Search

China is often considered as motivated by a desire to challenge the international status quo, a challenge the West is trying to mitigate. Social constructivists account for this challenge via a norm of nationalistic assertiveness in Chinese foreign policy; a norm constructed in the synergetic relationship between China's Communist Party and its nationalist movement. However, this work argues that Chinese foreign policy is motivated, in part, by nationalist pressure arising from an antagonistically symbiotic relationship between the Communist Party and China's nationalist movement. This understanding is significant as it indicates that western policies are paradoxically factoring in the emergence of a challenger China. © 2023 Victoria University of Wellington and John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taking document analysis as its method, this paper examines the Tibetans' response to the Chinese state nationalism. Due to the fear of political secession, the Chinese government has stayed silent about the Tibetans' right to self‐determination and subjected regional ethnic autonomy to the centralised political system. The Chinese authorities continue to dismiss the Tibetans' nationalist struggles as an imported foreign design and warn the international community not to sympathise with the Dalai Lama and his supporters. Amidst an adverse national and international political environment, the Tibetans have managed to sustain their nationalist wishes and obtain substantive international attention. Taking this background into account, this paper explores how the Tibetans have succeeded to resist China's state nationalism and position themselves as a champion of inclusion, justice, and minority rights. It argues that the Tibetans recognise the Chinese government's fear of secession and utilise that fear to forward their nationalist aspirations. The Tibetans shift their demand from independence to autonomy and highlight their own desire for recognition as a distinct community within the Chinese state. This strategy has helped them to claim that they are against the violations of autonomy but not against the Chinese state's territorial norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many scholars note that since the early 1990s, the CCP has been invoking Chinese nationalism to rescue the party's declining ideological legitimacy. Probing China's political indoctrination (thought work), this article makes two contributions to such conventional consensus. First, empirically it argues that the rise of nationalism in the 1990s was not altogether new. Instead, from the early 1980s, the CCP had been switching to "patriotism." Second, this article argues that the communist regime's transition to nationalism was hesitant. It was an interactive process whereby multiple layers of the society and elite, confused alike, worked together to explore whether and how to embrace nationalism. The nation‐building also bore the imprint of the revolutionary and state‐socialist past. This article suggests that though the nation‐state has become the dominant political format of the world, as a pattern it fuses with a society's traditions, preconditions, and internal struggles. Such fusions made nation‐building in the non‐Western world unseparated from quasi‐national legacies such as revolution and socialism and could yield consequences other than capitalism and democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is Chinese nationalism? Is nationalism the most effective framework for understanding how people in China are making sense of the world today? These are among the questions raised by Allen Carlson in his 2009 article 'A flawed perspective: the limitations inherent within the study of Chinese nationalism', which developed a provocative critique of decades of scholarship. Acknowledging the insights of Carlton's questions while disagreeing with his proposed conceptual shift towards national identity construction, I propose a further shift towards national identity deconstruction. In doing so, I combine the political insights of Hong Kong nationalists with the theoretical insights of deconstruction. This shift redirects the study of Chinese nationalism away from an abstract conceptualisation of nationalism to a more precise definition of the phenomena under study, as well as moving the debate on potential impacts away from international relations to consideration of the complex dynamics of China's ethnic politics. New definitions of both nationalism and minzu (of minzu zhuyi) are developed, reconceptualising the phenomena heretofore known as 'Chinese nationalism' as external symptoms of underlying tensions between conflicting identity narratives. In conclusion, the practical implications of this reconceptualisation are considered, exploring potential future paths for the People's Republic of China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the gender undertone of China's nationalist discourses, especially in familial metaphors of nationalism, and how such an undertone shapes people's understandings of state authority and state‐citizen relations. Conventional nationalist discourse of the 'motherland' evokes the image of an insulted and raped mother as the symbol of national humiliation and calls for actions from patriots (masculinised in the discourse). In recent years, however, we have seen the emergence of a new discourse that depicts the nation‐state as a rich, powerful and masculine 'daddy'. Using discourse analysis and Foucauldian genealogical methods, this article argues that the discursive development has to be analysed against China's historical backgrounds, especially considering new standards of masculinity and femininity in the era of economic reform. Capital is equated to masculinity and righteousness, whereas femininity is shaped by the middle‐class values of consumerism and political disengagement. The 'daddy state' discourse conjures strong paternalistic power from China's economic capacity that can be projected onto challengers of state authority, while also constructing the nationalist public as feminised consumers whose consumerist enjoyment relies on patriarchal state protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on Finnish national identities because they expressed the shared experiences of newly established Finnish communities, and they were crucial in constructing a new nation. It also explores created images of the Finnish and Finland, as well as community construction in Republican China, especially after Finland gained independence in 1917. Another aim is to examine those Finnish political, cultural and economic activities that supported their identity construction in China. The specific emphasis will be on analysing the largest and sometimes cross‐functioning Finnish groups in China: the governmental officials and the commercial community. By using qualitative methods, namely, discourse analysis and historical analysis, this study shows how the Finnish community created alternative, sometimes imaginative and frequently anti‐imperialist national identities in the new Republican China. Indeed, by signing the Treaty Principles of Reciprocity and Equal Treatment, it was agreed that Finland and China 'shall enjoy same rights, privileges, favours, immunities and exemptions which [might] be accorded to similar foreign agents in accordance with the principles of international law'. This article argues that Finnish aspirations were positively regarded by many Chinese, and they respected this quite unique national connection with Finland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: The purpose of this research is to explore whether the location of a citizen's residence is an important source of explanation for nationalistic attitudes in China. Methods: Using data from a nationwide representative survey of Chinese adults and a multidimensional approach to nationalism, analyses include bivariate correlation and multiple regression. Results: Significant support is found for 12 of 16 hypotheses linking "location variables" to specific types of nationalistic attitudes, even when modeling with a substantial set of controls. The hypothesis‐supporting evidence touches on three of the four dimensions of nationalism covered here. Conclusion: In regard to the development of nationalistic attitudes in China, location matters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study discusses the socialisation experiences of young Chinese from two different education backgrounds and media environment. Through a survey on the attitudes of students from Macau and mainland China towards nationalism‐related news events using a survey, this study has revealed that their education social background and media‐use patterns have a greater impact on students' attitudes towards political events (military parade and Occupy Central) than cultural events (Tu Youyou's Nobel Prize and championship of women's volleyball team), and the differences of their attitudes vary depending on the events in question. Moreover, mainland students are more nationalistic and supportive of the official mainland media's discourse on sovereignty issues, but more sceptical of its sources on events of conflicts between Chinese ethnicities. The findings of this study have revealed how wider media exposure impacts the attitudes of individuals; additionally, it responds to the debates on whether people are more inclined to recognise their existing common identities or influenced by the political regimes constructed by the elites; most importantly, it tests the socialising experiences of nationalism among young Chinese from different educational and media backgrounds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While most English studies of Chinese Christianity recognise the significance of early independent church movements led by indigenous leaders, few have looked in detail at the pioneering example of Yu Guozhen and his China Jesus Independent Church. Indeed, what motivated the early efforts of Chinese Protestants to form independent churches? As probably the first leader of independent churches to achieve national impact, Yu exhibited a clear commitment to harmonising Christianity with the Chinese state, which he deemed as the basis of guaranteeing religious rights. Though it would adopt various forms in the years to come, such synthesis of Christian nationalism has proved to be a recurring theme in the indigenisation of Chinese Christianity in the twentieth century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nationalism today interacts in complicated ways with advanced information and communication systems, regularly leading to unanticipated consequences. Popular online nationalism in the People's Republic of China (PRC) is a case in point: In the PRC, digital nationalism has become a central feature of political discourse and decision‐making, at times powerfully shaping the state's policy efforts. This article explores a missing puzzle piece in how state‐led and popular nationalism interact in Chinese politics: the role that advanced information and communication technologies play in such processes. This is a question that is not only relevant to scholars of China but also to anyone interested in the role that digital media and communication play in the formation and spread of contemporary nationalism. How do interactions in complex sociotechnical systems affect nationalism today? To answer this question, the article analyses and traces interaction and feedback loops in Chinese digital environments during Sino‐Japanese disputes over the East China Sea. It shows how the interactions between humans, organisations and technologies create unexpected variations in outcome that resonate through China's internet and create the conditions from which digital nationalism can powerfully emerge to shape legitimation and policy‐making processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fighting the COVID‐19 pandemic requires large numbers of citizens to adopt disease‐preventive practices. We contend that national identification can mobilize and motivate people to engage in preventive behaviors to protect the collective, which in return would heighten national identification further. To test these reciprocal links, we conducted studies in two countries with diverse national tactics toward curbing the pandemic: (1) a two‐wave longitudinal survey in China (Study 1, N = 1200), where a national goal to fight COVID‐19 was clearly set, and (2) a five‐wave longitudinal survey in the United States (Study 2, N = 1001), where the national leader, President Trump, rejected the severity of COVID‐19 in its early stage. Results revealed that national identification was associated with an increase in disease‐preventive behaviors in both countries in general. However, higher national identification was associated with greater trust in Trump's administration among politically conservative American participants, which then was associated with slower adoption of preventive behaviors. The reciprocal effect of disease‐preventive behaviors on national identification was observed only in China. Overall, our findings suggest that although national identification may serve as a protective factor in curbing the pandemic, this beneficial effect was reduced in some political contexts. HighlightsPolicymakers should note that national identity serves as a protective factor in curbing the COVID‐19 pandemic. Narratives that highlight the collective agency of people would be useful in promoting disease‐preventive actions as long as they are also endorsed by national leaders.National leaders should provide clear and consistent recommendations in promoting disease‐preventive actions.Practitioners and policymakers should be aware of how the communication strategies they use would be affected by society's political contexts. Mobilizing disease‐preventive actions through a patriotic frame might not be useful when national leaders did not unambiguously promote disease prevention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Outside of the dominant frame depicting World War II as a showdown between the Allied and Axis powers, the war also represented a critical juncture in the global battle between empire and nation. In Asia, the war allowed a "semi‐colonial" China to successfully reclaim its sovereignty from both its allies and enemies and compelled the Dutch to forfeit colonial rule in Indonesia and its prestige as a regional power. Moving beyond conventional dichotomies and great‐power bias, this paper analyses two portentous wartime controversies between China and the Netherlands, whose common goals as allies did not prevent clashes over diametrically opposed national pursuits. In exposing the conflicting nature of their respective nationalisms, these disputes elucidate the interplay of war, nationalism, and imperialism in East Asia as well as China's changing place in the emergent post‐war regional and global orders. The Dutch refusal to accept these shifting realities and underlying notions of national self‐determination presaged the traumatic trajectory of Indonesia's decolonisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been proven that language is a symbol of culture and politics. This study investigates the cohort effect of Hong Kong's handover on the language spoken in adulthood based on the 2006 and 2011 Hong Kong population censuses. We find that Mandarin is more likely to be used by Hong Kong natives who were exposed to the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997 during their school‐age years, especially the generation that were exposed during their primary‐school years. This cohort insisted on speaking Mandarin, even when the political environment changed from 2006 to 2011. Our evidence reveals that the political change that occurs during one's school‐age years has a long‐term impact on an individual's behaviour in adulthood. Further discussion indicates that exposure to political change such as regime transfer during school‐age years impacts an individual's national identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"The Socioeconomics of Nationalism in China: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives" by Fan attempts to explain Chinese nationalism using a utilitarian economic model. The author argues that nationalism is more pronounced in the modern world when people's incomes are above a certain threshold. However, the reviewer finds this approach too grand and believes that rational choice theory fails to adequately explain social and historical problems. The book also overlooks the role of propaganda in constructing nationalist narratives. While some of the author's conclusions may be valid, the reviewer disagrees with the book's basic approach and instead recommends a more evidence-based and sociological analysis. [Extracted from the article]

China's strategy in the South China Sea has gone through considerable changes over the last decades. While multiple oscillations have occurred over short periods of time, the three‐decade‐long "trend line" has been characterized by two major inflection points. China's provocations in the mid‐1990s were followed by a transition to cooperation at the turn of the millennium, itself followed by a shift toward heavy‐handed methods since the turn of the 2010s. While each of these two "transitions" has been studied in great detail, few studies have tried to apply explanatory models to both of the transitions to assess their strength. This article fills this void in the existing literature by examining how major explanatory frameworks are distributed into two main categories – domestic and systemic – and perform in explaining China's changing strategy in the two transitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Taiwan Strait is heating up, as Mainland Chinese netizens, generals, and politicians increasingly talk about 'forceful' rather than 'peaceful' reunification. While Xi Jinping and Chinese nationalists desperately desire Taiwan's reunification, Trump's isolationist "America First" rhetoric has only encouraged reckless Chinese thinking about forcing reunification, and the Taiwanese remain largely passive, unable to confront an overwhelming threat. Wishful thinking in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington is increasing the odds of miscalculation. The 2020 presidential elections in Taiwan and the United States, and the ongoing U.S.-China trade war, furthermore, bode ill for peace in the Taiwan Strait. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to analyze the influence of Prime Minister Abe Shinzō's nationalist stance on Japan's policy towards China from a neoclassical realist perspective. It is argued that the extent to which Abe's ideological leaning exerted impact on foreign policy making depended on external stimuli, as well as Abe's domestic political interests. Prime Minister Abe generally perceived China as a threat to Japan, and remained assertive towards it, but he also pragmatically displayed flexibility in such areas as history issues, security policy, and territorial dispute. This article analyzes these complex developments in light of the changes in international environment and domestic politics, examining three periods: Abe's first administration (2006–2007); the escalation of diplomatic disputes with China (2012–2014); and gradual rapprochement with China (since 2014). It is concluded that the nationalist beliefs of decision makers affect foreign policy to the greatest extent whenever they are in line with other kinds of variables, such as external pressures and domestic interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China is home to the world's largest audience for e‐sports, or competitive videogames. While competitive videogames have become popular within a borderless, digital environment, the e‐sports fan base has a decidedly nationalist element to it. This article argues that new forms of digital nationalism are part and parcel of normal discourse within the Chinese competitive videogames environment. Through a case study of one specific competitive videogame, this article shows how nationalist narratives are enacted by the community itself at the grass roots, creating bottom‐up forms of nationalism. Combining digital fieldwork with offline interviews and observations, the study sheds light on new forms of nationalist expression appearing online in China. It focuses in particular on memes and how these serve as micro expressions of nationalism, maintaining and reinforcing nationalist narratives originating within state discourses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper elaborates upon a cultural logic of overseas Chinese nationalism. Around the early twentieth century, some bourgeois members of overseas Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Seas mobilised Confucianism as an ethno‐symbol. The latter helped the overseas Chinese bourgeoisie to counter the quest for greater secularisation and to confront the surge of anti‐imperialist movements. The implications of this research include to recentre the role of overseas Chinese in China's modern transformation; to decentre the May Fourth agendas in the understanding of overseas Chinese nationalism; and to situate overseas Chinese nationalism in an extraterritorial space, which includes the Confucian zone created in the dialogical connections between Confucian intellectual elites (such as Zheng Xiaoxu and Chen Huanzhang) and overseas Chinese bourgeois networks that converged in Hong Kong and spread transnationally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Chinese Communist Party is confronted with a growing gap that separates the rhetoric about socialism and party rule from the individualism and materialism caused by capitalism and opening up to the outside world. In response, the Party has developed strategies that draw on an understanding of the dedication to the Party that is specifically religious, yet does not require belief, conviction, or faith in a doctrine. These strategies revolve around the Leninist concept of 'party spirit', which, paradoxically, has been turned into a commodity that can be produced, supplied, and consumed. Drawing on insights from the anthropology of pilgrimage, tourism, and religion, this article discusses these strategies in the context of party cadre education and so‐called 'red tourism'. The article concludes that the Party is shaping its evolution from an infallible bearer of ideological dogma to a sacred object of worship as part of a new 'communist civil religion'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This article conducts a comparative biographical analysis to explain why the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) revolutionaries used non‐nationalist Marxism to boost a nationalist movement. It argues that these people, based on their own observations of the precommunist Chinese nationalism, thought that China lacked structural conditions for making a solid nationalist movement such as cultural homogeneity, mass literacy, and a shared pride in modern history. They thus turned to seek a non‐national ideology that could still fulfil the functions of integrating leading elites, mobilizing the masses, and motivating the patriots themselves. Then, to explain why the CCP leaders particularly adopted Marxism, this article draws comparison with the Kuomintang (non‐communist nationalists) elites who advocated for more patience and insistence to develop regular nationalism. The comparison shows that the CCP's impatient jump stemmed from their disadvantaged backgrounds that had limited their ideological horizon: lower‐class origins, narrow overseas experiences, poor education, and weak attachment to traditional culture. To pre‐existing literature, this article makes three contributions: (1) provides a more detailed interpretation of the CCP's diagnosis of Chinese nationalism; (2) explains why the same structural dilemmas produced nationalist and non‐nationalist responses alike; and (3) draws a biographical database of the CCP and the Kuomintang. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Prior to its recent, much discussed international ‘assertiveness’, China's attitude to the West had deteriorated, as reflected in official discourse of national identity. Drawing from political science and social psychology literature on identity studies, I argue that the discursive pattern of national identity can shift as a function of an elite strategy to exclude internal others through opposition to foreign others. Internally exclusionary nationalism, often employed by elites during major crises, is instrumental to consolidating control and maintaining order. But when targeting internal opponents alone is politically inconvenient or lacks public resonance, elites will accentuate ethnocentric national identity discourse vis‐a‐vis foreign nations in order to reinforce internal battles and divert popular discontent externally. An interpretive analysis of the official texts of Chinese national identity discourse during the Hu Jintao decade, supplemented by quantitative data, shows a significant correlation between the regime's fear of internal instability and bottom‐up political opposition on the one hand and the timing and intensity of ethnocentric identity discourse regarding the West on the other. The party‐state negatively framed the West in order to shift the blame for domestic troubles onto foreigners and discredit internal resistance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper explores the impact of the dissociated feminine principle resulting from the trauma of cultural displacement in a young Chinese woman keen to embrace a modern Western identity. A case study illustrates the outcome of the client both consciously and unconsciously rejecting the traditional stereotypical Chinese feminine identity and instead embracing the distorted, yet seductive, image of the Western (Caucasian) woman as independent, intellectual and confident. Her defensive denial of the traditional feminine was dealt with by intellectualising both personal and professional relationships. Then, unconsciously, the dissociated traditional feminine was projected into a separate aspect of her identity that held the traumatised feelings. The intellectualisation was eventually understood as being a necessary defence to cope with the cultural as well as geographical dislocation trauma. And with this realisation a space was created to accept and integrate the denied feminine-in a literal as well as a symbolic manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inspired by the dichotomous understanding of nationhood contributed by Brubaker (1992), this paper explores how Chinese nationhood is constituted by particular symbols in middle school historiography since the 1950s. In response to the analysis on the high school textbooks done by Baranovitch (2000), this study finds that the narratives in the middle school history textbooks have a similar transition from equating China to Han to defining China as a multi-ethnic nation. However, the analysis also demonstrates that the transition of the middle school history textbooks is not as complete and absolute as that of their high school counterparts. A textbook may follow different principles in nationhood configuration simultaneously. In the textbook narratives before the change, the jus sanguinis logic was dominant over the jus soli logic; in those in the textbooks after the change, Chinese nationhood was constituted by the jus soli principle and the jus sanguinis principle complementarily. This study questions the perception that a nation only consistently follows one philosophy in the symbolic consolidation of nationhood, and casts doubt on the understanding that jus sanguinis or jus soli logic is deeply rooted in the historical development of a nation and cannot change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the rise of Han-centrism, a form of hyper-nationalism, in contemporary China. As Chinese nationalism has become more ethnocentric since the 1990s, the cultural chauvinism of Han-centrism has become increasingly more influential in the debate over national identity. Within this narrative, Han culture is considered to be the authentic character of the nation; to deviate from the Han identity will only tarnish Chinese exceptionalism and impede China's rise. While Chinese nationalism consists of many competing discourses, we argue that Han-centrism has a significant influence within both policy-making circles and the public sphere in China, and, as a result, has important consequences for the future of international politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Methodological nationalism takes the nation-state as a pre-given container of social life, and thereby treats internal and international migrations as separate matters. Epistemological behaviouralism redresses this by removing the conceptual divide between internal and international but is problematic in regarding migration as a human behaviour distinct in itself. In explaining why and how these two pitfalls need to be addressed in tandem, I first trace how these contrasting viewpoints are historically deeply intertwined. I then draw on examples from China to demonstrate that migrations should be understood as composites of actions carried out by multiple actors and institutions, which in their turn lead to and become part of other social processes. Internal and international migrations are interlinked as constituted and constitutive assemblages. In the case of China, the nation-state is a central link between the two, and is at the same time itself reconfigured by mobilities. Instead of promoting migration as a subject matter in its own right and migration studies as a distinct field, this article seeks to turn migration into an analytical perspective to examine broad social changes. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I present findings from a survey experiment in which Chinese university students exposed to a treatment designed to increase feelings of national threat were-based on their responses to the four-item postmaterialism values-priority battery-significantly more likely to be classified as 'pure materialists.' These findings are presented in support of the proposition that perception of a hostile international environment may tend to exaggerate citizens' authoritarian and nationalistic sentiments at the expense of more democratically favorable value orientations. Media and political figures in the West who rail against the evils of China's authoritarian leadership might believe that they are championing and encouraging democratic aspirations among the Chinese people, but might instead be inciting impulses and attitudes that are far less 'democracy-friendly.' [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the context of literature on Chinese nationalism. It highlights the arguments between the identification of the English-language literature such as the foreign policy for Chinese nationalism and the threat of erroneous Chinese nationalism. It also stresses the political identity of the literature on Chinese nationalism.

This article unpacks the contemporary relationship among racial, cultural, and civic notions of the concept of the Chinese nation ( Zhonghua Minzu 中华民族), specifically examining Han (汉), Hua (华), and Zhongguo (中国) as categories representative of each identity marker. It examines the relationship between Han and Chinese identities and how people from multiple ethnic identities relate to the idea of the Chinese nation. Han identity is often fused with the larger Chinese identity that in the past conflated the two, sometimes leading to Han chauvinism and a problematic relationship with the state for non-Han people. Government orthodoxy that emphasizes civic harmony and minimizes national distinction is challenged by exclusive ethnic and racial conceptions. A classical cultural understanding of Chinese identity may be more inclusive yet is undermined by the ongoing territorializing of Chinese nationalism and myth making of Chinese identity in ethno-national rhetoric. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the national narratives of young, urban Protestants in contemporary China. Based on 100 interviews conducted in Beijing and Shenzhen, it argues that in constructing their national narratives, Chinese Protestants display critical selectivity in adopting the values of official party-state nationalism. They display affection towards China, a sense of responsibility for improving the country and a concern for society's morality, all of which echo official nationalist priorities. However, they are critical of China's political arrangements, dispute the primacy of economic growth and are less hawkish on international and territorial issues. They see no contradiction between their Protestant and Chinese identities, but generally prioritise the former. This selectivity is explained by the fact that Protestantism generally attracts those less satisfied by the social and political status quo, and because of, in Carlson's terms, the 'boundary-spanning' nature of the Protestant identity and morality to which these converts then subscribe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To reverse the downturn in and develop EU-China relations requires mutual understanding. However, the opaque nature of Chinese politics makes it difficult to track China's expectations and its changing views of the EU and their relationship. This paper examines the official Chinese media discourse on the EU's 'actorness' and partnership with China. This helps to bridge the gap between international relations and media studies by linking government foreign relations to media discourse. It argues that China's relations with the EU should be characterized neither as a case of a 'Capability-Expectations Gap' (Hill, ) nor as an 'Expectation Deficit' (Tsuruoka, ), but should rather be seen as a matter of 'Reflexive Expectations' by China. The media analysis shows that China's changing national identity, interests and perception of the EU's capability at various times and in various situations influence expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Internal debates continue in China and abroad about the meaning and significance of Chinese President Xi Jinping's position on a new Asian regional security order. Some observers insist that a strongly worded May 2014 speech Xi delivered in Shanghai reflects China's intensified determination to exercise an increasingly assertive posture toward the United States. Others suspect that such rhetoric is largely designed for internal consumption to appeal to nationalist sentiments about the need for China to stand up to the United States and take a leadership role in the region. Such differences in interpretation are extended to discussions about China's attitudes toward the United States' continued strategic presence in Asia and about Washington's maintenance of its long-standing alliance network there. The truth is that a combination of Chinese aspirations for shaping a new regional security architecture tempered by the realities and constraints of what China can actually do at this point in time must be acknowledged by both Chinese policymakers and their foreign counterparts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has reached such a position of relative strength in the Asia-Pacific region that anxiety about stimulating anti-China security cooperation among other states, once a powerful moderating force over Chinese foreign policy making, appears less of a restraint for the nationalism-indulgent Xi Jinping government. Chinese leaders believe that China's challenges to key aspects of the U.S.-sponsored regional security order will result in increased regime and national security for China, but these challenges also threaten to unravel the order. If Washington and its partners are unwilling to accept the inevitable harm to their own interests that would accompany increased Chinese influence over regional affairs, they should demonstrate a willingness to pursue policies the Chinese would view as strategic setbacks, thereby causing the Chinese to recalculate the advisability of bullying behavior as opposed to cooperative behavior within the rules and institutions of the current regional order, an approach under which China has made spectacular gains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I find in the Asia-Pacific new modes of regulatory regional governance-regulatory regionalism. My approach suggests that a variety of regulatory regimes are located inside rather than outside the state. Hence an important implication of my argument is that my analysis of regional governance must be focused much more on the transformation of the state rather than on the creation of new regional institutions. Governance is regionalized within the state bringing with it new actors, forums, and procedures which go unrecognized in much of the literature on regional governance. In the latter half of the article, I examine the mobilization of regulatory governance projects via both the national and subnational state in China. These regulatory projects are in response to the interests and challenges faced by internationalization of state capital. The article concludes by focusing on the increasing contestation between U.S.- and Chinese-led regulatory projects such as the Trans Pacific Partnership and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the invention of a Chinese National Day from 1949 through 1987 in Taiwan to illuminate the significance of mnemonic work in nation-building. The 1949 Retreat after the Chinese Civil War resulted in a serious legitimacy crisis for the government of the Republic of China; thus, (re)inventing the National Day became an important mission to maintain and even strengthen this shaky regime. While the role of the standardized commemorative narrative in influencing people's collective memory is granted, this article emphasizes the aspect of embodied memory in nation-remembering. I point out that the official Chinese nationalism constructed its National Day as 'inevitably' bustling, memorialized, accepted, heroic, familial-ized, blessed, and pivotal-ized to shape the impression of a sacred and memorable day. This paper-while essentially consistent with Billig's argument of banal nationalism-suggests that national identity is accumulated by many symbolically encoded elements found in daily life; it goes further to argue that banal nationalism needs the 'hot' nationalism found in special occasions to encode, refresh, and redefine the symbolic meaning of entities. That is, the oscillations between sacred and profane are needed to guarantee that patriotic emotions can be continually created and maintained. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The modern academic discipline of archaeology in China was born in a period of heightened nationalism. This fact, combined with repeated pronouncements by early twentieth-century Chinese archaeologists, museum curators, and nationalist intellectuals that archaeology could 'awaken' the Chinese to patriotism, has led many contemporary historians to assert that archaeology was an effective tool in educating the people in nationalist ideology at the time. This research note seeks to qualify that assessment by calling for closer attention to the working of the discipline at the local level. Using archaeological activities conducted under the auspices of the Sichuan Provincial Education Office in the late 1930s and early 1940s as a case study, this essay suggests the ambiguities inherent in the discipline, as local actors used it to bolster their case for historic differences from the putative centre of Chinese civilization, thus creating a sort of provincial nationalism, which stood in contrast to the version of national history expounded by the centre. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why has Korean migration policy been ethnicized? This research mainly aims to explain ethnic preference in Korea's immigration policy through the lens of Korean nationalism. The influx of ethnic Koreans in China (or Joseonjok) since the early 1990s has created a new dilemma for the South Korean government, which has long claimed to be the only legitimate polity of the Korean nation. The discrepancy between the legal citizenship and ethnicity of the Korean- Chinese workers in Korean society has forced the Korean state to redefine both legal and discursive national boundaries. This study analyzes the bifurcation of the Korean state discourses regarding Korean- Chinese workers in Korean society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea of the nation has been considered to have delivered political modernity from its native Europe to the rest of the world. The same applies, though more implicitly, to those paradoxes inherent to the nationalist ideology - that between universalism and national particularity and that between liberal nationalism and imperialism. This article seeks to complicate these theses by looking at the interpretations of nationalism, imperialism, and cosmopolitanism provided by Liang Qichao, one of the most influential Chinese intellectuals in early twentieth century, during his exile in Japan when increasingly exposed to the encounter between worlds. This reading also engages with the wider debates on modernity/modernities in non- Western societies through showing that neither the 'consumers of modernity' approach nor the 'creative adaptations' approach can be easily applied here. I argue that the various tensions, contingencies and historical situatedness in Liang's accounts of the nation-state structure represent and constitute the paradox of the structure itself. They also shed light on contemporary debates about the limits of our political imagination in the misnamed 'global politics' beyond the false opposition between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses economic and political problems facing China. Topics include the reliance of China's economy on state investment in infrastructure projects, the possibility of economic reforms to move toward a more consumer-based economy, and the use of nationalism to build support for the Chinese Communist Party. Also addressed are Chinese public opinion regarding democratization, the opinions of Chinese President Xi Jinping on Maoism, and the prosecution of former internal security official Zhou Yongkang by Xi's government.

This article seeks to explore the intersecting relationship between gender and race in early twentieth-century China within a transcultural framework. The gendering practices in modern China not only produced sexed bodies, but also provided a space of mediation between western discourses and local tradition, between orientalist representation and imperialist power and between colonial hegemony and nationalist resistance. It is often through this complex process of mediation that a nationalist agency is constructed across mutually contradictory global discourses. In this article, I will first examine the intertwined relationship between gender and race, which binds China’s ‘women question’ squarely with that of men and the nation. Based on the reading of translated and original essays on the women question by Chinese intellectuals, cultural critics and sex theorists in early twentieth-century China, I argue that, along with the spreading of enlightenment discourse that demystified sexed bodies, there was another conspicuous ‘retrograde’ intellectual trend to re–enchant the feminine as a phantasmal source to empower Chinese men and the Chinese nation, resulting in various theories on female superiority and gynocentrism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the handover of sovereignty from the United Kingdom to China in 1997, the post-colonial government in Hong Kong initiated a nation-building project aimed at boosting nationalism and patriotism. Drawing on documentary analysis, this article analyses how the dominant bloc subtly manipulates a Chinese identity rooted in local traditions through its national education policy, and how it seeks to foster hegemony via several discursive strategies including normalization, naturalization, homogenization, utilitarianization, glorification, moralization, and eclecticism. This article also draws attention to the alternative discourses by the civil society in opposition to the hegemony project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the 2012 London Olympics, a spontaneous movement to 'ignite positive energy' emerged in Chinese social media from the massive and fervent support for the Chinese grassroots torch bearers. This grassroots-oriented movement has generated a 'transcendental Chinese patriotism', in which patriotism is intertwined with individualism, transnationalism, and universalism. The ideal and sentiment of this hybrid Chinese patriotism forms a stark contrast to the mainstream 'Chinese nationalism', which has been characterized by scholars as various forms of reactive collectivism derived from state authority, Confucian tradition, and the wounded memories of China's recent history. This online movement has also demonstrated an impressive efficacy in shaping the socio-political landscape of China beyond transforming Chinese nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My article replies to Allen Carlson's critique of the existing literature on Chinese nationalism ( Carlson's article was published in Volume 15, issue 1 of Nations and Nationalism, 2009). I address Carlson's criticisms and proceed to evaluate his proposal to move away from an allegedly unhelpful focus on nationalism towards the allegedly more illuminating framework of national identity construction. My approach to the existing literature on Chinese nationalism acknowledges efforts made within it at grappling with issues of theory and definition and builds on this acknowledgement to operate a selective appraisal of its strengths and weaknesses. I argue that while some of the problems identified by Carlson do indeed plague the literature, his advocacy of abandoning nationalism as a focus of research is unwarranted. There is continuing validity in using nationalism as a lens for understanding how China sees its place in the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to conventional wisdom, the Chinese collective memory constructed within the enterprise of state-driven nationalism largely conforms to the presentist view of memory studies. The memory-based legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP), however, is premised upon some basic assumptions embedded in the indigenous political culture. In the consumption of the collective memory of foreign aggression and invasion, the memory-encoded social norms have grounded the domestic expectations of the state's diplomatic behavior, which can both enable and constrain the deliberation and execution of Beijing's foreign policy. Due to China's fragile domestic politics and the resurgence of popular nationalism, collective memory manipulated by the authoritarian regime to enhance its legitimacy has become an endogenous variable of the CCP's diplomatic decision making and has led to China's paradoxical performance on the international stage. The rationality of the party-state on the foreign relations front has been bounded by the historical institution of collective memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses political conditions as of October 2012 in Tibet, which has been controlled by China's Communist Party since 1950, with a focus on Tibetans' national identity and loyalty to their leader, the Dalai Lama, head of the Tibetan branch of Buddhism. Topics include efforts by China to transform Tibet into a communist nation through permanent military occupation; the cessation of the Sino-Tibetan Dialogue meetings; and Chinese policies which have provoked Tibetan resistance, demonstrations, and public self-immolations. U.S. foreign policy toward the self-determination movement in Tibet is discussed, along with the Dalai Lama's plans for his succession.

The present study validated implicit animosity as a unique determinant of consumer behavior in the context of Chinese animosity toward Japan. The Implicit Association Test (IAT) was employed to measure implicit Chinese animosity toward Japan. The results showed that (a) implicit animosity was distinct from consumer ethnocentrism; (b) implicit animosity was significantly correlated with war animosity, but not with economic animosity; and (c) implicit animosity exerted negative impacts on purchase intention, independent of explicit animosity, consumer ethnocentrism, and product judgment. Taken together, these findings provide initial evidence of discriminant, convergent, and predictive validity for implicit animosity, highlighting the importance of taking implicit animosity into account in future animosity research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper employs concepts and analytical frameworks drawn from Sociology, particularly collective memory, to examine China's attempts - and the limitations of those attempts - to improve relations with Japan in the new century. In particular, it focuses on a specific episode, the attempt to bring 'new thinking' to Sino-Japanese relations. It concludes that the difficulties and complexities are the product of many factors. In the first place, CCP is constrained by its own definition of nationalism and national identity. Secondly, Beijing's control mechanisms and its ability to direct nationalist discourse in ways convenient to itself are challenged by the rise of popular nationalistic sentiment. In addition, the rise of revisionist nationalism in Japan further complicates Beijing's stance toward Japan. The achievement of China's vision of harmonious world and of 'Mutually Beneficial' relations with Japan will depend on how well China handles the delicate matters of the construction of national identity and the basis of government legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers the authors' insights on civicism, which express the sentiment of loving a city regarding their ethos. They say that civicism can limit the excesses of nationalism, and that the people with civicism do not need the sense of nationalism to feel good for themselves. They also tell that China has spending efforts for their own ethos protection to resist the tendencies of globalization. They add that the cities with ethos can achieve the political goals compared to other state.

Both ongoing practice and the theory of interaction ritual chains imply the significance of the contribution that ritual makes to group solidarity, such as national identification. This contribution is in need of empirical examination as in this study, which surveyed 1,788 schoolchildren in Hong Kong, a special administrative region of China. The results show that, controlling for earlier national identification behavior (within the previous year) and other predictors, ritualized interaction in an activity for national cause (within the previous 6 months) manifested both linear and quadratic positive effects on current national identification sentiment. The effect was stronger for children who previously displayed lower national identification behavior. These results favor the use of ritual to promote national identification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The advent of post-Cold War order, growing economic interdependence and dense social and cultural networks have greatly facilitated South Korea's bilateral ties with China and Japan since the early 1990s; however, disputes over the history and territory have recently strained such ties. Whereas Japan's renewed territorial claim over Dokdo Island, its distortion of history textbooks and Koizumi's tribute to the Yasukuni Shrine dealt a critical blow to Seoul-Tokyo relations, China's Northeast Project, which claims Korea's ancient kingdom of Goguryeo as a Chinese peripheral local government, provoked widespread anti-Chinese sentiments in South Korea. Nevertheless, South Korea's nationalist responses were not uniform. Seoul responded to Tokyo in a much tougher manner with profound diplomatic implications, whereas public outcry over China did not escalate into any specific retaliatory actions. This article argues that such variation can be explained by the dynamic interplay of issue-character, domestic political terrain involving public opinion and leadership perception and feedback from political leadership in China and Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]