Search

International Relations (IR) scholars generally focus on disputes on land when they study international affairs. However, disputes on the sea are also very common in IR, and the states try to establish global and regional hegemonies over the seas in their regions. In retrospect, in case of Turkey, maritime disputes have been important factors in Turkish foreign policy. The Turks will celebrate the centennial of the Republic in 2023, and maritime disputes have been an unchanging factor in Turkish foreign policy in this last 100 years, in relation to neighbors and great world powers. Therefore, one may stipulate that Turkey has been both an important sea power, and that maritime disputes have also shown a continuous recurrence in its foreign relations. Due to Turkey’s strategic location in between significant seaways like the Aegean Sea, Mediterranean, Black Sea and Turkish Straits, and between the continents of Europe, Asia and Africa, maritime disputes have always been on the agenda, as items of Turkish foreign policy. In this context, this paper analyses maritime disputes in Turkish foreign policy as a continuous element of Turkey’s relations with its neighbors and the rest of the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 1998 Brasilia Peace Agreement ended a territorial dispute between Ecuador and Peru that, due to the size and location of the contested area, had remained a source of regional instability and continental tensions for decades. This paper examines the circumstances that finally allowed negotiations, beginning in 1995, to overcome an almost two-centuries-old conflict, long after almost all territorial disputes in South America had been laid to rest. It will focus in particular on the diplomatic endeavours by the guarantor countries of the 1942 Rio de Janeiro Protocol, which involved a unique set of negotiations, and the setting up of the first effective multilateral peace operation in South America. It also suggests that the peace agreement benefited from the dynamics of economic integration underway since the 1980s. Finally, it considers the implications for regional security arrangements, as well as Brazil's leadership credentials in South America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2001, China finally joined the WTO. The accession of China was looked forward to by many WTO members and China itself. However, observers had some fears that the Chinese accession would prove to be a Trojan horse, disrupting the working of the WTO. This paper looks into the Chinese accession and its involvement in the WTO Dispute Settlement and argues that these fears seem so far to be unfounded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We introduce the new, substantially updated, and revised version of the Dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) dataset. We discuss the underlying logic of constructing dyadic MIDs and demonstrate that these operations generate significant differences between the actual occurrence and properties of MID dyads and those extracted from machine-generated programs such as EUGene, or from the MID participant dataset. We provide some descriptive measures of dyadic MIDs over the period of 1816 to 2010 and compare some of the key dyadic results on the correlates of MIDs using different datasets. We discuss the theoretical and empirical implications of our results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses those provisions in model BITs relating dispute settlement procedures, particularly provisions under the following two mechanisms: on the one hand, mechanisms for the settlement of disputes between contracting parties concerning the interpretation or application of the BIT; on the other hand, mechanisms for investor-State dispute settlement. An increasing number of States include in their model BITs precise and detailed procedural provisions, especially as to clauses for the settlement of disputes between the investor and the host State. In this sense, the trend moves towards States introducing flexibility in certain elements of the most common procedural provisions in model BITS. Likewise, the most significant innovations may be appreciated in model BITs of North-American States referring to the promotion of transparency and procedural economy in investor-State arbitration.

How does variation in the strength of a court's jurisdiction and enforcement affect strategic behavior by states involved in international disputes? The authors construct a formal model and identify three important ways that legal institutions can have a deleterious effect on international cooperation by magnifying the bargaining problems arising from incomplete information about the quality of the legal claims. First, strong courts create less information revelation in pretrial bargaining. Second, strong courts reduce the likelihood of pretrial settlements between states. Third, strong courts lead to more brinksmanship over high-value assets, which leads to conflict if the court refuses to intervene. The authors argue that a key policy implication of their model is that attempts to strengthen international courts must be accompanied by increased precision of international law to ameliorate the deleterious effects of strong courts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is a controversial exercise in legalization at the international level, with direct implications for inequality between developed and developing countries Conventional wisdom suggests that moves to establish binding, third-party arbitration in international law generally favor smaller, less powerful states. Nevertheless, many of the most pointed criticisms of the new WTO system and the most radical reform proposals have come from developing countries, its presumed beneficiaries. To unravel this paradox, (examine the role of the Appellate Body, which has become the principal engine of institutional change in the WTO system. Like all quasi-judicial actors, the Appellate Body has a certain level of delegated authority, especially over procedural issues. Despite objections from WTO members, the Appellate Body has brought about several significant procedural reforms. It has broadened the access of third parties in appellate proceedings; opened the door to amicus curiae submissions by private individuals and organizations; and endorsed the representation of governments by private counsel. In all three moves, the Appellate Body - whose legitimacy remains contested - generates information about the political context and potential consequences of Its rulings. Its institutional interests, however, at times conflict with those of developing countries in the WTO, as these decisions on balance threaten to exacerbate existing inequalities, at least in the short term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract The 1998 Brasilia Peace Agreement ended a territorial dispute between Ecuador and Peru that, due to the size and location of the contested area, had remained a source of regional instability and continental tensions for decades. This paper examines the circumstances that finally allowed negotiations, beginning in 1995, to overcome an almost two-centuries-old conflict, long after almost all territorial disputes in South America had been laid to rest. It will focus in particular on the diplomatic endeavours by the guarantor countries of the 1942 Rio de Janeiro Protocol, which involved a unique set of negotiations, and the setting up of the first effective multilateral peace operation in South America. It also suggests that the peace agreement benefited from the dynamics of economic integration underway since the 1980s. Finally, it considers the implications for regional security arrangements, as well as Brazil’s leadership credentials in South America.