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This paper explores the diplomatic and cultural dimensions of Algerian family migration to France in the decade following Algerian independence in 1962. During the ‘Thirty Glorious Years’ of economic growth (1945–73), French industries came to rely on Algerian (male) labour, and successive administrations welcomed their wives and children. After Algerian independence, however, this welcome shifted. As French and Algerian diplomats circumscribed family migration to prevent permanent migration, so too did social workers and French administrators emphasise the family unit as the primary locus of integration (or, in contrast, maladaptation). The paper illuminates how the idea of family stability proved incapable of easing the minds of French and Algerian administrators who, for their own reasons, saw families as a particular problem. The paper then investigates the role social aid associations for Algerian wives and families played in accentuating families’ perceived failures to acculturate. Algerian families found themselves caught in legislative loopholes for resettlement, and, once in France, measured against a colonial-era definition of integration designed to prevent their inclusion. In this account, families (and not single male workers) and cultural exclusion (and not economic contraction) furnished the logic for limiting Algerian migration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study addresses current gaps in the empirical literature regarding the effect of diplomatic representation on trade using a panel data set for 100 countries with 5‐year interval data from 1985 to 2005 and four‐digit level industry data. The results indicate that the effect of diplomatic representation on exports in differentiated goods is positive and significant and larger than on exports in homogeneous goods on average, but not statistically different from it. Furthermore, diplomatic representation only increases trade along the extensive margin and not along the intensive margin. The results indicate that diplomatic representation is effective in performing its function as a network search intermediary and that it is a useful policy tool to alleviate market failure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the U.S.'s military disengagements throughout the world, American diplomacy and the U.S.'s alleged aversion to exercise its power under U.S. President Barack Obama. The U.S.'s policies towards the Syrian Civil War, Russia's role in the Ukrainian conflict and its military withdrawal from Iraq are discussed.

In the late 1940s and the 1950s, in the context of the White Australia policy and strong anti-Japanese sentiment, Australia mounted a successful diplomatic campaign against the use of Japanese contract labour in New Caledonia. Australia also campaigned, but with only partial success, against the use of Japanese labour in the nearby New Hebrides. These initiatives further illustrate Australia's traditional assertiveness, when it saw its interests threatened, in the South Pacific. Blocking the use of Japanese labour probably contributed, as Alan Ward has argued, to increased permanent migration to New Caledonia from the other French South Pacific territories and France, shifting the population and voting balance against the indigenous Melanesian nationalist movement which later emerged. But Ward overstates his case: immigration of this kind would have happened anyway, especially from resource-poor and over-populated Wallis and Futuna. In its campaign on the Japanese labour issue Australia profited from its strong relationship with France, which resulted from comradeship in the two world wars, and from the lack of contentious bilateral issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In May 1991, writing in the op-ed column of the New York Times, the US Senator for New York, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, called for the Central Intelligence Agency to be disbanded. Arguing that the CIA represented an historical anachronism that had outlived its usefulness to American foreign policy-makers, Moynihan proposed that the Agency should be stripped of its autonomy and have its intelligence functions subsumed by the Department of State. Moynihan's rhetorical assault on the CIA marked the opening salvo in a protracted campaign that, over the following decade, until his death in March 2003, would see the one-time member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence lobby relentlessly for reform of America's intelligence community and against pervasive official secrecy. To date, Moynihan's evangelical fervour in championing a more open intelligence paradigm, which came to incorporate the drafting of congressional bills, the chairmanship of a bipartisan commission on government secrecy, the publication of a book, and innumerable speeches and articles, has been interpreted in a narrow personal and political context. Commentators have tended to characterize Moynihan's turn against the CIA, and towards government transparency as symptomatic of individual eccentricity, disenchantment with purported Agency excesses during the Reagan administration, and ill-judged post- Cold War hubris. This article breaks new ground by reframing and reperiodizing Moynihan's relationship with intelligence. It suggests that Moynihan's attitudes to intelligence and state secrecy were formulated much earlier than has hitherto been acknowledged, and in an environment far removed from Washington's corridors of power. Specifically, the essay relocates Moynihan's emergence as an advocate of intelligence reform in the global political turmoil of the early 1970s when, as Richard Nixon's ambassador to India, he was afforded ample scope to assess the CIA's utility as an instrument of American diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses theoretical insights from neoclassical realism to explain how the end of the Cold War shaped North Korea's domestic political structures and foreign-policy strategies. It suggests that political leaders are uniquely positioned at the nexus of domestic politics and international politics and employ two different strategies: utilizing international politics for domestic political gain and mobilizing domestic resources to further international ambitions. In the politicking process, political leaders are interested in maximizing both the state security and the regime security; leaders' concern for regime security outweighs their protection of the national interest when threats to the regime appear more serious. In North Korea, the end of the Cold War forced Kim Jong-il to adopt military-first politics, in which the political power and authority of the Korean Worker's Party waned and the Korean People's Army gained the upper hand in the governing process. In foreign policy, Kim Jong-il and his son Jong-un pursued nuclear weapons to maximize national security at a lower cost and to secure the legitimacy of their rule through successful nuclear tests and mobilization of international threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australia's role in resolving the conflict in Cambodia has been described as a triumph of cooperative security that achieved a balance between principles and pragmatism. The pursuit of cooperative security is a familiar theme in discussions of Australian diplomacy during the 1990s, yet there has been little scholarly consideration of whether this accurately captures the nature of Australian foreign policy at the time. This article explains Australia's conflict resolution role in Cambodia using an alternative, neoclassical realist framework. Specifically I demonstrate that expectations of reciprocity meant that Australia, when negotiating for peace in Cambodia, preferred bilateral over multilateral diplomacy. Secondly, Australia actively sought to lead the Cambodian peace-keeping operation to enhance its regional security credentials. Finally, building closer ties with Vietnam was an important, often overlooked policy outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In October 1954 Japan was admitted to the Colombo Plan as a donor country with Australia's sponsorship. The dramatic shift in Australia's position on Japan's involvement in the Colombo Plan, from strong opposition to sponsorship, was recognised by the Japanese government as the first Australian initiative to improve the bilateral relationship since the resumption of diplomatic relations in April 1952. This article examines Japan's attempts to participate in the Colombo Plan and considers how Australia's actions and reactions determined the course of events. The episode provides an insight into how Australian diplomacy was conducted towards Japan and the Japanese view of its relations with Australia at the initial stage of the bilateral relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Historians still associate the Good Neighbor Policy in Latin America almost exclusively with Franklin Roosevelt while admitting that Republican administrations before his set some precedents. This article argues more forcefully for recognizing the work of Herbert Hoover in establishing the major pillar of the policy--the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Latin America. More attuned than previous presidents to dissenting voices throughout the Americas, Hoover abandoned the rhetoric of paternalism toward Central America and the Caribbean and understood the moral and economic damage that occupation was doing to the United States. His diplomatic footprint was most visible in withdrawals from Nicaragua and Haiti. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Amherst embassy to China has long been viewed as a major diplomatic failure in Britain's early relations with China. This article concentrates on the greatly overlooked aspect of the Amherst mission: the delegation's discoveries in China after the official proceedings were concluded. Since the embassy was given unprecedented freedom of movement during its four-month return journey from Beijing to Canton, British observers were able to explore the interior of China and to communicate more fully with the Chinese government and people than ever before. As a consequence, the Amherst embassy not only provided valuable first-hand observations which increased and improved Britain's knowledge of China, but developed the view that the Qing government was the chief obstacle to the progress of Chinese civilization and to the general welfare of the Chinese people. These important perceptions laid the foundation for future changes in Sino- British relations and led, indirectly, to the outbreak of the Opium War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As an early development practitioner, Harry Johnston came to Uganda intending to develop a socially responsible capitalism - his 'new boot' for the Baganda. He negotiated this intent into the 1900 Uganda Agreement and expected that, once implemented, these conditions would lead naturally to the desired ends. What happened was something quite different. Baganda chiefs negotiated their own goals into the Agreement, and their actions, along with those of Baganda farmers and workers, produced very different results than that which Johnston envisioned. In effect, his intent to develop was subsumed by the contingent process of development. While interesting in itself, this story informs recent development debates. Some post-development theorists, while attempting to provide a practical alternative to modernist development, appear to incorporate assumptions similar to those under which Johnston operated. However, if these laudable attempts are to succeed, they must learn from Johnston's experience and account for development's contingent nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article studies the ideational underpinnings of the UK Coalition government's 'liberal conservative' foreign policy. It begins by suggesting that an Iraq-centric account of Blair's foreign policy suggests a grand vision on the prime minister's part that was lacking from his earlier foreign policy adventures, which relied on a more conventional form of British statecraft. The second section contends that the Gordon Brown years 2007-10 and, since the end of New Labour, Coalition foreign policy, can be seen as a response both to the substance and style of Blair's highly personalised stewardship of foreign policy post-9/11. The war on terror and the invasion of Iraq were accompanied by a seemingly open-ended democracy promotion around the globe which was quite out of character with past British practice. The article argues, therefore, that under Brown and Cameron cautious pragmatism has tended to win out over the proclamation of grand strategic ambition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the Suez crisis the head of the Royal Navy, Admiral Lord Mountbatten, twice appeared to offer his resignation, fearing Sir Anthony Eden favoured a military resolution of Britain's dispute with President Nasser over Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal. Mountbatten believed that an Anglo-French seizure of the Canal Zone would destabilize the Middle East, undermine the authority of the UN, divide the Commonwealth and diminish Britain's global standing. Within the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and in advice to cabinet, the First Sea Lord voiced his fears, querying what the exit strategy was. The parallels with the Iraq war are striking, except that in 1956 the White House opposed military intervention, compounding Mountbatten's unease by deploying the US Navy to delay its erstwhile allies' taskforce en route to Port Said. Mountbatten believed his unique status as royal confidant and imperial consul, and presumed close friend of the prime minister, allowed him to buck constitutional convention and complement military advice with keenly felt political opinion. Yet at the same time he prepared the Royal Navy for war with characteristic professionalism and thoroughness, finding himself party to the collusion with Israel which he later condemned. How did Mountbatten reconcile genuine dissent with a state servant's obvious sense of duty, and was this achieved through constructing an alternative version of events that ran counter to actuality? From a contemporary perspective what insight does this episode offer into the historic relationship between executive and chiefs of staff within the British model of civil-military relations? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores an intriguing and unexplored angle of the evolution of Russia's Asian Mission in the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1869 the opening of the Suez Canal increased Russian shipping to the Far East and brought more Russian travelers to Southeast Asia where in an interesting coincidence of local interests and imperial views they interacted with the local rulers, officials in the region. As scholars, naval officers or government officials/advisors they wrote literary accounts or reports of their journeys and sometimes gave public presentations on their experiences which informed the Russian public and government about British and French expansion in the region and the local perception of Russia as a European power. One of these travelers included the heir to the throne and future tsar of Russia, Nicholas II and his mentor E. E. Ukhtomskii, later a prominent exponent of Russia's Asian mission. By examining the contact of Russian travelers with the rulers and officials of Burma and Siam this article reveals how the interpenetration of Russia's imperial myth of an Asian Mission with an Occidental view of Russia in Burma and Siam helped confirm the empire's notion of a 'civilizing mission' and its claim of moral and cultural superiority to other Western powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the empirical determinants of the treaty network of the 1860s and 1870s. It makes use of three central theories about the determinants of Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) formation, considering economic fundamentals from neoclassical and 'new' trade theory, political-economy variables, and international interaction due to trade diversion fears (dependence of later PTAs on former). These possible determinants are operationalized using a newly constructed dataset for bilateral cooperation and non-cooperation among 13 European countries and the US. The results of logistic regression analysis show that the treaty network can be explained by a combination of 'pure' welfare-oriented economic theory with political economy and international interaction models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to make a long overdue re-examination of Indo-Australian relations in the early Cold War years. By drawing on available secondary sources, it reassesses the existing literature on Australian engagement with Asia. In so doing, it seeks to understand the reasons why the Menzies government found it so difficult to forge a close partnership with India. Canberra's rather frosty relations with New Delhi during the Menzies-Nehru years had little to do with Menzies' alleged condescension towards the Asians or his personal antipathy towards Nehru. Rather, it had to do with the two leaders' different readings of Cold War politics as well as their responses to the structural changes taking place at the international level following the end of the Second World War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a study of the Australian government's exchanges with the Chamberlain government over the ultimately unsuccessful attempt to negotiate a Grand Alliance between the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union during 1939. Robert Menzies and Stanley Bruce carefully weighed the arguments for and against before deciding to support the proposal for an Alliance. Yet there was considerable ambivalence about their support as evidenced by Bruce's panicky response to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In its own very small and distant way the Menzies government contributed to the inertia that marked the British Empire's failure to secure a Grand Alliance in 1939. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article responds to recent calls for a ‘new diplomatic history’ of early modern Europe with an investigation of an important subset of Renaissance diplomatic practices: those related to the house, household and hospitality. It considers the prescriptive sources, including treatises on the office of ambassador by Ermolao Barbaro and Étienne Dolet, in light of the practice of a small number of diplomats active in the 1520s and 30s, in particular Gregorio Casali, a well-connected member of a Bolognese patrician family who acted as Henry VIII's resident ambassador at the papal court from 1525 to 1533. The article draws on a range of archive evidence, including diplomatic correspondence, notarial records and trial witness statements, and begins by assessing how diplomats in sixteenth-century Italy understood the house and household, highlighting the symbolic and instrumental functions of sociability. It then turns to some characteristics of diplomatic entertainment, examining attitudes towards splendour and the interplay between the diplomat's official and familial concerns. Third, it asks why the authors of treatises on diplomacy were preoccupied by the proper conduct of members of the ambassador's household, arguing that contemporary conceptions of the household as a microcosm of the polity have a particular resonance in the case of the Renaissance ambassador, a point neglected in recent studies of the treatises on diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The centrality of the Reconquista in the historiography of medieval Spain has meant that there has been little examination of the evidence for interaction on and across political boundaries in pre-Islamic Spain. This article re-examines existing theories about the defence of the Byzantine province of Spania that had been established by Justinian in the 550s and was taken by the Visigoths in 625. The two existing and opposing models for the extent, defence, and – therefore – the importance of the province to the empire do not explain the evidence convincingly. Rather, a fluid zone of interaction was established in which diplomacy and ‘propaganda’ was the primary means by which opposition was articulated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]