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It is widely recognized that the political system in the PRC is more institutionalized and predictable than in the past, and that its regular rejuvenation is a source of strength. While not denying the virtues of the age-based system, this paper argues that there are limits on the forced rejuvenation scheme. It looks at how cadres on the CCP's Central Committee are excluded from competing for the top leadership positions because of their age. Four groups of elite are identified, T2 (zongshuji, zongli), SCP-T2 (changwei), PB-SCP (juwei), and CC-PB (zhongwei), and their frustration over exclusion from competing for the T2 positions in the next major leadership turnover (next even-numbered Party Congress) measured (Exclusion and Frustration Rate, EFR). An overall score is also calculated to measure the total frustration with the system (Total Exclusion and Frustration, TEF). It is shown that the EFR and TEF are extremely high, and tension is bound to accumulate in the system. Finally, the Bo Xilai (...) case is explored to demonstrate how aspiring cadres may be discriminated against by the system and thus inclined to rebel against it. It is advised that instead of simply accepting the system [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper complements the traditional realist perspective (TP) with the strategic triangle theory (ST) in analyzing alliance formation and shift in East Asia. Alliance is perceived as a marriage triangle, and is subject to the dynamics of strategic actions taken by players to elevate their roles in the game. During the Cold War, two hierarchically structured alliance systems opposed each other in East Asia. Power shift in the continental system disrupted the Sino-Soviet pact, while hegemonie stability in the maritime system buttressed the U.S.-led alliance. The division in the continental system offered Washington opportunities to befriend Beijing and buttress its position in the U.S.-Soviet-PRC strategic triangle. Washington's allies were prompted to act likewise. The tension in competitive rapprochement was absorbed by the hegemonie structure of the maritime system. The result was collective hedging (balancing-cum-engagement). In the post-Cold War era, the predominance of the United States caused the revival of the Beijing-Moscow nexus, now constructed as an equal partnership. Again one finds the continental and the maritime systems facing each other. Cross-system hedging is inevitable as this would increase the payoff of strategic players. Russia and Taiwan are examined in the above context, combining the perspectives of both TP and ST. The rise of China is expected to cause tension in the continental system, as predicted by the internal security dilemma. The rise of China also impacts on the maritime system by both increasing the tendency to balance it (as predicted by TP), and to improve relations with it (as predicted by ST), hence prompting hedging. However, hedging is difficult for Taiwan, for it is only loosely connected to the maritime alliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a domestic electoral explanation for Russia's foreign policy surge during Vladimir Putin's second term. It argues that neither the rising power of Russia nor the incessant Western encroachment on Russia's core interests (international-level explanations) can fully account for the abrupt surge that shocked observers around the world. Instead, it points out the significance of Putin's succession and the domestic need to appeal to anti-Western sentiment during an election campaign in Russia's switch to a more assertive foreign policy. The international-level explanations provide insufficient reason for the abruptness and timing of the surge. A comparison is also made with China, a similarly situated continental power, to demonstrate that if international factors had been sufficient to provoke such a surge, Beijing would have taken a much more assertive attitude toward the West than Moscow. The fact that this has not happened points to a major difference between Russia and China." the lack of electoral competition and hence the need to whip up anti-Western sentiment in China. There has been no moderation in Russia's foreign policy after the 2007 and 2008 elections, despite the windows of opportunity opened up by the electoral cycle. This is attributed to the inherent tension in a diarchy, the ratchet effect, and the unfavorable international environment. It is asserted that if the current window of opportunity is shut, and as time goes by Russian politicians get geared up once again for electoral competition, the chances of a rapprochement between Russia and the West will grow even dimmer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Empirical evidence has shown that domestic political competition has a great impact on triangular interaction among Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. How do policymakers play the domestic game and the international triangular game concurrently and expect to maximize their payoffs? This paper examines the relevant literature and proposes a refined sequential model to analyze the China policy of the United States since 1980. The hypothesis is that domestic political competition determines external policy during election periods. In between elections, triangular strategic calculation dominates. Specifically, the quadrennial presidential elections provide opportunities for challengers to attack the incumbent president's realist China policy, thus bringing pressure for a change of the existing policy. Whether such an attack takes place hinges on the combinations of the idealist and realist images of the PRC in the United States. Attack will occur only when the two images diverge and the president does not preempt the issue. Seven presidential elections since 1980 are examined to test this refined model. The findings will be integrated into a composite framework to analyze interaction among Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper applies the "strategic triangle" approach to the relations among Washington. Beijing, and Taipei in the post-Cold War period. The main argument is that the strategic triangle among the three has been gradually shifting from a "romantic triangle" with the United States playing the role of an "unwilling pivot," to a "marriage" between the United States and Taiwan--although whether that status can be sustained remains to be seen. The cause of this shift is mainly structural: an unwilling pivot tends to tilt toward the weaker of the two wings, particularly when the stronger wing is emerging as a threat. In making this argument, the paper draws a historical analogy with the Berlin-St. Petersburg-Vienna triangle between 1870 and 1914. In that triangle, the unwilling pivot, Germany, first adopted an impartial attitude toward Russia and dustria-Hungary. As the duel between St. Petersburg and Vienna intensified over the Balkans, however, Germany was forced to take sides and bind its fate with the Hapsburg Empire. A comparison of the two triangles--including their modes of entry., operation, and exit--reveals a strong tendency in the Washington-Beijing-Taipei triangle to evolve following the historical pattern of the pre-WWI Berlin-St. Petersburg-Henna triangle. Based on this comparison, we can conclude an unwilling pivot should find that the costs associated with pivot playing are likely too high, and entry into a partnership with one of the wings is deemed more favorable. It remains to be seen whether a formal marriage will come about between the United States and Taiwan, as it did between Germany and Austria-Hungary prior to WWI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the response of Yu-Shan Wu, research fellow and director of the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, professor of political science at National Taiwan University and convener of political science at the National Science Council, to a commentary of Professor Wing Thye Woo to his article "Chinese Economic Reform in a Comparative Perspective: Asia vs. Europe, that was published in the December 2002/March 2003 issue of "Issues & Studies." Wu believes that there is a need for the Convergence school to explain the policies derived from their position that resulted to a poor performance in Russia. Wu compares resultant economic reform in China and Russia, arguing that it succeeded in China and failed in Russia.

This article views China's economic reform in a comparative perspective. It sets out with the significant phenomenon of China's rise and Russia's fall in the 1990s. The literature is reviewed. Two main approaches are identified: the non-institutional and the institutional, with the latter holding sway. Culture, stage of economic development, international environment, and pre-reform system are the four non-institutional factors; all are found wanting in terms of explaining the performance difference between Asian and European transition economies. The institutional factors are reform philosophy, speed of reform, property rights restructuring, and role of the state--the last two of which constitute an effective analytical framework. It is argued that China's de facto privatization and active developmental state have proven more effective than Russia's de jure privatization and weak democracy in promoting growth and achieving stability. China and Russia are treated as representing two modes of exit from state socialism and two distinct development patterns. The duel between the two harks back to the competition between East Asia's capitalist developmental model and the West's neoclassic economics. China's better transition performance proves the effectiveness of the East Asian model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article develops a four-category analytical framework to compare the process of democratic consolidation in East Asia (the Republic of China on Taiwan in particular) and East and Central Europe (ECE--Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary). The four categories are social cleavage, party system, constitutional framework, and the nature of elections. Each category impacts on political stability. A major finding is that Taiwan is characterized by pre-materialist social cleavages, a biparty system sustained by the SNTV (single nontransferable vote) electoral regime and the staying power of the Kuomintang (KMT), a semi-presidential structure plagued by divided government, and identity voting. In contrast, the ECE countries are characterized by materialist social cleavages, a multiparty system, a parliamentary constitutional structure (except for Poland who shares with the ROC a semi-presidential system), and economic voting. Those characteristics have specific implications for political stability: materialist cleavages, biparty system, parliamentarianism, and economic voting are all conducive to political stability, while pre-materialist cleavages, multiparty system, semi-presidential system with divided government, and identity voting induce political instability. With Taiwan gradually developing into a multiparty system, the lessons from the ECE countries are becoming even more pertinent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan (the Republic of China, ROC) adopted a semi-presidential system in the 1997 constitutional reform. That system is now being put to the test through the transfer of power from the Kuomintang (KMT) to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) given that the DPP won the 2000 presidential elections. This paper first develops a theoretical framework to analyze political stability under different types of semi-presidential systems. Three factors are singled out as the most critical: presidential power (high or low), president-parliament relations (congruent or incongruent), and party system (biparty or multiparty). Following is a look into Taiwan's institutional background and its process of constitutional reform. We discover that after the inauguration of President Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan fell into a highly unfavorable situation, with a low stability rating. The second part of the paper focuses on the interaction mode between the president and the parliament which is characterized by incongruent relations. Four empirical cases are used to demonstrate the four interaction modes under incongruence: the French Fifth Republic ("cohabitation"), Finland ("division of labor"), Weimar Germany ("collision"), and the Russian Federation ("supremacy of the president'). The Chen (Shui-bian)-Tang (Fei) duarchy is closer to the Finnish "division of labor "system than to any other interaction mode, but with less presidential concessions. This setup is clearly a compromise rather than cohabitation. As such, the Chen-Tang system is useful in defusing parliamentary opposition in the short term, but is conflict-prone in nature, as born out by its ultimate collapse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jiang Zemin's succession to Deng Xiaoping in the PRC can be investigated from three perspectives: change in leadership, a shift in orientation, and systemic transformation. This article argues that Deng's passing signifies more than a mere redistribution of power among the top leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). At the same time, a systemic transformation through tactical political reform is an unlikely scenario. Jiang's succession in essence ushers in a new era in the CCP's development. It formally ends the period of radical reform, and brings about the stage of bureaucratic stability. This orientation shift falls between leadership change and systemic transformation. The major factors militating for regime reorientation are evolutionary necessity, favorable economic conditions, and the Jiang regime's weaker leadership. Proof of these political changes abound in the post-1989 (especially post-1994) period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of the "strategic triangle" has been conventionally applied to the relationship among the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China (PRC). In actuality, there has also existed a mini-triangle among Washington, Taipei, and Beijing. The first part of this paper explores the various positions in a strategic triangle, ranks these roles in terms of desirability, differentiates between endogenous and exogenous factors, and identifies three sets of derivative relations based on exogenous factors. The paper then reviews the historical patterns of interactions within the great strategic triangle and the mini-triangle, as well as explores the impact of the former on the latter. The third part concentrates on the post-Tiananmen permutations of the dual triangles, evaluates the PRC's position after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and explains U.S. behavior during the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait mini-crisis in view of the structure of the mini-triangle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper starts with a literature review of cross-Strait relations studies. It then evolves into a proposal for an analogical model and a new research agenda. After pointing out the shortcomings of the dominant approaches in the field for not grasping the defining features of Taiwan-mainland relations (power asymmetry and sovereignty claims based on ethnic ties), it then argues that the cross-Strait relations are structurally similar to the relations between the Russian Federation and the "near abroad" countries. Taiwan, like Ukraine or the Baltics, can choose between balancing and bandwagoning under power asymmetry and sovereignty claims by a potential aggressor. Democratization and the resultant rise of Taiwanese nationalism have prompted the government to pursue balancing, while the increasing costs associated with such a strategy have given rise to political forces advocating reconciliation and bandwagoning. The learning curve derived from the Russian case is heuristic in pointing out the possible development of Taiwan's mainland policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]