Search

Over the last two decades, China has experienced one of the most dramatic and sustained periods of economic growth in world history. China's use of economic statecraft provides an important venue in which to examine the role of unacknowledged ‘coercive diplomacy’ within the context of China's ‘peaceful rise discourse.’ In contrast to Western countries, which have overtly used sanctions and other forms of economic coercion, China has publicly denied any such policies while at the same time quietly pursuing them. China's denial of using coercive economic statecraft has muted the reactions of neighboring publics and government, but it cannot entirely forestall them. Without seriously undermining China's ‘peaceful-rising’ image, a more explicit statement from Beijing regarding its coercive economic measure could provide deterrence and assurance to China's neighbors in resolving the disputes. This article first surveys existing literature on economic statecraft focusing on the coercive aspects of such strategies. Second, it presents an in-depth case study on how China uses economic leverages over its neighbors in East Asia: North Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. Finally, it highlights the limits of China's economic statecraft within the constraints of China's ‘peaceful rise’ discourse. It concludes with implications for Asian politics and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 1990s, alongside China's economic growth, the international community has fostered a general anxiety towards a "China threat." In order to relieve itself from suspicion, China adopted the dual strategies of "harmonious worldview" and "good neighbor policy." The strategies led to the use of soft power in China's foreign policy. China aimed to reduce security concerns implied by the threat theory by supporting an image that caters to international peace and development. This article seeks to explain how China achieves its interests in Southeast Asia through the use of soft power. The authors address the concepts of "harmonious worldview" and "good neighbor policy" and how the twin strategies and soft power have shaped China's foreign policy in recent years. This article aims to provide insights into China's policy options in Southeast Asia in the near future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's rise entails a potentially threatening increase in its political and military power. Adherents of 'democratic peace theory', however, see cause for optimism: the economic development accompanying China's ascendance might have a pacifying effect on Chinese foreign relations. Unfortunately, in China's case this hope is probably unfounded. Some of China's most prickly foreign policies, including its unwillingness to accept postwar Japan as a 'normal' nation and its insistence that Taiwan must eventually unify with China regardless of the wishes of Taiwan's inhabitants, are already 'democratic' in the sense that most of China's people endorse them. Chinese public opinion has become a powerful influence on foreign-policymaking, and one that sometimes pushes Beijing toward conflict even when China's leaders would prefer conciliation. Democratisation in China would not immediately remove the sources of tension between the Chinese and the other Asia-Pacific democracies, and China's neighbours must understand that on some issues the Chinese government must meet compelling domestic expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of China is seen by some observers as a precursor of inevitable hegemonic competition in East Asia. At the very least, it seems likely that China's influence in East Asia will grow at the expense of the United States. Whether this will eventually amount to a form of hegemonic transition is far less clear. It is, therefore, an opportune moment to consider the relative strengths and weaknesses of China and the US in East Asia. This paper suggests that the nature of hegemonic competition and transition is more uncertain and complex than some of the most influential theoretical understandings of hegemony would have us believe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]