowledged the importance of tax treaty expertise to the legislation's drafting. [Amounts] paid by an enterprise of a [State A] to a resident of the other [State B] shall, for the purpose of determining taxable profits of such enterprise, be deductible under the same conditions as if they had been paid to a resident of the first-mentioned [State A].[11] Even so, interpretive rules and past case law suggest that courts attempt to construe authorities to avoid conflict unless Congress expresses a clear intent for one to override the other.[16] Furthermore, in a nondiscrimination case courts generally interpret the "same circumstances" hurdle to apply to the taxpayer. [Extracted from the article]

On 7 June 2017, Swiss representatives signed the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting ("BEPS Convention"). Once in force, the BEPS Convention will amend 14 of Switzerland's double taxation agreements and implement, among other measures, an arbitration dispute resolution procedure. Where two contracting states are unable to reach an agreement within a certain timeframe, the affected taxpayer can initiate an arbitration procedure on any unresolved issues. The article provides background information, gives an overview over the arbitration procedure under the BEPS Convention while highlighting potential pitfalls from a Swiss perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problems of tax evasion and tax avoidance are as old as taxes themselves. Between 2015 and 2016 alone, many U.S. multinational corporations were involved in tax disputes with the European Commission. From a historical perspective, these disputes are unprecedented as they have resulted in tremendous amount of tax penalties. The most notable case was Apple for 13 billion of unpaid tax. This article discusses what tax strategies these corporations used that caused such disputes. It specifically investigates seven corporations: Apple Inc., McDonald's, Starbucks, Fiat, Amazon, Google, and Ikea, and elaborates on the following tax strategies: high royalties, intercompany transfer pricing, intercompany loans, and source of income in a high-tech industry. This article also discusses the European Commission's charges of tax evasion and how these corporations defend against them. When multinational corporations are operating abroad, they must observe not only domestic tax law but also international law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of European Review of Public Law is the property of European Public Law Organization and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In 2013, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), at the behest of the G20, embarked upon an ambitious project of coordinating and harmonizing countries' international tax rules under the guise of curtailing multinational companies' cross-border tax planning, generally referred to as base erosion and profit shifting, or BEPS. The project was finalized with great fanfare in November 2015. But the proclamations of success masked real underlying differences between participant countries. I argue that the project suffered from a number of flaws that largely precluded effective coordination, as a result of which the project's recommendations largely gloss over key differences in participants' goals and commitments while doing nothing to solve the systemic problems it was seeking to address. For example, while a key stated goal of the project was to align the taxation of profits with value creation, there was no attempt made to define the location of value creation nor to address the fact that this principle is fundamentally at odds with the arm's length principle that serves as the backbone of transfer pricing rules. The project left in its wake a system even more broken than before, but one papered over with rhetoric suggesting the illusion of consensus and general agreement on new rules. Broadly worded antiabuse rules allow different countries to go in their own, preferred directions in interpretation, implementation, and enforcement. They thus open the door to unprincipled and aggressive tax agents and an increase in multilateral tax disputes, with no clearer path to resolution. Poor outcomes were largely predictable from the project's premises, which merely sought to reinforce the existing rules but never questioned whether those rules needed updating to adjust for global economic changes to lead to a fairer allocation of taxing rights. Furthermore, the project failed to acknowledge the bias in the existing system, which meant that the outcomes were likely to benefit more powerful countries at the expense of smaller and weaker ones. While the project may have succeeded in its overt goal of limiting multinationals' international tax avoidance, it never addressed the more systemic failures of the system that underpinned the broad consensus it achieved in obtaining initial agreement on its action plan. The BEPS project thus holds important lessons for the future of international coordination efforts, as efforts to fix a broken international tax system, restore public confidence in multinational corporations, and achieve real agreement on the underlying principles of the rules must continue, if only to minimize the flood of disputes expected to result from the recent changes in law and policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One goal of the fight against aggressive tax planning is to improve tax transparency of the globalized activities of Multinational Entities (MNE). The OECD Action Plan No. 13 does not only recommend a unilateral implementation of a Country-by-Country- Reporting (CbCR), but also an additional implementation package composed of a Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement (MCAA) and bilateral agreements. In line with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) tax policy the European Union (EU) has already amended again the Council Directive 2011/16/EU (hereinafter ‘DAC 1’) by the Council Directive 2016/881/EU of 25 May 2016 (so-called DAC 4) implementing the OECD-CbCR-standard also on the EU-level. However, this action will respect, in general, the international tax secrecy (see Article 16 paragraph 4 DAC 1) as well as the business secrets of Article 17 paragraph 4 DAC 1. Furthermore, the EU commission has issued a proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of income tax information by certain undertakings and branches, COM (2016) 198 of 12 April 2016 (so-called Report on Income Tax Information – RITI). In contrast to DAC 4, the RITI will make the CbCR data public. This article will ask for legal consistency, a mismatch of legislative competence and the protection of business interests during the CbCR process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article informs on the tax treaties and efforts of decentralized structure of international taxation regime in creating a network for eliminating negative externalities to treaties. Topics discussed include current framework and problems associated with international tax regime; streamlining solutions for standardization of international taxation; and current standard of tax treaties like Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

The EU Court of Justice recently confirmed that EU Member States have a duty to cooperate to help ensure that Value Added Tax (VAT) is correctly assessed. In the Court's view, this implies that they have to exchange information whenever a request for information may prove expedient, or even necessary for determining where the VAT is due. This judgment deviates from former case law. It may considerably affect the rights of taxable persons facing a double VAT taxation of their transactions. This article provides an overview of (possible) implications of this judgment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whereas currently the OECD's Model Tax Convention, Commentaries and Guidelines are being broadly utilised by many countries, there is no legal certainty regarding the extent to which they can constitute part of international tax law. It might be argued that despite the widespread practice by both the OECD Member states and non-member states conforming to the OECD's Model Tax Convention, Commentaries and Guidelines, the opinio juris is still difficult to prove. This means that the legal status of the OECD's Model Tax Convention, Commentaries and Guidelines has not necessarily evolved into binding customary international law. However, this widespread practice by both the OECD member states and non-member states might still have a legitimising effect if the issue is considered from different perspectives. By recourse to general principles of international law and according to the settled case law of the International Court of Justice, this paper seeks to prove that opinio juris exists under certain circumstances. Countries which have voluntarily implemented or practised a norm regularly over time can be held to have acquiesced in those norms and practices (acquiescence) and therefore are bound to these rules. Even if there are some uncertainties regarding the parties' tacit acceptance of the OECD's Model Tax Convention, Commentaries and Guidelines, they are deemed to be estopped or precluded from denying such acceptance due to their regular practices (estoppel). In international law these principles have specifically evolved to govern situations in which countries reasonably rely on the regular practices of each other. By scrutinising the relevance of these general principles of international law to cross-border tax matters, this article intends to clarify the extent to which legitimising international tax norms can emerge outside of the OECD Model Tax Convention, Commentaries, and Guidelines. It will discuss whether under current international tax law the OECD's pronouncements potentially constitute a part of international tax law or whether they should be regarded as mere guidance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we extend the zero tax at the top result obtained in the closed economy case with bounded skill distributions for the case of unbounded skill distributions in the presence of international labor mobility and tax competition. We show that in the equilibrium for the tax competition game, the optimal marginal income tax rate converges to zero as the income level tends to infinity. We further show in simulations that the zero-marginal tax result is not a local property: over a substantial range at the higher end of the income distribution, the optimal tax is approximately given by a lump-sum tax set at its Laffer rate. We further show that the range in which the optimal marginal tax is approximately set to zero is widening as migration costs decrease. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the author's claim that the U.S. Treasury Department's proposed amendments to the nation's Model Income Tax Treaty could alter international taxation as of 2015. According to the article, the proposed amendments are intended to improve a stateless income problem and influence the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development’s work on its Base Erosion and Profit Sharing (BEPS) initiative. The taxation of foreign persons' income in the U.S. is also examined.

The author discusses international initiatives to combat the tax evasion problem of base erosion and profit-shifting (BEPS). Topics covered include the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Action Plan, the roles of the U.S. as a high-tax jurisdiction and Great Britain as a relatively high-tax jurisdiction, India's role as a developing source country, Bermuda's role as a tax haven, and using a byte tax to equitably allocate taxes associated with the digital economy.

The article focuses on the rapid expansion in international tax cooperation without neglecting the study of taxpayers' safeguards, particularly bank secrecy in Brazil by following the directions from Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to combat tax fraud.

The article focuses on Canadian tax treaties and proposals announced by Canadian Department of Finance related to anti-treaty-shopping rule or legislation in the 2014 federal budget. Topics discussed include Canadian international tax policy, proposals regarding anti-treaty- shopping legislation that plans to amend the Canada Income Tax Conventions Interpretation Act (ITCIA), and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) treaty shopping project.

The article focuses on approaches adopted by Australian government to address the problem of treaty shopping including a two-pronged approach. Topics discussed include limitation-on-benefits (LOB) provisions adopted by the government to support tax treaties, influence of Australia's tax treaties approach in governing incentives for treaty shopping and case Commissioner of Taxation v. Lamesa Holdings BV based on treaty-shopping issue. It mentions a report on international taxation arrangements.

The article reviews articles such as "Intellectual Property Law Solutions to Tax Avoidance" by Andrew Blair-Stanek that appeared in periodical "UCLA Law Review," "An Antigua Gambling Model for the International Tax Regime" by Adam H. Rosenzweig and an article focused on income tax treaty policy.

The article examines the conditions of global background justice that need to be met to guarantee rules of international taxation that are free from unjust bias. Topics discussed include the impact of the different types of tax exemption, namely, portfolio capital, so-called paper profits and foreign direct investment on the de facto sovereignty of states, and the manner by which the principles of international taxation protect and circumscribe the fiscal prerogatives of the state.

This article investigates how international coordination vis-à-vis sales tax policies affects the welfare of participating countries. A country's tax policies have asymmetric effects on the pricing behaviors of domestic and overseas producers. International cooperation endogenizes the externality that improves the purchasing power of foreign residents, but at the cost of its own residents’ work efforts. The first-best taxes are lower than in the noncooperative case. When world welfare is utilitarian, smaller economies may experience welfare losses from cooperation under the weak income effect of sales tax. We propose a coordinated tax rule that all countries agree to employ. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the concerns of Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Topics discussed include efforts taken for the publication and endorsement of the Plan, actions on challenges of tax in digital economy and international taxation as recommended by the Plan, and effect of the Plan on developing countries.

This article aims to offer the first structural analysis of tax disputes under institutional instability using a core element of the international tax regime as an example. It offers a theory grounded on Mancur Olson's seminal contribution to group dynamics, the logic of collective action. It also suggests implications of this theory that might help to address key enforcement issues faced by the international tax regime in a frequent context worldwide: institutionally unstable countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has played a significant role in the area of taxation since its inception in 1961. Among its contributions to international tax coordination was the release of a draft model tax convention, revised many times subsequently, which has been adopted by many countries as a template for them to negotiate their double tax agreement (DTAs) from. New Zealand was not one of the founding members of the OECD. New Zealand joined the OECD in 1973, following Australia in 1971 and Japan in 1964. New Zealand's later entry into the OECD after the Draft Model Convention first appeared in 1963 provides an interesting opportunity to examine the extent that OECD membership has influenced New Zealand's DTA negotiations and international tax policy, using as a primary analysis tool a computer based text comparison programme. The result obtained show that prior to joining the OECD none of New Zealand's DTAs were based on the OECD Model. Only after it joined the OECD and entered its reservations to the 1977 version of the OECD Model did that Model have any influence upon new Zealand's DTA negotiations. Now nearly forty years on since joining, New Zealand has a network of 37 DTAs, most of which are based upon the OECD Model. Despite this, all of these DTAs depart in some areas from the OECD Model, the reasons for which are analysed further in this article. Overall it appears the OECD Model has assisted New Zealand's DTA negotiations enabling it also to enjoy the benefits flowing from the international acceptance of the Commentaries as a tool for interpretation. The OECD Model may have also made it harder for New Zealand to negotiate DTAs with articles that differ substantially from international tax norms and has probably been a factor behind some of the latest changes to New Zealand's international tax rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Assesses the taxation rulings on electronic commerce issued by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Background of the rulings; Requirements for human intervention in electronic commerce taxation; Factors to consider in the establishment of tax rulings.