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When the journal Minerva was founded in 1962, science and higher educational issues were high on the agenda, lending impetus to the interdisciplinary field of 'Science Studies' qua 'Science Policy Studies.' As government expenditures for promoting various branches of science increased dramatically on both sides of the East-West Cold War divide, some common issues regarding research management also emerged and with it an interest in closer academic interaction in the areas of history and policy of science. Through a close reading of many early issues of Minerva but also of its later competitor journal Science Studies (now called Social Studies of Science) the paper traces the initial optimism of an academically based Science Studies dialogue across the Cold War divide and the creation in 1971 of the International Commission for Science Policy Studies as a bridging forum, one that Minerva strangely chose to ignore. In this light, attention is drawn to aspects of the often forgotten history of Science Studies in the former Soviet Union and the Eastern European block. Reviewed also are several early discussions that are still relevant today: e.g., regarding differing concepts of Big Science, science and democracy, autonomy in higher education and what conditions are necessary to sustain academic freedom and scientific integrity (some of Edward Shils' primary concerns). Finally, it is noted how the question of quantitative methods to measure scientific productivity lay at the heart of a 'Science of Science' movement of the 1960s has re-emerged in a new form integral to the notion of a 'Science of Science Policy.' [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a critical historical analysis of the trajectory of geo-political and economic relations between India and Singapore. This paper argues that India’s perception of its interests and its geopolitical orientation towards the Cold War prevented India’s security and economic integration with Southeast Asia. Apart from geopolitics, the economic orientation of India was also a critical factor that influenced the trajectory of India – Singapore economic engagement. However, there was a dramatic change after the Cold War ended. The structural change from bi-polarity towards a unipolar moment transformed both geopolitics and economic engagement. Moreover, India’s own economic orientation had also changed by the end of the Cold War. In sum, this paper attempts to elucidate upon how ideas construct economic and political interests and how geopolitical interests, once constructed, drive economic relations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Recently declassified archival materials permit the revelation of a previously unknown element of the early Cold War. Specifically, U.S. officials worried about an electro-magnetic attack by the Soviet Union, using hundreds of radio transmitters, on worldwide communications in advance of or in conjunction with the outbreak of general war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

African Americans viewed Ghana as a symbol of black success, capability, and modernity during the 1950s and pressured the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower to attribute more importance to the decolonizing nation and its leader, Kwame Nkrumah. Black American leaders thus played a role in shifting American policy in Africa toward a more ‘middle ground' approach balancing European and African desires and also helped cause Vice President Richard Nixon's 1957 trip to Ghana and Nkrumah's 1958 visit to the United States. Such actions reveal domestic influence on international relations, black American agency and a positive outcome of racially based worldviews during the Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Information on several papers discussed at a workshop held March 23-25, 2012 at the Institute of Contemporary History of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic in Prague, titled "Environmental histories of the Visegrad countries: Cold War and the environmental sciences," is presented. Topics include the history of environmental science during the Cold War, the cooperation between scientists in the Soviet Union and Scandinavia, and the development of industrial towns in socialist Hungary.

The article discusses the history of the European Youth Campaign (EYC), an international anti-communist youth organization aimed to promote European unification, to illustrate the intersection of anti-communism during the Cold War in 1950-1959 with the concerns of the Catholic hierarchy over the vulnerability of youth in Ireland. It looks at the U.S. influence of Ireland. It examines the various ways in which Ireland's foreign policy has been circumscribed by the war. It also discusses the opportunities presented by the war to Ireland.

Between 1959 and 1962, children played a highly visible role in the dramatic realignment of revolutionary Cuba’s diplomatic relations. This article demonstrates that Fidel Castro’s government consistently deployed discourses and images of childhood as well as actual children within a broader campaign to liberate themselves from U.S. domination even as it sought to strengthen ties between Cuba, the U.S.S.R. and the socialist world. At the same time, the Castro regime also made use child-centered images, texts and speeches in order to negotiate the contradictions between the Revolution’s claims to have fulfilled the islands’ long-frustrated aspirations towards national sovereignty even as it sought to justify its reinvention as “la niña adorada del mundo socialista,” dependent for its survival on the protection and largesse of the Soviet Union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's stance on its Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence is diametrically opposed to its evolving attitude within the Security Council in a number of dossiers where it has lent its support either tacitly or affirmatively to resolutions adopted that endorsed, facilitated, reversed and prevented regime change since the end of the Cold War. Rather than measuring such developments from a conflictual perspective, China's increasing contribution in the international legal and political order, with a view to promoting a so-called harmonious world,may be seen in light of the international law of co-progressiveness and theory of relationality and relational governance respectively espoused by two Chinese international law and relations scholars Sienho Yee and Yaqing Qin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Before Nixon’s trip to China in 1972, China was bound by historical, nationalistic, ideological, and treaty considerations to support North Korea against South Korea and the United States militarily and politically. The U.S.–China rapprochement in the 1970s had far-reaching effects on international relations in and around the Korean peninsula. But up to now, there is no article-length study on how China adjusted its policy toward North Korea and managed to maintain a close relationship with Pyongyang during this process. Making use of documents from the Chinese, U.S., and East European archives, this article traces China’s policy toward North Korea from 1970 to 1975. It examines China’s views and positions on the Korean issue during the U.S.–China rapprochement negotiations, and China’s policy and tactics toward the Korean issue at the subsequent United Nations deliberations. It attempts to address the questions of how and why China could maintain an alliance relationship with Pyongyang while seeking détente with the United States—North Korea’s enemy No. 1. The article argues that it was in North Korea’s interest to maintain good relations with Beijing in order to achieve Korea’s unification on Pyongyang’s term. For China’s revolutionary credential, it was important to retain North Korea on its side. To achieve this purpose, China provided large economic and military aid to Pyongyang and was North Korea’s most important donor during this time. But China’s primary foreign policy goal during this period was to maintain détente with Washington in order to counter the Soviet Union, and prevent the resumption of war on the Korean peninsula. Thus, China’s policy toward North Korea was made mainly due to national security and geopolitical concerns, rather than ideological affinities. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

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Copyright of ÖZP - Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft is the property of Oesterreichische Zeitschrift fur Politikwissenschaft and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Nixon and Ford administrations celebrated the 1973 Chilean coup and did everything they could to help the dictatorship that followed. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, in particular, supported General Augusto Pinochet’s regime and turned a blind eye to its human rights abuses. But how did the Chilean dictatorship view the United States and how did the relationship play out in practice? Drawing on Chilean and U.S. documents, this article argues that in spite of Kissinger’s efforts, bilateral relations were actually rather tense. Not only did the Chilean dictatorship continually request more than the Ford administration could offer but Santiago’s military leaders also had different conceptions of the Cold War and how to fight it. This, in turn, sheds light on the problems U.S. policy makers faced when dealing with anti-communist Third World allies. It also points to the fragmentation of the global Cold War struggle in the mid-1970s. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

American President Harry S. Truman called the Cold War a "struggle for the minds of men," and assigned journalists an important role in the conflict. The American administration's strategy was to influence young people and opinion leaders in countries deemed important during the Cold War in the hope that their views would trickle down to the broader population. This article analyzes transnational flows of people and knowledge between the United States and Denmark after World War II. Through an examination of archival material, the study finds that the U.S. Department of State, via the American Embassy in Copenhagen, consciously attempted to shape Danish journalists' view of America directly and indirectly. The article finds that American officials were very skilled at picking future opinion and media leaders for educational exchange and thereby provided them with a deeper understanding of U. S. affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]