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The recent advances in the N‐heterocyclic carbene (NHC)‐organocatalyzed generation of azolium enolate intermediates and their subsequent interception with electrophiles are highlighted. The NHC‐bound azolium intermediates are generated by the addition of NHCs to suitably substituted aldehydes, acid derivatives or ketenes. A broad range of coupling partners can intercept the azolium enolates to form [2+n] cycloadducts (n=2,3,4) and various α‐functionalized compounds. The enantioselective synthesis of the target compounds are achieved with the use of chiral NHCs. Herein, we summarized the development that occurred in this subclass of NHC catalysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study welfare effects of horizontal mergers in a successive oligopoly model with general demand. We find that downstream mergers can increase welfare if they reduce input price. In an environment with asymmetric upstream firms, lower input price reallocates some input production from cost‐inefficient upstream firms to cost‐efficient ones. In the presence of fixed cost and free entry, lower input price rationalizes the upstream sector and decreases average cost of production for each upstream firm. Both reallocation and rationalization can improve welfare. We identify necessary and sufficient conditions for welfare‐improving horizontal mergers and explore how demand curvature, market structure and Herfindahl index (in case of asymmetric firms) affect these conditions. The possibility of consumer surplus improvement and upstream mergers is also explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The secondary amine‐catalyzed reactions proceeding via α,β‐unsaturated iminiums and the N‐heterocyclic carbene (NHC)‐catalyzed transformations taking place via α,β‐unsaturated acylazoliums are the two widely used electrophilic intermediates in organocatalysis. Over the last two decades, these two intermediates are extensively utilized for the enantioselective construction of valuable molecules. Both intermediates are generated by the covalent binding of catalysts to the substrates leading to LUMO activation of α,β‐unsaturated carbonyls. A variety of soft nucleophiles are known to add to the α,β‐unsaturated iminiums and acylazoliums in a conjugate fashion, and in many cases, striking similarity in reactivity has been observed. Having said this, there are few cases where these intermediates exhibit difference in reactivity. This Minireview is aimed at highlighting the resemblances in reactivity between α,β‐unsaturated iminiums and acylazoliums thereby shedding light on the unnoticed parallels of the two intermediates in organocatalysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The diverse reactivity of N‐heterocyclic carbenes (NHCs) in organocatalysis is due to the possibility of different modes of action. Although NHC‐bound enolates and dienolates are known, the related NHC‐bound cross‐conjugated aza‐trienolates remain elusive. Herein, we demonstrate the NHC‐catalyzed formal [6+2] annulation of nitrogen‐containing heterocyclic aldehydes with α,α,α‐trifluoroacetophenones leading to the formation of versatile pyrrolooxazolones (29 examples). The catalytically generated cross‐conjugated aza‐trienolates (aza‐fulvene type) underwent smooth [6+2] annulation with electrophilic ketones to afford the product in moderate to good yields under mild conditions. Preliminary DFT studies on the mechanism are also provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: We examine how trade liberalization affects South's incentive to protect intellectual property rights (IPR) in a North–South duopoly model where a low‐cost North firm competes with a high‐cost South firm in the South market. The North firm serves the South market through either exports or foreign direct investment (FDI). The extent of effective cost difference between North and South depends on South's imitation, which in turn depends on South's IPR protection and absorptive capacity and North firm's location choice, all of which are endogenously determined in our model. For a given level of IPR protection, South's absorptive capacity under exports may be greater than under FDI. Even though innovation is exogenous to the model (and hence unaffected by South's IPR policy), strengthening IPR protection in South can improve its welfare. The relationship between trade costs and the degree of IPR protection that maximizes South welfare is non‐monotone. In particular, South has an incentive to protect IPR only when trade costs are moderate. When masking technology or licensing is incorporated into the model, however, some protection of IPR may be optimal for South even if the trade costs are not moderate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An alliance often involves one firm acquiring an equity stake in its alliance partner. We explore oligopoly models that capture the link between knowledge transfer and partial equity ownership (PEO), where alliance partners can choose the level of PEO. PEO can increase the alliance partners' profitability by inducing knowledge transfer, but the PEO itself reduces their joint profit because it induces other firms to take more aggressive actions. This trade-off endogenously determines the level of PEO, which can benefit consumers and/or improve welfare. Given the growing antitrust interest in PEO, we explore the antitrust implications of our analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Globalisation sceptics argue that trade liberalisation has high social costs, including an increase in expropriative behaviour such as civil conflict, coercion of labour and crime. We show that a theoretical relationship between trade and expropriation exists, but the sign differs for developed and developing economies. We verify this empirically using data on crime rates. Specifically, we find that trade liberalisation, as measured by both higher openness and lower import duty rates, tends to increase burglaries and theft in very labour-abundant countries. For other countries, however, we find that trade liberalisation has either a small negative effect on crime or no effect, depending on the country's capital abundance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyze privatization in a differentiated oligopoly setting with a domestic public firm and foreign profit-maximizing firms. In particular, we examine pricing below marginal cost by the public firm, the optimal degree of privatization, and the relationship between privatization and foreign ownership restrictions. When market structure is exogenous, partial privatization of the public firm improves welfare by reducing public sector losses. Surprisingly, even at the optimal level of privatization, the public firm's price lies strictly below marginal cost, resulting in losses. Our analysis also reveals a potential conflict between privatization and investment liberalization (i.e., relaxing restrictions on foreign ownership) in the short run. With endogenous market structure (i.e., free entry of foreign firms), partial privatization improves welfare through an additional channel: more foreign varieties. Furthermore, at the optimal level of privatization, the public firm's price lies strictly above marginal cost and earns positive profits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We look at privatization in a general equilibrium model of a small, tariff-distorted, open economy. There is a differentiated good produced by both private and public sector enterprises. A reduction in government production in order to cut losses from such production raises the returns to capital and increases the tariff revenue, which are welfare-improving. However, privatization also leads to lower wages and possibly fewer private brands. This lowers workers' welfare, which may make privatization politically infeasible. Privatization can improve workers' welfare with complementary reforms, e.g., attracting foreign investment or trade liberalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the optimality of policy specifications used to regulate the acquisition and operation of local firms by multinational enterprises. We emphasise the consequence of such regulations on the price of the domestic firm in the market for corporate control. We show that it is optimal to impose ceilings on foreign ownership of domestic firms when the government's objective is to maximise domestic shareholder profits, or a sum of those profits and tax revenues. While the optimal ceiling is high enough for the multinational enterprise (MNE) to gain control of the domestic firm, it nevertheless influences the price that the MNE must pay for the domestic firm's shares to the advantage of the domestic shareholders. Surprisingly, stringent restrictions on transfer pricing turn out to be strictly suboptimal in this context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the incentives for integration between two nations of different sizes in a set-up similar to that used by : individuals are indexed by location, each nation (comprising of individuals) is an interval, and the public good in each nation is provided from its capital located in the middle of the nation. We analyse integration where each country gives up its sovereignty and there is a joint decision about the location of the new nation's capital. We find that integration occurs if the size differences are below a certain threshold. After integration, a new capital is built (in the most efficient location) if the costs of relocating the capital are not too high. The results are robust in a number of plausible decision-making scenarios. Either country can be the major beneficiary of integration, depending on transport and capital maintenance costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider strategic trade policy when a high-cost and a low-cost firm belonging to two different countries compete in quantities in a third country, and technology is transferable via licensing. We characterize the effects of subsidies on (i) licensing payments—a new source of rents, (ii) the decision to license, and (iii) the subsidy bill difference (compared to when licensing is infeasible). We find that, in the presence of licensing, optimal strategic trade policy has several interesting features. For example, even under Cournot competition, optimal policy can be an export tax instead of an export subsidy. Also, unlike results in strategic trade policy with asymmetric costs, we find that optimal export subsidies are not necessarily positively related to the cost-competitiveness of firms. In other words, governments need not necessarily favor “winners” when licensing is possible. Furthermore, there exist parameterizations such that a government, if it can, might ban licensing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a two-country segmented markets model with homogeneous product Cournot oligopoly we show that production efficiency improves in the free-trade regime compared to autarky, if autarky price in each country is lower than both the post-trade prices—which holds, for example, when preferences are identical. The result holds irrespective of the demand structure, number, and cost distribution of firms in the two countries. The improvement in production efficiency lowers average cost of production which, for some parameterizations, gives rise to higher aggregate profits for all countries in the free-trade regime (compared to autarky). Though free trade (zero tariffs) improves production efficiency from autarky (prohibitive tariffs), freer trade is not always associated with greater production efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Platform sharing across manufacturers has become common practice in the automobile industry. Although platform sharing reduces the degree of product differentiation, manufacturers can reduce their procurement costs by taking advantage of the commonality of components. We investigate this trade-off through analyzing a model that incorporates manufacturer--supplier relationships into a differentiated duopoly model, and find an interesting inverse relationship between the advantage of platform sharing and manufacturers' costs to communicate with their potential suppliers. We also explore welfare consequences of the Internet trading exchanges by considering an extension that allows the manufacturers to jointly establish a business-to-business electronic marketplace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In developing economies a firm's strategy is directed more often at the government than at other competing firms. As an initial step towards modeling such interactions this paper considers a situation where a government confronts a monopoly. The latter chooses price and maximizes profit and the former chooses a tax rate and maximizes tax revenue. The government and the monopoly can delegate the final decision- making to, respectively, a bureaucrat and a manager. The incentive equilibrium of the model is characterized. It is shown that this kind of industrial setting is likely to exhibit greater inefficiencies than that which arises in standard models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reports that capital inflows with full repatriation give rise to welfare Improvement possibilities in a small tariff-distorted economy, when imperfect competition and increasing returns are allowed for in one sector of a two-sector model. In the period following the Second World War, a large number of newly independent developing countries sought to industrialize by pursuing an import substitution strategy. Since their imports were industrial goods, this strategy involved imposing a tariff on the import of such goods. These countries also faced shortages of capital and modern technology, and thus they often had to ask multinational enterprises to come and produce in the tariff-protected sector. Given the controls prevalent in most LDCs in capital markets, capital is immobile. Domestic rates of return are thus endogenous. In this framework we find that the welfare effects of an inflow of foreign capital depend on three parameters: the share of the differentiated goods in expenditure; the monopoly power or elasticity of substitution between brands; and tariff revenue as a proportion of national income.