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Copyright of EuroChoices is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of EuroChoices is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Many developments in the bioeconomy depend on the use of genetically modified microorganisms (GMMs). GMMs are used in bioreactors to convert biomass into food, feed, and energy products. The recent judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union on gene editing technologies has affected the use of GMMs. A heated debate has started on whether and under what circumstances GMMs should be considered genetically modified organisms. This kind of decision is extremely relevant, as it will have a strong effect on the innovation of sustainable supply chains in the bioeconomy. The question has been raised as to whether the regulatory policies on GMMs can be justified from a sustainability perspective and, in particular, whether they do not endanger the European Green Deal, the flagship policy strategy of the new European Commission under Ursula von der Leyen. This contribution will first provide an overview of GMMs and their importance for the development of the bioeconomy, followed by a theoretical framework for assessing investments in GMMs. The third part of the article includes a discussion of four scenarios for regulating GMMs in the future, derived from the EU legal environment. The potential implications of the scenarios are assessed by linking them with the benefits and costs of investments in GMMs, following a modified version of the model presented in Purnhagen and Wesseler (2019). The results show that reforms based on the current EU legal environment do not look very promising to further support the use of GMMs. This has important implications for reaching the objectives of the Green Deal, as more radical legal changes are needed for the success of the initiative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU Farm to Fork (F2F) strategy includes a number of policy objectives that have implications for agricultural production in the EU and beyond. This contribution discusses the possible implications from an economic perspective. We draw on economic assessments by other authors and discuss their wider implications by considering only partially quantified benefits and costs. Overall, the assessments indicate a decline in EU agricultural production in quantitative terms. The F2F strategy negatively affects aggregate consumer surplus and—depending on the assumption made—a net increase or decrease in producer surplus, thereby inducing an overall net welfare loss. Partially quantified benefits and costs include the environmental benefits and costs linked to the F2F strategy, such as implications for greenhouse gas emissions, biodiversity, or the landscape. Therefore, by launching the strategy, policy makers have implicitly concluded that the additional net benefits outweigh the losses in consumer surplus. The economic studies combined with studies on the impact of agricultural practices on biodiversity and the emission of greenhouse gases do not support this claim without further technological and institutional changes, such as supporting the application of modern biotechnology by reducing regulatory hurdles. Also, whether most consumers will share this view remains to be seen. EU policy makers have it in their hands to implement the necessary institutional changes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

New plant breeding technologies (NPBTs), including CRISPR gene editing, are being used widely, and they are driving the development of new crops. They are nevertheless a subject of criticism and discussion. According to a summer 2018 interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) applying an absolute interpretation of the precautionary principle, European Union (EU) law makes most NPBTs subject to regulations governing the use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in the EU. This contribution summarizes the status of the debate and highlights issues that have thus far not been considered—particularly with regard to the implications of EU regulations for NPBTs for countries outside the EU. Related Content: The effect of scientific information and narrative on preferences for possible gene-edited solutions for citrus greening [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of EuroChoices is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

New plant‐breeding technologies (NPBTs), including gene editing, are widely used and drive the development of new crops. However, these new technologies are disputed, creating uncertainty in how their application for agricultural and food uses will be regulated. While in North America regulatory systems respond with a differentiated approach to NPBTs, the Court of Justice of the European Union (EU) has in effect made most if not all NPBT subject to the same regulatory regime as genetically modified organisms (GMOs). This paper discusses from a law and economics point of view different options that are available for the EU's multi‐level legal order. Using an ex‐ante regulation versus ex‐post liability framework allows the economic implications of different options to be addressed. The results show that under current conditions, some options are more expensive than others. The least costly option encompasses regulating new crops derived from NPBTs similar to those used in 'conventional' breeding. The current regulatory situation in the EU, namely making the use of NPBTs subject to the same conditions as GMOs, is the most costly option. © 2019 The Authors. Pest Management Science published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Society of Chemical Industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: A special regulatory regime applies to products of recombinant nucleic acid modifications. A ruling from the European Court of Justice has interpreted this regulatory regime in a way that it also applies to emerging mutagenesis techniques. Elsewhere regulatory progress is also ongoing. In 2015, Argentina launched a regulatory framework, followed by Chile in 2017 and recently Brazil and Colombia. In March 2018, the USDA announced that it will not regulate genome‐edited plants differently if they could have also been developed through traditional breeding. Canada has an altogether different approach with their Plants with Novel Traits regulations. Australia is currently reviewing its Gene Technology Act. This article illustrates the deviation of the European Union's (EU's) approach from the one of most of the other countries studied here. Whereas the EU does not implement a case‐by‐case approach, this approach is taken by several other jurisdictions. Also, the EU court ruling adheres to a process‐based approach while most other countries have a stronger emphasis on the regulation of the resulting product. It is concluded that, unless a functioning identity preservation system for products of directed mutagenesis can be established, the deviation results in a risk of asynchronous approvals and disruptions in international trade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over 95% of post-mortem samples from the 1918 pandemic, which caused 50 to 100 million deaths, showed bacterial infection complications. The introduction of antibiotics in the 1940s has since reduced the risk of bacterial infections, but growing resistance to antibiotics could increase the toll from future influenza pandemics if secondary bacterial infections are as serious as in 1918, or even if they are less severe. We develop a valuation model of the option to withhold wide use of an antibiotic until significant outbreaks such as pandemic influenza or foodborne diseases are identified. Using real options theory, we derive conditions under which withholding wide use is beneficial, and calculate the option value for influenza pandemic scenarios that lead to secondary infections with a resistant Staphylococcus aureus strain. We find that the value of withholding an effective novel oral antibiotic can be positive and significant unless the pandemic is mild and causes few secondary infections with the resistant strain or if most patients can be treated intravenously. Although the option value is sensitive to parameter uncertainty, our results suggest that further analysis on a case-by-case basis could guide investment in novel agents as well as strategies on how to use them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pests and diseases are a continuous challenge in agriculture production. A wide range of control strategies have been and will continue to be developed. New control strategies are in almost all countries around the world assessed prior to approval for use in farmers' fields. This is rightly so to avoid and even reduce negative effects for human health and the environment. Over the past decades the approval processes have become increasingly politicized resulting in an increase in the direct approval costs and the length in approval time without increasing the safety of the final product. This reduces the development of control strategies and often has negative human health and environmental effects. Possibilities exist for improvements. They include reducing approval costs and approval time by streamlining the approval process and substituting approval requirements by strengthening ex‐post liability. © 2018 Society of Chemical Industry Approval processes have become increasingly politicized resulting in an increase in the direct approval costs and the length in approval time without increasing the safety of the final product. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Microbial biological control agents (MBCA) are biopesticides based on living microbes. They have huge potential for the control of pests and diseases, but have trouble reaching the European Union (EU) market. According to several authors, this is caused by the regulatory regime, which is less supportive compared with that in the USA. The main objective of this paper is to present regulatory differences between the USA and the EU, and the resulting effects and developments of registration in both regions. Results: Results show that EU registration is more complex due to differences between EU‐ and Member State (MS)‐level processes, large actor heterogeneity and low flexibility. As a result, EU registration takes, on average, ∼ 1.6 years longer than US registration. Regulatory amendments have improved EU‐level processes and led to a significant contraction of procedural time spans, but processes at the MS level have not improved and have become a larger procedural obstacle. Conclusion: The results correspond with the idea that EU registration is complex and lengthy compared with that in the USA. To improve regulation, national‐level processes should be targeted for amendment. To that end, the authors suggest various ways of expanding the registration capacity of MS. © 2018 The Authors. Pest Management Science published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Society of Chemical Industry. This article compares the regulation of microbial biopesticide registration in the European Union (EU) and the USA, discussing regulatory differences and resulting obstacles. EU registration takes substantially longer, lagging mostly at the national level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The unintended presence of traces of genetically modified (GM) crops in the harvests of non‐GM crops plays a prominent role in the debate over the coexistence of GM and non‐GM crops. One way to address the issue is the formation of GM‐free or GM‐only clubs. We model the decisions of individual farmers to cultivate either GM or non‐GM crops and combine this with a game theoretic model of club formation to investigate the feasibility of such clubs. We consider two liability regimes: GM farmers are liable or they are not. We consider two benchmarks: Nash equilibrium without negotiations and the efficient allocation and compare those with partial co‐operation through a Coasean club. We find that in both regimes a relatively large club can form but they are not always necessary to reach the efficient allocation. In fact, if farmers can freely decide under profit maximisation what to cultivate, they reach 95% of an efficient allocation. This holds independent of the property rights system and provides strong support for coexistence policies based on ex‐post liability such as in the US and Spain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sustainable development can be attained by policies that are derived by analyses that integrate biophysical considerations into economic models. We show that policies and incentives that correct market failure can attain sustainable development through enhancing conservation, recycling, the use of renewable resources, and development of the bioeconomy, which relies on biological processes and feedstock to produce renewable products. The design of sustainable development policies and analysis of the bioeconomy pose new challenges to applied economists, who are uniquely qualified to integrate economic analysis with biophysical considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We estimate the perceived costs of legal requirements ('coexistence measures') for growing genetically modified (GM) Bt maize in Germany using a choice experiment. The costs of the evaluated ex-ante and ex-post coexistence measures range from zero to more than €300 per measure and most are greater than the extra revenue the farmers in our survey expect from growing Bt maize or than estimates in the literature. The cost estimates for temporal separation, the highest in our evaluation, imply that the exclusion of this measure in Germany is justified. The costliest measures of the ones that are currently applied in Germany are joint and strict liability for all damages. Our results further show that neighbours do not cause a problem and opportunities for reducing costs through agreements with them exist. Finally, we find that farmers' attitudes towards GM crops affect the probability of adoption of Bt maize. Our results imply that strict liability will deter the cultivation of Bt maize in Germany unless liability issues can be addressed through other means, for example, through neighbours agreements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Genetically engineered ( GE) crops are subject to regulatory oversight to ensure their safety for humans and the environment. Their approval in the European Union ( EU) starts with an application in a given Member State followed by a scientific risk assessment, and ends with a political decision-making step (risk management). In the United States ( US) approval begins with a scientific (field trial) step and ends with a 'bureaucratic' decision-making step. We investigate trends for the time taken for these steps and the overall time taken for approving GE crops in the US and the EU. Our results show that from 1996-2015 the overall time trend for approval in the EU decreased and then flattened off, with an overall mean completion-time of 1,763 days. In the US in 1998 there was a break in the trend of the overall approval time. Initially, from 1988 until 1997 the trend decreased with a mean approval time of 1,321 days; from 1998-2015, the trend almost stagnated with a mean approval time of 2,467 days. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: We describe the maize supply chain in Portugal for maize bread, a traditional bread type. As this bread is not labelled as ‘contains genetically modified organisms’ it should not contain more than 0.9 per cent genetically modified ingredients. On the basis of interviews we identify a general lack of documentation of the presence or absence of genetically modified ingredients along the complete supply chain (farmers, traders, mills and bakeries). Part of this deficiency is probably driven by a lack of awareness of the labelling rules at the end of the supply chain. A test of maize bread showed that more than 40 per cent of breads were indeed over the labelling threshold, and should be labelled. This includes GM maize that is not cultivated in the EU and enters the supply chain via international trade. We conclude that the realisation of coexistence and segregation requires involvement of the full supply chain, rather than just segregation at the start, if bread is to be sold with a GMO content below the 0.9 per cent threshold level. Alternatively, retailers can label their bread. This might be a cheaper solution and as a study from Switzerland shows may not result in adverse consumer reaction. Nous décrivons la filière de l'offre de maïs au Portugal pour la fabrication du traditionnel ‘pain de maïs’. Comme ce pain n'est pas étiqueté comme contenant des OGM, il ne devrait pas contenir plus de 0.9 pour cent d'ingrédients génétiquement modifiés. À partir d'entretiens, nous remarquons un défaut général de documentation sur la présence ou l'absence d'ingrédients génétiquement modifiés le long de la filière de l'offre complète (agriculteurs, négociants, meuneries et boulangeries). Ce défaut est probablement en partie dû à un manque de connaissance des règles d’étiquetage en fin de filière. Selon des tests faits sur le pain, plus de 40 pour cent des pains dépassaient le seuil nécessitant un étiquetage et devraient donc être étiquetés. Cela correspond à du maïs GM qui n'a pas été cultivé dans l'Union européenne et qui entre dans la filière par le biais du commerce international. Nous en concluons que la mise en place de la coexistence et de la ségrégation exige la coopération de l'ensemble de la filière et pas uniquement la ségrégation au début de la filière si le pain doit être vendu avec un taux de GMO inférieur au seuil de 0.9 pour cent. Alternativement, les détaillants peuvent étiqueter leur pain. Il pourrait s'agir une solution moins onéreuse et une étude réalisée en Suisse montre que cela pourrait ne pas entraîner de réaction négative des consommateurs. Wir beschreiben die Wertschöpfungskette für Mais in Portugal für Maisbrot, eine landestypische Brotsorte. Da dieses Produkt nicht mit dem Vermerk „enthält genetisch veränderte Organismen” gekennzeichnet ist, sollte sein Anteil an genetisch veränderten Inhaltsstoffen nicht über 0,9 Prozent liegen. Unsere Befragungen ergeben, dass es allgemein an Unterlagen fehlt, die das Vorhandensein oder Nichtvorhandensein genetisch veränderter Inhaltsstoffe entlang der gesamten Wertschöpfungskette (Landwirte, Händler, Mühlen und Bäckereien) dokumentieren. Dieser Schwachpunkt ist wahrscheinlich zum Teil auf eine fehlende Kenntnis der Kennzeichnungsvorschriften am Ende der Wertschöpfungskette zurückzuführen. Eine Untersuchung von Maisbrot ergab, dass über 40 Prozent der Proben sehr wohl über der Kennzeichnungsschwelle lagen und somit gekennzeichnet werden sollten. Dies gilt auch für genetisch veränderten Mais, der außerhalb der EU angebaut wird und über den internationalen Handel in die Wertschöpfungskette gelangt. Wir kommen zu dem Schluss, dass die Umsetzung der Koexistenz und Trennung die Beteiligung der gesamten Wertschöpfungskette erfordert und nicht nur eine Trennung zu Beginn, wenn das Brot mit einem Anteil an genetisch veränderten Inhaltsstoffen noch unterhalb des Kennzeichnungsschwellenwerts von 0,9 Prozent verkauft werden soll. Alternativ hierzu können die Einzelhändler ihr Brot kennzeichnen. Dies könnte eine kostengünstigere Lösung sein, die nicht zu einer Ablehnung durch den Verbraucher führen muss, wie Belege aus der Schweiz zeigen. We describe the maize supply chain in Portugal for maize bread, a traditional bread type. As this bread is not labelled as ‘contains genetically modified organisms’ it should not contain more than 0.9 per cent genetically modified ingredients. On the basis of interviews we identify a general lack of documentation of the presence or absence of genetically modified ingredients along the complete supply chain (farmers, traders, mills and bakeries). Part of this deficiency is probably driven by a lack of awareness of the labelling rules at the end of the supply chain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: Many EU MS have implemented coexistence policies to govern the cultivation of GM crops on their territory but only one GM crop, the Bt maize event MON810, is currently cultivated in the EU. From a practical point of view, a combination of paper traceability and implementation of isolation distances between GM and non‐GM maize are considered as being the most effective way of segregating both types of materials. In general, infringements will however only become apparent after harvesting the crops. Liability issues will then be invoked late in the process restricting or at least limiting flexibility in the marketing of the materials in an appropriate way. Nevertheless, following the general guidelines for coexistence developed by the European Commission, EU Member States are progressively regulating coexistence at the national level. The policies in the EU governing coexistence can be differentiated into ex‐ante regulations and ex‐post liability rules. This differentiation is useful as the economic implications between the two differ. With regard to maize, studies show that the costs of complying with the given threshold values for GM content at farm level range from zero to 2 per cent of the total growing costs for both conventional and organic production. De nombreux États membres de l'Union européenne ont mis en œuvre des politiques de coexistence qui régissent la culture de plantes GM sur leur territoire mais seule l'une d'entre elles, le maïs Bt MON810, est actuellement cultivée dans l'Union européenne. D'un point de vue pratique, combiner la traçabilité documentée et la mise en place de distances d'isolement entre les maïs GM et non‐GM est considéré comme le moyen le plus efficace de séparer les deux types de produits. Cependant, les infractions ne deviendront généralement apparentes qu'après récolte. Les questions de responsabilité seront alors invoquées tardivement dans la procédure ce qui restreindra ou, au minimum, limitera la flexibilité dans la commercialisation appropriée du produit. Dans le cadre des directives générales pour la coexistence développées par l'Union européenne, les États membres réglementent progressivement la coexistence au niveau national. Les politiques européennes en matière de coexistence peuvent se distinguer entre réglementations a priori et règles de responsabilité a posteriori. Cette différenciation est utile car les implications économiques des deux catégories sont différentes. En ce qui concerne le maïs, les études montrent que le coût du respect des valeurs limites du contenu en produit GM au niveau de l'exploitation varie entre zéro et deux pour cent du coût de croissance total en production conventionnelle et biologique. Zahlreiche Mitgliedsstaaten der EU haben Koexistenzmaßnahmen eingeführt, um den Anbau von genetisch veränderten Feldfrüchten auf ihrem Gebiet zu regeln; derzeit wird jedoch nur eine genetisch veränderte Sorte, Bt‐Mais MON810, in der EU angebaut. Aus praktischer Sicht stellt eine Kombination aus der Rückverfolgbarkeit anhand von Unterlagen und der Einführung von Sicherheitsabständen zwischen den Anbauflächen für genetisch verändertem und nicht genetisch verändertem Mais wohl das wirksamste Mittel dar, um die unterschiedlichen Qualitäten zu trennen. Im Allgemeinen zeigen sich Konflikte allerdings erst nach der Ernte. Haftungsfragen werden daher spät aufgeworfen, was die Flexibilität bei der angemessenen Vermarktung des Ernteguts einschränkt. Gemäß den von der Europäischen Kommission entwickelten allgemeinen Leitlinien für Koexistenz regeln die Mitgliedsstaaten der EU Koexistenz zunehmend auf nationaler Ebene. Die in der EU zur Regelung der Koexistenz angewandten Politikmaßnahmen lassen sich in Vorabverpflichtungen und Ex‐Post‐Haftungsvorschriften sinnvoll einteilen, da sich deren wirtschaftliche Auswirkungen voneinander unterscheiden. In Bezug auf Mais geht aus den Untersuchungen hervor, dass sich die Kosten für die Einhaltung der vorgegebenen Schwellenwerte für den Gehalt genetisch veränderter Inhaltsstoffe auf Betriebsebene zwischen null und zwei Prozent der Gesamtanbaukosten sowohl bei konventionellem als auch bei ökologischem Anbau bewegen. Many EU MS have implemented coexistence policies to govern the cultivation of GM crops on their territory but only one GM crop, the Bt maize event MON810, is currently cultivated in the EU. From a practical point of view, a combination of paper traceability and implementation of isolation distances between GM and non‐GM maize are considered as being the most effective way of segregating both types of materials. In general, infringements will however only become apparent after harvesting the crops. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: Food suppliers in the EU must comply with labelling regulations for genetically modified organisms (GMOs). However, excluded from mandatory labelling are food products derived from animals fed with GM feed (mainly GM soybean in the EU). Because of this labelling exemption, consumers are unable to identify which animal products were derived without the use of GMOs. Therefore, Germany and other countries introduced voluntary ‘GM‐free’ labelling legislations or guidelines that allow companies to signal that their products are ‘GM‐free’. We present the results of a survey among German dairy companies. We asked them whether they produce ‘GM‐free’ and to assess the ‘GM‐free’ market in terms of (1) the current status, (2) potential benefits, (3) limitations and (4) risks. We find that smaller dairy companies mostly switch completely, whereas ‘GM‐free’ production of larger dairy companies is often limited. The results indicate that for switching to ‘GM‐free’ production, long‐term effects such as the creation of a positive image or differentiation from competitors are more important for dairy companies than short‐term effects such as higher sales or profit. Les entreprises agroalimentaires de l'Union européenne doivent respecter les réglementations relatives à l’étiquetage des organismes génétiquement modifiés (OGM). Cependant, sont exclus de l’étiquetage obligatoire les produits alimentaires issus des animaux nourris aux aliments GM (principalement le soja GM dans l'Union européenne). Du fait de cette exception, les consommateurs ne peuvent pas identifier les produits animaux dont la production n'a pas fait appel à des OGM. En conséquence, l'Allemagne et d'autres pays ont introduit des législations d’étiquetage volontaire ‘sans OGM’ ou des lignes directrices permettant aux entreprises de signaler que leurs produits sont sans OGM. Nous présentons les résultats d'une enquête menée auprès d'entreprises laitières allemandes. Nous leur avons demandé si elles produisaient des produits sans OGM et d’évaluer le marché sans OGM en termes de (1) son état actuel, (2) des avantages potentiels, (3) des limitations et (4) des risques. Nous avons constaté que les entreprises laitières plus petites avaient généralement adopté cet étiquetage complètement, tandis que la production sans OGM des plus grandes entreprises était limitée. Selon les résultats, les effets à long terme d'un passage à une production ‘sans OGM’, comme la création d'une image positive ou la différenciation des concurrents, sont plus importants pour les entreprises laitières que les effets à court terme tels que des ventes ou des profits plus élevés. Die Lebensmittelzulieferer in der Europäischen Union müssen sich an die Kennzeichnungsvorschriften für genetisch veränderte Organismen (GVO) halten. Die Kennzeichnungspflicht besteht jedoch nicht für Lebensmittel von Tieren, die mit genetisch veränderten Futtermitteln (überwiegend genetisch veränderte Sojabohnen) gefüttert werden. Aufgrund dieser Ausnahme von der Kennzeichnungspflicht können Verbraucher nicht erkennen, ob Nahrungsmittel ohne Zugabe von GVO in der Fütterung hergestellt wurden. Daher wurden in Deutschland und anderen Ländern freiwillige Vorschriften und Leitlinien zur Kennzeichnung von gentechnisch freien Nahrungsmitteln eingeführt, damit Unternehmen ihre Produkte als solche kennzeichnen können. Wir stellen die Ergebnisse einer Erhebung bei deutschen Molkereien vor, die danach befragt wurden, ob sie gentechnisch freie Nahrungsmittel herstellen, und die gebeten wurden, den Markt für gentechnisch freie Nahrungsmittel im Hinblick auf (1) die aktuelle Situation, (2) den potenziellen Nutzen, (3) Einschränkungen sowie (4) Risiken zu bewerten. So stellen kleinere Molkereien meist ihre Produktion vollständig um, während die Produktion von gentechnisch freien Nahrungsmitteln in größeren Molkereien häufig Einschränkungen unterliegt. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass langfristige Effekte wie z.B. eine positive Imagebildung oder die Differenzierung vom Wettbewerb für die Molkereien einen höheren Stellenwert haben als kurzfristige Effekte wie z.B. höhere Umsätze oder Gewinne, wenn es um die Umstellung der Produktion auf gentechnisch freie Nahrungsmittel geht. Food suppliers in the EU must comply with labelling regulations for genetically modified organisms (GMOs). However, excluded from mandatory labelling are food products derived from animals fed with GM feed (mainly GM soybean in the EU). Because of this labelling exemption, consumers are unable to identify which animal products were derived without the use of GMOs. Therefore, Germany and other countries introduced voluntary ‘GM‐free’ labelling legislations or guidelines that allow companies to signal that their products are ‘GM‐free’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, we investigate the new European Union ( EU) regulations in the light of the ruling by the World Trade Organization ( WTO) panel on the trade in genetically modified crops. To this end, we describe: the basic differences in approaches between the EU and the complaining parties with regard to genetically modified crops, what the main arguments were of the complaining parties as well as the defence of the EU, what the final judgement of the panel was and finally, we describe the current EU regulations. We then analyse to what extent, the arguments and conclusions of the panel still hold regarding the new EU legislation. We find that parts of the current EU legislation, that is, the safety bans as they are currently in place, are in breach of the WTO commitments. Moreover, the new approval procedures have the potential to also break these rules, although whether or not they will, depends on how the European Commission acts. Whether or not the EU will be challenged at the WTO remains an open question, as the decision to fight before the WTO may be more costly than working out new bilateral trade agreements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores consumer acceptance and valuation of a genetically modified (GM) staple food crop in a developing country prior to its commercialization. We focus on the hypothetical introduction of a disease-resistant GM banana variety in Uganda, where bananas are among the most important staple crops. A choice experiment is used to investigate consumer preferences for various attributes related to the banana (such as bunch size, technology, producer benefit, and price) and examine their opinions on GM foodstuff. Choice data come from 421 banana-consuming households randomly selected from three regions of Uganda. A latent class model is used to investigate the heterogeneity in consumers' preferences for selected attributes related to the banana and to profile consumers who are more or less likely to accept GM bananas. Our results reveal that there is significant heterogeneity in consumer preferences across our sample. GM bananas are valued the most by poorer households located in the rural areas of the Eastern region. These food-insecure households would experience the highest benefits (i.e., welfare gains) from the commercial release of GM bananas. In contrast, urban consumers are less accepting of GM bananas, and they would experience significant welfare losses if GM banana is released. According to our welfare estimates, both the total welfare benefits acquired by the gainers and the total welfare losses borne by the losers of this technology are significant and large. These results suggest the need for further investigation of the overall welfare effects of the introduction of GM bananas on the Ugandan society as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although recurrent evidence is found that consumers have different willingness to pay for GM and non-GM products, there is disagreement in the scientific community about the size of consumer benefits from GM labeling. In this article we use a theoretical model based on a standard constant elasticity of substitution (CES) to explain the importance of the quality effect. It is shown that failing to consider the quality effect may yield an overestimation of benefits from GM labeling, voluntary or mandatory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines how the different coexistence policies among the European Union (EU) Member States affect the adoption of genetically modified (GM) crops. Trade-offs for different regulatory systems within the EU are analyzed. The model being used combines ex ante regulatory and ex post liability costs including irreversibility and uncertainty. Researchers found that the adoption dynamics of GM crops within the EU are likely to be very different across and within EU Member States. One element causing variability is the heterogeneity of farms, farm practices and landscape structure.

Productivity assessment of damage control inputs (such as pesticides) is complicated because their effect depends on the exposure to damage agents (such as pests). We discuss some open specification and estimation issues. The contribution is threefold. First, we elaborate the separability conditions for the damage control function and production function. Second, we employ a two-stage semiparametric technique to combine attractive features of both nonparametric and parametric approaches. Third, we model the interaction between pest exposure and damage control inputs by using slope dummies. An application to productivity analysis of small scale Bt cotton production in China illustrates the approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper demonstrates that treating multidestination trips (MDT) as single-destination trips does not involve any systematic upward or downward bias in consumer surplus (CS) estimates because the direct negative effect of a price increase (treating MDT as a single-destination trip) is offset by a shift in the estimated demand curve. Still, ignoring MDT can greatly underestimate or overestimate the CS. In addition, we demonstrate that there is a sound theoretical basis for using preference information for allocating travel costs between different sites included in the MDT package. A novel extreme value approach is proposed, which does not require any overly restrictive assumptions about consumer preferences. This approach is applied to the zonal travel cost model of the Bellenden Ker National Park, Australia. Parametric and non-parametric estimation techniques are used for calculating CS estimates, and the effects of different MDT treatments and estimation methods are compared. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We discuss a diversity measure combining information of relative abundances and taxonomic distinctiveness suggested by Ricotta (2004). We show that Ricotta's measure violates weak species monotonicity, a condition that requires that the addition of a species should always increase a diversity index if abundances change only marginally. We suggest an alternative index satisfying weak species monotonicity and apply it to the ‘Zeesserveld’ forest reserve in the Netherlands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]