Search

Company activities are important contributors to climate change. Consumers take companies' actions toward environment into account when they decide to engage with these companies. We study under which conditions corporate misconduct with respect to climate change outrages consumers, eliciting negative moral emotions. Moreover, we explore the capacity of these negative moral emotions to energize consumer decisions and action tendencies to retaliate against "offending" companies. Testing two moderated mediation models on random samples of 152 adult citizens of the United States and 159 adult citizens of France, we show that negative moral emotions experienced by consumers that witness corporate malfeasance toward the climate determine negative attitudes toward the company and intentions to penalize it. Moreover, for both samples, empathy, collective self, and moral identity moderate the relationship between the perception of corporate irresponsibility and moral emotions, while the effect of political orientation is culturally specific. These findings help to uncover under which conditions consumer hostile responses toward corporate misconduct takes place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic policy uncertainty significantly influences governmental decisions regarding environmental sustainability, particularly in CO2 emissions reduction efforts. This study examines the impact of economic policy uncertainty on environmental inefficiency across 136 emergent and non‐emerging countries from 1990 to 2018, using an unbalanced and heterogeneous sample. Additionally, we explore the moderating effects of institutional quality and political orientation on this relationship. Employing a directional distance function in a parametric context, our analysis reveals that economic policy uncertainty exacerbates environmental inefficiency. However, we find that institutional quality and political orientation act as important moderating factors, fostering greater environmental sustainability. Sensitivity analyses support these empirical findings, providing insights into potential implications for economic policy and guiding regulatory and policymaking efforts toward achieving enhanced environmental sustainability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A central aspect of political conservatism is the notion that the system is fair. Political conservatives tend to defend the system more than do liberals. Here we test whether the link between political orientation and this system justification tendency depends on the comparisons people make across time. Across five studies, we found that the typically observed link between conservative (vs. liberal) political orientation and system justification is only observed when no temporal comparisons are made, or when the status quo is compared to a future alternative. However, this association is not observed when the status quo is compared to the past. Instead, when comparing the present to the past, the link between political orientation and system justification was blocked (Studies 1, 2, and 4) or even reversed (Study 3). Theoretically, these results connect the system justification literature to literature on temporal comparison and suggest that system justification is meaningfully influenced by comparisons processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article replicates and extends previous results indicating that system justification, in a pool of non‐American samples, decreases at the extremes of the political continuum. Data came from 29 European countries enrolled in nine rounds of the European Social Survey from 2002 to 2018. Results indicated that right‐wingers were more likely to support the existing social system than left‐wingers. However, a significant and negative quadratic effect emerged indicating that system justification decreased among extremists in both left and right‐leaning poles. Findings also revealed that the level of national populist voting moderated the relationship between political orientation and system justification so that the difference between extreme leftists and extreme rightists was further reduced when national populist voting was higher. Results seem to confirm that extremists can be critical of the existing social system and that this trend is affected by the level of the rise in populism in those countries. Please refer to the Supplementary Material section to find this article's Community and Social Impact Statement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political orientation profoundly influences individual and social decisions. Yet adequate and culturally adaptable tools to quantify it are missing. In personality research, it is common to use questionnaires to capture the multifaceted nature of a construct. Thus, surprisingly, most studies assess political orientation using single‐item scales that fail to account for cultural contexts beyond two‐party systems. Using a bottom‐up approach in which the core content of political orientation was defined by a German sample (N = 117), the current preregistered study developed a contemporary German questionnaire of political orientation (CGPOQ). The CGPOQ consists of 20 items that together form three main factors: "Tradition and National Security," Gender and Sexuality," and "Global Thinking." The factor structure that was determined by exploratory factor analysis (N = 1,089) was validated by confirmatory factor analysis in an independent sample (N = 303). Good fit was demonstrated by comparing the CGPOQ with several convergent (self‐identification, older conservatism questionnaire, voting intention, social dominance orientation, right‐wing authoritarianism) and divergent (religiosity, empathy) measures. The results indicate that the CGPOQ is a valid and reliable instrument for measuring political orientation in a German population. Furthermore, it challenges the assumption that political orientation relies on the same two dimensions across cultures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unconditional basic income (UBI) is a redistributive policy proposal that is receiving increasing attention in the Spanish political sphere. Welfare attitudes literature has shown that support for UBI is higher among left‐wing citizens and those of lower socioeconomic status. However, previous studies have not addressed the mediating role of ideological values such as egalitarianism or meritocratism in supporting UBI. Furthermore, studies have not considered the interactive relationship between ideological and self‐interest motives when studying attitudes toward UBI. Drawing on modernization theory, we propose that individuals' socioeconomic status conditions the role of ideological motivations in shaping support for UBI. To test this hypothesis, we study data from two different surveys conducted in Spain in 2017 (N = 1958) and 2021 (N = 2004). Our findings suggest that ideology is a less relevant motivation for supporting UBI among the Spanish citizens of lower socioeconomic status, but it becomes increasingly salient among higher‐status citizens. Among the latter, egalitarian values lead leftists to support UBI, whereas anti‐egalitarian and meritocratic values lead rightists to anti‐UBI positions. We discuss these findings within the framework of modernization theory, addressing support for UBI by different social groups and the ability of this policy proposal to elicit broad‐based support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does political partisanship extend to childhood? To what degree are children, a largely non‐political population, impacted by parents' and communities' political orientations? We examined children's behaviours and attitudes during a politically divisive event – the COVID‐19 pandemic. Children (4‐ to 12‐year‐olds; N = 313) of liberal (vs. conservative) parents reported greater preventive COVID‐19 behaviours, such as mask wearing and physical distancing, and responded more positively to these health behaviours. At the community level, children living in Democratic‐voting (vs. Republican‐voting) U.S. counties more strongly endorsed preventive COVID‐19 behaviours. Political orientation was a better predictor than education, income, religiosity, population‐density, and infection rates. Mediation and moderation analyses revealed that the parent–child political link was driven by children's perceptions of their parents' guidance, behaviours, and concern about COVID‐19, and that this link was attenuated in Democratic‐ versus Republican‐voting counties. Political orientation appears to play an unexpectedly prominent role, both at the intimate family and broader community level, in determining children's behaviours and attitudes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political polarisation has become an increasingly alarming issue in society, exacerbated by the widespread use of social media and the development of filter bubbles among social media users. This environment has left users susceptible to disinformation, especially those with whom a user is politically aligned. In this research, we integrate truth bias, elaboration likelihood model and new media literacy into a model for explaining social media engagement (with both disinformation and factual information) and analysing how political polarisation (operationalised as political alignment between users) influences perceptions and behaviours. Using an experimental design, we analyse the model separately for posts containing disinformation and factual information, highlighting key differences. Political alignment positively moderates truth bias's effect on engagement with disinformation. For both disinformation and factual information, political alignment moderates the effect of generalised communicative suspicion (GCS) on truth bias, such that GCS's effect on truth bias flips from negative to positive as political alignment increases. Issue involvement and political alignment appear to be the primary drivers of disinformation engagement, with critical consuming media literacy failing to mitigate engagement. Our findings contribute to the understanding of persuasion, conviction, amplification, polarisation and aversion related to fake news on social media. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous explanations regarding transnational solidarity in the European Union (EU) have mainly focussed on factors including left–right self‐placement, support for European integration and European identity. We expand this model by considering deeper psychological determinants of transnational solidarity: values, operationalised as Schwartz's basic human values of universalism and security. We expect them to exert (1) direct effects on transnational solidarity – measured as support for pan‐European social benefits – and (2) indirect effects via the three aforementioned factors. We test and find evidence to support our theoretical framework using multigroup structural equation modelling and data from the European Social Survey. We further show that the effect size of the value of universalism on preferences for an EU social benefit scheme in each country is positively moderated by that country's net contribution to the EU budget, highlighting the interaction between material interests and psychological value motivations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores how authoritarianism as a factor in child‐rearing values (CRV) is associated with political orientation, party support, and policy preferences among voters and societal elites in the Nordic context, which is characterized by social trust and solidarity, feelings of affinity, and a modest degree of ideological polarization. Based on a representative citizen survey conducted in 2018 (n = 4,076) and an elite survey conducted in 2020 (n = 948) among Finnish political, administrative, advocacy, business, and influence elites, our findings suggest that authoritarianism in Finland mostly relates to culturally conservative, and less to economically conservative, political orientations. While authoritarianism is connected to policy preferences and political orientations on both cultural and economic dimensions, it has more relevance for preferences regarding cultural issues than economic ones. Our findings support the notion that authoritarianism plays a role in political orientation mainly in the cultural realm. Overall, our study indicates that authoritarianism as captured by the CRV scale might be a politically important underpinning among both citizens and societal elites also outside the U.S. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the COVID‐19 pandemic, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reported that Black and Latinx communities experienced a disproportionate burden of illness. The goal of this study is to investigate laypeople's attribution of these disparities. We hypothesized the following four potential attributions: external causes (e.g. systemic racism), internal causes (e.g. personal choices), cultural causes (e.g., being close knit), or genetic causes (e.g., being more vulnerable for genetic reasons). Data from 447 participants revealed that lay theories involving external factors were the most endorsed, whereas theories relating to genetic causes were the least endorsed. Our analyses further revealed that external attributions predicted broader COVID‐19 relevant outcomes (i.e., perceived threat of COVID‐19, adherence to CDC guidelines, and support for government policies in response to COVID‐19), even after controlling for political orientation, participant race, and other attributions. This research provides insight into how lay people's explanations for disparities can predict their reactions to the pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Right‐wing movements across the globe call for system‐changing actions. This development contradicts the typically assumed resistance to change among the political right. Many of these movements use conspiracist rhetoric and, thus, we reasoned that conspiracy mentality might be associated with the striving for system change—especially on the political right. In four cross‐sectional studies in Germany (one nationally quota‐balanced, one preregistered; total N = 1539) we found that high conspiracy mentality was related to support for social change among the right and to support for reactionary social change among the left. Support for change among those high in conspiracy mentality was diminished when elected representatives (vs the population) were thought to drive social change. These results suggest that both right wingers and left wingers high in conspiracy mentality support change in ways that are seemingly incompatible with their political orientation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given that risk beliefs predict engagement in behaviors to prevent disease, it is important to understand the factors associated with risk beliefs. In the present paper, we conducted path analyses to investigate the associations of belief systems (political orientation and cultural worldviews of individualism and hierarchy) with COVID‐19 risk beliefs (i.e., perceived likelihood, perceived severity, and worry about disease; Studies 1 and 2), and the indirect effect through trust in information sources in these relationships (Study 1). Two online panels of U.S. adults were surveyed at three timepoints during the COVID‐19 pandemic (Study 1: baseline n = 1,667, 1‐year follow‐up n = 551; Study 2: n = 404). Results of path analyses indicated that, across studies and timepoints, when controlling for political orientation, trust, and demographic factors, greater individualism had consistent significant direct effects on lower perceived severity and worry about COVID‐19, whereas greater hierarchy had consistent significant direct effects on lower perceived severity. However, after accounting for cultural worldviews of individualism and hierarchy (and trust and demographic factors), none of the associations among political orientation and any of the three COVID‐19 risk beliefs were significant. The test of indirect effects indicated that individualism and hierarchy were indirectly associated with lower perceived severity of and worry about COVID‐19 through less trust. The findings suggest that cultural worldviews of individualism and hierarchy play a role in shaping people's risk beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID‐19 pandemic has impacted the world in many ways; for example, evidence from the United Kingdom indicates that higher rates of discriminatory behaviours against immigrants have been recorded during this period. Prior research suggests that political orientation and trust are instrumental in discriminatory beliefs against immigrants. A longitudinal study (six waves and a follow‐up) was conducted in the United Kingdom during the COVID‐19 pandemic (September 2020–August 2021) using convenience sampling (N = 383). The hypotheses enquired about whether political orientation predicts trust in government, trust in science and discriminatory beliefs. Multilevel regression and mediation analyses were conducted, using repeated measures nested within individuals. It was found that conservative views are associated with higher discriminatory beliefs, lower trust in science and higher trust in government. Furthermore, trust in science promotes reduction of discrimination, whereas trust in government, increases discriminatory beliefs. However, a nuance revealed by an interaction effect, shows that a positive alignment between political and scientific authorities may be required to reduce prejudice against immigrants. Exploratory multilevel mediation showed that trust is a mediator between political orientation and discriminatory beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Domain knowledge is often considered a minor contributor to environmental attitudes, with social and motivational factors dominating. Yet, domains may differ. Declining insect populations are a critical conservation concern but are not prominent in public discourse, potentially reducing the impact of social and motivational variables. We present data on the relations of insect knowledge (both propositional and causal), associated emotional valences, and political orientation to concern for insect conservation, for samples of American college students and U.S. and U.K. Prolific workers. We asked whether concern for insect conservation is more associated with knowledge than emotional valence or political orientation, and whether this is especially so for U.K. residents, who have a reputation for a love of nature that is not linked to political identity. We found that U.K. participants did show greater overall concern, consistent with the national reputation. Causal knowledge mattered, but political orientation was the strongest predictor of concern for insect conservation for both U.S. and U.K. participants. Valence contributed for U.S. participants but not for U.K. participants. Our results suggest that politicized public discourse penetrates attitudes toward insects even when it does not explicitly concern insects, and knowledge variation has less impact. However, the emotional reaction has a reduced influence where relevant discourse is less polarized. Insects may often evoke negative emotions and motivations, but it is not impossible to love a bug. We studied psychological barriers to insect conservation, a pressing environmental issue. Despite absence of politicized public discourse about insects, political orientation was a major driver of conservation concern, as was the emotional valence of people's insect knowledge. Knowledge of insects' roles in ecosystems showed more limited influence, but improving causal knowledge may yield more positive emotions and moderate the impact of political orientation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Researchers and practitioners have become increasingly interested in the role of political orientation in the workplace. Importantly, people do not always agree with other members of their profession when it comes to politics. However, the effects of such person–occupation political orientation misfit on people's work‐related attitudes remain unclear. According to the social identity perspective, person–occupation political orientation misfit is likely to lead to the experience of identity threat, which in turn should negatively impact people's occupational identification. To address this idea empirically, the goal of this study was to examine the influence of different political depictions of the field of industrial and organizational (I–O) psychology (i.e. as generally neoliberal, left‐wing, pluralistic, or neutral) on I–O psychologists' occupational identification, depending on their personal political orientation (i.e. more or less liberal vs. conservative). Specifically, we hypothesized that experiencing person–occupation political orientation misfit would reduce occupational identification. Results of an experiment (n = 800 I–O psychology academics and practitioners) provided some support for this hypothesis, suggesting specifically that person–occupation political orientation misfit might alienate people with a more conservative political orientation from their occupation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on a typological approach and data from the World Values Survey Wave 7 and utilising the comparative method of variation‐finding and a multi‐level mixed‐effects model, this study formulated a quartered typology of welfare attitudes on the country level informed by people's attitudes towards government responsibility for social welfare (welfare attitudes) and their associations with socio‐political orientation. This typology substantiated the cross‐national variations in welfare attitudes. Outcome measures included Welfare Attitudes Score, and explanatory measures included subjective social class and political orientation score. This study concludes that country‐specific welfare attitudes and their associations with political orientation inform an empirically quartered typology of welfare attitudes. Implications feature closer examinations of within‐country variances of welfare attitudes and the correlations of country‐specific intercepts and coefficients and highlight further theoretical and conceptual examination and substantiation of this new typology of welfare attitudes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is considerable research showing that economic threat influences people's social and political views. There are two prevailing perspectives on threat and political attitudes, broadly defined as the Conservative Shift Hypothesis and the Entrenching Hypothesis. The former predicts that threat induces change in the conservative direction (for both conservatives and liberals), whereas the latter predicts that threat causes people to adhere more strongly to their prexisting political perspective. In two experimental studies (one pre‐registered replication), we find evidence in support of the Entrenching Hypothesis. Conservatives responded to Economic Threat with increased endorsement of the conservative moral foundation Purity, whereas liberals responded to Economic Threat with decreased endorsement of the Purity foundation. Economic Threat appears to increase commitment to one's pre‐existing political ideology and not conservatism specifically. Implications for psychological theory and future directions are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Religious and conspiracy beliefs share the feature of assuming powerful forces that determine the fate of the world. Correspondingly, they have been theorized to address similar psychological needs and to be based on similar cognitions, but there exist little authoritative answers about their relationship. We delineate two theory‐driven possibilities. If conspiracy theories and religions serve as surrogates for each other by fulfilling similar needs, the two beliefs should be negatively correlated. If conspiracy and religious beliefs stem from the same values and cognitions, this would speak for a positive correlation that might be diminished—for example—by controlling for shared political ideologies. We approached the question with a meta‐analysis (N = 10,242), partial correlations from large Christian‐dominated datasets from Germany, Poland, and the United States (N = 12,612), and a preregistered U.S. study (N = 500). The results indicate that the correlations between religiosity and conspiracy theory endorsement were positive, and political orientation shared large parts of this covariance. Correlations of religiosity with the more need‐related conspiracy mentality differed between countries. We conclude that similarities in the explanatory style and ideologies seem to be central for the relation between intrinsic religiosity and endorsing conspiracy theories, but psychological needs only play a minor role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current research examined how the perceived physical attractiveness (by humans) of an endangered species, the Dead Leaf Butterfly (Kallima inachus), political orientation, and political ideology impacted participants' attitudes toward supporting and protecting a species. Three experiments were conducted where the physical attractiveness of the Dead Leaf Butterfly was manipulated. Two of the experiments used a representative American sample, while one of the experiments used a Polish sample. In all three studies: (1) Participants rated the Dead Leaf Butterfly as more physically attractive when its wings were open and displayed a black apex, an orange discal band, and a deep blue base than when its wings were closed and resembled a dried leaf with dark veins; and (2) those who scored high in humanitarianism‐egalitarianism provided more support for protection from harm for the Dead Leaf Butterfly compared to those who scored low in humanitarianism‐egalitarianism. Only in the studies where Americans participated did we find (1) those who were politically liberal indicated more support for the Dead Leaf Butterfly regardless of physical attractiveness as compared to those who were politically conservative, and (2) those who scored low in right‐wing authoritarianism provided more support for protection from harm for the Dead Leaf Butterfly compared to those who scored high in right‐wing authoritarianism. The differences observed between the American and Polish samples suggest that environmental attitudes are more polarized in the United States compared to Poland. These studies advance our knowledge of how attitudes toward animals are affected by the polarization of political attitudes toward the environment and provide insight for marketers when creating marketing strategies and designing appropriate messaging. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests challenge the existing social order whereas other protests do not (e.g., gun‐rights protests). Some protests even reinforce it (e.g., Blue Lives Matter protests). Protests challenging the social order align with "individualizing" moral foundations (e.g., fairness, harm/care) but undermine "binding" moral foundations (e.g., loyalty, authority), which may partially explain political differences in approval of protesting. Four studies examined whether moral foundation endorsement mediated the effect of political orientation on protest evaluations. In Study 1, liberals rated BLM protests and general protesting as more moral than conservatives, partially due to increased individualizing and decreased binding endorsement. Studies 2–4 replicated this pattern for BLM and general protesting, but these effects disappeared for gun‐rights protests and largely reversed for Blue Lives Matter protests, which uphold the status quo. These results suggest that protest evaluations partially reflect the moral values prioritized by different political groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Consumers showed a dramatically increased interest in contactless shopping in reaction to the COVID‐19 pandemic. Based on the protection motivation theory, this study investigated how contactless shopping grew as a protectionary action against COVID‐19. Findings from a nationwide online survey (n = 311) confirmed the impact of politicization of the pandemic on consumer responses for contactless shopping intention and the significance of threat and coping appraisals in taking protectionary actions. This study adds knowledge to the existing literature on contactless shopping and protection motivation theory. Results imply that retailers must invest in contactless shopping and provide an in‐store shopping environment that prioritizes the health and safety of shoppers and employees to decrease the threat of virus infection during shopping. However, in doing so, retailers are recommended to develop different marketing strategies regarding contactless shopping based on consumers' political orientations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Popular press articles have asserted that those with certain political orientations are less likely to wear face masks during the COVID‐19 pandemic. We propose that this relation is due to differential information shared by political parties rather than values associated with face mask wearing. We further propose that, when assessed together, political party affiliation (e.g., Republican, Democrat) but not political ideology (e.g., conservative, liberal) predicts face mask wearing, and this effect is mediated by perceptions of efficacy doubts but not perceptions that face masks infringe upon the wearer's independence. We performed a three‐wave, time‐separated survey study with 226 participants. Each proposal was supported. When assessed together, political party affiliation but not political ideology significantly predicted face mask wearing, and a significant indirect effect was observed via perceptions of efficacy doubts but not independence. Our results support that face mask wearing is a unique preventative action, which should be understood using political theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public response to the COVID‐19 pandemic provides a unique opportunity to study risk perception in relation to political orientation. We tested a risk perception model of how political orientation influences risk perception of an emerging infectious disease and how it moderates other influences. Two nationwide online surveys in South Korea (N = 2,000) revealed that conservatives showed a higher risk perception regarding an emerging infectious disease, and political orientation can even moderate the influence of perceived risk characteristics on risk perception such as how a liberal orientation exhibited a greater outrage effect of perceived unfairness on COVID‐19 risk perception. Also, the frequency of media use is positively related to higher risk perception. The implications of the direct and moderating effects of political orientation are discussed in the context of the studies of political orientation as well as risk perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2020 US Presidential election was historic in that it featured the first woman of color, Kamala Harris, on a major‐party ticket. Although Harris identifies as Black, her racial identity was widely scrutinized throughout the election, due to her mixed‐race ancestry. Moreover, media coverage of Harris's racial identity appeared to vary based on that news outlet's political leaning and sometimes had prejudicial undertones. The current research investigated racial categorization of Harris and the role that political orientation and anti‐Black prejudice might play in shaping these categorizations. Studies 1 and 2 tested the possibility that conservatives and liberals might mentally represent Harris differently, which we hypothesized would lead the two groups to differ in how they categorized her race. Contrary to our prediction, conservatives, and liberals mentally represented Harris similarly. Also surprising were the explicit racial categorization data. Conservatives labeled Harris as White more than liberals, who tended to categorize Harris as multiracial. This pattern was explained by anti‐Black prejudice. Study 3 examined a potential political motivation that might explain this finding. We found that conservatives, more than liberals, judge having a non‐White candidate on a Democratic ballot as an asset, which may lead conservatives to deny non‐White candidates these identities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most health models emphasize individual factors in predicting health behavior. However, in the context of COVID‐19 where the immediate response to stopping the spread of the virus requires collective efforts and change, other sociopolitical factors need to be considered. Prior research points to health behaviors being impacted by neighborhood and national social relations, social identification, confidence in government and political orientation. This research, though, is generally piecemeal (or specific), tends to be cross‐sectional, and is usually not oriented to pandemics. These issues are addressed in the current research. A two‐wave study with a representative sample of Australians (NWave 1 = 3028) gathered during COVID‐19 examined sociopolitical factors at the local and national level as predictors of health behaviors one month later. Four models were tested. These encapsulated geographic levels (local or national) and two health behaviors (hand hygiene or physical distance). In the three of the four models, social identification was a significant predictor of health behavior, while controlling for sociodemographic and individual‐level measures. There were more mixed results for social relations and confidence in government. There is evidence that to better promote health behaviors sociopolitical factors need to be more prominent in public policy and health behavior models. HighlightsThe goal of this study is to examine how sociopolitical factors impact physical distance and hand hygiene during the Australian COVID‐19 pandemic.Based on social cohesion literature and the social identity approach, we expected three social cohesion dimensions (social identification, confidence in government and social relations) to predict greater health behaviors one month later. Political orientation was also expected to predict health behaviors.The results show that social identification consistently predicts health behaviors, with weaker evidence for political orientation and confidence in the government, and mixed evidence for social relations.This research highlights the importance of considering and strengthening the sociopolitical context in our response to pandemics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research documents the counterintuitive effect that consumers actually have better service experiences with politically conservative service providers, but expect to have better experiences with politically liberal service providers. First, we document the effect in actual consumer service experience across three different contexts (Airbnb hosts, Uber drivers, waiters), and demonstrate that conservative (vs. liberal) providers enhance consumer experience (studies 1, 2a, 2b), because conservative providers are higher on trait‐conscientiousness (study 3). Second, in an experiment (study 4), we document expectations about service experience and demonstrate that consumers expect to receive better service from liberals (vs. conservatives). We explain that this effect emerges because consumers do not perceive that conservatives (vs. liberals) are more conscientious, but do perceive that they are less open. Overall, our theoretical framework outlines how conservative providers possess an unknown strength (higher conscientiousness) and a known weakness (lower openness), which leads to different actual and expected consumer service experiences. These novel findings provide valuable contributions to our understanding of how consumers are impacted by the political orientation of marketplace providers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the effect of shared political identity between acquirers and targets on merger outcomes. In a sample of public US mergers, we find that targets are more likely to merge with firms of similar political orientation. We document that acquirers in politically matched mergers experience significantly worse cumulative abnormal returns around the merger announcement, compared to their non‐politically matched counterparts. Acquirers in those mergers pay lower takeover premiums, experience worse post‐merger operating performance, retain more from the target management, and receive larger bonuses. Our results indicate that politically matched mergers create less value to shareholders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: Research has consistently revealed positive correlations between political liberalism and Openness to Experience, and between conservatism and Conscientiousness. Most of this research has made use of domain‐level models of the Big Five personality traits. Recent work suggests, however, that each Big Five trait domain can be divided into distinct aspects or facets, which offer more nuanced characterizations of each trait. Methods: Across four studies (Ns ranging from 1,123 to 116,406), the present research examined the degree to which distinct lower‐level traits would be associated with meaningful differences in political orientation. United States residents completed two different hierarchical Big Five personality measures (the Big Five Aspect Scales and the Big Five Inventory‐2), as well as a range of measures of political orientation. Results: Across both personality measures, liberal political orientation showed distinct positive associations with the lower‐level traits Openness/Aesthetic Sensitivity, Intellect/Intellectual Curiosity, Compassion, and Withdrawal/Depression, as well as distinct negative associations with Orderliness/Organization, Politeness, and Assertiveness. Discussion: By examining individual differences at a higher level of granularity, these data provide insight into specific motivations that predispose individuals toward different ends of the political spectrum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Politicians are influential both in directing policies about refugees and in framing public discourse about them. However, unlike other host country residents, politicians' attitudes towards refugees and integration are remarkably understudied. We therefore examine similarities and differences between politicians' attitudes towards refugee integration and those held by citizens. Based on the stereotype content model, we expect that political ideology informs stereotypes about refugees, which subsequently shape attitudes towards refugee integration. Based on the Contact Hypothesis, we further argue that personal contact with refugees reduces negative stereotypes about them—in particular for those endorsing a right‐wing ideology. We draw on data collected via two surveys with 905 politicians and 8013 citizens in the Netherlands to show that (1) unlike those with a left‐wing orientation, residents (i.e., both politicians and citizens) with a right‐wing orientation hold more negative stereotypes about refugees, which in turn relate to more negative attitudes towards refugee integration; (2) personal contact with refugees is associated with less negative stereotypes among residents; and (3) politicians, compared to citizens, report less negative stereotypes and more positive attitudes towards refugee integration. The practical implication of fostering residents' contact with refugees as well as the implications for future research are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change is the most significant threat to the Great Barrier Reef (GBR). While Australians express appreciation and concern for the GBR, it is not clear whether they connect climate‐related action with reef conservation. An online survey of 4,285 Australians asked "...what types of actions could people like you do that would be helpful for the GBR?" Only 4.1% mentioned a specific action related to mitigating climate change; another 3.8% mentioned climate change but no specific action. The most common responses related to reducing plastic pollution (25.6%). These findings demonstrate that most Australians have poor capacity to identify individual climate‐related actions as helpful for reef protection, and that generic calls to action—such as "protect the reef"—are unlikely to elicit climate‐related actions. As such, reef conservation initiatives must explicitly promote actions—in the home and in society—that reduce emissions and support the transition to a low carbon society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Universities are accused of being left‐wing bastions, unwelcoming to conservative and right‐wing professors. However, we know little about the political orientation of professors in comparison to other professionals, which would be the right comparison group if we want to know whether universities are potentially hostile environments to conservatives. Examining culturally and economically oriented political orientations in Europe, it is demonstrated that professors are more liberal and left‐leaning than other professionals. However, there is no greater homogeneity of political orientations among the professoriate relative to other specific professions, suggesting that there is a diversity of opinions which is similar to what professionals would find in other occupations. One exception concerns attitudes towards immigration, on which professors have more liberal orientations and comparatively low residual variance around that more liberal mean. Importantly, the difference between professors and other professionals is not so clear within graduates from the social sciences, but emerges more clearly among graduates with a medical, STEM, economics or law degree. An important political cleavage exists between professionals and managers, a group of similar social standing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to common wisdom, which is supported by extant psychological theorizing, a core feature of political conservatism (vs. liberalism) is the resistance to (vs. acceptance of) societal change. We propose that an empirical examination of the actual difference in political liberals' and conservatives' attitudes toward change across different sociopolitical issues may call into question this assumed association between political orientation and relation to change. We examined this proposition in four studies conducted in Germany. In Study 1, we assessed lay people's intuitions about liberals' and conservatives' attitudes toward change. Results of this study concur with theoretical assumptions that liberals accept and conservatives resist change. In Study 2a, Study 2b, and Study 3, self‐identified liberals and conservatives were asked whether they would resist or accept change on various sociopolitical issues. Results of these studies suggest that both conservatives and liberals resist and accept societal changes, depending on the extent to which they approve or disapprove of the status quo on a given sociopolitical issue. Overall, our findings provide no evidence for a one‐directional association between political orientation and the tendency to accept or resist change. These findings therefore challenge theoretical and lay assumptions regarding general, context‐independent psychological differences underlying political ideologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a study on the association between empathy and political orientation. Particular attention is given to the stereotypes associated with liberals and conservatives, noting the influence of religiosity on patterns of empathy in political attitudes.

Moral foundations theory suggests that relative to liberals, conservatives care more about values that are believed to bind group members together: loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and purity/degradation. In contrast, we propose that individuals who are deeply aligned ("fused") with their group should display elevated commitment to group‐oriented moral values, regardless of their political orientation. The results of three studies supported this hypothesis. The tendency for conservatives to endorse the binding foundations more than liberals only emerged among weakly and moderately fused Americans. In fact, liberals strongly fused with the United States endorsed "binding" foundations more than average conservatives and to the same extent as strongly fused conservatives. These results indicate that to fully understand moral prerogatives, one must consider the nature of the connections people form to the group, as well as their political orientation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyzed two datasets to determine the predictive validity of four explanations of support for Donald Trump during the 2016 US presidential election: (a) security concerns regarding immigrants, (b) economic concerns regarding immigrants, (c) cultural concerns regarding immigrants, and (d) social dominance orientation. Results of a two‐phase study (N = 354) suggested that perceiving immigrants as a security concern was predictive of increased support for and greater odds of voting for Donald Trump three weeks later. Perceiving immigrants as an economic threat predicted odds of voting for Donald Trump, but only among liberals and there was no evidence of cultural concern or social dominance orientation (SDO) predicting support for Donald Trump or odds of voting for Trump. A follow‐up analysis of the cross‐sectional ANES survey corroborated that security concerns were an important correlate of voting for Trump, but also that SDO was correlated with having previously voted for Donald Trump. While our two‐phase study has the benefit of prediction, the cross‐sectional ANES data does not—"predictors" in these data were collected up to two months post‐election. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The "conservatism as motivated social cognition" approach posits two core ideological motives underlying political conservatism across cultures. However, there is a scarcity of tests from non-Western cultures, and much research has failed to distinguish between social and economic conservatism. Using a relatively large undergraduate sample from a non-Western, predominantly Muslim country (Turkey), we tested the associations among resistance to change and opposition to equality motives, social and economic conservatism, right-wing political orientation, and religiosity. In line with the "conservatism as motivated social cognition" account, we found that (a) social conservatism is more strongly related to resistance to change (rather than opposition to equality), (b) economic conservatism is more strongly related to opposition to equality (rather than resistance to change), (c) social conservatism is the strongest predictor of right-wing political orientation among other conservatism measures, and (d) political orientation and religiosity had divergent effects: While right-wing political orientation was related to economic conservatism, religiosity was inversely related to the latter, providing support for previous work indicating a resemblance between leftists and Islamists in Turkey. The results generally support the motivated social cognition approach to conservatism while also highlighting the importance of distinguishing between social and economic conservatism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multiple and counterstereotypic categorization of outgroup members reduces prejudice towards them. The present research addresses, for the first time, the role of political orientation in moderating the impact of these strategies on prejudice reduction. Given that right‐wingers have very likely a higher need for cognitive closure compared to left‐wingers and thus may be less tolerant to social diversity, for them, increasing the complexity of outgroup members through counterstereotypic versus stereotypic or multiple versus simple categorizations should be a less effective strategy of prejudice reduction than it is for left‐wingers and moderate individuals. Results using Romanians and immigrants as outgroup targets for Italian participants supported our prediction. Further, we found that the effect of prejudice reduction was explained by the sequential mediation of increased individuation of immigrants and reduced sense of threat from them. Implications of the interplay between multiple categorization and political orientation are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research has consistently demonstrated that political liberalism is predicted by the personality trait Openness to Experience and conservatism by trait Conscientiousness. Less well studied, however, is how trait personality influences political orientation. The present study investigated whether differences in media preference might mediate the links between personality and political orientation. Participants completed measures of Big Five personality, media preferences, and political orientation. Results revealed that increased preferences for Dark/Alternative and Aesthetic/Musical media genres, as well as decreased preferences for Communal/Popular media genres, mediated the association between Openness to Experience and liberalism. In contrast, greater preferences for Communal/Popular and Thrilling/Action genres, as well as lower preferences for Dark/Alternative and Aesthetic/Musical genres mediated the link between Conscientiousness and conservatism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to investigate factors influencing concern for global warming among six Islamic nations (Turkey, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Indonesia and Malaysia). Due to the hierarchical nature of the data, the study uses multilevel and Bayesian multilevel modeling to cross-culturally test the influence of nations' wealth, CO2 emissions, post-materialistic tendencies, religiosity, political orientation and locus of control on concern for global warming. The results obtained from the Islamic nations investigated contradict both the affluence and the post-materialist hypotheses. The general pattern of the results shows that concern for global warming is a global phenomenon and not unique to the wealthy nations. We also found that concern for global warming is driven by religiosity, political orientation and internal locus of control. The findings of this paper highlight the importance of simultaneously assessing individual- and contextual-level variables in determining concern for global warming across nations. They also highlight the importance of examining the specificity of global warming and environmental concern within a non-Western context. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using data from three national surveys, the present research investigates among the native Dutch (Studies 1 to 3) and three immigrant-origin groups (Study 3) the endorsement of a shared sense of national belonging across cultural differences. The endorsement is examined in relation to political orientation and education, and sociocultural (deprovincialization) and egalitarian (autochthony) beliefs. In all three studies, a more right-wing orientation and lower education were associated with lower endorsement of common national belonging. Furthermore, deprovincialization and autochthony were independent mediating beliefs in these associations. The findings were similar for native majority members and immigrants, with the exception of the role of autochthony belief. The results are discussed in relation to future research on cultural diversity and the societal importance of developing a shared sense of belonging despite group differences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines in detail the psychological variables underlying ideological political orientation, and structure and contents of this orientation, in Sweden and Latvia. Individual political orientation is conceptualized on two dimensions: acceptance vs. rejection of social change and acceptance vs. rejection of inequality. Swedish (N = 320) and Latvian (N = 264) participants completed measures of political orientation, Social Dominance Orientation ( SDO), Right Wing Authoritarianism ( RWA), self vs. other orientation, tolerance for ambiguity, humanism and normativism, core political values, system justification, as well as moral foundations questionnaire and portrait values questionnaire. The results showed that the relation among the measured variables was similar in both samples. Swedish participants showed stronger endorsement of egalitarian attitudes and social values, whereas we found more self-enhancing and socially conservative values and attitudes among the Latvian participants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Boredom makes people attempt to re-establish a sense of meaningfulness. Political ideologies, and in particular the adherence to left- versus right-wing beliefs, can serve as a source of meaning. Accordingly, we tested the hypothesis that boredom is associated with a stronger adherence to left- versus right-wing beliefs, resulting in more extreme political orientations. Study 1 demonstrates that experimentally induced boredom leads to more extreme political orientations. Study 2 indicates that people who become easily bored with their environment adhere to more extreme ends of a political spectrum compared with their less easily bored counterparts. Finally, Study 3 reveals that the relatively extreme political orientations among those who are easily bored can be attributed to their enhanced search for meaning. Overall, our research suggests that extreme political orientations are, in part, a function of boredom's existential qualities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research has demonstrated that genetic differences explain a sizeable fraction of the variance in political orientations, but little is known about the pathways through which genes might affect political preferences. In this article, we use a uniquely assembled dataset of almost 1,000 Swedish male twin pairs containing detailed information on cognitive ability and political attitudes in order to further examine the genetic and environmental causes of political orientations. Our study makes three distinct contributions to our understanding of the etiology of political orientations: (1) we report heritability estimates across different dimensions of political ideology; (2) we show that cognitive ability and political orientations are related; and (3) we provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that cognitive ability mediates part of the genetic influence on political orientations. These findings provide important clues about the nature of the complex pathways from molecular genetic variation to political orientations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although attitudes toward peace and war are usually treated as two opposite poles of one dimension, in this article we argue that they may represent two distinct dimensions. To investigate this idea, we developed and tested a new balanced measure, the Attitudes Toward Peace and War ( APW) Scale, in three studies ( N = 4,742) in the United States and Denmark. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses showed that attitudes toward peace and war formed two distinct, though negatively related, factors. Structural equation modeling showed that antecedents of attitudes toward peace included egalitarian ideological beliefs, the values of international harmony and equality, and empathic concern for others, and consequences included intentions to engage in peace-related activities. On the other hand, antecedents of attitudes toward war included authoritarian ideological beliefs, the values of national strength and order, and less personal distress, and consequences included intentions to engage in warlike activities. Results also showed that political affiliation had an impact on the relationship between peace and war attitudes, with conservatives less likely to find the attitudes incompatible. The findings support the view that attitudes toward peace and war represent two distinct dimensions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although skeptics continue to doubt that most people are “ideological,” evidence suggests that meaningful left-right differences do exist and that they may be rooted in basic personality dispositions, that is, relatively stable individual differences in psychological needs, motives, and orientations toward the world. Seventy-five years of theory and research on personality and political orientation has produced a long list of dispositions, traits, and behaviors. Applying a theory of ideology as motivated social cognition and a “Big Five” framework, we find that two traits, Openness to New Experiences and Conscientiousness, parsimoniously capture many of the ways in which individual differences underlying political orientation have been conceptualized. In three studies we investigate the relationship between personality and political orientation using multiple domains and measurement techniques, including: self-reported personality assessment; nonverbal behavior in the context of social interaction; and personal possessions and the characteristics of living and working spaces. We obtained consistent and converging evidence that personality differences between liberals and conservatives are robust, replicable, and behaviorally significant, especially with respect to social (vs. economic) dimensions of ideology. In general, liberals are more open-minded, creative, curious, and novelty seeking, whereas conservatives are more orderly, conventional, and better organized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The negative reciprocity norm (NRN) is the personal moral code specifying retaliation as a proper response to wrongdoing ( Eisenberger, Lynch, Aselage, & Rohdieck, 2004 ). We examined the role of negative reciprocity in interpreting and reacting to the prison abuses at Abu Ghraib. Results showed that people who believed that American soldiers behaved wrongly at Abu Ghraib were more likely to view punishing the soldiers responsible as a highly moral response and were less likely to contribute money to a charitable organization that helps American soldiers. These relationships were only present among those highly endorsing the negative reciprocity norm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by a political assassin caused shock disbelief and deep grief to the Israeli people. Particularly prominent was the reaction of the youth, who gathered in large crowds, at the site of the murder and in other places, and engaged in various mourning behaviors of a ritual nature. This drew the attention of the media in Israel and around the world. A study of approximately 700 teenagers conducted after the assassination examined their emotional reactions, participation in ritualistic mourning activities, and assessments of the reasons for feeling shocked. In all areas, differences were found as a function of gender, and attitudes toward Rabin`s peace policy. An attempt was made to explain the youth's behavior in terms of the formation of groups and group identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]