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During Prime Minister Koizumi’s recent visit to the States, Prime Minister Koizumi had been invited to join CIA’s intelligence brief with President Bush for the first time among the Japanese prime ministers. The invitation had been recognized as President Bush’s way of thanking Koizumi for his timely staunchly statement to indicate Japan’s support for U.S. and British actions against Iraq without the U.N. resolutions. Between Bush and Koizumi, they seem to be enjoying the hey day of the alliance, but in reality, what is happening between two countries can be explained that Japan has been much more deeply placed in American Grand Strategy while Japan has not realized that it does not have its own. In this sense, the U.S.-Japan alliance has not the product of American and Japan’s grand strategies. It is a part of the American grand strategy, and Japan happens to be in the strategy. In the aftermath of 911, the United States changed its military policy from the threat based one to the capability based one. Under the circumstances, not having its grand strategy, Japan will soon face the problem of rationally deciding what Japan should do for the sake of Japan’s national interest whenever the United States calls for contribution. In this paper, I would argue that it will be high time to recognize the gap of the image and reality of the alliance between Washington and Tokyo. For the States, it might not become the issue as long as Japan has been following Washington’s order blindly, but for Japan, it means that Japan has missed another prime opportunity to establish its grand strategy after 911 and the swift victory of American and British war against Iraq. In this paper, I will trace back how the expectation and reality of the alliance has shifted since its establishment to the present. Then, I will point out the gap of the image and reality of the alliance between policy makers in Washington and Tokyo and its impact on the future U.S.-Japan security relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States and Japan have maintained their strategic alignment for nearly an half century. This is the longest alliance ever for Japan and the second longest one for the United States besides NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). However, theoretical understanding of this bilateral relashionship is relatively poor. In particular, existense of the alliance after the Cold War generated further explanative disturbance. This paper attempts to grapes U.S.-Japan alliance as an "security community," modeled by Karl Deutsch in the 1950s, that is more convincing theoretical framework than neorealism, neoliberalism and constructivism. Although his model was created upon "transatlantic" relationship between the United States and Western Europe, the author considers the model is largely applicable to "transpacific" alignment. This paper argues a mechanism of peaceful change on multilateralism, military planning, and common definition of threats by examining institutions, norms and identity between the two countries in the 1990s. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The American scholars might argue that Gaiatsu still plays an important role in the U.S.-Japan alliance in the aftermath of 911. However, the Constructivist’s analysis will show Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s trauma and his complacency are the key factors and weigh more than Gaiatsu in the current U.S.-Japan alliance. It will also mean that what the U.S. and Japan seem to enjoy might not be there once Prime Minister Koizumi stepping down and Japan will not be able to deliver what the U.S. expects. In the aftermath of 911, the U.S.-Japan alliance immediately faced the problem of show the flag incident, but it did not become too big a stumbling block between Washington and Tokyo after all. Washington owed big to Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi. His trauma concerning the Gulf War and his guts against Hashimoto, his enemy in the LDP, paved a way for Washington’s Gaiatsu (outside pressure) strategy to work. In face of the U.S. and British actions against Iraq, Prime Minister Koizumi staunchly supported their actions even without the U.N. Security Council’s resolutions. On the surface, his decision signaled Japan’s departure from its postwar diplomacy, was welcomed by President George W. Bush, Jr. As a token of appreciation, during the recent bilateral summit, President Bush invited Prime Minister Koizumi for the first time to sit in on a secret meeting of the CIA. On the surface, as Shinzo Abe, Japan’s Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan, secretary of the cabinet stated, In the century and a half since (Commodore Matthew) Perry came to Japan, Japan-U.S. relations have probably never been better. However, in reality, to the constructivists, Japan’s attitude toward the alliance has not changed at all; a dependent and blind follower. Otherwise, Japan should have made its position clearly and opted to turn the cold shoulder to the United States when the U.S. and Britain decided to act without the U.N. security resolutions. What Japan has done since 1945 is to go with the flow of the United States. Washington has no intention to comment on Japan’s action as long as Japan is in her side. However, as a result, Japan has not made an effort to develop an independent spirit and historical understanding. Dependence does not lead to mutual trust and respect. It is high time for Japan to have a realistic look at history to derive lessons that look to the future. For Japan to develop its own perspective, it is important to understand that the nature of the alliance has not changed a bit from the outset for Japan. In this paper, using the Constructivist’s approach, I will trace back Japan’s problem to the beginning of the U.S.-Japan alliance and explain why the problem remains intact more than a half century. By doing so, I will point out the way for Japan to develop an independent spirit to win stronger mutual trust and respect from the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the early 1980’s, the Soviet threat in Asia was publicized and Tokyo’s need to increase contribution to the U.S.-Japan alliance was emphasized. At that time, Japanese universities rushed to establishing International Relations departments. System level had an impact on the focus of teaching and research in Japanese universities. Even tough the field of International Relations holds both “low facilities” and “higher facilities” perspectives, what stands out lately in the study of International Relations in Japan is the one close to “higher facilities.” While 2007 marks 60th anniversary of atomic bombs devastated Horoshima and Nagasaki, “lower facilities” aspect of International Relations has not yet prevailed and been suppressed by “higher facilities” aspect. To make a situation worse, Japanese politics is about to give “higher facilities” aspect of International Relations another big push. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe recently set up an advisory panel which will study the issue of Japan’s right to collective self-defense. At the same time, he is moving toward revising Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. The panel gathered by Prime Minister Abe consists of 13 members, mainly of people who support the concepts. It appears to be a rigged race with a foregone conclusion. Majority of the members is university professors. Generally professors believe that being chosen as a member of the government, it gives them prestige outside the universities and in turn gain more respect in the universities. Consciously or unconsciously, these professors are serving to make Abe’s wish come true. However, eventually they might regret what they had done was a political act which delimited political imagination and political transformation. By using Prime Minister Abe’s group as a case study, this paper sheds a light on the crisis of the Japanese universities today. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explains one of the central roles of alliance contracts, the prevention of undesirable military entanglement. The existing literature on alliances argues that entrapment—being dragged into a conflict over an ally's interest that one does not share—is a major concern for potential and actual alliance partners. After pointing out some problems with the concept of entrapment, I argue that states carefully design alliance contracts so that they prevent entrapment while not diminishing the value of alliances by preventing entanglement altogether. I present an analysis of the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions dataset (ver.3.0, 1815-2003) that establishes that factors which increase the risk of entrapment also tend to make alliance obligations conditional. Then, I conduct a comparative case study of U.S. alliances with South Korea, Japan, and Spain to show that states design and renegotiate alliances in order to reduce the risk of entrapment. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents an examination of the dynamics of multilateral military alliances or 'coalitions'. Framed within the wider debate over the future security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region, it has the dual objective of both enriching the academic debate and offering guidance to policy-makers by investigating the theory and practice of coalition behaviour. The article expounds the case for the American-Japanese-Australian combination and analyses the issues that confront such an alliance-coalition using two competing theoretical perspectives of allied behaviour: 'balance of power' and 'intra-alliance politics'. The main propositions of these perspectives are empirically tested against policy statements based on American, Japanese and Australian foreign and defence policies and associated academic writings. The paper demonstrates the continued validity of realist-conceived approaches to security provision and concludes that both theoretical perspectives are useful tools of analysis in this case. Focusing on separate levels and therefore different aspects of allied behaviour, they can in fact be viewed as complementary, rather than competing, and clearly exhibit strong potential for further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The revised US-Japan Defense Guidelines of 1997, the subsequent War on Terrorism and other recent developments have significantly expanded the scope of the bilateral alliance and increased the role of Japan?s military beyond its own shores. This expansion directly affects the security of other Asian states. Deriving predictions from balance of power theory and a modified version of balance of threat theory, this paper tests both theories and attempts to explain Asian reactions. It tests two variables: the presence (or absence) of a military alignment relationship with the US, and wartime experience with the Japanese Empire. Asian reactions are evaluated according to whether they focus on the implications for power aggregation (i.e., the potential for changes to strengthen the aggregated military capabilities of the alliance) versus the implications for the containment function of the alliance (i.e., degrading the constraints on Japan?s reemergence as an independent military power). This paper finds that alignment with the US is less important than wartime experience. Regarding states with a brutal wartime experience, even US allies worry about the potential for expansion to degrade the alliance?s containment function rather than welcoming the power aggregation benefits of an expanded alliance. On the other hand, states that did not have a brutal wartime experience did not express concern about the degrading of the containment function regardless of alignment, and were likely to welcome the power aggregation benefits of the expanded alliance if they were allies or at least loosely aligned with the US. These reactions suggest that an alliance can have an important third-party reassurance effect by appearing to contain the military independence of an apparently threatening power. Finally, this paper assesses the implications of these findings for balance of power and balance of threat theories, and for East Asian regional security. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the end of the Cold War, the Japanese Government started the dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) for overseas missions that do not require the use of force. I argue that collective identity formation in the U.S.-Japan Alliance is an important factor to comprehend the transformation of Japan’s security policy in the post-Cold War Period. In this paper, collective identity is defined as “identification with other states on the basis of mutual trust in terms of non-violence and mutual aid.” My main method is the content analysis of public documents such as join communique, joint declaration, joint statement and Japan’s Defense White Papers, partially by using a computer program. In the case of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, I analyze its behavioral component – cooperative interaction in policy consultation, joint exercises, joint research, and cost sharing; and the attitudinal component – the consensus among group members about basic values, external threats, strategic goals, and strategic means. In addition, I attempt to trace chronological change in the description of Japan by Japanese policymakers. The evidence shows that since the end of the Cold War, collective identity has become stronger between Japanese and American policymakers in the national security field. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When, in September 2003, the U.S. requested that its allies dispatch troops to the Iraq war campaign in a show of support, both its partners in Asia complied. Although the rationale behind the decision was ?for the national interest? in both Japan and South Korea, the domestic context and public reaction surrounding the troops dispatch issue were greatly different. In contrast to the huge stir created in Korean domestic politics, there was not much debate or opposition noticeable in Japan. The question then is why the ?national interest? argument rang hollow in the Korean public?s ears while Japanese citizens tended to unconditionally support their government decision. Existing accounts have speculated on (1) the unraveling of the U.S.-Korean alliance versus the strong ties between President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi and (2) the recent surge of anti-American sentiments in Korea. Yet, despite the different state of alliance relations, both the Japanese and Korean governments swiftly and aggressively decided to send troops to Iraq, even going against public opinion in the case of South Korean president Roh. In this paper, I offer an alternative explanation that takes seriously the domestic-international linkage in alliance politics, focusing on the type of issue linkage created by gaiatsu (external pressure), the domestic political context, and rhetorical entrapment of leaders through their previous interactions with the public. I argue that the Japanese domestic political scene was able to absorb the Bush administration?s demand for troops since the issue was linked diffusely to a wide array of agendas such as redemption for the painful criticism of ?checkbook diplomacy? during the first Gulf War, the expected quid pro quo assistance from the U.S. on the question of kidnapped Japanese in North Korea, and the LDP?s push for a greater role for the Self Defense Forces. In Korea, however, the troops dispatch issue was linked specifically and solely to the U.S.?s cooperation toward South Korea?s North Korea policy, a topic already highly contested in domestic politics. The issue became further polarized into pro- versus anti-alliance debates in Korea with the additional fuel of Roh?s perceived ?betrayal? by succumbing to U.S. pressure and overturning his previous anti-sadae (revering the great powers) rhetoric. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines China's changing perspectives on the evolving U.S.-Japan alliance from both the hard and soft power angles. Four sets of considerations affect how Beijing views the alliance. The first has to do with the alliance's scope and missions. While Beijing tacitly acknowledges the alliance's role in preventing Japanese re-militarization, it now sees it as an instrument for sustaining U.S. hegemony in the region beyond its original, limited missions of defending Japan. Second, China considers the U.S.-Japan alliance increasingly as a convenient cover for Tokyo to pursue ~ normal state ~ status, including the strengthening of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and the dispatch of JSDF personnel overseas. A politically ambitious, militarily assertive, and economically strong Japan poses a serious challenge for China and for the region given the historical past and ongoing territorial disputes between Japan and its neighbors. Third, Beijing has serious concerns about the alliance's potential interference in what it considers as its domestic affairs, namely, the Taiwan issue. Finally, Chinese perspectives on the U.S.-Japan alliance must also be put in the broad contexts of the evolving and complex Sino-U.S. and Sino-Japanese relations. Stable and better relationships could mitigate the potentially negative impact of the alliance on China while tension and deterioration of ties heighten Beijing's concerns and worse-case assessments. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT #1Japan's Post-Mahanian Maritime StrategyThis paper will assess the dynamics of maritime security in Northeast Asia using the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the U.S. naval officer who, writing around the turn of the nineteenth century, contended that "sea power" was founded on the "three pillars" of international commerce, naval stations scattered along the sea lanes to support the operations of fuel-thirsty warships, and, most importantly for him, a powerful battle fleet. Mahan's works exhibited a strong geographical hue, urging the United States to build a fleet capable of defending the Caribbean sea lanes against the largest concentration of naval forces likely to be hurled against it. Only by securing the Caribbean basin, its "Mediterranean," declared Mahan, could the United States dig an isthmian canal and wrest away its rightful share of the Asia trade.We have unearthed considerable evidence suggesting that China will pursue a Mahanian maritime strategy as its diplomatic, economic, and military power waxes. Influential Chinese strategists talk of "absolute control" over China's littoral waters, through which the shipments of raw materials upon which the nation's economic growth has come to depend must pass. In so doing, they routinely invoke Mahan's writings. If indeed Beijing follows Mahan's path to sea power, it will regard the Yellow, East China, and South China seas much as Mahan regarded the Caribbean: as an expanse in which naval dominance is vital to national prosperity.If so, an increasingly assertive Chinese maritime strategy will intersect with that of Japan, which has been rethinking its own approach to the uses of sea power, in large part because it relies on the same sea lanes for its own imports of oil, gas, and other commodities. Whether Tokyo would entrust the safety of its seaborne commerce to a China jealous of its "Caribbean" is an open question. Also problematic for Sino-Japanese relations are conflicting claims to islands whose adjacent sea beds purportedly contain major oil and gas reserves.Yet few, if any, Japanese strategists look to Alfred Thayer Mahan for guidance. They do not quote Mahan; nor do they urge Tokyo to found its maritime strategy on Mahanian precepts or some distinctively Japanese derivative thereof. Why is that so? Was Mahan discredited by association with the Japanese militarism of the 1930s and 1940s? Was he simply forgotten during the postwar years, when large segments of the Japanese populace looked with revulsion on the use of military force? Upon what maritime theories will Tokyo base its emerging naval strategy, if not those of Mahan? With what effect?By venturing some answers to these questions, the study will show how Japanese strategy may evolve over the next decade and how the strategies deployed by Tokyo and Beijing may interact. Our findings and recommendations will be of immediate use to policymakers in Tokyo, as well as to policymakers and alliance managers in Washington, which, if recent events are any guide, will depend increasingly on the U.S.-Japanese alliance to sustain its East Asia strategy in the coming years. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

60 years have passed since the end of World War II. The U.S.-Japan alliance seems to be strengthening ever before under the leadership of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and President George W. Bush. At the same time, relations between China and Japan seem to be hitting all time low since the end of World War II. In the meantime, the major shifts in Japanese security policy are about to take place by the initiative of Prime Minister Koizumi; the revision of Article 9 of the Constitution and Japan?s bid to a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. These moves are regarded as the rise of Japan?s nationalism. In this paper, I would like to analyze how the rise of Japan?s nationalism influences Japan?s security policy in the 21st Century. To understand the impact, I would like to analyze it from there levels; system level, state level, and individual level. At the system level, I would like to analyze the dual impact of the rise of Japan?s nationalism on international relations. From Washington?s perspective, it will be welcomed for the time being to promote the joint effort of spreading democracy. From Beijing?s perspective, it might be viewed as the move putting both countries into a collision course in the future. At the state level, I would like to examine how the Japanese view the rise of Japan?s nationalism, and point out the factors behind the revision of Article 9 of the Constitution and Japan?s bid to a permanent seat at the U.N. Security Council. Based on the findings at the system and state levels, finally, at the individual level, I would like to examine how Prime Minister Koizumi needs to maneuver his policy to accomplish his security policy objectives. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to explain the position of the U.S.-Japanese alliance in the context of Northeast Asian regional security order. It also examine how strengened ties between the two countries would influence in shaping the future regioanl security order. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on a study that examines the rationales and substance of the redefined U.S.-Japan alliance. It cites the implications of the 1997 Revised Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and the 2005 Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee for regional security issues, particularly a contingency in the Taiwan Strait. It examines the special role that Japan plays in the U.S. security strategy in the region.

The article discusses Pax Americana II, the period after the Cold War, and the strategic choices of Japan. It states that the transformation of the international system from bipolar to unipolar results in a more assertive U.S. policy. It cites the decision of the U.S. government to restore its alliance with Japan and initiate talks with China to prevent the financial market crisis. It offers an overview of the defense policy of the Japanese government.

The article focuses on the ongoing Japanese discussion on soft power and its implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance is presented. It discusses the concept of soft power which was developed by author Joseph Nye and its potential and limitations as an instrument of national policy. It examines how the Japanese are utilizing the concept in dealing with their nation's security policy.

Why do U.S.-led alliances, such as NATO, U.S.-Japan, and U.S.-Korea, continue on in the post-Cold War world where they have lost their conventional rationale? Can their continuation be explained in terms of conventional IR theories, be they realism, liber ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although U.S. policy toward Asia is often articulated in terms of the emergence and political evolution of China, the U.S.-Japanese relationship has been the primary means of effecting American policy in the region for over a century and a half. If Washington is to achieve a second "Pax Americana" in this century, the relationship with Japan will continue to be a major factor as U.S. policymakers attempt to best devise and implement diplomatic and defense policy in Asia. The rapid development of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance in the past decade indicate that it will continue to be a viable and valuable policy tool in this effort, although there are several areas where it remains deficient relative to the demands placed upon it. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can we account for various changes in military alliances after the Cold War? Why do some purposeless alliances persist after the Cold War, while others perish? Which theoretical approaches best explain the disorderly outcome of military alliances after the Cold War? In order to answer these questions, I situate my research in the Northeast Asian area, where there are two military alliances that have made puzzling moves after the Cold War: the US-Japan and the US-South Korea alliances.The US-Japan and the US-South Korea alliances have been two security pillars in Northeast Asia against the communist bloc during the Cold War period. As the Soviet demise occurred in 1991, the realists predicted that these two alliances would change in accordance with the post-Cold War discourse: the US-Japan alliance would not maintain as strong as during the Cold War period, and with the disintegration of communism as an ideology and the Soviet Union as a state, no purpose would motivate American policy in this region any more; the US-South Korea alliance would remain as strong as ever due to the threats of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction posed by North Korea. However, for the past decade and a half, these projections did not come to pass: rather, they changed inversely. The US-Japan alliance has become very cohesive and stronger than ever, while the US-South Korea alliance has undergone difficulties after the Cold War.How do we account for these puzzles? That is, how do we account for the weakening of the US-South Korea alliance and the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance after the Cold War?In explaining these counter-intuitive developments, I employ the critical juncture approach. I argue that in South Korea and Japan, certain critical events readjusted domestic security cultures so that they became more pronounced, and this ultimately affected their alliance policies towards the United States. In the case of South Korea, the democratic transition in the late 1980s and the reactive government policies thereof may be seen as the first critical juncture. The second one manifested in the North-South Korea Summit Meeting in 2000. With these critical junctures, a more liberal, nationalist, and anti-American culture has developed in South Korea, which has holistically formulated the cohesion level of the US-South Korea alliance. In Japan, the Persian Gulf War was the first critical juncture, after which the cultural movement towards a normal state began to arise. The second one involved the North Korean Taepodong missile shock in 1998, which has changed the security perception of the Japanese people. These critical junctures have reshaped the security culture in Japan to a more conservative, militarist, and normalcy-oriented one, and it has affected the cohesion level of the US-Japan alliance. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]