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Anticorruption is a prevalent global phenomenon and has yielded many good results. This study empirically tests the real effect of China's anticorruption on corporate acquisition premiums and explores its mechanisms. We find that after the exposure of and crackdown on corrupt provincial officials, firms without political connections had lower mergers and acquisitions (M&A) premiums than those with political connections. Cross‐sectional test results show that when firms are private or in areas with high marketization, the anticorruption event has a greater impact on their acquisition premiums. The channel test demonstrates that anticorruption reduces the value of political connections and improves the negotiation advantages of nonpolitically connected firms, enabling them to pay lower M&A premiums. Our findings indicate that anticorruption can create a considerably fair business environment. Moreover, we confirm the real effects of anticorruption on the distortion of resource allocation at the firm level. Finally, the results of this research have policy implications for the world's largest emerging market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While popular with voters, politicians rarely advance anticorruption policies because they can personally inconvenience them. When do the benefits of anticorruption reform outweigh the costs? I explore the role of electoral incentives by leveraging original data on over 600 anticorruption initiatives introduced to state legislatures in Mexico and an overlap between two reforms—one that required states to create local anticorruption systems and one that lifted an 80‐year‐old ban on reelection. Results show that legislators with reelection incentives were more likely to advance anticorruption initiatives and more likely to comply with the creation of local anticorruption systems. Findings underscore that while anticorruption reform is often met with resistance because corruption benefits those in power, electoral incentives can generate conditions under which reform takes place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research Summary: This study examines whether different entrepreneurship subsidies signal initial public offering (IPO) firms' quality to external investors. We employ a quasi‐natural experiment by exploiting the exogenous, staggered introduction of "Eight‐Point Code" inspections to Chinese provinces, which anticorruption campaign impacts how subsidies match firm quality. Based on a difference‐in‐differences analysis of 584 IPOs, we find that research and development (R&D) subsidies match highly innovative firms regardless of government corruption, but investors interpret R&D subsidies as a quality signal only when government corruption is low. High‐growth subsidies match high‐growth firms only when government corruption is low; however, investors do not interpret high‐growth subsidies as a quality signal regardless of government corruption. Our study contributes by examining subsidy–firm matching and investors' interpretations to isolate the signaling effect of entrepreneurship subsidies. Managerial Summary: Do initial public offering (IPO) investors interpret different entrepreneurship subsidies as signals of entrepreneurial firms' quality? We find that when government corruption is high, research and development (R&D) subsidies are matched to high‐quality firms, but high‐growth (HG) subsidies are not; nevertheless, because of dubious subsidy–firm matching under high corruption, neither R&D nor HG subsidies signal firm quality to IPO investors. When government corruption is low, both R&D and HG subsidies are matched to high‐quality firms; however, because of the distinct nature of innovation and growth, IPO investors interpret only R&D subsidies as a signal of quality, ignoring HG subsidies. Our findings suggest that investors' interpretations of entrepreneurship subsidies depend on subsidy type as well as subsidy–firm matching under different anticorruption regulations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Exploiting a recent anticorruption campaign in China, an event that incentivizes government officials to hide negative news from central inspection teams (CITs), we study whether market participants can counter that. We find that firm‐level information embedded in stock price actually increases during CIT visits, especially in regions with poor legal environments, stronger social connection, or state‐owned firms. Further, media coverage, analyst coverage, and corporate site visits by external stakeholders increase during the CIT visits. Collectively, our findings indicate that the market defeats local government officials' attempt to hide firm‐specific news. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motivation: Bribery is common in Uganda's health sector, with an estimated one in four Ugandans who engage with the sector being asked to pay a bribe for services in 2010. Health workers in the public sector are badly paid, while significant numbers of well‐trained health workers emigrate to find better‐paid work. However, between 2010 and 2015, estimated rates of bribery halved in Ugandan health services. Purpose: Why did bribery in Uganda's health service fall so much in the 2010s? What does this mean for anticorruption research and practice? Approach and methods: In addition to reviewing relevant literature and documents, in‐depth semi‐structured interviews with service providers, users and experts were conducted in Uganda's Central, Eastern and Western provinces. Findings: The establishment of the Health Monitoring Unit (HMU) in 2009 has been a major factor in reducing bribery. It used highly visible, often controversial investigations based on a principal–agent approach to anticorruption. Its approach, however, also led to negative unintended consequences, including undermining morale among frontline health providers and probably also citizens' trust in health services. It is moreover questionable if the HMU's approach can be sustained. Policy Implications: To tackle frontline bribery effectively and sustainably, and so enhance service delivery, anticorruption interventions must consider the underlying functions and needs—such as compensating frontline staff for low wages—that bribery may help fill. Otherwise controls on corruption may result in more harm than the good they do in reducing corruption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to bridge a gap in the literature by investigating a continuous audit case for anticorruption. The evolution of technology can offer valuable opportunities to integrate legality checks and business processes that are consistent with the growing call to fight corruption at the institutional level. Since the last decade, researchers have proposed conceptual frameworks demonstrating the visible advantages of continuous auditing and data mining, but significant difficulties still exist in practice. This process has been implemented in only a few cases, and the lack of empirical studies implies a need for additional research on this topic. To fill this gap, we adopt the framework proposed by Chan and Vasarhelyi (2011) and identify success factors for the implementation of continuous auditing. For the analysis, we use the research methodology of a single case study and focus on the Italian company Acciai Speciali Terni Spa (AST), the only steelwork company in Europe that has been ISO 37001 certified. This study demonstrates the practical impact of continuous auditing and data mining on strategic risk control by empirically testing the Chan and Vasarhelyi (2011) framework for the specific issue of anticorruption. The results show that effective continuous auditing is centered on an integrative and change management approach and that strategic vision, risk mapping, and a no‐corruption culture are among the most influential factors. The AST case demonstrates that technology is currently essential for supporting strategic risk control but only if it is integrated with consistent growth in organizational and managerial capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both China and India are adopting information and communication technologies to facilitate openness and transparency in their governments, and hence reduce corruption. Distinctive from their traditional anticorruption approaches, is the innovative e‐government approach an effective solution to corruption in these two large developing countries? This paper addresses the question through comparative in‐depth interviews with 44 mid‐ or senior‐level officials in the public sector in these two countries. The first study of its kind, our research shows that civil servants in both countries overall think positively about transparency and technology in reducing corruption. However, to what extent these innovative measures will be effective is conditional on various factors, such as political willingness, income inequality, and infrastructure readiness. What is worth noting is that the Chinese respondents were more positive regarding the role of transparency, whereas the Indian respondents were more positive about the role of technology, which may reflect the different facilitators of corruption and the constraints of anticorruption in China and India. Both China and India are increasingly adopting information and communication technologies (ICTs) to facilitate openness and transparency in the government. Is this innovative e‐government approach an effective solution to corruption in the two countries? This paper addresses the question through investigating the important yet underexplored perceptions of the senior and mid‐career civil servants on anti‐corruption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our paper investigates the integration of anticorruption practices, corporate strategy and business processes of contemporary organisations to provide a new and emerging sustainable governance model. Using the single case study approach to answer our research question, we provide novel evidence from the analysis of the Italian manufacturing company Acciai Speciali Terni Spa. Our case study interprets a consolidated entrepreneurial experience, constructing an integrated meta‐management framework of anticorruption practices. Enriching existing literature, we have adopted the frameworks by Asif et al., (2010) and Asif et al., (2011) to test results and obtain general perspectives and practical implications for organisations, regulators and governments, proposing a sustainable governance model to prevent corruption and bribery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scandinavian countries continue to build strong reputations as the world's least corrupt countries. In this case study, in a search for an institutional framework that other countries and policy makers can learn from, we explore sources of high transparency and anticorruption norms in Scandinavia. The most important lesson from this study is that legislative, normative, and cultural institutional pillars must be aligned to achieve the highest level of transparency and anticorruption. We made three main observations. First, adequate and comprehensive legislation in addition to severe noncompliance consequences contribute to an ethical business environment in Scandinavian countries. Second, a willingness to embrace integrity norms and standards through active participation in international conventions and agreements on anticorruption movements contributing to high transparency and integrity management in the Scandinavian countries. Third, a national culture that emphasizes high governmental and civic trust makes bribery and corruption less sustainable. Residents' high level of trust in public officials and police in addition to high civil and media engagement in antibribery cases results in corruption being "starved of oxygen". The findings suggest high trust levels, enforced regulative legislation, small country size, and high human development help craft a framework that drives a transparent business environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article maps the prospects of crowdsourcing technologies in the area of corruption reporting. Despite a flurry of initiatives and media hype in this area leading to hopes of an effective tackling of corruption, the potential of crowdsourcing has so far been mainly approached from a technology-centric perspective. Where challenges are identified and worked on they are primarily technical and managerial in nature, such as challenges of privacy protection, data management, information validation, and fundraising. However, little attention has been paid to insights from a growing body of multidisciplinary literature on how corruption works, how it can be tackled, and more generally how observed logics of collective action and social mobilization interact with technological affordances to condition the success of these efforts. Linking the technology-centric experience of crowdsourcing more closely to our evolving understanding of corruption makes it possible to move beyond common-sense conjectures in this area, to identify some little-discussed challenges, and develop some fresh ideas around the future of crowdsourcing corruption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines corruption in the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS). Corruption is framed as an exchange problem between a public official and the state. New Institutional Economics suggests such problems can be overcome using formal and informal institutional structures (e.g. laws and norms). Behavioural economics emphasises that norms may render formal rules less effective. The role of norms in fostering corruption and the constraints on the effectiveness of formal institutions in general and in the ACBPS in particular highlights the importance of addressing the role of norms in anticorruption reform. Current and proposed ACBPS reforms emphasising formal structural incentives need to more explicitly consider and outline the intended effect of reforms upon norms, and/or the expected relationship between the new formal institutional structures and the norms of the organisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]