Search

This article argues that recent global health cooperation has been marked by two trends. First, there has been a highly successful proliferation of vertical funds to fight specific diseases. These are characterized by narrower problem-based mandates; multistakeholder governance; voluntary and discretionary funding; no in-country presence for the delivery of assistance; and an output-based legitimacy (based on effectiveness, not process). The rise of new initiatives with these characteristics has dovetailed with an increase in the funding of international organizations. However, the latter has not necessarily strengthened multilateralism. Instead, rapid increases in discretionary earmarked funding to the WHO and World Bank, which we call Trojan multilateralism, has replicated features of the vertical funds. With what consequences for international cooperation? Using principal-agent theory, we find a mixed picture. International organizations are being redirected by specific incentives. However, two constraints on bilateral control are not shifting. There is a persistent asymmetry of information between the WHO or the World Bank and individual member states, which gives the former a degree of autonomy. Equally, there are persistent obstacles to tightening bilateral monitoring of multilateral action. We conclude that the positive lessons to be drawn from vertical initiatives need to be balanced by the risks posed from a convergence of vertical initiatives and Trojan multilateralism [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ngaire Woods talks to Juncture about the 'new world order', why predictions of China eclipsing the US are overstated and why the increasing power of emerging nations needn't mean the end for multilateralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reports on criticisms of international economic institutions, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. High failure rate of the projects; Porosity of the agencies to political pressures; Disadvantage of the neo-liberal view of the world economy.

Over the past two decades the functions of international economic institutions have greatly expanded to include programmes and policies which affect a wider range of people, groups, and organisations than before. Where previously people could hold their national governments to account for such policies, they must now look to international institutions where the decisions are being made. But to whom are these institutions accountable and are they accountable to those whom they directly affect? This paper sets out to answer that question in respect of the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO. After analysing the new intrusiveness of the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank, we explore how the concept of accountability might best be applied to international economic institutions. The paper then outlines the specific ways in which the IMF, World Bank, and WTO have recently bolstered their accountability through enhanced transparency and monitoring. In conclusion, however, the paper argues that in spite of improvements in accountability, the international economic institutions have not gone far enough in reforming their governance structures. There is a remaining imbalance between what they do, and their legitimacy as perceived by those they affect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]