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Copyright of Policy & Internet is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Policy & Internet is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Despite the surge of interest in platform cooperatives, we have a limited understanding of the dynamics of platform worker‐member participation in these cooperatives. Drawing on interviews with 21 senior leaders and founders of platform worker cooperatives, we investigate the dynamics of platform worker‐member participation, finding that these cooperatives experience some successes and many challenges. We then build theory about how four distinct features of platform worker cooperatives—the facilitation of multihoming, the physically untethered nature of work, the relatively high importance of scale as a strategic imperative, and the relatively low importance of initial platform worker‐member investment—influence these participation dynamics. We find that the platform and worker cooperative organisational models are in tension with one another when brought together within a platform worker cooperative, leading to positive and negative effects on participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Policy & Internet is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Policy & Internet is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Policy & Internet is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Policy & Internet is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Policy & Internet is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

GoFundMe, founded in 2010, has already profoundly impacted giving practices, introducing many laypersons to the empowering potentials and user‐friendly affordances of peer‐to‐peer fundraising. Overall, GoFundMe's extraordinary success as a for‐profit company in traditionally nonprofit charitable giving markets can be attributed to: normalizing their platform as the go‐to destination for people seeking help; tasking the beneficiaries themselves with crafting appeals for support; restricting forms of support to money; deferring responsibility to donors to assess the legitimacy of appeals; and dominating the market by acquiring competitors and pursuing growth wherever possible. No charity could plausibly adopt such an operating model and GoFundMe's lean, hands‐off, self‐policing approach has attracted sharp criticism over the years. Nonetheless, the company has not humbly reined in their ambition but expanded it even further. This paper outlines three broad phases through which GoFundMe has defended their capture of "the giving layer of the internet." Initially, GoFundMe espoused ideals of utopian disruption and soteriological solutionism, selling their platform as a "take‐action button" and user‐friendly means of empowering everyday citizens to improve the lives of others. Later, after attracting more divisive causes and criticisms of its revenue model, GoFundMe adopted forms of reputational repair and attempted neutrality, insisting that their for‐profit platform could be accommodative to all worldviews and persons willing to embrace "positive precarization." More recently, as "neutral" stances became untenable and fundraising success rates increasingly grim, GoFundMe pivoted toward strategies of state critique and civic capture. Specifically, GoFundMe have: more pointedly highlighted state failures; actively aligned themselves with social movements; shifted away from relying solely on peer‐to‐peer fundraising; and instead partnered more with established nonprofits. However, as GoFundMe's expansion inevitably means becoming entangled in sensitive political matters, the company's ambition to become the key intermediary in all charitable giving is facing acute challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Digital platform ecosystems increasingly dominate the enterprise software domain, and the persistence of platforms depends on the sustained engagement of complementors. However, there is a limited understanding of its antecedents, complementors' evaluation of antecedents and the manifestations and dynamic changes of complementors' engagement. Therefore, we investigate complementors' engagement within platform ecosystems over time. We draw on actor and stakeholder engagement from service research to conceptualise complementor engagement (CE) and create an integrated empirical understanding of CE and its dynamics in digital platform ecosystems. Our embedded case study builds on 30 interviews with complementors in Anubis and Osiris enterprise software platform ecosystems. Inductive data analysis reveals five CE antecedents: platform resources and rules, platform value proposition, platform agents, customer needs and other complementors' value propositions. The antecedents are associated with three CE behaviours: generating, networking and synchronising. Further analysis of CE over time resulted in 26 different sequences representing stable and changing engagement trajectories, the latter comprising selective, growing and abating engagement as subcategories. We show how complementors' evaluations of antecedents lead to behaviour changes, providing a novel perspective on the dynamics underlying CE. Finally, we link complementors' evaluation outcomes to their (dis)satisfaction, contributing to the discussion on what drives and impedes CE. The findings implicate the debate on dynamic platform governance and inform platform owners about using cooperative and competitive approaches in the short and long term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Policy & Internet is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The concept of Government as a Platform (GaaP) has recently encountered setbacks in practice worldwide. While existing literature on inter‐governmental collaboration has emphasized organizational restructuring and data sharing, this study argues that a pragmatic way to improve administrative efficiency in the absence of formal institutional change is to adopt an alternative model to GaaP: platform‐enabled government. Enabled by innovations of the middle‐tier platform, this new model of platform governance integrates the functions of distributed systems of multiple departments into a sequential workflow without the requirement of institutional reform or sharing proprietary data. To demonstrate how this model facilitates information flow across institutional boundaries and improves collaborative governance, we analyze horizontal, vertical, and public‐private collaboration using a diverse case study design. We examine administrative review, law enforcement, and contact tracing during the pandemic in the context of China. Our findings suggest accommodating institutional boundaries is a practical and effective approach to advance the digital government agenda in decentralized contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the emerging platform economy, blockchain technologies are reshaping the digital economy. Moreover, disintermediation and decentralization have broken new ground for platform organizations and management mechanisms and instigated the concept of a DAO (Decentralized Autonomous Organization). Recent literature on operations management has called for further research on governance issues related to DAOs. In response to this call, we explore the relationship between DAO management efforts and platform performance in this study. Specifically, we propose and theoretically articulate decentralized voting tasks in DAOs as a new form of organizing. Harnessing both online and on‐chain data from seven sources, we empirically examine how voting task division, task allocation, reward distribution, and information provision affect platform performance in the context of MakerDAO (an Ethereum‐based stablecoin issuance platform). Our findings reveal that strategic decisions arrived at through voting have a positive impact on platform operational performance under certain conditions, whereas operational decisions resulting from voting have a negative impact. Moreover, we elucidate the moderating effects of voting task execution characteristics on the relationship between completed decision tasks and operational performance. These findings have important implications from both theoretical and practical perspectives. We also share all the raw data we use to promote the development of blockchain‐related empirical research. Highlights: We developed a flowchart to describe the process of DAO performing voting tasks.We found that strategic decisions via DAO voting have a positive impact on platform operational performance under certain conditions, whereas operational decisions resulting via DAO voting have a negative impact.We found that task allocation, reward distribution, and information provision moderate the relationship between DAO management efforts and platform operational performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Policy & Internet is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Policy & Internet is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Policy & Internet is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

TikTok, a short‐video app featuring video content typically between 15 and 60 s long, has become immensely popular around the world in the last few years. However, the worldwide popularity of TikTok requires the platform to constantly negotiate with the rules, norms and regulatory frameworks of the regions where it operates. Failure to do so has had significant consequences. For example, for content‐related reasons, the platform has been (temporarily and permanently) banned in several countries, including India, Indonesia and Pakistan. Moreover, its Chinese ownership and popularity among underage users have made the platform subject to heightened scrutiny and criticism. In this paper, we introduce the notion of visibility moderation, defined as the process through which digital platforms manipulate the reach of user‐generated content through algorithmic or regulatory means. We discuss particular measures TikTok implements to shape visibility and issues arising from it. This paper presents findings from interviews with content creators, which takes a user‐centric approach to understand their sense‐making of and negotiation with TikTok's visibility moderation. Findings from this study also highlight concerns that leave these stakeholders feeling confused, frustrated or powerless, which offer important directions for further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Governments across the world are struggling to address the market dominance of technology companies through increased regulation. The Australian Federal government found itself leading the world in platform regulation when, in 2021, it enacted the Australian News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code. The furore surrounding the introduction of the legislation, and Facebook's subsequent Australian 'news ban' exposed the limits of a regulatory model that has previously left the tech industry to moderate itself. In this paper, we argue the introduction of the Code is a leading example of a global trajectory towards regulatory change, which sees governments move from a reactive regulation model to specific interventions around the governance of digital media spaces. We discuss how best to measure the successes and failures around this more interventionist model through a case study of the implementation of the Code in Australia. More broadly we consider how global platforms have responded, and whether the reform is an effective regulatory model for other national governments to emulate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Policy & Internet is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Policy & Internet is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The widespread uptake of platform strategies turns many vendors of enterprise software into curators of an ecosystem of firms that collaboratively develop and commercialize a shared technology. As a platform owner's effectiveness in integrating knowledge across ecosystem participants will distinguish it from its competitors, we investigate the management of development‐related knowledge across firm boundaries. Our exploratory, multiple‐case study of 4 platforms illustrates how "knowledge boundaries" emerge between platform owners and complementors. We observe that knowledge boundaries are influenced by a platform's functional extent, interface design, and evolutionary dynamics, which create differences, dependencies, and novelty of development knowledge, resulting in qualitatively distinct types of knowledge boundaries. To overcome knowledge boundaries, platform owners provide various resources at the boundary, including information portals, documentation, helpdesks, and alignment workshops. We observe that in shaping these resources, platform owners face a trade‐off between providing knowledge at the right scope, while allowing for the scalability of knowledge resources for the entire ecosystem. Depending on their scope and scale, we classify knowledge boundary resources as broadcasting, brokering, and bridging, each representing qualitatively distinct patterns in managing knowledge in platform ecosystems. We conclude with implications for researchers and managers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Crowdfunding has emerged as a viable alternative to venture capital or angel investments in order to raise funds for entrepreneurial initiatives. Despite its growing importance, we still know little about the underlying network effects that drive the evolution and growth of crowdfunding platforms. Specifically, is the evolution and growth primarily driven by a growing number of entrepreneurial projects attracting funders, or do funders primarily attract entrepreneurs, or does a reciprocal relationship exist between the two market sides? We also explore whether and how input control, a common gatekeeping mechanism on platforms, has an impact on the formation of network effects. By analyzing eight years of data on the evolution of Kickstarter, one of the leading reward‐based crowdfunding platforms, we find that network effects are asymmetric. An increasing number of entrepreneurial projects has a strong and significant effect on the installed base of funders (cross‐side network effects) and also attracts other entrepreneurs to the platform (same‐side network effects). However, an increased installed base of funders does not have an effect on the growth of either side of the market. We also find that, under weaker input control, cross‐side network effects and same‐side network effects are weaker and less sustainable. Taken together, our exploratory evidence suggests that the relationship between the market sides on crowdfunding platforms might be less reciprocal than expected, having profound implications for entrepreneurs and providers of crowdfunding platforms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]