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To what extent is Islam that descended on a tribal traditional society relative to modern society? These Muslims believe that Islam is a religion of peace and want to live alongside non-Muslims in harmony. [Extracted from the article]

Islam is the second most practiced religion globally, and the number of Muslims in Western countries has been increasing due to recent trends in migration. Studies have shown that Muslims in the Western world have more negative attitudes toward organ donation and transplantation compared with individuals from other religious backgrounds. Multiple barriers have been postulated that may prevent Muslims from exploring organ donation or transplantation. We conducted a literature review with the goal of summarizing the opinions of major Sunni and Shia scholars and Islamic bodies about organ donation and transplantation, including their opinions and rulings on the neurological determination of death to inform healthcare professionals, community members, and leaders. We also identified factors and attitudes that may prevent members of the Muslim community from achieving equitable access to transplantation or from consenting to donate organs during life or after death. Key factors or concerns identified included: lack of information regarding organ donation, mistrust of the healthcare system, family opinions, sacredness of the body, lack of clear understanding of religious rulings, and opinions of religious leaders. Studies have suggested that partnering with religious leaders to address these concerns may help foster positive attitudes toward organ donation and transplantation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the effects of religion on charitable contributions of Muslims who are in a minority to non‐Muslims who are in a majority and to fellow Muslims. We find that religious thinking leads to significantly more charitable giving by 10%. The effect of religious thinking is dependent on the ethnic identity of the recipient. We find a significant effect on giving behavior toward relatively more privileged out‐group members (Han Chinese), but a small and generally insignificant effect toward in‐group members (fellow Muslims). With religious thinking, prosocial behavior toward out‐group members is significantly higher by 14%, which is mainly explained by the religiosity of Muslims. Our results have implications for our understanding of the influence of Islamic rules on Muslims' attitudes and behavior toward non‐Muslims and for the design of fundraising mechanisms in Muslim communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under Ottoman rule, conversion to Islam took place in the Balkans in various forms often described as forced, voluntary or "conversion for convenience." Islamic law, however, strictly forbade apostasy for Muslims, who risked the death penalty. Although the Ottoman reform of 1844 banned the execution of apostates from Islam and that of 1856 declared freedom of religion, Muslim conversion was carried out discreetly. In 1878, the establishment of the Bulgarian nation‐state paved the way for potential conversion from Islam to Christianity. This study examines the conversion of Muslims, Catholics, and to a lesser extent, Jews, to Bulgarian Orthodoxy and Protestantism in the city of Ruse. It shows that apostasy was a result of a complex interplay of loyalties, political dynamics, and self‐interests rather than purely religious principles. Specifically, it argues that Muslims and, to a lesser extent, Jews, perceived conversion as a way of developing a Bulgarian identity, whereas Catholic conversion to Orthodoxy was mostly marriage‐based and did not necessarily entail an intention to achieve a Bulgarian national identity. Moreover, the way that the Bulgarian Church processed the petitions shows a continuity from the practices that the Ottomans used when Christians and Jews converted to Islam during the Tanzimat Era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In sharp contrast to the traditional ushering in of a New Year as a harbinger of good tidings and happiness, India on the night of 31st December 2019, rocked by protests against religious discrimination, seems the very epitome of the vision conjured up by the lines of Auden ([1]) - " I if we did not have a hated "them" to turn against, there would not be a loving "us" to turn to i ." In tandem, the Government is promoting the National Citizenship Register (NCR) to list valid and legal citizens of India and the National Population Register (NPR) to build a database of citizens. Viva-la-Republic In this dismal scenario unprecedented protests have spontaneously erupted against the Citizen Amendment Act (CAA), the National Citizenship Register (NCR), and the National Population Register (NPR), a development which has taken everyone by surprise. [Extracted from the article]

This article examines dreaming as an Islamic practice of historical inquiry among traditionalist Muslims of Central Java, Indonesia. Combining insights from the anthropologies of Islam and history, it looks at alternative praxes of history, how they are interpreted through Islamic frameworks, and how they generate forms of religious authority. The article follows the work of a Sufi master, Habib Luthfi bin Yahya, in identifying old unmarked graves as saintly tombs through dreams. Successful history‐making projects have resulted in the increasing – albeit contested – recognition of Habib Luthfi's role as a dreaming saint, a form of Islamic authority premised on his perceived ability to oneirically explore the past on behalf of others and arbitrate history. By observing the connection between praxes of history and the formation of religious authority, the article calls for the broadening of anthropological studies of Islam beyond their current preoccupation with the religion's prescriptive dimension. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this study is to analyze the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI)'s policy toward and involvement in the African continent as a case study of the IRI's global policy and reach. The aspiration of the IRI's leadership for international standing and support coupled with a desire to export its revolutionary model and extend its influence beyond its borders have shaped its activity on many continents, including Africa. Africa's strategic location, past colonial experience, political position, rich resources, large Muslim population, and economic attractiveness have all contributed to shaping the IRI's activity within it. This study analyzes IRI's foreign policy in general and its implementation in Africa in particular, identifying the different historical phases of its activity in Africa, distinguishing between the various African regions, the main Iranian organizations involved therein, the means of and channels for Iranian involvement in Africa, and the reasons for IRI's gains and losses on that continent. The study shows how the Islamic regime has managed, during its 40 years of rule, through pragmatism and resilience, to gain influence and support, has endeavored to balance its losses, and has adapted to new circumstances in the African continent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the Islamic banking in Oman. Topics discussed include Oman's moderate attitudes, Islamic banking had not previously been allowed in the country; Oman was the only country in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the only country in the world with a Muslim majority, that did not allow Islamic banking; and the demands of the protesters centered on concerns that particularly troubled the large youth population of Oman.

Despite the centrality of national identity in the exclusionary discourse of the European radical right, scholars have not investigated how popular definitions of nationhood are connected to dispositions toward Muslims. Moreover, survey‐based studies tend to conflate anti‐Muslim attitudes with general anti‐immigrant sentiments. This article contributes to research on nationalism and out‐group attitudes by demonstrating that varieties of national self‐understanding are predictive of anti‐Muslim attitudes, above and beyond dispositions toward immigrants. Using latent class analysis and regression models of survey data from 41 European countries, it demonstrates that conceptions of nationhood are heterogeneous within countries and that their relationship with anti‐Muslim attitudes is contextually variable. Consistent with expectations, in most countries, anti‐Muslim attitudes are positively associated with ascriptive – and negatively associated with elective (including civic) – conceptions of nationhood. Northwestern Europe, however, is an exception to this pattern: in this region, civic nationalism is linked to greater antipathy toward Muslims. It is suggested that in this region, elective criteria of belonging have become fused with exclusionary notions of national culture that portray Muslims as incompatible with European liberal values, effectively legitimating anti‐Muslim sentiments in mainstream political culture. This may heighten the appeal of anti‐Muslim sentiments not only on the radical right, but also among mainstream segments of the Northwestern European public, with important implications for social exclusion and political behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sociology has neglected the terrain of the gay Muslim single as a sociological phenomenon. Produced and managed via meaningful social conduct, the gay Muslim single often holds negative symbolic and cultural worth, one of lacking identification and presence. The stigma of the gay Muslim single is actively reproduced through social and power relations. I examine multiple stigmas and dichotomies by using autoethnography to illustrate the human lived experience of a gay Muslim single, who is silenced, invisibilized, and embodies a social life of "emptiness." The gay Muslim single, bringing about a "moral panic," confronts temporal regulations, norms, and values, notably those of heterosexual ones in everyday social life. He is cast as an "outsider," which reinforces his stigma in everyday social life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aim: The impact of a stoma on the health related quality of life (HRQoL) in patients is irrespective of faith. Muslim patients report lower quality of life and spiritual well‐being following stoma surgery as compared to others. This critical review aims to improve awareness of Islamic practices and HRQoL outcomes in this cohort of patients amongst healthcare professionals. Method: An extensive non‐systematic search of EMBASE, MEDLINE and Google Scholar was performed for original research articles pertaining to health related quality of life (HRQoL), stoma care and impact on religious practice in Muslim patients. A narrative synthesis of extracted data was performed and presented using basic thematic analysis. Results: The findings from the 10 original articles, including 954 participants, were identified. Perceptions of cleanliness emerged as a concern to Muslim patients with stomas as it is core to the performance of prayer. Muslim patients with stomas are known to avoid or reduce participation in prayers due to perceived inferior hygiene and fear of leakage. The consensus opinion from Islamic scholars is that they can pray normally, attend mosque and perform the Hajj pilgrimage. Stoma patients may fast in the holy month of Ramadan provided it is medically safe. Evidence suggests religion‐specific counselling can reduce the detrimental effect on HRQoL of Muslim patients following stoma‐forming surgery and increases engagement in social aspects of life. Conclusions: It is important for patients, family members and healthcare professionals to understand the practical and religious implications of stomas on these patients for appropriate guidance and counselling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Muslim communities have frequently been the victim of vilification and discrimination in Australia and the broader Asian region. This article discusses and compares the narratives around Muslim vilification in Australia and Sri Lanka. Despite the fact that these two nations are vastly different in size, demographics and cultural history, I will argue that there are remarkable similarities in how Muslims are subject to attack in both nations. The hate speech occasioned against Muslims in Sri Lanka and Australia is shaped by almost identical narrative structures and is cultivated in similar online environments. In both cases, anti‐Muslim animus is fuelled by a fear of displacement and perceived contamination of what nativists regard as ethnically sovereign territory. I will argue that the underlying sub‐text in both cases is owed to a repulsion to the physical presence of Muslims which can be understood in terms of Mary Douglas' concept of the moral pollutant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2006, the Turkish Harun Yahya Enterprise published and distributed thousands of copies of its anti‐evolutionary text Atlas of Creation to educational institutes in the West. Although this was little more than a publicity stunt, it resulted in Harun Yahya becoming a mainstay in discussions about creationism in Europe. Although Yahya is often presented as the "go to" representative of European Muslim perceptions of evolution, one would be hard pressed to find the literature about Islamic creationism in Europe that does not engage in a discussion of Harun Yahya. However, little evidence exists to support the notion that Harun Yahya warrants such extensive attention, or that Harun Yahya has a substantive influence among European Muslims. This article will explore existing claims about the popularity of Harun Yahya, before drawing on recent research into Muslim perceptions of evolution to argue that Harun Yahya is relatively unknown among Muslims, at least in the British context, and is not influential even among those who are familiar with his work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Perception of Western governments' hostility to Islam is one of the indicating features of Islamic fundamentalism and, in some cases, is serving as a pull to join extremist groups. In this paper, using data from two waves of a cross‐national survey, we investigate what affects European Muslims' opinions about Western governments. We find that residential segregation is associated with perceived hostility of Western governments to Islam. Further, we find that Muslims living in segregated neighbourhoods and enclaves have a higher probability of believing that Western governments are hostile to Islam. National origins of Muslim immigrants have a significant impact, with people from African countries measuring less perceived hostility than others. We also find that education is associated with perceived hostility of Western governments to Islam in a non‐linear way. People with the highest and lowest levels of education tend to be less likely to believe that Western governments are hostile to Islam, relative to people with mid‐level education. This non‐linear effect is best explained by education's differential effects on perceptions of key world events. During the time between 2011 – before ISIS's announcement of its Caliphate in Iraq and Syria – and 2013, subsequent to that announcement, we see a sharp decrease in perception of Western governments' hostility to Islam, particularly among more educated European Muslims. We make the case that this decrease can be attributed, in some ways, to the emergence of ISIS. We discuss our findings in terms of theoretical and policy implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study tested the levels and consequences of positive religious coping among a multinational sample of Muslims. The sample consisted of 706 university students recruited in three Muslim countries: Israel/Palestine, Turkey and Malaysia. Participants' average age was 22.61, and 65% of them were females. This investigation applied a cross‐sectional comparative methodology. Measures used: demographics, positive religious coping, satisfaction with life and depressive symptoms. The findings indicated that (a) participants reported high levels of positive religious coping usage, and Malaysians scored significantly higher in this regard than both Palestinians and Turks; (b) positive religious coping correlated positively with satisfaction with life but was not linked to depressive symptoms and (c) the magnitude of correlation between positive and satisfaction with life was significantly higher among Malaysians than among both Palestinians and Turks. The findings suggest that to understand the implications of positive religious coping for the health and well‐being of Muslims, a detailed and nuanced analysis is needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The incompatibility of Islam with democracy has been the focal point of many public and scholarly debates. However, very few studies have attempted to investigate empirically whether the followers of Islam are less favorable to democracy than the followers of Christianity. This study extends previous research by conducting empirical and representative analyses of whether Muslims in general and religious and practicing Muslims in particular prefer democracy less than their Christian counterparts. Using country fixed effects regression and data from the World Values Survey (WVS6) that include 52,326 Muslims and Christians, the analyses show that Muslims in general, as well as religious and practicing Muslims, endorse democracy to the same extent as do Christians. Thereby, this study is the first to provide comparative, individual‐level evidence of the influence these religions may have on democratic attitudes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the role of fun and freedom in the moral learning of young women students in two Indonesian Islamic boarding schools. Recent debates about Islam and ethical subject formation have centred on the assumed tension between Islam and freedom. I examine decisions about television viewing and dress to illustrate both the flexibility and fixity of moral values and evaluation in girls' lives. I argue that anthropologists of morality and Islam should take seriously moments of fun as important instances for 'moral ludus' or 'moral play' – the testing, shifting, and reshaping of the boundaries of moral behaviours that involve balancing the demands of various social fields and the larger ethical community in which a person is embedded. I suggest that these moments be viewed not as ruptures or instances of hypocrisy but as everyday occurrences of embedded agency in the lives of piety‐minded individuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research utilizing conversion narratives to understand how and why people convert has been troubled by the "accuracy" of the accounts. This study of Muslim converts in the United States sidesteps this problem by turning the focus away from the causes, motives, and drivers of conversion and placing it instead on the form or structure of their conversion narratives. More specifically, it foregrounds the subjective process of making sense of one's conversion story through the employment of formulaic narrative structures. Findings suggest that when accounting for their conversion to Islam, these respondents employed three different narrative structures: stories of awakening, continuity, and return. Although these stories vary in meaningful ways, each provides a different perspective on how conversion to Islam can be conceptualized and expressed narratively. The discussion centers on the similarities and differences between these stories in order to more fully articulate and distinguish their underlying premises. I conclude by considering how each of these stories are used by converts to convey the authenticity of their Muslim identities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the impact of journalist Jamal Khashoggi's murder in the Middle East. Topics discussed include anti-Americanism among the world's Muslims, the impact of the Khashoggi affair on the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia and adoption of politico-military polices independent of the U.S. by Saudi Arabia.

Islamophobia represents one of the greatest moral dilemmas of our time. Anti‐Muslim hostility and hatred, driven by racism, has manifested itself in exclusionary, discriminatory, and violent actions toward Muslims and those perceived as Muslims. By most metrics, Islamophobia in the United States is only getting worse. This article draws on Krister Stendahl's rules of interfaith engagement as a means of offering Christians a blueprint for how to reach out and engage with their Muslim neighbors in an age of Islamophobia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper estimates the returns to English‐speaking fluency on the socioeconomic outcomes of childhood immigrants. We further investigate whether Muslim childhood immigrants face additional hurdles in economic and social integration into the host country. Motivated by the critical age hypothesis, we identify the causal effects of English skills on socioeconomic outcomes by exploring the differences in the country of origin and age at arrival across childhood immigrants. We first document that all childhood immigrants who migrate from non‐English‐speaking countries at a younger age attain higher levels of English skills. We also find that acquiring better English‐language skills improves the educational attainment and labour and marriage market prospects of non‐Muslim childhood immigrants significantly and increases their participation in volunteer work. However, our results show that while a good command of English enhances the educational attainments of Muslim childhood immigrants, it shows no positive return in either the labour or marriage markets. Our results also show that progress in English fails to improve Muslim childhood immigrants' engagement in voluntary work, meaning that the opportunity for social cohesion is missed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explored the perceived values considered by Muslims when undertaking a halal holiday. The data for the study were gathered via 21 semistructured interviews conducted among Sri Lankan Muslims. Incorporating the theory of consumption values developed by Sheth, thematic analysis was used explore the key perceived consumption values that Muslim travellers associated with halal tourism. The findings of the study demonstrate that the perceived value associated with halal holidays is multidimensional, comprising both consumption and Islamic religious values such as Iman (faith), which refers to the conscience, and suggest that "Muslims should act within the Sharia (Islamic Law), and only choose what is halal and remember Allah when making decisions". This study contributes to the body of knowledge on consumer perceived values by emphasizing that in the context of halal holidays, Islamic values captured by Iman play a significant role in customer expectations regarding perceived consumption values. Thus, tourism and hospitality organizations need to develop products and services that are Sharia‐compliant. Such initiatives would enable tourism and hospitality firms to demonstrate their responsiveness to specific cultural needs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines church–state relations in Europe, and analyzes their influence on anti‐immigrant attitudes. The literature explains this relationship primarily with religious demographics, or state privileges for the majority faith. Alternately, this study focuses on the status of the majority religion. It argues that, in countries with a national church, citizens are more likely to consider the institutionalization of a new religion to be occurring at the expense of the national heritage, and react negatively. To test that hypothesis, the study focuses on Muslim immigrants in Europe, and builds an index that gauges the extent to which European states institutionalize Islam. Then, employing multilevel regression analysis, it investigates how the institutionalization of Islam influences anti‐Muslim prejudice in different contexts of church–state regimes. Individual‐level data come from the latest wave of the European Values Study, and cover 31 countries. Findings indicate that, in European countries with a national church, institutionalization of Islam increases anti‐Muslim prejudice. In countries without a national church, however, institutionalization leads to tolerance. These results confirm the continuing relevance of religion on the national level in Europe, despite the decline in individual religiosity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We explore the effects of anti‐Islamic right‐wing, populist political campaign ads on voting intention for a right‐wing populist party using a quota‐based online experiment (N = 174). Additionally, we investigate implicit attitudes (i.e., automatic affective associations) and explicit attitudes (i.e., overtly expressed evaluations) toward Muslims as underlying mechanisms of these effects. We find that exposure to the political campaign ads prompts explicit hostile attitudes toward Muslims mediated by implicit attitudes. Explicit attitudes in turn shape voting intention. Moreover, implicit attitudes toward Muslims predict voting preference beyond the influence of explicit attitudes. Thus, resentments toward Muslims may foster voters' support for anti‐Islamic right‐wing populist parties even "under the radar" of conscious awareness. In sum, this study demonstrates for the first time the entire process of right‐wing, populist political campaign ads' effects on voting preferences via implicit and explicit attitudes toward Muslims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: The article presents a global comparison of antisemitic attitudes and their functions. Methods: The sample of the study consists of 18 countries from five continents surveyed in 2011 by the Pew Research Center (n = 13,975). These data are analyzed using multilevel analyses. Results: It can be shown that antisemitism, on the one hand, offers a pseudo‐explanation for rapid social change by equating capitalism, "American imperialism," and globalization with Jews, and on the other hand is used for the construction of nationalistic boundaries. Nationalism and anti‐globalization views are particularly important predictors in countries with higher GDP per capita. Those countries, however, have comparatively low base rates of antisemitism whereas Muslim countries have rather high ones. Cross‐level parameters show that especially Muslims living in countries that are rather democratic but have low GDP and where Muslims are a minority report negative views of Jews. Conclusion: There is a significant global variation of negative attitudes toward Jews. The theoretical approaches at hand best describe the situation in economically stable regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"World-class Muslims": Examining the Discursive Construction of a Singapore Muslim Identity The Muslim minority community in Singapore came under great scrutiny in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, and even more so, after the arrests of local members of terrorist network, Jemaah Islamiyah, in 2001 and the 2002 Bali bombings. When unpacking the identity of the ideal Singaporean Muslim in government speeches, it can be argued that Singaporean Muslims are still viewed through the lens of securitisation, and that the approach to understanding the Singapore Muslim identity remains prescriptive and essentialised. The purpose of focusing on government speeches, instead of discourse used in initiatives by Muslim institutions (like the SMI project), is due to the far-reaching impact that the national government has, affecting how citizens perceive the Singaporean Muslim identity. [Extracted from the article]

At the turn of the twentieth century, the interest of American Protestant churches in foreign missions increased dramatically. "The evangelization of the world in this generation" became a powerful slogan and a new understanding of the Great Commission or the instruction of the resurrected Jesus Christ to his disciples, was among factors that "revolutionized American missionary movement."1 This article presents the views on Islam of Rev. John G. Lansing from the New Brunswick Seminary of the Reformed Church of America,2 and suggests that Lansing changed the view that Islam is not approachable and awakened the imagination of his disciples concerning the land of Islam and its inhabitants as people to whom the words of the gospel should be addressed. Although the Arabian Mission established by Lansing in 1889 finally failed in ensuring mass conversions of Muslims, it did result in a great discovery of Islam by the missionaries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to 'Abd al-Mun'im Abu al-Futu , then a prominent Egyptian Ikhwan figure, the position of the Jordanian Ikhwan diverged significantly from that of the Egyptian Brotherhood, which attempted to assert a position for the Brotherhood as a collective:The Jordanian Brothers may have had a more rebellious position than others for they backed addam usayn and some of their preachers started comparing him to ala al-Din. The Jordanian Brotherhood's position on Palestine was far more politically strident in opposing the Jordan-Israel peace accords signed in 1994 and marked the first hints of a structural transformation in the relationship between the Ikhwan and the Jordanian state. 1 The terms "Muslim Brotherhood", "Ikhwan", "Muslim Brothers", "Brothers", and "Brotherhood" will be used interchangeably throughout this article to refer to the Muslim Brotherhood. 27 The terms "Muslim Brotherhood", "Ikhwan", "Muslim Brothers", "Brothers", and "Brotherhood" will be used interchangeably throughout this article to refer to the Muslim Brotherhood. [Extracted from the article]

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Russian Empire (aside from the protectorates of Bukhara and Khiva, which were declared independent according to international law) had a Muslim population of more than fourteen million, constituting at least eleven per cent of the total population. Yet, at that particular moment of time, they all considered Islam and only Islam to be the basis for the religious, social, educational as well as political lives of Russia's Muslims. 35 Ibrahimov, I Alem-i Islam ve Yaponyada Intishar Islamiyet i [The Muslim World and the Spread of Islam in Japan] (Istanbul: Ahmad Saqi Bek Matbaasi, n.d), 2:25-26; and Landau, I The Politics of Pan-Islam i , 29-30. 91 Ibrahimov, I Alem-i Islam ve Yaponyada Intishar Islamiyet i [The Muslim World and the Spread of Islam in Japan] (Istanbul: Ahmad Saqi Bek Matbaasi, n.d), 2:25-26; and Landau, I The Politics of Pan-Islam i , 29-30. [Extracted from the article]

This article examines the role of houses of worship as institutions where individuals acquire civic skills that can be deployed for political participation in the world's largest Muslim‐majority democracy: Indonesia. Drawing on participant observation and interviews in Muslim, Protestant, and Catholic religious communities in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, this article investigates three questions: (1) What opportunities exist for individuals worshipping in Indonesian churches and mosques to develop and practice civic skills as part of their religious engagement? (2) Does civic skill opportunity vary across religious denominations? and (3) What factors might explain variation across different religious settings? The study shows that mosques offer fewer prospects for their worshippers to develop civic skills than do churches. These denominational differences can be explained by a house of worship's management practices, which are shaped by its degree of autonomy, style of worship, and the relative size of the religious denomination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research has found that migrants with strong dual identities (e.g., Muslim German) are more likely to endorse the rights of their minority group. This article aims to contribute to the literature by examining whether dual identity predicts stronger endorsement of minority rights when migrants perceive pressure to conform from their minority community. This is examined in two subgroups that tend to exert different pressures: Alevi and Sunni Muslims. Muslim migrants (n Sunni = 464; n Alevi = 235) in Germany and the Netherlands answered questions about dual identity, endorsement of Muslim rights, and perceived minority pressure. For Alevi Muslims, dual identity predicted greater minority rights as minority pressure increased. For Sunni Muslims, the opposite pattern was found, with dual identity predicting less minority rights as minority pressure increased. These findings highlight the importance of studying different minority communities, and their pressures, to understand the societal ramifications of dual identities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Grounded in cultural developmental and critical gender perspectives, this study focuses on the narratives of early adolescent Muslim females. The mixed‐methods study sample included 26 individuals who identify as Muslim and female and was designed to understand the strengths and challenges they face from a youth‐centered and ecologically valid perspective as they negotiate normative developmental experiences (e.g., participating in sports, developing a personal style in terms of dress) given the religious meaning of the onset of puberty. Youth described a wide range of personal, peer, family, and faith based support that they draw on, but also outlined societal and family related challenges. The manuscript concludes with future directions for developmental science scholarship and implications for practitioners and families. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moderation and mediation models of religiosity and effortful control as predictors of tobacco and alcohol use were tested in this 2‐year longitudinal study of 563 16‐year‐old Muslim Indonesian adolescents. Adolescents reported their effortful control, religiosity, and tobacco and alcohol use and peers provided reports of adolescents' effortful control. Although both moderation and mediation effects emerged when predicting Year 2 substance use, predictions of change from Year 1 to Year 2 substance use yielded effects of moderation for peer‐ but not self‐reported effortful control for boys; no mediation effects emerged. These findings provide evidence of interconnections between effortful control and religiosity as predictors of substance use and suggest the need for further longitudinal studies that compare moderation and mediation models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the increasing interest in Islam and evolution, some Islamic thinkers have vehemently rejected evolution, while others have eagerly embraced it. However, those seeking to embrace evolution sometimes err in their interpretation of historical writings. Indeed, there are texts written by famous historical scholars of Islam who seem to suggest that humans have evolved from lower forms of species. These include Ibn Khaldūn, Jalāl ad‐Dīn Rūmī, al‐Jāhiz, and The Brethren of Purity (Ikhwān al Safā). Although this may be true, such readings are a mistaken interpretation of the aforementioned authors who are actually referring to some form of the scalae naturae (the Great Chain of Being). This reference to the Great Chain of Being is unknown to some contemporary readers who mistakenly believe these writers to be discussing an evolutionary or a proto‐evolutionary theory. This article demonstrates how and why these historical records do not actually represent any notion of evolution as it is currently understood, in the hope of avoiding any further erroneous claims that seem to be proliferating among modern thinkers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers author's opinion on how Mauritania's authorities have joined leaders of several other Arab states in accusing Qatar of fueling regional instability. It is mentioned that Mauritanian officials' anti-Qatar animus has been evidenced not only in rhetoric but in some concrete actions. The article also discusses the closure of two Muslim Brotherhood-linked Islamic universities and a gradual shift in the direction of prohibiting the Muslim Brotherhood.

Muslims in the United States experience many psychosocial issues and underutilize mental health services. This study sought to systematically identify the common issues and strengths of the Muslims affiliated with a college in the Southeast region of the United States and address them accordingly. A survey comprising 33 items and 2 open‐ended questions regarding common issues and strengths was constructed. A total of 116 participants completed the survey. The overall rating for items was quite high, whereas the satisfaction rating was very low. The most important item was, "You have prayer places/rugs, ablution stations, and water in restrooms," with an importance rating of 94.52% and a satisfaction rating of 20.50%. Four items regarding mental health were rated as the least important, and participants reported lack of knowledge regarding mental health services. This is the first study that includes a list of common concerns and strengths of the Muslim communities affiliated with colleges in the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

William Lane Craig has recently formulated a set of arguments that aim to undermine the rationality of Islamic theism. This paper will consider seven arguments that Craig deploys against Muslim belief. The seven arguments can be summarised as follows: (1) the Quran makes an egregious historical error by denying the crucifixion of Jesus; (2) the Quran contains legendary stories about Jesus; (3) the Quran is mistaken about the self‐understanding of Jesus; (4) the Quran misunderstands the Trinity; (5) the Islamic concept of God is morally deficient; (6) the Islamic concept of God is less plausible than a Trinitarian concept of God; and (7) the Muslim doctrine of salvation compromises God's holiness and proves to be unattainable. I contend that Craig's arguments, when examined closely, do not undermine the rationality of Islamic theism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the author discusses articles within the issue on topics including Muslims' religious behavior, Islamic civilization and Islamic asceticism.

This paper examines the violence between Carolingians, Saracens, and Byzantines in southern Italy during the second half of the ninth century. Traditionally these conflicts have been viewed as violence between Muslims and Christians. This paper argues that contemporary southern Italians did not perceive this violence to be religiously motivated, because they did not understand Saracens to be Muslims. Instead, these tensions were about local and foreign claims to political authority and control of territory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the links between religious beliefs and capitalist mentalities—namely devoutness to Islam and hierarchic self‐interest (HSI)—and violence‐accepting attitudes among the young Muslim migrant population in Germany. Following a situational perspective, these links are analyzed under different individual conditions structured by (socioeconomic) precariousness and education. Based on framing approaches and concepts from socialization theory, we derive the following hypothesis: The links between religious beliefs and capitalist mentalities and the attitudinal acceptance of violence are stronger among individuals with low levels of education and a precarious economic status (compared to high education/nonprecarious status). The strongest link is expected for a negative status inconsistency (high education/precarious economic status). Structural equation models for data from a random probability sample of 350 Muslims (aged 14–32 years) in Germany indicate that attitudinal acceptance of violence among young Muslims is not predicted by devoutness to Islam but by economic precariousness and by acceptance of capitalist values of the HSI belief system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How did premodern Muslim thinkers talk about living authentically as a Muslim in the world? How, in their view, could selves transform themselves into ideal religious subjects or slaves of God? Which virtues, technologies of the self and intersubjective relations did they see implicated in inhabiting or attaining what I shall call ʿabdī subjectivity? In this paper, I make explicit how various discursive, ethical strategies formed, informed, and transformed Muslim subjectivity in early Muslim thought by focusing on the writings of an important ninth century Muslim moral pedagogue, al‐Muḥāsibī (d. 857). This study illustrates the advantages of approaching early Muslim texts and discourses through the tools and methods made available by comparative religious ethics in order to reexamine our understanding of Muslim subject formation and the role of ethical and theological discourses in the same. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a response to the rise of populism across and beyond the Western world. It takes seriously the possibility that there are parallels between the unconscious dynamics underlying contemporary threats to liberal democracy and those which were mobilised during the inter‐war crisis in Europe. The paper explores how historical contexualization and ideological orientation shape psychoanalytic theorizing, with significant consequences for our conceptualizations of the nature of the "fascist" mind. It suggests that a "basic fault" in the evolution of nation states that seek to reconcile political democracy and economic anarchy provides the conditions in which irrationality and the politics of scapegoating is a permanent temptation. It is this, the paper argues, that provides the link between inter‐war fascism and the present rise of populist movements around the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Islamic psychology (IP) community in Europe has recently witnessed a heated debate about the credentials required to participate in the theoretical substantiation of IP and Islamically integrated psychotherapy and counseling. This debate has provided convenient circumstances for Muslim psychologists and Islamic scholars alike to rethink their roles within the flourishing movement. Specifically, the discussions hint toward the importance of adopting a collaborative research methodology for IP, in particular for basic research. The methodology of choice will need to define the necessary qualifications and responsibilities of scholars and psychologists in a collaborative research process (personal collaboration) and evince its capability to appropriately marry knowledge and data, diverging research methods, and perspectives, concepts, and theories from Islamic studies and contemporary psychology (content‐related collaboration). Here, we devise and offer a case illustration of an Islamic Psychology Basic Research Framework (coined the SALAAM Framework). This framework uses the Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies (IIS) Model of Interdisciplinary Research, developed by the IIS at the University of Amsterdam. Our first aim is to appropriate the IIS model for the IP literature by applying the model's research process phases and technique for the integration of disparate bodies of knowledge—that is, the identification of common ground—to methodological approaches in the contemporary IP literature. Our second aim is to exemplify the devised SALAAM Framework using the relatively unexplored area of Islamic cognitive theories (ICTs), which remain underdeveloped in contemporary psychological literature, primarily because of a lack of commensurability with the nomenclature of contemporary psychology. We thus provide a primer on the potential scope of ICTs. Toward the end of this article, we discuss the potential of the project of interdisciplinary construction of Islamic psychological theory, and the ability of the SALAAM Framework to establish a research program in IP that centers on cognition. We finally offer our reflections on the distinctiveness of Islamic psychologies in comparison to mainstream and Christian psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently there has been renewed interest in the role of religion in the public sphere in the context of a 'post‐secular' age characterized by the resurgence of religious identities and communities in increasingly diverse, multi‐faith societies. Young people's active political and civic engagement has also emerged as a core challenge for robust democracies. While an interesting body of current research suggests that religious commitment may cultivate participation amongst youth by acting as an incubator of civic and political engagement, such literature often positions religiosity as outside of, and consequently at odds with participation in a secular public sphere. We suggest that while religiosity may indeed act as an incubator for civic and political engagement, we propose greater attention to an emergence of alternative, entwined conceptualizations of religious citizenship evident in the practices, performances and dispositions of young Muslim and Buddhist religious practitioners in Australia, whereby processes of individuation contribute to greater fluidity within and across the domains of the religious and the civic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within the religiously and ethnically diverse secular state of Malaysia, the ethnic and religious identities of the Malay Muslim majority group are constitutionalized. This, together with the official classification of religious issues as "sensitive," provides a distinctive context for the political psychological analysis of Islam and interfaith relations. The qualitative study presented in this article examines how Malay Muslims who are students in the United Kingdom perceive and experience engagement with other religious groups in Malaysia. Four focus group interviews were undertaken with 18 participants. Interview transcripts were subjected to thematic analysis. Three themes were developed: "Perceived sociopolitical influences on interfaith engagement in Malaysia"; "Individual and group barriers to engagement with other religious traditions"; and "Potential pathways toward positive interfaith engagement." These are elaborated and discussed in terms of the social categorization processes used to conceptualize and navigate interfaith relations. It is recommended that future research in the political psychology of religion should attend closely to the complexity of religious groups' social identities and the implications this might have for recategorization efforts as a means of encouraging and facilitating interfaith contact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Living with diversity requires that we sometimes accept outgroup practices that we personally disapprove of (i.e., tolerance). Using an experimental design, we examined Dutch majority group members' tolerance of controversial practices with varying degrees of moral concern, performed by a culturally dissimilar (Muslims) or similar (orthodox Protestant) minority group. Furthermore, we examined whether arguments in favour or against (or a combination of both) the specific practice impacted tolerance. Results indicated that participants expressed less tolerance for provocative practices when it was associated with Muslims than orthodox Protestants, but not when such practices elicit high degrees of moral concern. This indicates that opposition towards specific practices is not just a question of dislike of Muslims, but can involve disapproval of specific practices. Argument framing did not have a consistent effect on the level of tolerance for the practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on UK government counter‐terrorism measures has claimed that Muslims are treated as a 'suspect community'. However, there is limited research exploring the divisive effects that membership of a 'suspect community' has on relations within Muslim communities. Drawing from interviews with British Muslims living in Leeds or Bradford, I address this gap by explicating how co‐option of Muslim community members to counter extremism fractures relations within Muslim communities. I reveal how community members internalize fears of state targeting which precipitates internal disciplinary measures. I contribute the category of 'internal suspect body' which is materialized through two intersecting conditions within preventative counter‐terrorism: the suspected extremist for Muslims to look out for and suspected informer who might report fellow Muslims. I argue that the suspect community operates through a network of relations by which terrors of counter‐terrorism are reproduced within Muslim communities with divisive effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Providing humanitarian assistance to displaced individuals is a critical policy challenge. Many refugee camps are run by charities supported by Western donors. If refugees are predominantly Muslim, might Islamophobia suppress donations to these charities? Using a survey experiment conducted in the United States, the authors examine whether donors' willingness to support a charity is influenced by the dominant religion of the refugees, the regions in which refugee camps are located, and/or the religious affiliation of the charity. The authors find modest support for Islamophobia: while willingness to donate is not affected by the location of camps or the predominance of Muslim refugees, it declines significantly for Islamic charities. Respondents overall tend to be especially willing to donate to a charity that serves Christian refugees in the Middle East. Among self‐identifying Christians, respondents are more willing to donate to a charity serving Christian refugees than one serving Muslim refugees. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]