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This paper updates the classic growth accounting research of the early 1980s taking account of improved data that has subsequently become available. The picture of long‐run growth which results from incorporating many revisions is considerably different. The long‐run path of productivity growth is now that of a roller‐coaster with twin peaks in the third quarters of the 19th and 20th centuries rather than a U‐shape. Productivity growth appears to have been very slow to accelerate in the Industrial Revolution, the notion of an Edwardian climacteric is not persuasive and the current productivity slowdown stands out as unprecedented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is now a large volume of growth accounting estimates covering the long run experience of advanced countries. However, most of the studies in economic history are not based on state‐of‐the‐art methods. There is a trade‐off between maintaining international comparability and achieving the best results for individual countries. A one‐size‐fits‐all approach will not always do justice to the variety of historical experiences since the conventional assumptions may sometimes be inappropriate. Nevertheless, growth‐accounting studies have produced some eye‐catching results which provide food for thought both for economic historians and for growth economists. These include (1) the finding that TFP growth was comparatively slow during the First Industrial Revolution, (2) Solow's famous conclusion that TFP growth accounted for 7/8ths of American labour‐productivity growth was atypical, (3) the impact of new general‐purpose technologies on growth typically takes a long time to materialize, ICT being the notable exception and (4) that capital‐deepening was much more important relative to TFP growth in east Asian than in western European catch‐up growth. Growth accounting is undoubtedly a valuable item in the cliometrician's toolkit. Nonetheless, we anticipate the introduction of more sophisticated methods and look forward to progress in understanding what explains marked differences in TFP performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research relating to productivity growth during the British industrial revolution is reviewed. This confirms that there was a gradual acceleration rather than a 'take‐off'. The explanation for the speeding‐up of technological progress remains controversial but the evidence base has improved considerably. In the face of a surge in population growth, slow growth of real wages during the industrial revolution may be seen as a good outcome which was underpinned by improved growth potential. Slow total factor productivity growth from the 1870s suggests that British technological capabilities at the end of the industrial revolution were still quite limited. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the role of industrial structure in labour productivity growth in manufacturing in US cities during the 'second industrial revolution'. We find that initially greater specialization was associated with faster subsequent productivity growth but that only the very high levels of diversity which obtained in some very large cities had a positive correlation. We interpret our results as demonstrating the existence of dynamic Marshallian externalities. The impact of industrial specialization in our sample of US cities after 1890 is found to have raised the level of labour productivity in manufacturing by about 4 per cent by 1920. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reviews UK industrial policy in the context of Brexit and weak productivity performance. It considers proposals made in a recent White Paper as well as more general arguments for reform now that the 'post‐Thatcher consensus' has ended. The desirability of improving horizontal policies in the areas of innovation, infrastructure and skills is noted. In the event of a hard Brexit, there would be an opportunity to return to 1970s‐style selective industrial policies and public‐interest‐based competition policy. An advantage of a soft Brexit is that it would preclude interventionism of this kind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the author talks about the industrial strategy published by the Great Britain's government that will bridge the gap between its productive companies, industries, places and people.

The remedies provided in Prosperity and Justice: a Plan for the New Economy are less convincing than its diagnosis. It entails a substantial shift back towards selective industrial policies and resource allocation by the state rather than the market, with the ambition of changing the structure of the economy. Many economists are likely to be sceptical of some of the arguments put forward in the report. An obvious issue is the huge policy discretion to be given to government without effective constraints, and the significance of government failure is overlooked. It is a triumph of hope over experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines contrasting experiences of the United Kingdom in addressing high public debt to GDP ratios following major wars. A clear message is that interest rate / growth rate differentials were more important than primary budget surpluses for the different outcomes. The debt to GDP ratio fell very rapidly under financial repression following the Second World War but remained stubbornly high despite large budget surpluses with price deflation after the First World War. Implications for policymakers today are that averting price deflation is a high priority and that supply-side policies that raise growth could play an important part in debt reduction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relatively deep level of economic integration achieved by the European Union ( EU) has been highly successful in increasing trade for its members. Larger trade volumes have had positive effects on productivity levels. In the case of the United Kingdom the gain from joining the EU was probably around 10 per cent of GDP and this far exceeded any costs of membership, possibly by a ratio of seven to one. A major reason for this outcome was a significant increase in competition as protectionism was abandoned. The economic implications of Brexit are much less clear because there are many permutations of what it would entail. Future trade barriers rather than budgetary transfers are the main issue. Brexit could be quite costly if the UK left the single market and used its new policy space badly. Ironically, while Brexit clearly appeals to free traders, it could end up empowering protectionists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If the eurozone follows the precedent of the 1930s, it will not survive. The attractions of escaping from the gold standard then were massive and they point to a strategy of devalue and default for today's crisis countries. A fully federal Europe with a banking union and a fiscal union is the best solution, but it may be politically infeasible. However, it may be possible to underpin the euro with a ' Bretton Woods Compromise' that accepts some retreat from deep economic integration and provides greater policy space since exit entails risks of financial crisis that were not present 80 years ago. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers 'unconventional' monetary stimulus and supply-side reform as ways to speed up UK recovery in the context of fiscal consolidation, drawing on the experience of the 1930s and 1980s. To imitate the 1930s, the inflation-targeting regime may need to be reformed to cut real interest rates, with land-use planning liberalised to 'crowd in' residential investment. To emulate the 1980s, supply-side reforms to improve productivity and to raise permanent income are required and possibilities in the areas of infrastructure, education and taxation are outlined. A problem common to all these options is that they are 'politically challenging'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents and discusses errors within the article "Were British railway companies well managed in the early twentieth century?" by Nicholas Crafts, Timothy Leunig, and Abay Mulatu, that was published in the November 2008 issue of the journal.

This paper examines major privately owned British railway companies before the First World War. Quantitative evidence is presented on return on capital employed (ROCE), total factor productivity (TFP) growth, cost inefficiency, and speed of passenger services. There were discrepancies in performance across companies but ROCE and TFP typically fell during our period. Cost inefficiency rose before 1900 but then was brought under control as a profits collapse loomed. Without the discipline of either strong competition or effective regulation, managerial failure was common. This sector is an important qualification to the conventional wisdom that late Victorian Britain did not fail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper builds on a method proposed by Geary and Stark for estimating regional incomes in Victorian Britain. This is modified by using tax data to allocate non-wage income across regions. The results suggest that the coefficient of variation of regional GDP per head was rising rapidly prior to World War I in similar fashion to the late 20th century such that its level in 1901 and 2001 was about the same. In both episodes of globalization there were big winners and big losers among British regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reviews the historical evidence on the relationship between globalisation and economic growth. Divergence in the growth of income and industrialisation in the twentieth century is documented but it is also noted that international income inequality appears to have decreased since about 1870 and that long-run trends in the Human Development Index are much less pessimistic about the experience of developing countries. It is argued that trade liberalisation has been good for growth on average but that successful capital liberalisation requires high institutional quality and that the developmental state may have an important role to play in the early stages of development. The recent claim by Robert Lucas that the 21st century will see a massive reduction in income inequality across countries in a globalised world economy is sceptically discussed in the context of empirical evidence that bad institutions are often persistent and that geography is still a major factor in explaining international income differences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on British productivity performance from 1950 to 1979. The article also explores the microeconomics of manufacturing productivity outcomes in terms of exploring the incentive structures that informed investment and, particularly, innovation decisions by firms and the policy stance of successive governments. The distinctive features of the papers include their use of economic theory and their quantitative approach to testing hypotheses. Two caveats need to be made to the suggestion that British trade performance gives no cause for concern. First, given that innovation and human capital formation are positive influences on manufactured exports, Great Britain's dramatic loss of world market share can be seen as a diagnostic of weaknesses in domestic manufacturing. Second, as is well known, the UK had a strong tendency for exports to grow more slowly than imports at a constant real exchange rate. Over time this was corrected by periodic devaluations. The implication was that the terms of trade moved less favorably than was the case for strong trade performers such as Germany. Adjusting real gross domestic product growth for terms of trade effects adds about 0.5 per cent per year to the gap in real income growth between Great Britain and Germany during 1950-73.

Analyzes productivity performance in Great Britain through the use of insights from growth economies and its embodiment in growth accounting techniques. Calculation of labor productivity; Productivity performance evidence; Impact of economic incentives on productivity outcomes; Approach to the productivity problem.

Focuses on the productivity performance of Great Britain in an international perspective. Reason for distinguishing the differences of the definition of productivity across countries; Elements that comprise the computation of gross domestic product per head; Measurement issues which can affect the accuracy of relative productivity.

In this article Nicholas Crafts reports that the crisis in East Asia is essentially a financial crisis and, as such, reflects failures of regulation and macroeconomic policy rather than a slowdown in underlying growth potential. In the past the Tigers have been very good at factor accumulation but less strong in the effective use of investment and in productivity growth. GDP/hour worked is still well below European levels. Accordingly there remains considerable scope for strong growth based on further catch up provided that the financial crises are resolved satisfactorily. History suggests that this is quite likely. Nevertheless, the leading tigers will need to improve their productivity performance if they are to sustain rapid growth and the example of Japan shows that this is not automatic and may not be easy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]