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Political epistemology has become a popular field of research in recent years. It sets itself the ambitious task to intertwine epistemology with social and political theory in order to do justice to the relationships between truth and politics, or reason and power. Yet many contributions either expand arguments and concepts from traditional epistemology to political phenomena or use existing theories and frameworks from social and political theory to address the politics of epistemological questions. The former approach (prominent, e.g., in the epistemic injustice debate) leads to an epistemisation of political phenomena and concepts coupled with their de‐politicization, the latter approach (prominent, e.g., in Frankfurt School critical theory) leads to a politicization of epistemic phenomena and concepts coupled with their de‐epistemisation. Instead, it is argued that political epistemology requires reworking even basic concepts, due to its three foundational commitments: It is committed to the claim that socio‐material conditions of existence matter epistemically (minimal materialism), to the self‐reflection of the socio‐material conditions of political epistemology's own arguments and theories (radical self‐reflexivity), and to a specific form of epistemic humility (epistemic non‐sovereignty). Using the notion of normativity as an exemplary problem, the article closes by highlighting the difficulty of maintaining these three commitments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that there are irreducibly social epistemic values alongside more traditional epistemic values such as knowledge and true belief. In particular, I argue that what I call "epistemic convergence" is one such value, and that it can help us explain the badness of social epistemic pathologies, such as testimonial injustice and epistemic bubbles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We review several topics of philosophical interest connected to misleading online content. First we consider proposed definitions of different types of misleading content. Then we consider the epistemology of misinformation, focusing on approaches from virtue epistemology and social epistemology. Finally we discuss how misinformation is related to belief polarization, and argue that models of rational polarization present special challenges for conceptualizing fake news and misinformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I argue that various epistemic challenges associated with eating disorders (EDs) can negatively affect the care of already marginalized patient groups with various EDs. I will first outline deficiencies in our understanding of EDs—in research, healthcare settings, and beyond. I will then illustrate with examples cases where discriminatory misconceptions about what EDs are, the presentation and treatment of EDs, and who gets EDs, instantiate obstacles for the treatment of various ED patient groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper advances disaster risk governance (DRG) research and practice by incorporating elements of intersectionality and place‐based thinking. Intersectionality provides a crucial yet underutilised lens to examine power, positionality, and individuals' experiences facing disasters and other climatic events. Through six principles and using examples from small islands and a synthesis of the literature, this paper presents an intersectional approach for DRG to support inclusive and contextualised actions: (i) individuals are multi‐dimensional and complex; (ii) identities and vulnerability are not predefined; (iii) spatial and temporal differences influence the expression of identities; (iv) materiality of ecological systems influences intersectionality; (v) power relations are central the emergence of social processes and epistemologies; and (vi) positionality plays an important role in defining risk reduction agendas and choices. This paper examines how an intersectional perspective generates pathways to address the root causes of vulnerabilities to disasters beyond the 'one size fits all' approaches promoted globally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholarship on girlhood—especially for girls of Color—is often relegated to studying risk and emphasizing individual deficits over humanizing girls and centering their voices. This approach to generating scholarship renders oppressive systems and processes invisible from inquiry and unaddressed by practice, with particularly insidious consequences for youth in the legal system. Critical youth participatory action research (YPAR) is acknowledged as an antidote to these conceptualizations because it resists deficit‐oriented narratives circling systems‐impacted youth by inviting them to the knowledge‐generating table. In this paper, we present an empirical analysis of the promises and perils that emerged as we conducted a year‐long critical YPAR project alongside five system‐impacted girls of Color. Our thematic analysis of process notes (30 meetings, 120 h) documents the stories posited by girls, in a democratized space, about the injustices of interconnected institutions, and unearths a complicated tension for both youth and adult coresearchers around the promises and perils of engaging in YPAR within the academy. These findings underscore the importance of using intersectional, collaborative research to challenge perceptions around how we legitimize knowledge. We describe lessons learned in conducting YPAR in academic settings and highlight recommendations to grow youth–adult partnerships within oppressive systems to share power. Highlights: Critical YPAR is heralded as a liberatory epistemology for social justice committed research. We conducted critical YPAR with system‐impacted girls of Color. We synthesize the promises and perils of critical YPAR in a research‐intensive university setting. We name the limits inherent in imperial logics and structures between academia and legal systems. Recommendations focus on structural changes at the nexus of academia and other systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a novel educational approach to epistemic vice rehabilitation. Its authors Gerry Dunne and Alkis Kotsonis note that, like Quassim Cassam, they remain optimistic about the possibility of improvement with regard to epistemic vice. However, unlike Cassam, who places the burden of minimizing or overcoming epistemic vices and their consequences on the individual, Dunne and Kotsonis argue that vice rehabilitation is best tackled via the exemplarist animated community of inquiry zetetic principles and defeasible‐reasons‐regulated deliberative processes. The vice‐reduction method they propose is made up of four distinct yet complementary components: (1) positive exemplarism of epistemic virtue (saints), (2) negative exemplarism of epistemic vice (sinners), (3) direct teaching/instruction, and (4) cognitive apprenticeship. Dunne and Kotsonis argue that this pedagogical intervention appropriately considers learnings deriving from forensic scrutiny of both ideal and non‐ideal interpersonally calibrated zetetic features integral to knowledge acquisition as well as wider societal influences impacting the development of agents' epistemic character. It bridges research on vice epistemology (Cassam's obstructivist theory), social epistemology (corrupted social processes mitigating against vice rehabilitation), virtue epistemology, and moral exemplarism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: The goal of selection to dental education was to find those with the greatest aptitude for dentistry. Recently, schools have introduced a variety of tools; however, these have often been adopted without appropriate evaluation regarding existing evidence for fairness, reliability or validity. We explore dental admissions staff beliefs about the quality of different selection tools, with the objective of exploring their decision‐making in implementing selection practices. Methods: This qualitative study is underpinned by a social constructionist epistemology, in which our principal concern is "explicating the processes by which people come to describe, explain or otherwise account for the world (including themselves) in which they live." We conducted individual interviews with 15 of the 16 UK dental admission leads to elicit their views around admissions processes and aims. Data coding and analysis were initially inductive, using thematic analysis. After the themes emerged, we applied a deductive framework of affordances to group themes and then examined these for heuristics. Results and Discussion: We identified three main themes; "Selection Tool Use," "Widening Participation Practices," and "Professionalising the Admission Lead Role." Admission leads spoke favourably of tools that allowed a "holistic" view of the applicants "potential". Selection tools were favoured if they enabled "Gut feeling". Leads spoke of evaluating candidates, making sure they were "rounded", and "know what dentistry is all about." In justifying the use of elements of their procedure, the use of heuristics was prominent. Conclusion: In order to minimise the potential consequences of poor selection decisions, it is important to acknowledge that dental admission leads are at risk of depending on sub‐optimal heuristics to make judgements about effective selection (shaped by previous practices) rather than using more rational decision‐making processes based on the extant evidence (regarding the quality of different selection tools). Future research may be usefully informed by the knowledge translation literature to offer solutions for improving selection practices in dental education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a growing recognition that victims of injustice may have privileged access to knowledge about the injustices they experience, and that injustices are perpetuated through silencing victims by taking them to be less credible, and through denying them the platform and capacity to speak. However, these are not ideas that political philosophers tend to engage with in a sustained manner, to the extent that they alter methodological approaches to be systematically attentive to victim testimony. In this article, I provide two arguments in favour of political philosophers attending to victim testimony, one moral, one epistemic, and demonstrate that the moral case has little purchase, but that the epistemic case is more successful. Then, I present the strongest case against including victim testimony in political philosophy, and I argue that it does not hold up to scrutiny. In so doing, I demonstrate how methodological practices in political philosophy could be improved through drawing on feminist social epistemology; attending to victim testimony can enrich political philosophy in epistemically acceptable ways, and it also corrects for a range of potential biases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a program of action for the philosophy of regulatory science, based on a general theory of social epistemology. Two candidates are considered. The first one, offered by Alvin Goldman, is not fit for our purposes because it is focused on a veritism incompatible with non‐epistemic aims of regulatory science. The second, championed by Steve Fuller, sociologically investigates the existing means of producing knowledge, to modify them with the goal of obtaining democratic aims through action on a legislative meta‐level. The program has been built upon this procedure, instantiated by the identification, characterization, and modification of epistemic policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that introspection recruits the same mental mechanism as that which is required for the production of ordinary speech acts. In introspection, in effect, we intentionally tell ourselves that we are in some mental state, aiming thereby to produce belief about that state in ourselves. On one popular view of speech acts, however, this is precisely what speakers do when speaking to others. On this basis, I argue that every bias discovered by social epistemology applies to introspection and other forms of self‐directed representation. If so, it becomes unclear in what sense social epistemology is social. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While social epistemology is a diverse field, much of it still understands knowledge as an individual status—albeit an individual status that crucially depends on various social factors (such as testimony). Further, the literature on group knowledge until now has primarily focused on limited, specialized groups that may be said to know this or that as a group. I wish to argue, to the contrary, that all knowledge attributions ascribe a collective status; and that this follows more or less directly from an essential function of entitlement‐ascriptions: Ascriptions of knowledge and entitlement serve a primarily social function in that they facilitate coordination by maintaining consensus around true beliefs, true theories, and truth‐producing methodologies. This conclusion will shed light on ways in which traditional theories of knowledge (such as foundationalism and coherentism) fail to capture a central function of our epistemic practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of what we know results from information sources on which we epistemically rely. This fact about epistemic reliance, however, stands in tension with a very powerful intuition governing knowledge, an intuition that Pritchard (e.g., 2010) has termed the "ability intuition," the idea that a believer's "reliable cognitive faculties are the most salient part of the total set of causal factors that give rise to [their] believing the truth" (Vaesen, 2011, p. 518; compare Greco, 2003; 2009; 2010). In this paper I suggest that this tension may indeed be ineliminable. I proceed by canvassing some representative attempts to reconcile epistemic reliance and the ability intuition. In doing so, I suggest that all of these attempts founder on one or the other of two elements of what I've previously described (Shieber, 2013, 2015) as a "personalist presumption" in discussions of social epistemology: an excessive focus on (i) reliability filters within the persons who are the recipients of information or (ii) on reliable truth‐tracking and ‐conveying abilities in the persons who are the transmitters of information. In conclusion, I suggest how best to resolve the tension: by abandoning the ability intuition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is an editor's note from the Southern Journal of Philosophy, announcing the editor's decision to step down after seven years. The editor reflects on their goals of advancing the journal's pluralist vision and enhancing its reputation. They highlight two successful initiatives: the "State of the Question" series, which offers critical reviews of current literature on various topics, and the SJP Workshop conference series, which brings cutting-edge thinking to classical and contemporary topics. These efforts have led to increased readership and submissions. The editor expresses gratitude to the team and announces the appointment of a new editor-in-chief. [Extracted from the article]

The article focuses on writings of the polymath and experimental scientist Georg Christoph Lichtenberg which comes across startlingly modern observations on the phenomenology of scientific activity. It mentions role of contingence in scientific discoveries, or on the dialectic between the invention of the new and the arrangement of accumulated knowledge. It also mentions a book "Toward a History of Epistemic Things" on epistemic things and technical objects.

This paper explores the ways in which HIV specialists based in the United Kingdom (UK) construct, conceptualise and imagine their patient group via the concept of the 'imaginary', a notion encompassing the symbols, concepts and values through which people make sense of their social environment. In discussing their work with men who have sex with men (MSM), practitioners described patients as knowledgeable and highly adherent to treatment, yet apt to pursue hedonistic lives involving sex and recreational drugs. Recent innovations in treatment were formulated in terms of optimism and progress and the ascent of biomedical approaches was cast as an advance over former emphases on psychosocial interventions and attempts to facilitate behaviour change. In contrast to the imaginary of patients who were well‐informed and highly compliant with treatment, participants also sought to explain those who were not easily enfolded within modern treatment regimens or who were seen to be overly emotional. These patients, it was said, had some pre‐existing psychological problem or perhaps were especially vulnerable to societal pressures. Overall, the imaginary of the public was pervaded by therapeutic optimism, a sense of progress and an invigoration of biomedical themes in overcoming the challenges of delivering services to MSM. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reviews how research on the demarcation problem has developed, starting from Popper's criterion of falsifiability and ending with recent naturalistically oriented approaches. The main differences between traditional and contemporary approaches to the problem are explicated in terms of six postulates called the traditional assumptions. It is argued that all of the assumptions can be dismissed without giving up on the demarcation problem and that doing so might benefit further discussions on pseudoscience. Four present‐day research movements on evaluating the boundaries of science are introduced: (1) philosophy of pseudoscience, (2) social epistemology of dissent, (3) agnotology, and (4) evaluation of expertise. Researchers working within these areas have abandoned some or all traditional assumptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Advances in implantable medical devices have increased the role for industry‐employed allied professionals (IEAPs) in providing training and support during surgical procedures and follow‐up care. The effect of these changes on the organization of medical knowledge and the sharing of information remains largely unexplored. Recent work in social epistemology and the conceptualizing of implantable medical device companies as part of a knowledge‐based industry provide a framework for engaging with this issue. In this article, we argue that the insertion of industry technicians into hospitals diminishes epistemically valuable knowledge‐sharing practices. This is in part a result of health care professionals' increased dependence on IEAPs, who control access to knowledge about devices, limiting opportunities both for independent learning and for dialogic education practices through which participants work toward a common goal. Ultimately, we claim that overdependence on the IEAP as expert undermines a basic social value regarding knowledge sharing for everyone's benefit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Argument from Inductive Risk (AIR) is taken to show that values are inevitably involved in making judgments or forming beliefs. After reviewing this conclusion, this paper poses cases that are prima facie counterexamples: the unreflective application of conventions, use of black‐boxed instruments, reliance on opaque algorithms, and unskilled observation reports. These cases are counterexamples to the AIR posed in ethical terms as a matter of personal values. Nevertheless, it need not be understood in those terms. The values that load a theory choice may be those of institutions or past actors. This means that the challenge of responsibly handling inductive risk is not merely an ethical issue but is also social, political, and historical. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conference "Teaching Ecumenism in the Context of World Christianity," held in June 2021, was an initiative of the Ecumenical Institute at Bossey together with related programme units in the World Council of Churches. This article offers background to this initiative by sketching historical developments in the field of teaching ecumenism and by outlining creative synergies and tensions that have emerged in relation to academic scholarship in the area of World Christianity. By bringing together colleagues teaching in the areas of ecumenical studies, World Christianity, and related fields, the conference aimed to enter more deeply into conversations around epistemologies and methodologies, where participatory approaches engage discourses like global‐versus‐local and unity‐versus‐diversity in a critical and constructive way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to anti‐reductionism in the epistemology of testimony, testimonial entitlement is easy to come by: all you need to do is listen to what you are being told. Say you like anti‐reductionism; one question that you will need to answer is how come testimonial entitlement comes so cheap; after all, people are free to lie. This paper has two aims: first, it looks at the main anti‐reductionist answers to this question and argues that they remain unsatisfactory. Second, it goes on a rescue mission on behalf of anti‐reductionism. I put forth a novel, knowledge‐first anti‐reductionist account, which I dub 'Testimonial Contractarianism'. According to the view defended here, in virtue of the social contract in play, compliance with the norms governing speech acts is the default position for speakers. Insofar as norm compliance is the default for speakers, I argue, all else equal, entitlement to believe is the default for hearers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article critically evaluates what we call the 'popular narrative' about the state of the public sphere. We identify three elements of this popular narrative (the post‐truth element, the polarisation element and the new technology element), and draw on philosophical work on hinge epistemology and social roles to challenge each one. We propose, instead, that public debate has always depended on non‐evidential commitments, that it has always been home to significant, deep division, and that social media, rather than causing these phenomena, has just made them more visible. Finally, we recommend some changes to traditional and social media which we believe would help foster a healthier, more inclusive, public sphere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is so, because jurors take the jury to be more reliable than each individual juror. Agent 1 entertains standard 1, agent 2 entertains standard 2, and so forth. Keywords: Condorcet's Jury Theorem; epistemic labor; fallibilism; Immodesty; social epistemology EN Condorcet's Jury Theorem epistemic labor fallibilism Immodesty social epistemology 235 251 17 09/01/21 20210901 NES 210901 Introduction Imagine an extremely confident businessman. 5 Li ([40], sec. 4.2) also thinks that, in cases where a rational agent has rational standards, the theory of standard possession should explain why agents ought to form beliefs in accordance with their own standards, rather than with other standards. [Extracted from the article]

Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) have, in recent years, become increasingly popular. An important challenge facing MOOCs is the "teacher bandwidth problem": in the MOOC environment, where there are potentially hundreds of thousands of students, it is impossible for a few teachers to interact with individual students -- in other words, there is not enough "teacher bandwidth." According to George Siemens and Stephen Downes's theory of "connectivism," one can make up for the lack of teacher bandwidth by relying on collaboration between students. Philosophically speaking, however, this theory is underdeveloped. In this paper, Ben Kotzee and S. Orestis Palermos consider the question of learner collaboration in online courses, and the theory of connectivism, from the perspective of social epistemology. They note the similarities between Siemens and Downes's theory and virtue reliabilist theories of epistemic collaboration more broadly. The paper has two main aims: first, to offer an illustration of how it is possible to conceptualize learner collaboration in online settings as analogous to collaboration between scientists; and second, to expand on and clarify what Siemens and Downes had in mind when they proposed the theory of connectivism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In healthcare settings, patient participation is increasingly adopted as a possible remedy to ill people suffering from 'epistemic injustices' – that is to their unfair harming as knowers. In exploring and interpreting patient participation discourses within the 2013–2018 Dutch Myalgic Encephalomyelitis (ME)/Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) Health Council advisory process, this paper assesses the epistemological emancipatory value of this participatory practice. It reveals that in the analysed case, patient representatives predominantly offer biomedical knowledge about ME/CFS. They frame this condition as primarily somatic, and accordingly, perceive appropriate diagnostic criteria, research avenues and treatment options as quantifiable, objectifiable and explicitly non‐psychogenic. This paper argues that such a dominant biomedical patient participatory practice is ambiguous in terms of its ability to correct epistemic injustices towards ill people. Biomedicalized patient participation may enhance people's credibility and their ability to make sense of their illness, but it may also undermine their valid position within participatory practices as well as lead to (sustaining) biased and reductive ideas about who ill people are and what kind of knowledge they hold. The final section of this paper offers a brief reflection on how to navigate such biomedicalized participatory practices in order to attain more emancipatory ones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While it is common in social epistemology, philosophy of education and sociology to speak of theoretical knowledge, the concept of theoretical knowledge used in ordinary discourse has not been properly examined, and its relations to other types of knowledge remain unclear. This article argues that this ordinary language notion of theoretical knowledge has a distinct meaning different from the meanings of terms for other knowledge types, for example, knowledge‐that, and meta‐cognitive knowledge, and provides an analysis that characterizes theoretical knowledge as distinguished by its indirectness. The article then discusses the implications of this view for the practical role of theoretical knowledge and suggests that a reappraisal of its epistemic significance is due. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Four-, 5-, and 6-year olds (N = 102) observed agents perform a reasoning task that required gathering hidden evidence. An agent who made sound inferences was contrasted with an agent who made either unsound inferences (UI; failed to base conclusion on gathered evidence) or guesses (failed to gather evidence). Four-year olds attributed knowledge to all agents and endorsed their conclusions widely. However, 5- and 6-year olds' knowledge attributions were mitigated by UI, and 6-year olds neither attributed knowledge to a guesser nor endorsed his conclusions. Notably, parents' tendency to make evaluativist epistemological judgments-which place value in evidence as a basis for belief-predicted children's reluctance to learn from and credit knowledge to poor reasoners. Parents' evaluativist judgments also predicted children's selective learning about object functions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When critical realists consider epistemology they typically start from "epistemological relativism." We find this position necessary, but we also find it insufficient because it lacks a critique of the highly unequal social relations among observers themselves—relations that shape the very production of knowledge. While it is indeed the case that all knowledge is fallible, it is also the case that all knowledge is positioned, with a particular standpoint. What is more, the social power relations between standpoints organize the production of truth in ways that produce systematic distortions. In this paper, we propose a critical realist social epistemology. We introduce feminist standpoint theory and postcolonial theory as our suggested interventions into critical realism and we use two case studies of existing work to highlight i) the social production of truth and the real, and ii) what is at stake for radicalizing epistemology in critical realism. In so doing, our paper emphasizes the epistemic complexities that continuously shape ontology, a commitment to subaltern voices or experiences, and a thorough interrogation of the relations between positions of knowledge production. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, the notion of "non-uniformism" has attracted attention in the epistemology of modality. In particular, weak non-uniformism (or weak uniformism) must be defended with appeal to the alleged quality of currently available modal epistemologies, while strong non-uniformism (or strong uniformism) is independent of any particular modal epistemology. The integration challenge is the challenge to provide an epistemology of modality which integrates well with the metaphysics of modality, and vice versa - which is often taken to be an important issue in modal epistemology. 23 In particular: current ambitious modal epistemologies tend to require that knowledge of necessity is prior to knowledge of possibility, and such necessity-based modal epistemologies cannot do justice to the social epistemology data. [Extracted from the article]

Even today, with all of the hearing technology and bilingual programs available, many Deaf children arrive at school with severe language delays. With a renewed focus on having Deaf children kindergarten‐ready, assessment of language milestones becomes critical as seen in the campaign Child First and the legislation referred to as Language Equality & Acquisition for Deaf Kids (LEAD‐K). Here, a strategy is proposed to ensure that Deaf children are kindergarten‐ready. The focus is on a re‐evaluation of the epistemologies of the social and individualized medical models of health, as well as Bronfenbrenner's bioecological systems approach, to assess all components that impact a Deaf child's ecology to permit maximizing their developmental potentials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to an influential Enlightenment ideal, one shouldn't rely epistemically on other people's say‐so, at least not if one is in a position to evaluate the relevant evidence for oneself. However, in much recent work in social epistemology, we are urged to dispense with this ideal, which is seen as stemming from a misguided focus on isolated individuals to the exclusion of groups and communities. In this paper, I argue that that an emphasis on the social nature of inquiry should not lead us to entirely abandon the Enlightenment ideal of epistemically autonomous agents. Specifically, I suggest that it is an appropriate ideal for those who serve as experts in a given epistemic community, and develop a notion of expert acceptance to make sense of this. I go on to show that, all other things being equal, this kind of epistemic autonomy among experts makes their joint testimony more reliable, which in turn brings epistemic benefits both to laypeople and to experts in other fields. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article first argues that the social sciences need to be decolonized, as the current epistemologies and research methodologies are too narrowly based on the European and North American experiences and hence unable to adequately capture non‐European experiences and realities. I then argue that decolonizing dominant social science epistemology means freeing it from its Aristotelian foundation. The next step undertaken is to discuss five non‐Western epistemologies from West Africa, China, Melanesia, India, and South America. Building on the work of Jimi Adesina (2002), I find that all five share a fuzzy perception of reality, allowing for statements that are non‐exclusive, non‐discrete, and hence fuzzy. I propose an operationalization of these fuzzy epistemologies by applying Charles Ragin's Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fscqa). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global German Studies require a reassessment of the global histories, narratives, and injustices that continue to be underrepresented in the classroom as well as a critical reflection of how we define "German." This article investigates the crucial role of decolonization in the reenvisioning of the discipline. Decolonization is understood as an intentional decentering of dominant voices, an interrogation of whiteness, and a move toward pedagogies incorporating Indigenous epistemologies and social justice practices. The article highlights opportunities for creating a global and decolonized curriculum, which can be implemented across all levels in German language classes, including German Studies courses taught in English. Examples demonstrate how such an approach decenters normative hierarchies that privilege whiteness, the cisgendered, hetero, abled, etc. and simultaneously reframe particular local histories while interrogating global colonizing processes and oppression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the history of epistemology of modality. Topics discussed include information on the modal conceivability of several arguments; discussions on the justification on the modal conceivability argument; and the information on the empirical argument on the existence of God.

I Epistemic Paternalism: Conceptions, Justifications and Implications i is a book which brings together scholars working on epistemic paternalism, a relatively new area of interest in social epistemology. With this collection, Bernal and Axtell give a forum to a diverse set of voices by not limiting themselves to "scholars conversant in analytic epistemology" (p. 12). Overall, I Epistemic Paternalism i is the first collection on the subject and the most efficient way for a scholar to get an overview of the field. [Extracted from the article]

The article offers information on French Catholic philosopher, Maurice Blondel, whose work focuses on relationship between autonomous philosophical reasoning and Christianity. It mentions about his philosophy of religion; his philosophical account of human rationality as orientated toward a transcendent Absolute; and analysis of epistemological conditions for the possibility of human understanding.

The article focuses on how to distinguish between a knowledge possession inquiry and a knowledge attribution inquiry in epistemology and show how using a pragmatic encroachment knowledge possession account to render verdicts on knowledge attributions. In knowledge attribution (KA), powers of discrimination between one knows or does not know are precisely the point.

Individuals' role perceptions are central guides to their behavior and choices as members of an organization. Understanding organizational dynamics thus requires knowledge about the determinants of such role perceptions, as well as whether-and when-organizations can influence them. This article brings forward a theoretical framework allowing for both prerecruitment ( extraorganizational) and post-recruitment ( intraorganizational) determinants of individuals' role perceptions, and examines its empirical implications using a large- N data set of temporary officials in the European Commission. We find that intergovernmental and epistemic role perceptions are strongly linked to pre-recruitment factors (such as educational and professional background), whereas postrecruitment factors (such as length of affiliation and embeddedness within the Commission) are the main driving force behind supranational and departmental role perceptions. This heterogeneity in the importance of pre- and postrecruitment factors for distinct role perceptions has important consequences for conceptualizing organizational change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leaving the field is a crucial moment that has been examined neither from an emotional point of view nor from a life course perspective. In this co-authored paper, we, the researcher and the research assistant, analyse through our diaries how this moment was entangled with decisive life events and how our emotions were conditioned by our embodied experience of sickness, separation and incertitude towards the future. Departing from life course and feminist geographical reflexive standpoints, we engage with the complexities of positionality and turning points. Drawing on the duality of our experiences of separation and the individual and collective evolution of our positionalities and identities, this paper reifies the life course principle of linked lives by examining the interdependency of researchers' and research assistants' lives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As new practice domains open up for practitioners of family therapy in the medical, organizational, and human relations fields, family therapy educators and supervisors are required to cross the epistemological spaces of scientist-practitioner, postmodernism, and critical theory. These new possibilities challenge family therapy educators to become comfortable moving between multiple epistemologies and require a hybridization of knowledge and pedagogical approaches. This article identifies multiple conceptual frameworks for teaching graduate students theories of family therapy and introduces a meta-pedagogical framework for a developmental pedagogy that supports integration of seemingly differing epistemologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is understanding epistemic in nature? Does a correct account of what constitutes understanding of a concept mention epistemological notions such as knowledge, justification or epistemic rationality? We defend the view that understanding is epistemic in nature - we defend epistemological conceptions of understanding. We focus our discussion with a critical evaluation of Tim Williamson's challenges to epistemological conceptions of understanding in The Philosophy of Philosophy. Against Williamson, we distinguish three kinds of epistemological conceptions and argue that Williamson's arguments succeed against only the most heavily committed kind, and leave the less heavily committed kinds untouched. Further, we argue that Williamson's elaboration of lessons from his arguments point in a direction opposite of his own conclusions and give vivid articulation and support to epistemological conceptions. We suggest also that skepticism about Williamson's larger metaphilosophical conclusions - according to which understanding plays no special role in the epistemology of philosophy - may be in order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Permissivism about rationality is the view that there is sometimes more than one rational response to a given body of evidence. In this paper I discuss the relationship between permissivism, deference to rationality, and peer disagreement. I begin by arguing that-contrary to popular opinion-permissivism supports at least a moderate version of conciliationism. I then formulate a worry for permissivism. I show that, given a plausible principle of rational deference, permissive rationality seems to become unstable and to collapse into unique rationality. I conclude with a formulation of a way out of this problem on behalf of the permissivist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I ask two questions prompted by the phenomenon of 'politically patterned' climate change denial. First, can an individual's political commitments provide her with good reasons not to defer to cognitive experts' testimony? Building on work in philosophy of science on inductive risk, I argue they can. Second, can an individual's political commitments provide her with good reasons not to defer to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's testimony? I argue that they cannot (at least, in the way identified in the first part of the article), because of the high epistemic standards which govern that body's assertions. The conclusion discusses the theoretical and practical implications of my arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The term 'studentification' refers to multifaceted urban transformations resulting from increases in and concentrations of student populations. Notably, this concept has been investigated with frequent reference to gentrification studies from both spatial and temporal perspectives. In this regard, spatial perspectives focus on the common urban spatial processes that studentification and gentrification share, whereas temporal perspectives assume students as candidates to become gentrifiers. This essay reorganizes the literature consistently with these two perspectives and aims to extend the limits of studentification studies beyond the epistemological constraints of gentrification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Increasing critical energy focuses on history of emotion and affective theory in order to better understand the eighteenth century. Scholars are re-examining history, literature, and culture to consider the importance of how people felt to what they experienced, how they thought, and how they acted in the eighteenth century. The essay examines the emotion words in use in this scholarly endeavor (such as passions, sentiments, and sensibility), the connections between affects, emotions, and politics, and the epistemological explorations connected to feeling. By surveying affective and emotional methods of interrogation from the past thirty years, this essay both concentrates on historical, cultural, and literary studies to map how scholars of the eighteenth century are analyzing the shape of emotion in the past, and it looks forward to new energy in this field of inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most people think of themselves as pretty good at understanding others' beliefs, desires, emotions, and intentions. Accurate mindreading is an impressive cognitive feat, and for this reason the philosophical literature on mindreading has focused exclusively on explaining such successes. However, as it turns out, we regularly make mindreading mistakes. Understanding when and how mind misreading occurs is crucial for a complete account of mindreading. In this paper, I examine the conditions under which mind misreading occurs. I argue that these patterns of mind misreading shed light on the limits of mindreading, reveal new perspectives on how mindreading works, and have implications for social epistemology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ranking theory is a formal epistemology that has been developed in over 600 pages in Spohn's recent book The Laws of Belief, which aims to provide a normative account of the dynamics of beliefs that presents an alternative to current probabilistic approaches. It has long been received in the AI community, but it has not yet found application in experimental psychology. The purpose of this paper is to derive clear, quantitative predictions by exploiting a parallel between ranking theory and a statistical model called logistic regression. This approach is illustrated by the development of a model for the conditional inference task using Spohn's (2013) ranking theoretic approach to conditionals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A popular view in mainstream social epistemology maintains that, in the face of a revealed peer disagreement over p, neither party should remain just as confident vis-a-vis p as she initially was. This 'conciliatory' insight has been defended with regard to individual epistemic peers. However, to the extent that (non-summativist) groups are candidates for group knowledge and beliefs, we should expect groups (no less than individuals) to be in the market for disagreements. The aim here will be to carve out and explore an extension of the conciliatory insight from individual peer disagreement to group peer disagreement; in doing so, I'll raise and address three key problems that face any plausible defence of such a constraint. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]