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Presents summaries of papers presented by members of the Middle East Working Group at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association on August 31, 2002. Relationship between the U.S. and Egypt; Information on the Iranian foreign policy; Secularism in Turkey.

This article examines the Foreign Relations documents of the U.S. and the papers of government officials in the Truman administration that reveals the possibilities for peace in the Middle East in 1949 and the opportunities present for the U.S. to have played a major role in the peace process. The first Arab-Israeli war came to an end with the signing of an armistice agreement between Egypt and Israel on the island of Rhodes, on February 24, 1949, under the direction of United Nations Mediator Ralph Bunche. Within the next five months, successful armistice agreements were concluded between Israel and Trans Jordan, Lebanon and Syria; and permanent peace negotiations were expected to follow before the year's end. In order to appreciate the possibilities for peace in the Middle East in 1949, we must go back to December 1948 when the United Nations General Assembly, in anticipation of the end of hostilities between the Arabs and Jews, established a Palestine Conciliation Commission consisting of representatives from France, Turkey and the U.S. Its major task, which was to be pursued concurrently with the armistice negotiations, was to negotiate peace treaties between Israel and the Arab states. Along with its pursuit of permanent peace, the Commission was also to formulate a plan for the internationalization of Jerusalem and to arrange for the repatriation and resettlement of approximately 725,000 Palestinian Arab refugees.

Does trading oil promote peace between rival countries? Despite the optimism of liberal theories on the value of economic interdependence, countries worry more about the possibility of being cut off from vital oil supplies than about forgoing the potential economic gains of trade. The 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace is an exception to this rule, as the inclusion of oil trade agreements during negotiations succeeded and eventually became a positive aspect of the relations between the two states. However, this resulted not from the promotion of economic interdependence during negotiations, but from its avoidance. The United States guaranteed to compensate Israel for any breach in the oil agreement. This permitted Israel and Egypt to trade freely without imminent concern of becoming too dependent on one another. In consequence, they slowly built mutual trust over the years. Israeli and US declassified documents shed light on the creation of this unique oil trade agreement during the final phase of peace negotiations. We argue that a third-party guarantee to compensate for a breach in energy trade is often a necessary condition for such deals to succeed, provided that the guarantor meets certain preconditions unique to energy trade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the events of the 'Arab-Spring', a certain liberal discourse has been espoused that promotes and glorifies 'activism'. This liberal discourse limits, rather than purportedly enhance, the inculcation of subjectivity of citizens at large in Egypt. By privileging a liberal individualist ontology, power struggles are eschewed in a favor of a 'transitional' paradigm that is associated with struggles for rights and liberties, which are seen as future gains as part of the struggle 'activists' wage. 'Activists' not only fit in and spread this 'rights and freedoms' agenda, but they become the agents and sole guardians of that agenda and the power relations it develops and controls. By scrutinizing the case of Egypt's Coptic Christians, a link can be drawn as to how overly naïve such analysis privileges 'activists', by way of a 'transition' paradigm, and silences the voices it supposedly seeks to speak on whose behalf. Copts, I argue, do not feel 'liberated' nor do they welcome such missionizing attitudes to 'save' Copts. In looking at the case of 'activists' in Egypt who are fighting for the 'Coptic cause', the United States 'religious freedom agenda' is problematized This discursive link highlights how such liberal notions are vehicles for intervention that continue to survey the region, attempt to control, modify and mould subjectivity to a discourse that is apologetic to the West as the bearer of rights and religious freedoms. In deconstructing this discourse a genealogy of the religious freedoms agenda since 2011 is made with respect to Egypt's Copts, showing how 'activists' automatically and naively adopt this liberal discourse. These 'activists' then become the gatekeepers, as well as the sole authorized speakers, of each 'cause'. This archaeological exercise highlights the links 'activists' have, the discourse and apologia they espouse and how they fit with the new-found bedrock of United States Foreign Policy: religious freedoms. In pushing for such an agenda power struggles and subjectivity is normalized in which the United States is elevated as the guardian of the oppressed and the weak. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the foreign relations between Egypt and the U.S. at the end of the Second World War. Reference on the book 'American Interests and Policies in the Middle East 1900-1939,' by John A. DeNovo; Impact of the involvement of Americans on the interwar period of Egypt; Developments in the realm of cultural contacts.

Presents the edited text of a discussion held on November 28, 2000 at the Sadat Forum at Brookings, Washington D.C. which dealt with the relationship between the United States and Egypt.

Analyzes the influence of American foreign policy on the outcome of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954. Aftermath of the 1951 Egyptian abrogation of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance; British efforts for retaining presence in Egypt; The Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO); Communist threats; American participation in negotiations; Egyptian attitude toward the United States; More.

Examines the state of foreign relations between the United States and Egypt during the second half of the 1950s as each state's interests intersected at northeast Africa. The United States' interests at Ethiopia; The Eritrean campaign for independence; Ethiopia's concessions from the United States; Egypt's interests in the Sudan.

Anwar Sadat was generally praised by Western leaders and scholars for his vision, courage, and negotiating skills. A critical examination of the documentary record shows that at least as far as negotiations and decision-making, the dominant Western view is self-serving. The two Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreements of 1974 and 1975 started Sadat on the road to the American-sponsored peace, the price of which Sadat must have known to be the establishment of an Egypto-American- Israeli strategic alliance at the expense of Egypt's traditional role in the Arab world. Having accepted this outcome Sadat allowed his alternatives to narrow and bargaining power to diminish until they almost exclusively and entirely rested on what the United States and Israel were prepared to offer. To the extent that the overall strategic goal of Henry Kissinger was to separate Egypt from Arab and Palestinian aspirations, and further isolate the "radical" forces in the region, thus weakening Soviet influence and paving the way for a settlement acceptable to Israel, the American negotiator achieved his goal, with hardly any opposition from Sadat. In fact, in his eagerness to accelerate his admission into the American camp, Sadat adopted a negotiating style and made concessions which surprised the Americans themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comments on issues pertaining to the relationship between the U.S. and Egypt as of October 2004. Survey findings on the attitude of Egyptian citizens toward the U.S.; Reasons why the Egyptians hate the U.S.; Political and economic conditions in Egypt.