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Over the past two decades, tax nudging has gained popularity as a method to boost tax compliance and help revenue authorities increase tax collection. However, most evidence on the effect of behaviourally informed tax letters comes from environments with high administrative capacity, which raises doubts about its generalizability. Against this background, this article tests the compliance effect of including messages that trigger deterrence or reciprocity beliefs in tax letters through a randomized controlled trial implemented in two mid‐sized Mozambican municipalities, Vilankulo and Dondo. Conducted in 2018, the experiment focuses on property taxation, a tax overwhelmingly perceived to perform well below its potential in many low‐ and middle‐income countries. The analysis relies on administrative data and exploits the complete universe of registered property tax taxpayers, including individuals and enterprises. The results indicate that (i) receiving a notification letter – not necessarily common practice in many contexts – has a significant positive impact on compliance; (ii) among enterprises, the message alluding to reciprocity backfires, while the most effective message to include generally is the one alluding to deterrence; and (iii) previously compliant taxpayers react negatively to the letter, regardless of the message included. These results carry relevant policy implications, indicating the large scope for behaviourally informed letters to help increase tax compliance, even in low administrative capacity settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates how tax rates and tax enforcement jointly impact fiscal capacity in low‐income countries. We study a policy experiment in the D.R. Congo that randomly assigned 38,028 property owners to the status quo tax rate or to a rate reduction. This variation in tax liabilities reveals that the status quo rate lies above the revenue‐maximizing tax rate (RMTR). Reducing rates by about one‐third would maximize government revenue by increasing tax compliance. We then exploit two sources of variation in enforcement—randomized enforcement letters and random assignment of tax collectors—to show that the RMTR increases with enforcement. Including an enforcement message on tax letters or replacing tax collectors in the bottom quartile of enforcement capacity with average collectors would raise the RMTR by about 40%. Tax rates and enforcement are thus complementary levers. Jointly optimizing tax rates and enforcement would lead to 10% higher revenue gains than optimizing them independently. These findings provide experimental evidence that low government enforcement capacity sets a binding ceiling on the revenue‐maximizing tax rate in some developing countries, thereby demonstrating the value of increasing tax rates in tandem with enforcement to expand fiscal capacity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the disaggregated behavioral responses of mobile money users' willingness to pay for electronic levy payments in Ghana. We use cross‐sectional survey primary data and a probit regression estimation technique with its associated average marginal effects and check robustness with a linear probability model. The evidence from the study indicates that the disaggregated behavioral factors that drive willingness to pay for the e‐levy include individuals maintaining their current levels of electronic fund transfers, the intention to increase their electronic fund transactions, and intention to stop using electronic fund transfers that attract the e‐levy. Beyond the disaggregated behavioral responses, psychological (e.g., trust in government) and socioeconomic factors (individual income and gender) are identified as important drivers of willingness to pay for the e‐levy. We suggest that policies around e‐levies must not only focus on individual behavioral responses alone, as the drivers include behavioral, psychological, and socioeconomic factors. Related Articles: Adegboye, Alex, Kofo Adegboye, Uwalomwa Uwuigbe, Stephen Ojeka, and Eyitemi Fasanu. 2023. "Taxation, Democracy, and Inequality in Sub‐Saharan Africa: Relevant Linkages for Sustainable Development Goals." Politics & Policy 51(4): 696–722. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12547. Lachapelle, Erick, Thomas Bergeron, Richard Nadeau, Jean‐François Daoust, Ruth Dassonneville, and Éric Bélanger. 2021. "Citizens' Willingness to Support New Taxes for COVID‐19 Measures and the Role of Trust." Politics & Policy 49(3): 534–65. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12404. Shock, David R. 2013. "The Significance of Opposition Entrepreneurs on Local Sales Tax Referendum Outcomes." Politics & Policy 41(4): 588–614. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12028. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motivation: Appropriately taxing the richest is a priority for African governments, which need tax revenues to invest and pay for public services. In Uganda, the revenue authority launched a unit in 2015 to monitor the tax affairs of high‐net‐worth individuals (HNWIs) and very important persons (VIPs), 393 individuals in all. The unit combined persuasion, assistance, and enforcement. Purpose: To establish the extent to which the unit was able to improve tax compliance by the rich. Methods and approach: In collaboration with the Uganda Revenue Authority, this study builds on taxpayer‐level data on tax filing and payment. The analysis employs a standard difference‐in‐difference framework, exploiting the timing of the launch of the unit (September 2015). It also makes use of the existence of the target group of 393 wealthy individuals and a group of another 1,731 potentially wealthy individuals who have been identified but never included in the unit's operations owing to limited resources. We match the groups using a propensity score algorithm. Findings: The unit has been only partially successful. While the unit increased the probability of filing a return, especially by VIPs, taxpayers declared less on different measures, with no impacts on tax liability. On tax payments, only a small and significant positive impact was found, again due to complex offsetting responses across tax categories. This study also measures the spillover effect on companies controlled by the richest—again documenting complex compensating reactions and no meaningful impacts on tax take. Lastly, while deterrence is more effective for HNWIs, taxpayer assistance and public shaming are more relevant for VIPs. Policy implications: This case shows that the rich can be identified and their tax monitored. It also shows the limits of what can be achieved. The Uganda unit lacked staff; it needed twice as many people to monitor the tax of wealthy persons adequately. Moreover, it was hamstrung by the difficulties of sharing data between different departments of the Tax Authority, among government agencies, and between government and key agents such as banks. Ultimately, the unit did not have the staff and data to challenge the tax avoidance schemes deployed by wealthy people and the companies they own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the empirical association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure and tax compliance when there is a tax amnesty policy provided by the government. Utilizing the difference in difference method, we studied the impact of the tax amnesty program on tax compliance and CSR disclosure of companies in the mining industry in Indonesia context for the research period 2014–2019. Consistent with inertia theory, we observe the organizational inertia phenomena as the findings indicate the insignificant impact of the tax amnesty program on tax compliance and the marginally significant negative impact on CSR disclosure. This might come from corporate attributes that cause the inertia such as routines and procedures as well as the fixed mindset of the companies' decision‐makers on the cost and benefit of becoming corporate citizens. The inertia might also reflect the weaknesses in the management control system, especially in the belief and boundary control system. This research discusses the impact of tax amnesty on CSR disclosure which has been rarely investigated in previous studies. This study also extends the inertia theory on the taxation context and provides policy implications on tax amnesty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses differences‐in‐differences to analyze the effectiveness of messages sent by the Spanish Tax Agency to deter tax evasion by owners of vacation rentals. The results suggest that these messages were effective in the aggregate, as there was an increase both in the declared amount of such income (6–8.5%, depending on the line item under which it is declared) and in the number of filers (29.7–64.2%), and this effectiveness became more marked over time. Notably, there was more response to the intervention from the self‐employed. However, in some collectives, the intervention produced the opposite of the intended effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Measuring and predicting compliance with tax obligations is an important but challenging task. Survey data from California smokers show that several forms of tax avoidance and evasion were common. The analysis shows that 43% of smokers avoided taxes by purchasing cigarettes from out‐of‐state sources in the past year, 15% admitted to evading taxes through cross‐border purchases, and 26% reported purchasing likely or certainly untaxed cigarettes in the state in the past month. Attitudinal factors related to tax morale explain much more of the variance in compliance rates than demographic or law‐and‐economics factors. The implications for policy are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tax agents' role in ensuring or deterring compliance with tax obligations has received relatively little attention in the literature. Some evidence has emerged indicating when agents improve (or decrease) compliance, and why taxpayers employ their services. However, most existing studies have focused on high- or upper-middle-income countries. As the tax systems of low-income countries present a unique set of compliance issues, a closer look at the role that tax agents play in these contexts is warranted. In this paper, we present evidence from two surveys on their use in Uganda. Our results show that tax agents contribute to an increased quality of filed returns thereby leading to lower audit adjustments The type of services more frequently requested by taxpayers seem to match those in highincome countries, as do their reasons for engaging tax agents in the first place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and fiscal responsibility have become a hot topic of debate in recent years. Many studies have investigated CSR and tax avoidance; however, such studies have overlooked countries' tax cultures and fiscal responsibility from a historical perspective and have not addressed how these elements affect current tax avoidance practices. Using a questionnaire, that was administered to a sample of Italian and Romanian respondents, and inferential techniques (Mann–Whitney‐test and correlation‐test) the paper tries to understand the aspects that be useful in the future development and implementation of more robust fiscal ISR and CSR processes. Our results reveal similarities and differences between the relevance of certain aspects between countries, identifying tax culture as a distinctive element from a geographical point of view. Despite the considerable differences, we found a strong demand for greater transparency of the company with administrations and communities and desire for the development of initiatives to spread a responsible tax culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taxation is one of the most widely acknowledged strategies to reduce inequality, particularly if based on progressivity. In a high‐powered sample study (N = 2119) we investigated economic inequality and conspiracy beliefs as two key predictors of tax attitude and support for progressive taxation. We found that participants in the high economic inequality condition had lower levels of tax compliance and higher levels of conspiracy beliefs and support for progressive taxation. Furthermore, the effect of the experimental condition on tax compliance was mediated by conspiracy beliefs. Finally, conspiracy belief scores were positively associated with support for progressive taxation. Our results provide evidence that attitudes towards taxation are not monolithic but change considering the aims and targets of specific taxes. Indeed, while the perception of economic inequality prompts the desire for equal redistribution, it also fosters conspiracy narratives that undermine compliance with taxes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I discuss how Law and Economics can benefit from incorporating some insights from Public Choice into their analyses. Within this argument, I examine the evolution of experimental methods by looking at laboratory, field, and natural experiments; and conducting a very simple scientometrics analysis on the relative frequency of experimental studies in journals such as Public Choice, European Journal of Political Economy, Constitutional Political Economy, Journal of Law and Economics, and Journal of Law, Economics and Organization compared with top economics journals such as American Economic Review, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Political Economy, Econometrica, or Review of Economic Studies. I also refer to the connectivity of Behavioral Law and Economics and Behavioral Public Choice. The paper then finishes with a discussion of a selected number of topics covering areas such as corruption, tax compliance, shitstorms/firestorms, constitutional choices, globalization, and international organizations; all of which present scientific challenges when applying pure Law and Economics approaches without also implementing a Public Choice analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The highly influential Allingham and Sandmo model of income tax evasion assumes that taxpayers are driven by utility maximization, choosing evasion over compliance if it yields a higher expected profit. We test the main assumptions of this so‐called deterrence approach considering both compliance decisions and the process of information acquisition using MouselabWEB. In an incentivized experiment, 109 participants made 24 compliance decisions with varying information presented for four within‐subject factors (the four central model parameters: income, tax rate, audit probability, and fine level). Additionally, explicit expected value information was indicated in one of two conditions. The results reveal that participants attended to all relevant information, a prerequisite for expected value‐like calculations. As predicted by the deterrence model, choices were clearly influenced by audit probability and fine level. Against the model assumptions, the presented parameters were not integrated adequately, indicated by a non‐monotonic increase of evasion with rising expected rate of return from evasion. Additionally, more transitions between information necessary for calculating expected values did not result in higher model conformity, just as presenting explicit information on expected values. We conclude that deterrence information clearly influences tax compliance decisions in our setting but observed deviations from the deterrence model can be attributed to failures to properly integrate all relevant parameters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Country‐by‐Country Reporting and Automatic Exchange of Information have recently been implemented in European Union (EU) countries. These international tax reforms increase tax compliance in the short term. In the long run, however, taxpayers will continue looking abroad to avoid taxation and, countries, looking for additional revenues, will provide opportunities. As a result, tax competition intensifies and the initial increase in compliance could reverse. To avoid international tax reforms being counteracted by tax competition, this paper suggests bilateral responsive regulation to maximize compliance. This implies that countries would use different tax policy instruments toward other countries, including tax and secrecy havens. Our agent‐based simulation finds that a differentiated policy response could increase tax compliance by 6.54 percent, which translates into an annual increase of €105 billion in EU tax revenues on income, profits, and capital gains. Corporate income tax revenues in France, Spain, and the UK alone would already account for €35 billion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the impact of a stricter tax compliance policy on firms' pollution emissions in the presence of labor market frictions. In contrast to a situation with perfect labor markets, we find that under the right‐to‐manage wage formation, a stricter compliance policy increases emissions when the shadow cost of the emission limit is excluded, whereas it has no impact when the shadow cost is included. With efficient bargaining, a stricter compliance policy decreases (or increases) pollution emissions under employment (wage) orientation but has no impact on pollution emissions under wage neutrality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use administrative tax data from audits of self‐assessment tax returns to understand what types individuals are most likely to be non‐compliant. Non‐compliance is common, with one‐third of taxpayers underpaying by some amount, although half of aggregate under‐reporting is done by just 2 per cent of taxpayers. Third‐party reporting reduces non‐compliance, while working in a cash‐prevalent industry increases it. However, compliance also varies significantly with individual characteristics: non‐compliance is higher for men and younger people. These results matter for measuring inequality, for understanding taxpayer behaviour, and for targeting audit resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I assess the costs of administering a wealth tax for taxpayers and the tax authority in the UK context, based on evidence from existing UK taxes on wealth and comprehensive wealth taxes that have been imposed in other countries. My central estimate is that a well‐designed wealth tax generates costs to taxpayers of 0.1 per cent of taxable wealth and costs to the tax authority of 0.05 per cent of taxable wealth. I discuss how these costs depend on design choices. My findings can inform revenue modelling and help to evaluate the desirability of wealth taxes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We model the optimal intertemporal decision of an agent who chooses tax evasion and consumption, over an infinite lifetime horizon, where consumption is driven by habits. We find the following: (i) tax evaders reduce consumption in the early stages of habit accumulation and increase it over time; (ii) habit formation has a dampening effect on tax evasion; (iii) neglecting tax evasion can lead to habit overestimation; (iv) the effect of the tax rate on tax evasion is ambiguous; (v) heavy fines are more efficient than frequent controls in reducing tax evasion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Large tax compliance gaps, together with the need to generate additional tax revenue have put a premium on tax administration reform in emerging Europe. The key features of an efficient tax administration are well established, but an objective assessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses of tax administrations have been lacking. This paper proposes a simple index of tax administration strength, based on objective indicators reflecting key organizational and operational aspects of revenue administrations relative to international best practice. A diagnostic test is then conducted to assess the performance of the proposed index in its ability to predict variations in tax collection efficiency in emerging Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whereas some researchers suggest that education fosters tax compliance, others argue that tax knowledge inspires tax evasion. The present study explores whether 'tax education' improves tax compliance using data from Hong Kong, given its influential position in East Asia and the government's reliance on taxpayers' voluntary reporting. Taxpayers comply if they are 'able and willing to' positively 'perceive tax system fairness' and 'morally' believe that it is right to comply. Our research model consolidates and empirically tests these factors as underlying channels explaining how tax education improves tax compliance. Being the first study to investigate how tax compliance in Hong Kong is affected by tax education through these channels, our empirical evidence is useful for future researchers and policy‐makers in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Tax experiments have been gaining momentum in recent years, although this literature dates back several decades. With new developments in methods and data availability, tax experiments have gradually moved away from lab settings and towards the field. This movement from the lab to the field has happened against the background of the ‘credibility revolution’ in applied economics, which has seen more rigorous methods applied to policy relevant questions, and of the availability to researchers of administrative data from tax returns. These developments have allowed significant advances in the experimental literature on tax compliance. This paper reviews this literature, giving particular attention to field experiments using administrative data, but putting them in the broader context of the compliance literature. A particular effort is made to take a global perspective, in a literature that is only recently seeing the emergence of evidence from Africa, Latin America and Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we suggest that individuals' tax compliance behaviours are affected by the behaviour of their 'neighbours', or those about whom they may have information, whom they may know, or with whom they may interact on a regular basis. Individuals are more likely to file and to report their taxes when they believe that other individuals are also filing and reporting their taxes; conversely, when individuals believe that others are cheating on their taxes, they may well become cheaters themselves. We use experimental methods to test the role of such information about peer effects on compliance behaviour. In one treatment setting, we inform individuals about the frequency that their neighbours submit a tax return. In a second treatment setting, we inform them about the number of their neighbours who are audited, together with the penalties that they pay. In both cases, we examine the impact of information on filing behaviour and also on subsequent reporting behaviour. We find that providing information on whether one's neighbours are filing returns and/or reporting income has a statistically significant and economically large impact on individual filing and reporting decisions. However, this 'neighbour' information does not always improve compliance, depending on the exact content of the information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Manuscript Type Empirical Research Question/Issue Companies operating in transition economies encounter a broad range of potential challenges. In the area of tax, firms make direct tax payments but may also encounter unofficial tax costs in the form of bribery or extortion. We focus on institutional determinants, including formal rules, informal rules, and enforcement, to examine conditions under which firms are more likely to encounter these transactions. We operationalize formal rules as rule-based trust and informal rules as dispositional trust. Research Findings/Insights Based on a sample of over 5000 firms representing 20 transition economies, we show that when rule-based trust is high, the presence of tax enforcement activities in the form of visits and inspections by tax officials does not change the relationship between rule-based trust and unofficial payments. However, when dispositional trust is low, unofficial payments are more likely if verification activities occur. Theoretical/Academic Implications We adopt a more holistic view and focus on the joint consideration of different institutional determinants and firm outcomes. In doing so, the article demonstrates the complexity of firms' tax environments where enforcement mechanisms can have unwelcome consequences, and, under certain conditions, create conditions for the persistence of corruption. Practitioner/Policy Implications This paper highlights the importance of the institutional landscape, especially considering the history of institutional voids in many transition economies. The results have implications for corporate governance and caution regulators and practitioners to consider institutional complexities when implementing reforms or establishing businesses in transition economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although it seems reasonable to assume that activating patriotism might motivate citizens to cooperate with the state in reaching societal goals, the empirical evidence supporting this contention is based mostly on correlational rather than experimental studies. In addition, little is known on whether patriotism can be manipulated without simultaneously triggering nationalism and on the psychological processes which determine the patriotism-cooperation relation. This current article reports results of one survey and three experiments that manipulate patriotism by displaying either a national flag or national landscapes or by priming national achievements. The outcomes indicate that reported and manipulated patriotism indirectly increase tax compliance, although the national flag also increases nationalism. National achievements, on the other hand, seemingly increases trust in national public institutions and the voluntary motivation to cooperate, whereas national landscapes only increase the voluntary motivation to cooperate. Hence, it is possible to increase social capital in the form of trust and cooperation through patriotism without fostering nationalism as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Equilibrium behaviour is one of the fundamental concepts of economics: that each player's strategy is a best response to their beliefs about other players' strategies (and that these beliefs are realised). It is therefore striking that one of the most utilised economic models of tax compliance (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) lacks this property as random audit selection is not a best response for the tax administration. The game theory literature of tax compliance has solved the equilibrium under assumptions of perfect information, full rationality and representative agents (Reinganum and Wilde, 1986; Erard and Feinstein, 1994). The recent application of behavioural economics to tax compliance (Hashimzade et al., 2014) allows richer assumptions such as heterogeneity and asymmetric information to be included in agent-based models. This paper investigates the tax administration's best-response audit strategy with heterogeneous taxpayers, imperfect information and evolutionary survival of taxpayers. It finds that, under these conditions, the tax administration's best-response audit strategy is an adaptive learning approach and not a well-defined audit function. This fits with actual practice of 'predictive analytics' by OECD tax administrations. Behavioural game theory also predicts that when actors are information rich, adaptive learning will dominate abstract thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The work of Feldstein (1995 and 1999) has stimulated substantial conceptual and empirical advances in economists' approaches to analysing taxpayers' behavioural responses to changes in tax rates. Meanwhile, a largely independent literature proposing and applying alternative measures of tax compliance has also developed in recent years, which has sought to provide tax agencies with tools to identify the extent of tax non-compliance as a first step to designing policies to improve compliance. In this context, measures of 'tax gaps' - the difference between actual tax collected and the potential tax collection under full compliance with the tax code - have become the primary measures of tax non-compliance via (legal) avoidance and/or (illegal) evasion. In this paper, we argue that the tax gap as conventionally defined is conceptually flawed because it fails to incorporate behavioural responses by taxpayers. We show that conventional tax gap measures, which [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The more a government is effective and fair, the more legitimacy that government is likely to attain, and the more it will possess the potential to elicit compliance without excessive monitoring or punitive action. We explore this proposition using contemporary survey data from sub-Saharan Africa. In particular, we are interested in the conditions that promote popular legitimating beliefs that provide support for governments that are attempting to serve their entire populations competently and in a manner that is relatively impartial and equitable. This article provides empirical support for a long hypothesized link between the extent of government effectiveness, procedural justice, and citizens' willingness to defer to governmental tax authority. The sample, drawn from a continuum of developing societies in Africa, allows us to analyze the impact of variations in government effectiveness and citizen perceptions of fairness on the sense of obligation to comply with the tax authorities, our indicator for legitimating beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent developments in regulation and tax administration in Australia inspired this article on tax compliance and responsive regulation. This article analyzes the economics of crime and compliance as the dominant approach to tax enforcement of the past three and a half decades. It evaluates the key advantages and disadvantages of the economic approach as well as its application to tax. The article then explores responsive regulation as an alternative method that draws on the economic paradigm but also supplements this approach with other theories, particularly those involving identity, conflict escalation, and procedural justice. Building on this analysis and a case study of Australian investors in mass marketed tax schemes, the article suggests that the broader, more balanced, and closely tailored method of regulating responsively may enable regulators to draw on the advantages of the economic model while alleviating some of its drawbacks. Responsive regulation may therefore constitute a superior method for regulating compliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When individuals embark on their careers they not only become acculturated into their occupational sectors' day-to-day norms and practices, but also their taxpaying ones. Although the research on taxpaying cultures is still in its infancy, understanding more about taxpaying cultures could improve our understanding of the processes underlying tax compliance. To this end, this study aimed to build a detailed picture of the taxpaying culture (i.e. the norms and values) of one business sector—the hairdressing/beauty industry. Nineteen small business and self-employed hairdressers/beauticians were interviewed and a variant of Grounded theory was used to uncover the main themes that ran through the interviews as a whole. The main themes that emerged—which appear to characterize this sector's culture—include a reliance on accountants/tax advisors, the notion of an acceptable level of cash-in-hand payments, and the use of different mental accounts for different types of income. Although some of these themes have already arisen in the small business literature they have often been couched in individualistic terms. We build a case that these issues are more cultural than individual—they are tied to occupational group membership as they are socially constructed within occupational groups and are a key component of the group's taxpaying culture. Implications and directions for future research are discussed. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A significant body of research has been accumulated concerning tax morale and tax compliance. This paper takes a stroll through the experimental findings, focussing on personal income. After briefly discussing the traditional topic of deterrence the main focus is on the social and institutional factors which until now have received only limited attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]