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A growing body of research stresses the importance of religion in understanding and addressing climate change. However, so far, little is known about the relationship between Muslim communities and climate change. Globally, Muslims constitute the second largest faith group, and there is a strong concentration of Muslims in regions that are particularly affected by global warming. This review synthesizes existing research about climate change and Muslim communities. It addresses (a) Islamic environmentalism, (b) Muslim perceptions of climate change, and (c) mitigation strategies of Muslim communities. The analysis shows that there is no uniform interpretation of climate change among Muslims. Based on their interpretations of Islam, Muslims have generated different approaches to climate change. A small section of Muslim environmentalists engages in public campaigning to raise greater concern about climate change, seeks to reduce carbon emissions through sociotechnological transition efforts, and disseminates proenvironmental interpretations of Islam. However, it remains unclear to what extent these activities generate broader changes in the daily activities of Muslim communities and organizations. Contributions to this research field are often theoretical and stress theological and normative aspects of Islam. Empirical studies have particularly addressed Indonesia and the United Kingdom, whereas knowledge about Muslim climate activism in other world regions is fragmented. Against this backdrop, there is a need for comparative studies that consider regional and religious differences among Muslims and address the role of Muslim environmentalism in climate change mitigation and adaptation at the international, national, and local scales. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The protection of the 'European way of life' has come at the expense of protecting the human rights of migrants. This trade‐off has occurred at border crossings and in host countries, and has left third‐country nationals, including Muslim refugee women, in grey areas of protection. How can we explain these limited protections across the EU? I argue that the limited protections of Muslim refugee women can be explained through a combination of the EU's fragmented non‐discrimination framework and surging nationalist dynamics. By using Germany as my case study and by drawing on ethnographic research, I propose that Muslim refugee women have been securitized through three distinct but connected 'threat logics': refugees as threat, Muslims and Islam as threat, and Muslim women as threat. All three threat logics have been employed by nationalist and right‐wing groups to simultaneously target migration and Islam qua Muslim refugee women. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, national populist politics has been translated with the emergence of two overlapping narratives of Islamophobia and anti‐EU immigration media discourses. Such discourses have been made highly visible in the increased spike in hate crimes that have been a hidden cost of the national(ist) debate about Britain leaving the European Union (Brexit). This is the context in which we can trace a remarkable shift in the state representation of the schooling of the South Asian/Muslim community and the reclassification from promoting South Asians as central to the future of a modernised multicultural Britain (1970s) to positioning Muslims as a 'suspect community' (2020). This article unpacks two cultural moments in the critical exploration of the State production of the Muslim School within a post‐Trojan Horse era. First, a national dominant image of the Muslim School operating within the State ascribed 'no‐go' ethno‐religious Muslim neighbourhoods, as a repository of regressive (extreme) Islamist religiosity; thus, reconstructing their religious belief as racialised identities, as they disconnect from British values. Second, the No Outsiders programme, with the accompanying framing of intolerant (Muslim) parents. In this case, the ensuing tension between 'homophobic Muslims' and 'British values' sets in place a homogenisation of differences. Deploying a simultaneity of categories of difference perspective, we address an underlying discursive re‐politicising of South Asian ethnic communities as religious communities, which is resulting in a perpetual negotiation of the meanings attached to being Muslim. This will enable an international application of the article beyond the specific focus on the city of Birmingham, identified in the international media as the Jihadi capital of Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political Quietism in Islam: Sunni and Shi i Practice and Thought, Saud al-Sarhan (ed.), After these theoretical essays, the three articles that form the second cluster focus on a range of views on political quietism in (both Shi i and Sunni) classical Islamic tradition. After examining a range of opinions on four caliphs of Islam, the author argues that the Sunnis of Kufa and Basra disagreed on the order of precedence of the rightly guided caliphs. [Extracted from the article]

The status of India as the world's largest democracy is often lauded, but the re‐election of the overtly Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party in 2019 has increased concerns about the threat to India's multinational democracy and the rule of law. India is not the only democracy facing challenges related to majoritarian nationalism; there has been a worldwide rise in the language of majority 'rights' in democratic systems. The importance of analysing the extent to which the rights of majorities are being increasingly institutionalized within democratic systems has therefore increased. It is vitally important to identify whether tendencies toward ethnic democracy are increasing (and the conditions under which they do so). There may well be red flags that emerge in democratic systems, heralding the potential direction of travel. This article proposes a methodology to identify degrees of ethnic democracy using a combination of formal and informal measures and illustrates it by assessing India through an examination of anti‐Muslim policies and rhetoric. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ayman Ibrahim's book "is concerned with the multifaceted nature of conversion as represented in Islamic historiographical accounts written during the first three centuries of Islam" (p. 2). Because Ibrahim restricts the horizon of his analysis to the early tenth-century CE, he does not capture the narratives of major chroniclers such as al-Mas'udi (d. 956 CE) and Ibn al-Nadim (d. ca. 995 CE). His critical reappraisals of the early ninth-century CE reporter al-Waqidi (pp. 111-116) and the mid eighth-century CE and early ninth-century CE hagiographers Ibn Is aq and Ibn Hisham (pp. 121-128) are particularly noteworthy. [Extracted from the article]

Trust, a cornerstone of economic development, is promoted within religions. In a randomized controlled trial, we examine how trust and trustworthiness vary across religions (Christianity and Islam), religiosity, and atheists/agnostics in the United States. Three novel findings emerge. First, Christians are trusted more than Muslims and nonbelievers, which is due to a Christian ingroup bias––Christians trust Christians more than they trust Muslims and nonbelievers, while Muslims and nonbelievers trust all groups the same. Second, religiosity matters to trust. Religious people trust those of higher religiosity more, but only if they are of the same religion. In contrast, nonbelievers trust people of higher religiosity less. Third, trustworthiness among nonbelievers is somewhat lower than that of the religious, especially toward Christians. We speculate that the lower reciprocity originates in the prejudice toward nonbelievers. Our results may help explain discrimination against Muslims and nonbelievers, given that discrimination often originates in distrust. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In European countries, a large number of people feel that Islam is incompatible with secularism. France's legal principle of laïcité (a type of state "secularism") has governed the relationship between religion and society since 1905. However, recent research suggests that there coexist two distinct lay conceptions of laïcité that differ most notably in their tolerance for the presence of religious symbols in public places, one inclusive, the other restrictive. This latter conception appears to target mainly Muslims. The present research examined the lay conceptions of laïcité held by Catholics, Muslims, and nonbelievers. Analyses of participants' responses (N = 375) to a scale measuring lay beliefs about laïcité confirmed the existence of two distinct lay conceptions of laïcité that differed in the importance given to public expression of religious beliefs, religious neutrality of the state, and equal treatment of different religions. The results also showed that, independent of participants' religiosity, the restrictive conception was more prevalent among nonbelievers, the two conceptions were equally prevalent among Catholics, and the inclusive conception was more prevalent among Muslims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This analysis departs from social identity being part and parcel of the system of social representations a group holds. Additionally, social identity is seen as being affectively laden with religious or other deeply ingrained ideological beliefs. These systems delimit the space of norms and behaviours where people socially construct the objects defining the local world as an objectively given. The local objectifications differ between groups and cultures and pose a problem for interaction and communication between members of different groups. Inter‐group discrepancies must be bridged by establishing a shared representational space and interobjective understanding. This understanding can be reached if both interactants mutually develop meta‐representations that allow them to grossly anticipate what to expect from the other and to orient their actions accordingly. But there is a catch in establishing interobjectivity: even if the interactants manage to overcome semantic and cognitive barriers, their interaction and open‐minded communication will be blocked if the two objectivities are ethically or affectively incommensurable. I illustrate this process by suggesting that native Europeans will feel blocked to establish interobjective acceptance for example with proponents of a slave holder culture whose values are incommensurable with European ideas of human equality. Accepting a slave holder's worldview would threaten the European's identity. A similar process seems to govern devout conservative Muslims living in 'gated communities' and enclaves in European cities who try to maintain their identity by avoiding regular contact with the non‐Muslim majority. Such contact would threaten their identity if their worldview and sharia rules were measured by the standards of human rights. Native Europeans on the other hand, will feel their own cultural objectivity to be incompatible with traditional Islam that does not equally observe human rights. The implications of such processes are discussed in terms of migrants' integration, multiculturalism, and socio‐political psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ramadan fasting is obligatory for Muslim healthy adults. However, there are many exemptions from fasting; including patients, whose diseases will be aggravated by fasting. Muslim patients with different liver diseases are frequently seen in the clinics discussing their intent to fast this month with their treating physicians. To answer our patients' inquiries about the expected benefits and/or risks of fasting and delivering them the best care, we carried out this review and we draw advices and recommendations based on the available evidence. A web‐based search, combining multiple keywords representing different liver diseases with Ramadan fasting had been carried out. To answer the research question: Do adult Muslim patients with different liver diseases who fast the month of Ramadan have had a deleterious effect on their health in comparison to those who did not fast? Relevant publications were retrieved. No randomized controlled trials were focusing on Ramadan fasting and liver diseases in the filtered databases, eg Cochrane library. Consequently, non‐filtered databases, eg PubMed, Google Scholar and Egyptian Knowledge Bank searched and full‐text high‐quality research articles were carefully analysed to draw recommendations. Other relevant publications with low quality of evidence like case studies and short communications were also reviewed to address practice advices. Although Ramadan fasting was found beneficial for patients with NAFLD, it was found deleterious to patients with Child B and C cirrhosis and patients with peptic ulcer. Patients with chronic hepatitis, Child A cirrhosis and those with non‐complicated liver transplant can fast with prefasting assessment and strict follow up. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The "Trojan Horse" scandal laid bare an anxiety at the heart of the British security establishment; an anxiety that brings together questions of identity, values, and security within the demand to manage radicalization. It is an anxiety that, I will argue, reveals a novel conceptualization of threat that has driven the UK's security and communities policies within the "war on terror." This conceptualization emerges within Prevent, the UK's counter-radicalization strategy. Yet, I argue, the extensive literature on Prevent has failed to adequately articulate this underlying, core logic. To date, the Prevent literature has effectively demonstrated the ways in which Muslim communities in the United Kingdom have been policed through British counter-radicalization policy. Yet, this analysis struggles to explain the expansion of Prevent into a wider range of "extremist" spaces. In this article, I contend that it is more useful to situate Prevent as a particular conception of power; a logic and an analysis of threat that demands new forms of government intervention. To do so, this article provides a genealogical reading of Prevent, locating it as a radical extension of state security ambitions to intervene early, making explicit a vision of security in which life as a process of becoming is produced as an object of management. The paper draws out the ramifications of this analysis to think through fundamental shifts in the principles and practices of contemporary security aspirations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do religious accommodations for Muslim minorities shape religiosity levels among Muslims minorities? Answering this question is critical in the contemporary period, as Western European countries have experienced greater diversity in religious affiliations due to immigration. In this article, we address this question by analysing individual data across multiple waves of the European Social Survey (ESS). Our analysis improves on existing studies in that it (1) incorporates a greater number of countries than prior studies, (2) covers a historically novel period of religious accommodations for Muslim minorities and (3) more effectively controls for unmeasured country and time‐invariant processes than previous research. We find that in countries that have instituted greater religious accommodations, Muslim respondents generally report higher levels of religiosity. Interestingly, we also find that the greater institutionalization of religious accommodations for Muslims also impacts the subjective religiosity levels of Protestant majorities. We find no effect for Catholic respondents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, much has been written about the growth of anti‐immigrant sentiment in Western countries. Propagated by the fastest growing party family, far right‐wing parties, there is growing support in Western populations in favour of scapegoating Muslim immigrants for economic, cultural and security problems. However, less has been written on how Muslim immigrants feel about their host country. What is their sense of belonging and identification with their country of residence? In this review article, we summarise the results of 29 studies that explicitly focus on questions of integration, national identity and sense of belonging of Muslim immigrants. The studies we review document a range of outcomes, varying from a low sense of belonging and attachment to the country of residence to extremely high integration levels and loyalty. It seems that most variation depends on the country of residence at the macro‐level and on their education at the individual level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Islamist movements are often considered the epitomes of transnational movements; however, little is known about the concrete workings of their transnational ambitions. In investigating the evolution of Muslim activists in France from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, this article shows that their embrace of pan‐Islamic ideals initially conflicted with strong investment in (Arab) homeland politics. Later on, their engagement with a French Islam signalled less the emergence of a de‐territorialised, de‐culturalised Islamic identity than it did the assertion of new nationally bounded (French) attachments. Overall, the analysis sheds light on a stimulating puzzle regarding cosmopolitanism: the persistence of national forms of identification in movements that aspire to bypass national affiliations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrasting colonial experiences shaped regional cleavages in the Philippines. Spain converted natives to Christianity but struggled with converting the Muslim population. Spain only succeeded in driving them further south. American colonialism also perpetuated this regional divide: Christians were under civilian rule while Muslims were under military rule. These administrative regional divides happened concurrently, but a cohesive Christian identity developed much sooner than a Muslim identity in the south. Why do some regional identities develop sooner than others? I argue that variation in the onset of identity formation is the result of contrasting colonial education policies that fell along regional lines. Christians experienced a penetrative education policy, which cultivated a shared experience and facilitated the development of a national identity. Muslims experienced a shallow education policy, which did not have a unifying objective. These factors maintained fragmentation, rather than fostering a cohesive Muslim national identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Neighbors: Christians and Muslims Building Community" is a practical guide aimed at American Christians who are interested in developing positive relationships with their Muslim neighbors. The book is divided into three parts, covering topics such as religious diversity in America, the historical presence of Christian-Muslim interaction, and practical issues related to interfaith awareness and collaboration. The author emphasizes the responsibility of the reader to take action and engage in meaningful dialogue and activities with Muslims. While the book focuses on Christian-Muslim relations, it also encourages American Christians to confront their own ambivalent feelings about living in a religiously diverse society. [Extracted from the article]

For a broader audience, it is a valuable contribution to knowledge about distinctive Muslim experiences and the many ways that mosques and imams are vital to everyday life within diverse Muslim cultures and societies. Andrew McWilliam's Chapter Nine returns to the Sulawesi-origin Muslim communities of Kupang to sketch out several broad themes regarding the spread and embedding of Islam in Indonesia's eastern archipelagos. Islam, according to a good friend and fellow Muslim from Malaysia, is one religion ( I deen i ). [Extracted from the article]

In contemporary North American Muslim congregations involved in the "progressive Muslim movement," prayer practices rework tradition in recognizably Muslim ways while nevertheless differing markedly from those of most mosques. Ethnographic description and participant narratives shed light on the process through which intercorporeality impacts interpretation of Islamic gender norms, outlining the connections among epicene prayer space, bodily proximity, multivocality, and multicorporeality in creating support for feminist and queer religious interpretations and solidarity with marginalized others. Interreligious critiques of such nonconformist approaches have tended to treat nonconformist Muslims as inappropriately concerned with individual liberties or as individual activists seeking media attention. Attention to alterity in context, however, demonstrates that alternative understandings develop not from individual beliefs, practices, or desires but rather through somatic practice within a community of like‐minded co‐religionists learning new habits through intercorporeality. [progressive Muslims, performativity, congregational prayer, intercorporeality and embodiment, sexual diversity and gender variance] [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior research in Europe and North America demonstrates that religious discrimination against Muslim people, commonly known as Islamophobia, results in many negative mental health impacts, including depression, anxiety, isolation, and feelings of exclusion (Awan & Zempi, 2015). In Canada, Muslim women face a unique form of discrimination based on their religious, racial, and gender identities (Helly, 2012; Zine, 2008). Grounded in feminist intersectional theory and practice (Hill Collins & Bilge, 2016), the present manuscript emerges from a community‐based project centered on Muslim women's experiences of discrimination and resulting adverse mental health impacts. Through a series of five focus groups (N = 55), the research team engaged with Muslim women from diverse backgrounds in order to gain a more complete understanding of mental health inequities in Canada. Thematic analyses of focus group data revealed that Muslim women participants regularly experience Islamophobic discrimination and face multiple barriers when attempting to access culturally relevant and responsive supports. Results illuminate the potential of reciprocal, community‐based research to investigate and respond to mental health disparities experienced by Muslim women in Canada. Highlights: Gendered Islamophobia is a unique form of Islamophobia that impacts Muslim women.Islamophobia directly and indirectly negatively impacts Muslim women's mental health.Intersectionality‐in‐practice enriches collaborative approaches to community‐based justice research.Microaggression Theory can assist in contextualizing experiences of subtle discrimination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political discourses about Muslim immigration in the media and on social networking sites (SNSs) are highly contentious and have the potential to further polarize societal segments, which may ultimately harm democratic processes. Especially on SNSs, politicians and citizens can circumvent journalistic filters often resulting in blatant and emotionally charged content. Using a two‐wave panel design (N = 559), we investigated how positive and negative portrayals of Muslims in traditional media outlets and on SNSs influence anti‐Muslim immigration attitudes among people who either agree or disagree with the encountered information. Our findings indicate that exposure to negative portrayals further reinforces anti‐Muslim immigration attitudes among those who agree with the encountered information. In contrast, for those who disagree with the negative information, a backfire effect emerges, showing that anti‐Muslim attitudes even decrease. This effect occurs for both SNSs and traditional media. Positive information about Muslims did not result in attitude polarization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article evaluates the design, delivery, and main outcomes of Cardiff University's first "Massive Open Online Course" (MOOC) entitled "Muslims in Britain: Changes and Challenges," delivered to over 20,899 international learners between 2014 and 2019. I explore the design principles underpinning the course and offer a detailed quantitative overview of our learner‐base. The paper examines the experience of course delivery, as well as providing an evaluation of the outcomes arising from the course in the short, medium and long‐term. It also explores some of the distinctive aspects of learning about religion (and Islam, in particular) online as a result of our course, thereby contributing to discussion about the pedagogy of Religious Studies in the digital environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In medieval miracles of the Virgin Mary that feature images, gazing at Mary and being seen by her can shape or change the identity of the miracle's protagonist. Such miracles often feature figures who have the potential to be adult male Christians but do not yet hold that status; they are transformed by their encounters with the malleable materiality of Marian images. Narratives of a Muslim devoted to a Marian statue and an English child who has to have an image of the Crucifixion explained to him show how questioning the nature of such images, and their material implications, could lead to belief. The widely popular story of "The Jewish Boy" extends the power of the image to suggest that merely looking upon it without understanding is sufficient to create a circuit of likeness and recognition that ultimately leads to conversion. In such miracles, an ostensibly surface‐oriented or simplistic mode of religious devotion engages with gendered bodies in powerfully transformative ways that touch on complex theological issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I explore entanglements of Muslim sociality and informal livelihoods in Dar es Salaam. I propose that Muslim practices of affiliation deserve to be counted among the ordinary strategies that urban majorities employ to navigate the city amidst conditions of uncertainty. Building on Stephan Lanz and Martijn Oosterbaan's (2016) work on "entrepreneurial religion," I draw on fifteen months of ethnographic research in Kariakoo, a super‐dense market district at the center of the city. The first part of my analysis explores associational life in Dar es Salaam, combining a historical overview with ethnographic description. I explore how urban actors use affiliations to football teams and political parties to generate livelihood opportunities and to secure protection. The second part of my analysis uses emic notions of "flags" (bendera) and "shields" (ngao) to demonstrate that Muslim modes of association operate in strikingly similar ways to those pertaining to football and politics. Engaging with the conceptual vocabularies of AbdouMaliq Simone and Erving Goffman, as well as recent debates about "everyday" and "lived Islam," this article foregrounds the interplay between religious forms and neoliberal processes of informalization as they are unfolding in African cities and beyond.[Tanzania; Dar es Salaam; Urban Religion; Muslim Urbanism; Informal Economy; Associational Life.] [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In medieval miracles of the Virgin Mary that feature images, gazing at Mary and being seen by her can shape or change the identity of the miracle's protagonist. Such miracles often feature figures who have the potential to be adult male Christians but do not yet hold that status; they are transformed by their encounters with the malleable materiality of Marian images. Narratives of a Muslim devoted to a Marian statue and an English child who has to have an image of the Crucifixion explained to him show how questioning the nature of such images, and their material implications, could lead to belief. The widely popular story of "The Jewish Boy" extends the power of the image to suggest that merely looking upon it without understanding is sufficient to create a circuit of likeness and recognition that ultimately leads to conversion. In such miracles, an ostensibly surface‐oriented or simplistic mode of religious devotion engages with gendered bodies in powerfully transformative ways that touch on complex theological issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A number of studies have found a relationship between religious affiliation and attitudes toward LGBQ individuals. To date, however, research on religious attitudes has focused primarily on Christians. We expanded upon existing research by including two of the three largest U.S. religions previously overlooked—Islam and Judaism. We used data from the 2014 Religious Landscape Study, which provided a larger sample of Jewish (n = 475) and Muslim (n = 135) respondents than most public opinion surveys. We found that Muslim and Protestant participants were the least accepting of homosexuality and supportive of same‐sex marriage compared with Roman Catholic and Jewish participants. Results also showed that fundamentalism and religiosity were significant predictors of attitudes toward homosexuality and same‐sex marriage across all participants, regardless of denomination. Implications for future research and data collection efforts learned from this study are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates residential segregation at the intraurban level of migrants in two Italian cities, Rome and Milan, considering religion as a point of reference in light of its pivotal role in terms of identity references for many migrants. The article focuses in particular on Muslim migrants—due to both the magnitude of their presence and complex issues related to their settlement in Italian cities. The analysis shows a low level of intraurban residential segregation of Muslim migrants in both cities, with some relevant differences related to national subgroups (e.g., a higher concentration for people coming from Bangladesh and Pakistan), so that religion seems not yet to be a main driver of residential choice for Muslim migrants. In light of both the low level of segregation of Muslim migrants and some features of Italian urban policies on migration and religion, we argue that residential concentration can currently play a beneficial role in terms of the insertion of migrants in Italian cities and fulfillment of some of their needs (e.g., availability of minority places of worship). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Voting is key to political integration of immigrant‐background minorities, but what determines their voting preferences remains unclear. Moreover, dual‐citizen minorities can vote differently in their country of residence and origin. Using a representative survey of Turkish‐Muslim minorities in two cities in Belgium (N = 447, M_age = 36.3), we asked whether left‐right ideology or religious identity predicted their voting in their country of residence and origin, besides typical predictors of right‐wing voting (i.e., efficacy, deprivation, and authoritarianism). Authoritarianism, low political efficacy, and high deprivation predicted voting for right‐wing parties in Turkey, whereas the latter two, surprisingly, predicted voting for the left in Belgium. Latent class analyses of their religious practices distinguished "moderate" versus "strict" Muslims. While "strict" Muslims voted for right‐wing parties in Turkey, ideology did not predict their voting. Conversely, in Belgium, while Muslim identity did not predict their voting, ideology did. Analyzing their combined effects, "moderate" Muslims voted based on their ideology—right‐leaning voting for the right, whereas "strict" Muslims voted according to their interests as a disadvantaged minority in Belgium—thus voting for the left—or as a devout Muslim in Turkey—thus voting for the right. Our results elucidate processes underlying the voting behaviors of European‐Muslim minorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: Media recommendations for the reporting of events where one person or a small group kills multiple others in public settings have been developed recently by suicide prevention experts. Evidence on the effects of reports that are compliant or noncompliant with these recommendations is lacking.Methods: We conducted a randomized controlled trial with n = 148 participants who were randomly assigned to read newspaper articles (A) on acts of terrorism assumed to be conducted by Islamist terrorists and not consistent with media recommendations, (B) the same articles differing only in their compliance with recommendations, or (C) articles of similar style that were about homicide. Islamophobia as well as suicidal ideation, stress, and mood were measured before reading the article (T1), immediately afterwards (T2), and one week later (T3). The primary hypothesis was that there is an increase in islamophobia after exposure to media portrayals not consistent with media recommendations.Results: Compared to the control group, only participants reading media reports that were not consistent with media recommendations showed a short-term increase in islamophobia.Conclusion: These findings suggest that reporting on terrorism that is not consistent with media recommendations appears to increase islamophobia. In the context of reporting on Islamist terrorism, consistency with recommendations might help reduce negative attitudes toward Muslim minorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although scholarship has examined the representation of Muslim characters and/or followers of Islam in literature for children and young adults and provided reference materials for classroom instruction, the incorporation of Muslim literature in classroom contexts has been largely unexplored. Drawing from Braun and Clarke's conception of thematic analysis as a methodological approach, the authors describe the shifting perceptions of a high school English class as student participants read and discussed young adult texts centered on Muslim protagonists and the religion of Islam. Findings offer a graphic display for understanding the participants' shifting perceptions and how the learning experience ultimately resulted in students' ability and willingness to challenge their initial beliefs about Muslim cultures and Islam. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature on populism in Asian countries over the past two decades has generally featured charismatic and often autocratic leaders, as notably demonstrated elsewhere by the rise (and fall) of Thaksin Shinawatra due to his vehement rhetoric that antagonized political elites in Bangkok, Rodrigo Duterte's brutal and lawless war on drugs, and the continuous electoral success of Narendra Modi's Hindu nationalist government, which propagates a divisive rhetoric that alienates Muslim minorities. As neither candidate directly represented Islamic ideological interests, incumbent President Jokowi accommodated Java-based Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) as the country's largest Islamic organization, whereas Prabowo was backed by the burgeoning Islamist forces. With the burgeoning presence of Abdul Somad as a populist preacher in the Muslim community, Islamist figures coalesced around him and the GNPF-MUI reached an agreement in July 2018, which recommended that Prabowo appoint Abdul Somad as his candidate for vice-president. According to him, unlike the two countries, Indonesia's Islamic populism did not have significant power because they failed to dominate either state institutions or civil society. [Extracted from the article]

While conducting this research, I encountered numerous generalizations from Madurese people about people's religious identities within Madura, such as "Are there any religions other than Islam in Madura?" In general, many Madurese perceive that Chinese-Madurese relations represent Christian-Muslim relations because the majority of Christians living in Madura are Chinese. In this context, I interviewed Madurese Christians, non-Madurese Christians (the majority of them are Chinese), and Christian leaders living in Madura. [Extracted from the article]

An Analysis of the Islamic Fatwa on the Prohibition against Wearing Non-Muslim Symbols in Indonesia The purpose of this study is not to regard the MUI's fatwa as merely a product of the growing conservatism among Indonesian Muslims causing negative social effects, but instead to situate the MUI and its fatwa in a more nuanced position. Previously, in 2005, when he was the head of the MUI's fatwa commission, the MUI issued the two controversial fatwas prohibiting religious pluralism, liberalism, and secularism, and condemning the Ahmadiyya group. 59 Ahmad Romadoni, "Sikapi Fatwa MUI soal Atribut Natal, Jokowi Panggil Kapolri" ["Responding to the MUI's Fatwa on Christmas Symbols, Jokowi Called the Head of Indonesian Police"], I Liputan 6 i , December 19, 2016, https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/2682793/sikapi-fatwa-mui-soal-atribut-natal-jokowi-panggil-kapolri. [Extracted from the article]

Although religious worship was banned during the Khmer Rouge regime (1975–79), spiritual practices are once again flourishing in Cambodia. These include both the practices of the majority Buddhist population and a small but visible Cham Muslim minority. While popular Buddhism in Cambodia today incorporates the legacies of Hinduism and animism in the country, the majority of Cham Muslims have adopted a more orthodox version of Islam due to the influence of global proselytization. This article argues that these dominant strains of religious practice divergently train conscious attention in habitual patterns, cultivating different orientations of intentionality among Khmer Buddhist and Cham Muslim Khmer Rouge survivors. The patterns of attention encouraged by current religious practices shape the narrative organization of memory as survivors engage in an NGO‐sponsored form of psychotherapeutic "testimonial therapy." As my ethnographic findings demonstrate, these divergent narrative constructions and their public performance reinforce different relational experiences of selfhood and engagement with supernatural others among Cambodian Buddhists and Muslims, with significant implications for perceived social belonging in contemporary society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Muslim converts tend to be overrepresented in terrorist activity compared to fellow nonconvert Muslims. However, due to the low base rate of terrorism activity, there is a significant risk that this overrepresentation is a "false positive." We therefore tested the prevalence of far more common, but potentially antecedent, cognitions to terrorism—activism and radicalism––among convert and nonconvert Muslims. We surveyed 356 American Muslim adults, of which 177 were self‐identified converts, with the Activism and Radicalism Intention Scale or ARIS. We found that converts as compared to nonconverts do demonstrate higher activism and radicalism intention scores. We also found that activism fully mediates the relationship between conversion and radicalism. This suggests that converts may be more likely to engage in radical behavior (such as terrorism) than nonconverts, but only because they are more likely to engage in activism than nonconverts. We discuss these findings in light of current psychology and political mobilization literature, then we offer suggestions for future research on the relationships between conversion, activism, radicalism, and terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Young refugees and diasporic youth often have multiply located senses of self. Using a creative visual methodology, recently arrived young Syrian refugees and young people of diverse African heritages born in the United Kingdom (aged 16–20) produced digital self‐portraits to express their translocal subjectivities. Young Syrians represented themselves as "bilingual becomings"; learning English occupied their minds and was key to their imagined futures, but their hearts were often associated with the homeland they had lost. In contrast, speaking English was sometimes taken for granted in the art work produced by young people of African heritages, which portrayed hybrid, multilingual selves and translocal relationality. Both groups embraced signifiers of national, religious, and cultural identity but through their silences and omissions, dis‐identified with exclusionary notions of "Britishness," nationhood, and citizenship. Their self‐representations provide hopeful counter‐narratives to hegemonic sociopolitical discourses that position "Black African" youth and Muslim young men as a "threat" and "illegitimate" citizens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In academic commentary since the Amistad was decided - and likely because of the way that the social and religious identities of the Muslim slaves was largely written out of the case - the religious identities of the Muslim slaves on the Amistad have rarely been part of the case study." Using Nathaniel Jocelyn's 1840 portrait to create his likeness of Cinque, Bearden then tells his hero's story by depicting the moment when Cinque kills the Amistad's captain (identifiable by his cap). "Cinque's second in command on the Amistad, Grabeau, had seen people in his hometown write "from right to left...that one unnamed Amistad African knew how to recite prayers in Arabic.". [Extracted from the article]

West European societies have seen strong debates about the acceptance of Muslim minority practices. In the current research we sought to better understand intolerance by examining whether people use a double standard in which the same practices are tolerated of Christians but not of Muslims (discriminatory intolerance), or rather reject the practices independently of the religious minority group because these are considered to contradict society's normative ways of life (normative intolerance). The results of two survey‐embedded experiments among native Dutch were most in agreement with an interpretation in terms of normative intolerance rather than discriminatory intolerance. This suggests that the rejection of Muslim practices has less to do with Muslims per se but rather with the perceived normative deviance of the practices, independently of the religious minority group. These findings broaden the research on anti‐Muslim sentiments and thereby the debate on the place of Islam within Western liberal societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The debate on post‐secularism indicates both the inclusion of religious voices into the public sphere and the rising importance of religion in international politics as well as in domestic politics of Western nation‐states. The term "post‐secular" firstly emerged to describe the Western societies where pluralism has been a vital concern for liberal democracy. Nonetheless, the very same concern is prevalent across non‐Western societies. In this respect, the Turkish case having a secular state in a predominantly Muslim society provides a vibrant example for the analysis of post‐secularism as Islamic‐oriented Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) has been ruling Turkey since November 2002. In this article, the success or failure of the AKP in representing a post‐secular moment in Turkish politics is analysed with reference to and in comparison of two issues. The first one is the Sunni‐Islamic demands on the visibility in the public sphere symbolised with the headscarf issue. The second issue is the demands of Alevis living in Turkey as they force the boundaries of the "secular" public sphere which has been dominated by the Sunni‐Turkish socio‐cultural identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores white British Muslim experiences of, and strategic performative responses to, the (mis/ non)recognition of their seemingly incompatible religious and ethnic identities. Based on in-depth interviews (N = 26), it highlights how the different identity categories they hold relate to one another, influencing processes of perceived recognition in interactional contexts. White British Muslims perceive their ethnic and religious identities to be (mis/not) recognized in complex and contradictory ways. Their identities are affirmed, denied, erased, and/or incorrectly ascribed, sometimes simultaneously, by relevant others in different contexts. Performative strategies such as the adoption, maintenance, or removal of identity markers are used consciously and agentically in attempts to take back control over how their identities are (mis/not) recognized. At times deliberate performative acts leading to misrecognition are orchestrated by white Muslims themselves to not only minimize the risk of experiencing possible harm or marginalization but also to transgress and challenge norms. They also assert their multiple identities as a response to (mis/non)recognition and claims of their identities being incompatible, regardless of the repercussions that may result in them being placed at the margins of, or excluded from, their ingroups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of protecting the Citadel of Islam (Hifẓ Bayzat al‐Islam), is common in the lexicon of Shiʿi political jurisprudence. It refers to those Islamic principles and foundations without which the existence of Islam and the Muslim community would be in danger. During the Occultation Era, Shiʿi mujtahids, as general deputies of the Hidden Imam, are believed to commit their utmost effort to fulfilling this sacrosanct responsibility. The meaning and applications of the concept have been evolved throughout the Shiʿi history. A noteworthy case of protecting the citadel of Islam is the position of Sayyid Abu'l‐Ḥasan al‐Iṣfahānī (1867‐1946) and Mirza Muḥammad‐Ḥusayn Nāʾīnī (1862‐1937), vis‐à‐vis the Najaf seminary and the newly established Hashemite dynasty in early twentieth century. This paper aims to shed more light on the concept of the Citadel of Islam, its implications in Shiʿi political thought, and contemporary applications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Muhammad Iqbal and Mohd. Kamal Hassan respectively wrote "To the Holy Prophet" and "SMS to Sir Muhammad Iqbal" in the 1930s and in the 2000s – two extremely challenging times, as in the former most Muslim‐majority countries were under European colonial rule and in the latter, Western global powers wove an all‐pervasive web of domination and exploitation of them. They focus on the internal weaknesses of subjugated Muslims and lament that, since the attitude of many of them is characterized by inaction and reliance on others, domination by foreign powers became an inevitable corollary. A culture of self‐indulgence, stagnation, and complacency precipitated their decline and facilitated their exploitation by powerful outside interests. In their pursuit to understand the reasons for Western domination over Muslim societies, they studied the "moral paralysis" of colonized Muslims in order to reform them. Accordingly, their analysis of the subordinate position of Muslim peoples and countries can clearly be viewed through the lens of Bennabi's notion of "colonizability," as Iqbal's and Hassan's complaints in the poems mostly involve exposing several of their weaknesses that prevented them from playing their actual role, and hindered them from realising their potential, in the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the political thought and careers of two important Shi'i religious figures in the twentieth century in Lebanon, Shaykh Mu ammad Mahdi Shams al-Din (d. 2001) and Sayyid Mu ammad usayn Fa lallah (d. 2010). Mughniyya may have opposed the establishment of the ISSC out of fear that such an institution, which was previously unknown in Shi'i history, would invite government intervention and thus undermine the independence and authority the ulema had traditionally enjoyed by forgoing government patronage. But again, Shams al-Din responded to the sociopolitical realities of Lebanon by developing his theory of consultative, majority-based democracy to include discussion of civil government, while Fa lallah merely shifted his focus from Islamic government to the religious and social needs of those who looked to him for religious guidance. The position on Lebanon expressed in the Papers of the Islamic Shi'i Council reflected al- adr and Shams al-Din's understanding of the roots of the conflict between Lebanon's Shi'a, the state, and the other confessional groups and included suggestions for fundamentally reforming the political system. [Extracted from the article]

This paper presents the discourse about the religious Other of an influential cleric of the twentieth century, Mu ammad Jawad Maghniyah. RAPPROCHEMENT WITH SUNNISM Maghniyah was one of the few active Shiite members of the Cairo-based initiative for rapprochement ( I taqrib i ) between Sunnis and Shiites, persisting in his efforts even as it faltered and wound down. He also allows marriage of Shiites with Sunnis, including a Shiite female with a Sunni male, which is forbidden or disliked by many authorities. The phrase "the polytheists are impure" ( I najas i ) in Q. 9:28 has been taken by many Sunni and Shiite exegetes to include the People of the Book, but Maghniyah rejects this (according to Darwish, he is one of the first if not the first Shiite commentator to do so). [Extracted from the article]

For successful donation, death verification and organ retrieval have to happen quite soon after death or warm-ischemic organ damage precludes transplantation, unlike DNDD where organs have an intact circulation until removal. TRANSPLANT PHYSICIAN'S PERSPECTIVE Dr Matt Fenton, a transplant cardiologist from GOSH explored the organs provided by each mode of donation, before focusing on heart donation and transplantation. Sunni view Dr Mansur Ali, an established academic, presented Sunni Islamic rulings applied to organ donation by stating there are no contentions with receipt of an organ transplant, out of necessity for maintaining one's life. We can find no similar reports focusing on the challenging theme of pediatric organ donation and do hope it will prompt and support conversations surrounding organ donation and faith in the Muslim community, and encourage HCP to similarly engage with local community faith groups. [Extracted from the article]

This article examines LGBT Muslim erasure by hegemonic Islamic and homonormative ideologies and how those involved in nonconformist Muslim groups queer those ideologies in order to forge narratives of belonging. I analyze the work of 'queering' Muslim voices among LGBT Muslims and allies involved in a multisited community of nonconformist Muslim face‐to‐face and online groups, and what such queering explains about the relationship among erasure, voice, ideological disjuncture, and resistance. Through analysis of individual and group conversations alongside ethnographic observations, I argue that LGBT Muslims and allies strategically index queerness and Muslimness as a challenge to marginalizing discourses and to create 'safe' spaces that also benefit other Muslims on the margins. Narratives of both LGBT Muslim marginalization and its strategic disruption as well as nonconformist group interactions are used to illustrate how the queering of Muslim discourse creates "indexical disjuncture" to make space for both LGBT Muslims and other nonconformist Muslims. I conclude by considering how providing evidence of language's role in the process of 'queering' contributes to ongoing conversations in queer theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We implement a lab‐in‐the‐field experiment among childcare workers in Chandigarh, India, to evaluate discriminatory attitudes of the Hindu workers toward Muslim children. We use a third‐party allocation game that controls for selfish payoff‐maximizing preferences across the treatments and focus exclusively on distributional attitudes. Our results indicate that the workers in our sample are primarily motivated by welfare‐based criteria in making their allocation decisions and do not practice discrimination based on religious identities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]