Search

Copyright of Canadian Journal of Economics is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We reassess the driving forces behind the recent decline of corporate tax rates in Europe. Using data for up to 32 countries from 1983 to 2006, we analyze the roles of economic and financial openness as well as tax competition, while allowing for dynamic adjustment to shocks and period-specific and country-specific effects. While there is no evidence that countries that have become more open have reduced their tax rates more, our findings suggest that countries strongly compete over statutory tax rates. A simulation of tax rates in a scenario with no cross-sectional dependence in tax setting suggests that, in the absence of tax competition, the mean statutory tax rate of Western European countries in 2006 would have been about 12.5 percentage points above its actual level. We conclude that the recent downward trend in corporate taxes is mainly a result of tax competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While there is a large and growing number of studies on the determinants of corporate tax rates, the literature has so far ignored the fact that the behavior of governments in setting tax rates is often best described as a discrete choice decision problem. We set up an empirical model that relates a government's decision whether to cut its corporate tax rate to the country's own inherited tax and taxes in neighboring countries. Using comprehensive data on corporate tax reforms in Europe since 1980, we find evidence suggesting that the position in terms of the tax burden imposed on corporate income relative to geographical neighbors strongly affects the probability of rate-cutting tax reforms. Countries are particularly likely to cut their statutory tax rate if the inherited tax is high and if they are exposed to low-tax neighbors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates how company taxation affects German foreign direct investment (FDI) in European Union (EU) accession countries. In 2004 and 2007, 10 former socialist eastern European countries joined the EU. Although the EU integration is associated with increasingly favourable investment conditions, accession countries also pursue active strategies to attract foreign firms. In particular, taxes on corporate income have been significantly reduced during the last decade. We analyse whether corporate tax policies of eastern European countries affect three aspects of multinational activity: the location decision, the investment decision and the capital structure choice. The results suggest that local taxes are negatively related to both location and investment decisions. The analysis of the capital structure confirms that higher local taxes imply higher debt-to-capital ratios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates whether different types of FDI are asymmetrically affected by corporate taxation. We classify investment projects according to several characteristics such as the general motivation for FDI, the type of business activity, or the degree of internationalisation of the multinational firm. Subsequently, we analyse how local taxes influence the number of German outbound investments in European countries. The analysis reveals significant asymmetries with regard to tax effects: vertically integrated investments are more sensitive to host-country taxation than horizontal FDI; larger tax rate elasticities are estimated if business activities are considered highly mobile; and in accordance with profit-shifting considerations, subsidiaries of more internationalised companies are less tax responsive to host-country taxation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We exploit the rapid economic integration of Eastern and Western Europe after 1989 as a natural experiment to assess the effect of international competition for mobile capital on corporate tax rates. By means of a series of difference-in-difference estimations, we show that Western European countries which have been directly exposed to neighbours in Eastern Europe have reacted to the intensified competition by cutting their corporate tax rates by 8.1 to 10.5 percentage points relative to those countries which do not share a common border with countries in Eastern Europe. It seems that this effect has mainly worked through Eastern European countries offering lower wages and less through competition over corporate tax rates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Company taxes and taxes on highly skilled labour both influence the attractiveness of a particular region as a location for investment. We measure the effective tax burden on capital investment and on highly qualified labour in 33 locations across Europe and the United States. We then correlate both types of tax burden in order to study the different tax policy strategies applied in different countries. We find that effective tax rates on companies and on highly skilled employees are closely correlated for a number of countries. Ireland and most new EU Member States impose relatively lower taxes on capital investment than on highly skilled manpower. Conversely, in the US, companies are taxed heavily but the effective tax rate on highly skilled employees is moderate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]