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This article uses interview data with people who were once skeptical about climate change but have come to accept climate science to assess the factors that contribute to their shifts in perspectives. Our findings show two trajectories of change for skeptics, depending on the nature of their skepticism. For those who move from actively denying climate change, shifting beliefs about climate change occur via a profound need to reconcile what emerges as cognitive dissonance due to challenges to their religious identities. For skeptics who move from being unsure about climate change, moving to accept climate science happens through either encountering new information from a trusted source or personally observing the effects of climate change. This extends existing scholarship on the factors that contribute to changing minds on climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing literature on perceptions of climate change skeptics does not include a direct examination of skeptics who are members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter‐day Saints (LDS), likely because they make up a small percentage of the U.S. population (1.6%). However, the LDS church is one of the fastest growing religious sects in the nation and world and is acquiring more political power, especially in the western United States. Our research note presents a preliminary look at Latter‐day Saint skeptics. We find evangelical and Latter‐day Saint skeptics align on measures of religious ideation and the belief that "humans are meant to rule over the rest of nature." Yet, on measures of environmental concerns and values, Latter‐day Saint skeptics appear to be somewhere between evangelical and mainline Christian skeptics. This pilot project provides a foundation for future work regarding LDS perceptions of climate change, environmental policy, and climate communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use data from 33 in‐depth interviews conducted with residents in the rural inland Northwestern state of Idaho who self‐identify as skeptical about anthropogenic climate change, to examine the nuance within the narratives that skeptics employ to voice their skepticism. Our findings show that the arguments employed by those who are skeptical of climate change do not constitute a clear typology of skepticism or "skeptics." Rather, individuals weave together unique stories—shaped by their social locations, personal experiences, and underlying ideological beliefs—and, through combining different argument threads, explain why they believe climate change is a fictitious problem. Our findings suggest that while some skeptics may lean on religion‐based or conspiracy‐based narratives to rationalize their skepticism, others may rely on science attitudes, personal experiences, or a range of additional reasons to be skeptical of climate change. In short, climate skepticism is not uniform nor accurately typologized, but a complex tapestry of socially shaped beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on sources related to psychological understanding for climate change skepticism including article "Climate change skepticism and denial: an introduction"; the book "Climate Change and Society: Sociological Perspectives"; and "Energy Research & Social Science".

Abstract: This article explores current sociological scholarship on climate skepticism and, drawing on recent literature in social psychology and behavioral science, presents an argument for future research on the relationship between emotion, information aversion, and climate denial. We extrapolate and unite these disconnected bodies of scholarship to argue that strong emotions such as fear may drive climate change skepticism and denial among some adherents. By partnering the scholarship outlined above with advances in research on conspiracy ideation, we argue that climate change skepticism and denial is, at least in some cases, a form of an exaggerated ostrich effect, whereby adherents are so driven to avoid learning about a specific problem; they actively seek to construct an alternative, safer, narrative. Given this predisposition, attempting to challenge such skepticism with information is counterproductive. As such, this paper presents alternative possibilities for communicating research findings on climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background As an island and a former British colony, Sri Lanka is a case of special interest for the study of 1918-1919 influenza pandemic because of its potential for isolation from as well as integration into the world epidemiologic system. Objectives To estimate population loss attributable to the influenza pandemic and weekly district-level excess mortality from the pandemic to analyze its spread across the island. Methods To measure population loss, we estimated a population growth model using a panel of 100 district-level observations on population for five consecutive censuses from 1891 to 1931, allowing for a one-time drop in population in 1918-1919. To estimate weekly excess mortality from the pandemic, we estimated a seasonally adjusted weekly time series of district-specific mortality estimates from vital registration records, ranked them, and plotted the ranks on weekly maps to create a picture of the geographic pattern of propagation across Sri Lanka. Results Total loss of population from the influenza pandemic was 307 000 or approximately 6·7% of the population. The pandemic peaked in two discrete (northern and southern) regions in early October of 1918 and in a third (central) region in early March 1919. Conclusions The population loss estimate is significantly higher than earlier estimates of mortality from the pandemic in Sri Lanka, suggesting underreporting of influenza-attributable deaths and a role for influenza-related fertility declines. The spatial pattern of peak mortality indicates the presence of two distinct entry points and three distinct epidemiologic regions, defined by population density and ethnicity, in colonial Sri Lanka. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]