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The Sino-US agreement regarding China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in late 1999 came as a surprise to many observers. How and why did the Chinese reach the agreement in view of the impasses in the negotiation that occurred earlier in the year? These impasses included the collapse of the WTO talks during Zhu's visit to the USA in April, the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May, and the deadlock between the Chinese and US negotiators in November. Drawing on published sources as well as experts' insights, this paper examines the Chinese leadership's decision-making process and its reasons for concluding the agreement. It suggests that the exclusive decision-making circle of top Chinese leaders circumvented the opposition to the agreement and facilitated the negotiations. These leaders, especially Jiang and Zhu, favoured an agreement because they believed WTO membership could improve China's international relations, trade conditions, the outcomes of reform at home, and China's leverage over Taiwan. The closed decision making on the WTO also left the Chinese leaders with a challenging task: educating officials and the population about the WTO rules and possible impacts while ensuring that they abide by the rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Washington has two long-term interests toward China: promoting a profitable, equitable economic relationship and managing Beijing's challenge to the U.S.-led international order. Although recent policy has achieved many tactical successes in these areas, the predominant record is one of broader strategic failure in the face of the rise of China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]