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Faced with COVID-19 (Coronavirus), countries are taking drastic action based on little information. Two tests can help governments shorten and soften economically costly suppression measures while still containing the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. The first—a PCR assay—identifies people currently infected by testing for the presence of live virus in the subject. The second—an antibody test—identifies those rendered immune after being infected by searching for COVID-19-specific antibodies. The first test can help contain the disease because it facilitates the identification of infected persons, the tracing of their contacts, and isolation in the very early stages of an epidemic—or after a period of suppression, in case of a resurgent epidemic. The second can help us assess the extent of immunity in the general population or subgroups, to finetune social isolation and to manage health care resources. Wide application of the two tests could transform the battle against COVID-19 (Coronavirus), but implementing either on a large scale in developing countries presents challenges. The first test is generally available, but needs to be processed in adequately equipped laboratories with trained staff. The second test is easy to perform and can be processed quickly on the spot, but at this stage it is produced and available only on a limited basis in a few countries. This policy brief reviews the use of both tests, suggests strategies to target their use, and discusses the benefits and costs of such strategies. If PCR assay testing, together with tracing and isolation, helps reduce the duration of suppression measures by two weeks, and antibody testing allows one-fifth of the immune return to work early, the gain could be about 2 percent of national income, or about $8 billion for a country like the Philippines. Because the estimated economic benefits of the tests are likely to far outweigh the cost, the international community must help countries develop the capacity to process the first test and procure the second.

Based on a randomized evaluation, the paper shows that a household-targeted Philippine cash transfer program significantly raised the local price of key foods relevant for child nutritional status. This shift in prices increased stunting among young nonbeneficiary children by 34 percent (11 percentage points). Price and stunting effects increase in program saturation; at median saturation, the village income shock is 15 percent. These effects persist 2.5 years after program introduction. The authors confirm the price patterns in their experimental sample against price information from nationally-representative household expenditure surveys across the 6-year rollout of the program. Failing to consider such general equilibrium effects may overstate the net benefits of targeted cash transfers. In areas where targeting of social programs covers a large proportion of the population, offering the program on a universal basis may avoid such long-lasting negative impacts at moderate additional cost.