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This paper presents a conceptual framework for the intellectual virtues in the context of online search. Intellectual virtues are dispositions and skills that enable good thinking and wise reasoning, such as intellectual humility and attentiveness. Despite their importance, today the intellectual virtues tend to be underdeveloped across society. In light of the institutional role that online search plays in life today, there is an opportunity (perhaps an obligation) for online search to facilitate the development of intellectual virtue. The framework presented in this paper locates this development in three areas: the Searcher, the System, and Society. Major issues in information ethics and virtue epistemology are discussed for each of these areas, leading to recommendations for education, design, and research. This paper provides specific suggestions in this regard along with an agenda for future research at the intersection of ethics, epistemology, and online search. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rather than confining the categories health and sickness to a biomedical conception of the biological organism, there is growing recognition of epistemological and ontological multiplicity in the realm of diagnosis and, indeed, in the very realm of disease itself. In short, the empirical manifestations of health and illness as well as the processes thought to cause them are now understood to assume a much wider variety of both biological and other forms. This essay considers the underlying epistemological and ontological opportunities and challenges of taking what we are calling this diffusion of diagnosis seriously. By diffusion we mean the movement from a concentrated understanding of diagnostic authority as confined to scientific biomedicine to a less concentrated appreciation of the diverse approaches to diagnosis throughout the world. We consider the extent to which, and the manner in which, we as sociologists of diagnosis might not only critique these various processes but perhaps also take them seriously in an ethnographic sense as locally produced, evaluated and legitimated forms of health care. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an overview of the process of entanglement at the 25th International Philosophy of Nursing Conference (IPNC) at University of California at Irvine held on August 18, 2022. Representing collective work from the US, Canada, UK and Germany, our panel entitled 'What can critical posthuman philosophies do for nursing?' examined critical posthumanism and its operations and potential in nursing. Critical posthumanism offers an antifascist, feminist, material, affective, and ecologically entangled approach to nursing and healthcare. Rather than focusing on the arguments of each of the three distinct but interrelated panel presentation pieces, this paper instead focuses on process and performance (per/formance) and performativity as relational, connected and situated, with connections to nursing philosophy. Building upon critical feminist and new materialist philosophies, we describe intra‐activity and performativity as ways to dehierarchise knowledge making practices within traditional academic conference spaces. Creating critical cartographies of thinking and being are actions of possibility for building more just and equitable futures for nursing, nurses, and those they accompany—including all humans, nonhumans, and more than human matter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notion of moral expertise poses a variety of challenges concerning both the question of existence of such experts and their identification by laypeople. I argue for a view of ethics expertise, based on moral understanding instead of on moral knowledge, that is less robust than genuine moral expertise and that does not rely on deference to testimony. I propose identification criteria that focus mainly on the awareness and communication of implicit biases and situated ignorance. According to the account of ethics expertise presented in this paper, the expert's testimony is not an epistemic reason for the layperson's belief, but merely an epistemic influence. The epistemic reasons for the layperson's belief are largely independent from the expert. But there is still some epistemic risk involved in the proposed method of knowledge transfer, and therefore criteria for the identification of a trustworthy expert are necessary. The risk involved in knowledge transfer can be both due to willful manipulation and due to the expert's implicit biases and situated ignorance. While willful manipulation cannot really be avoided, the influence from biases and ignorance can be minimized. I argue that the best way to do this is if the expert is aware of their own biases and ignorance and communicates them. Combined with evidence of the expert's education in moral philosophy and experience with the topic in question, this gives the layperson the best chance to identify someone who can really help them consider all relevant aspects of a situation and come to a better justified decision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rationale, Aims, and Objectives: The disciplinary profile and the quality of production of knowledge on Corona pandemic is studied. This scientific field is called 'Medical Corona Science'. Methods: Criteria of analytical philosophy of science and science studies are systematically applied. Results: It is shown that mainly auxiliary medical disciplines such as virology and epidemiology but not clinical disciplines provide Corona knowledge. We see a laboratory‐centered, technology‐ and data‐driven science, largely ignoring clinical issues. Therefore we call these approaches "Medical Corona Science" (MCS). We see the need to adapt to features of a 'post‐normal science', a 'mode 2 science' and of 'Integration and Implementation Science', especially as clinical knowledge must be integrated. There is also a severe lack of theoretical considerations that could help to frame the pandemic as a complex dynamic system. Conclusions: We suggest a deeper meta‐scientific discussion of the epistemic value of MCS and propose the application of tools from systems science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This epilogue is written in the ink of gratitude and provocation, reflecting on the essays that constitute the special issue on precarity. I briefly review the key gifts of the essays and then try to imagine how a social psychology of precarity could be theorized and engaged otherwise, with commitments to epistemic justice, designed with decolonizing methodologies and organized in solidarity with movements for social justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary scholars working in vice epistemology attribute a motivational approach to the Aristotelian understanding of intellectual vice. My aim in this article is to show that this is not an accurate interpretation of the Aristotelian position. Toward this end, I discuss Aristotle's account of the intellectual virtues of (a) intelligence and (b) comprehension as well as their corresponding vices. In opposition to the claims of several contemporary vice epistemologists, I show that Aristotle had an obstructivist view of vice that focused on their consequences. I argue that this realization can be of significant import to contemporary vice epistemology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous evaluation studies have rarely used authentic online texts and investigated upper secondary school students' use of evaluation criteria and deep reasoning. The associations between internet‐specific epistemic justifications for knowing and credibility evaluation of online texts are not yet fully understood among adolescents. This study investigated upper secondary school students' (N = 372) abilities to evaluate self‐selected authentic online texts and the role of internet‐specific epistemic justifications in students' evaluation performance when solving a health‐related information problem. Students selected three texts with Google Custom Search Engine and evaluated their credibility. Students' evaluation performance across the three texts was determined according to the different aspects evaluated (author, venue, intentions, evidence and corroboration) and the depth of their evaluations. Students also filled in the Internet‐Specific Epistemic Justifications (ISEJ) inventory previously validated with pre‐service teachers. The results revealed considerable differences in students' abilities to evaluate online texts. Students' beliefs in justification by authority and justification by multiple sources positively predicted their evaluation performance similarly in both topics. The findings suggest that the ISEJ inventory is also valid for upper secondary school students. Students should be explicitly taught to evaluate different credibility aspects and scaffolded to deeply engage with online information. Lay Description: What is currently known about the subject matter: Evaluation of online texts is challenging for adolescents.Students' abilities to evaluate the credibility of online texts vary considerably.Beliefs in justifications for knowing may contribute to the evaluation of online information.Three‐dimensional knowing construct has been found in the Internet context. What the paper adds: Students' evaluations of online texts reflected different credibility aspects and depth in reasoning.Students used more frequently venue, evidence and author than intentions and corroboration as evaluation criteria.Students' beliefs in justification by authority and justification by multiple sources predicted their evaluation performance.Personal justification did not predict students' evaluation performance. The implications of study findings for practitioners: Students should be instructed to evaluate various aspects of credibility and engage in deep reasoning.Students would benefit from learning how to use corroboration with multiple texts as an evaluation strategy.Personal feedback may promote advanced justifications for knowing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Object" is one of the most important concepts in Kant's philosophy. I argue that Kant's concept of an object involves a hitherto neglected distinction, between what I call the "quantificational" concept of an object (q‐object) and what I call the "representational" concept of an object (r‐object). I examine the relation between these two concepts and argue that there is a close connection, even in the case of q‐objects we cannot sensibly intuit (negative noumena) and the r‐objects of non‐sensible intuition (positive noumena). Even in the non‐sensible case, our only way of representing a concept as having non‐sensible instances (q‐objects) is by conceiving of a kind of intellect that would intuit those objects. We cannot know that such intuition or such objects are possible, but it is only by thinking of such intuition that we can think of such objects as instances of concepts (e.g., the concept "negative noumena"). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A review of a range of epistemic concepts that are commonly researched was conducted with reference to conventional epistemology and with reference to foundational approaches to justification. These were assessed in relation to previous research undertaken linking information behavior and experience with paradigm, metatheory, and discourse. This research assesses how the epistemic concept is treated, both within information science and within disciplines that have affinities to the topics or agents that have been the subject of inquiry within the field. An attempt is made to clarify the types of connections that are associated with the epistemic concept and to provide a clearer view of how research focused on information behavior might consider the questions underpinning assumptions relating to knowledge and knowing. The symbiotic connection between epistemics and information science is advanced as a suitably nuanced conception of socially organized knowledge from which to define the appropriate level at which knowledge claims can be usefully advanced. It is proposed that fostering a better understanding of epistemics as a research practice might also provide for the development of a range of insights and methods that reflect the dynamic context within which the study of information behavior and information experience is located. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the social relations between inpatients in psychiatric wards. Combining Barker's (2002) concept of 'collective illness identity' with Nelson's (1993) concept of 'epistemological communities', I draw attention to the inpatients' collective identification and experiential knowledge. Through the analysis, three aspects of the inpatients' relationships are unfolded. First, how the inpatients, through bodily expressions and narrative accounts, construct a collective illness identity based on shared experiences of symptoms and suffering. Second, the ways in which the inpatients use their shared experiential knowledge to support one another and challenge the mental health professionals. Third, how the inpatients' reflections on the long‐term potential of their relationships reveal a number of concerns related to their continuation. Centrally, the paper points to the potential and challenges that arise from the inpatients' relations to one another and their embeddedness in a specific time and space. Empirically, the paper draws on five months of participant observation conducted in two psychiatric wards in Denmark and interviews with 14 psychiatric patients. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rationale, aims and objectives: McHugh and Walker introduced a model of knowledge to demonstrate that EBM is a form of scientism that ignores important sources of knowledge thereby impairing the practice of medicine. We study the development of this model and explore additional applications. Methods: Review of the relevant literature and identification of possible areas for fruitful application. Results: We show that the McHugh and Walker model is closely related to the model of evidence considered earlier by Upshur et al. We also indicate that the utility of this model is not limited to showing scientism distorts clinical practice. Several representative applications are identified, including psychotherapy, the Salk polio vaccine trial, and the placebo effect. Conclusions: Priority should be given to Upshur et al for the development of a model that has far‐reaching application to medical epistemology. It is shown that all four of the types of evidence considered—qualitative/personal, qualitative/general, quantitative/general, and quantitative/personal—are required to adequately characterize epistemology in medical research and practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Preschoolers use others' behaviours to make inferences about what traits they possess (Harris et al., 2018, Ann. Rev. Psychol., 69, 251). The current study examined whether 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds also associate others' behaviour with how they appear on the surface. Specifically, we asked whether children's sensitivity to different face–traits (e.g., Cogsdill et al., 2014, Psychol. Sci., 25, 1132) would bias them to associate knowledgeable behaviours with faces that adults rate as highly competent‐ or trustworthy‐looking. We find that preschoolers expect puppets with trustworthy‐looking faces to be knowledgeable about the functions of familiar objects. In contrast, children did not match a puppet's knowledge to facial features that adults rate as varying in competence. These data suggest that children, like adults, are biased to associate facial appearance and behaviour. Furthermore, this bias appears to be rooted in a response to the same facial features that have been found to govern judgements of trustworthiness across development (e.g., Jessen & Grossmann, 2016, J. Cogn. Neurosci., 28, 1728). Statement of contributionWhat is already known on this subject?Preschoolers selectively trust others using epistemic and non‐epistemic cues (Harris et al., 2018).Preschoolers associate specific faces with trustworthiness and competence (Cogsdill et al., 2014).What the present study adds?Preschoolers infer that trustworthy‐looking characters will behave knowledgeably.Preschoolers do not infer that competent‐looking characters will behave knowledgeably.Children's reliability judgements are influenced by others' appearance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Islamic psychology (IP) community in Europe has recently witnessed a heated debate about the credentials required to participate in the theoretical substantiation of IP and Islamically integrated psychotherapy and counseling. This debate has provided convenient circumstances for Muslim psychologists and Islamic scholars alike to rethink their roles within the flourishing movement. Specifically, the discussions hint toward the importance of adopting a collaborative research methodology for IP, in particular for basic research. The methodology of choice will need to define the necessary qualifications and responsibilities of scholars and psychologists in a collaborative research process (personal collaboration) and evince its capability to appropriately marry knowledge and data, diverging research methods, and perspectives, concepts, and theories from Islamic studies and contemporary psychology (content‐related collaboration). Here, we devise and offer a case illustration of an Islamic Psychology Basic Research Framework (coined the SALAAM Framework). This framework uses the Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies (IIS) Model of Interdisciplinary Research, developed by the IIS at the University of Amsterdam. Our first aim is to appropriate the IIS model for the IP literature by applying the model's research process phases and technique for the integration of disparate bodies of knowledge—that is, the identification of common ground—to methodological approaches in the contemporary IP literature. Our second aim is to exemplify the devised SALAAM Framework using the relatively unexplored area of Islamic cognitive theories (ICTs), which remain underdeveloped in contemporary psychological literature, primarily because of a lack of commensurability with the nomenclature of contemporary psychology. We thus provide a primer on the potential scope of ICTs. Toward the end of this article, we discuss the potential of the project of interdisciplinary construction of Islamic psychological theory, and the ability of the SALAAM Framework to establish a research program in IP that centers on cognition. We finally offer our reflections on the distinctiveness of Islamic psychologies in comparison to mainstream and Christian psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information on the measurement of the effectiveness of knowledge translation interventions in transfusion medicine. The authors examine various methods which can measure use of knowledge. According to authors, clinical indicators of expected health results may include reduction in hospitalizations as well as mortality.

According to intellectualism, knowing how to V is a matter of knowing a suitable proposition about a way of V‐ing. In this paper, I consider the question of which ways of acting might figure in the propositions that intellectualists claim constitute the object of knowledge‐how. I argue that intellectualists face a version of the generality problem—familiar from discussions of reliabilism—as not all ways of V‐ing are such that knowledge about them suffices for knowledge‐how. I consider various responses to this problem and argue that none are satisfactory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent and emerging viewpoints in embodiment and knowledge necessitate a reexamination of epistemology within and beyond the brain. Taking a sociocultural approach, this article covers two main types of epistemology beyond the brain, namely, embodied epistemology and nonindividualist epistemology. Using citizen science and music to illustrate related concepts of intuition, experience, and embodiment, this article describes intuition as a cultural system, beyond a purely individual possession. We describe how—in cultural practices such as music—intuition acts as mediator between knowledge and embodiment, and intuition is built and modified by experience over time. Building on Dick's ( ) notion of “holistic perspectivism,” we pose a holistic epistemology approach that embraces knowledge that extends well beyond the purely cognitive, in both embodied situations and systemic manifestations. As information research becomes increasingly interested in the role of the body and its relationship to information, knowledge, intuition, and memory, we argue that such an approach will uncover further dimensions of nonindividualist, systemic, and embodied knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary memory sciences describe processes that are dynamic and constructive. This has led some philosophers to weaken the relationship between memory and epistemology; though remembering can give rise to epistemic success, it is not itself an epistemic success state. I argue that non-epistemic (causal) theories will not do; they provide neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for remembering that p. I also argue that the shortcomings of the causal theory are epistemic in nature. Consequently, a theory of remembering must account for both its fundamentally epistemic nature and for its constructive and dynamic processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anti-intellectualists about knowledge-how insist that, when an agent S knows how to φ, it is in virtue of some ability, rather than in virtue of any propositional attitudpaes, S has. Recently, a popular strategy for attacking the anti-intellectualist position proceeds by appealing to cases where an agent is claimed to possess a reliable ability to φ while nonetheless intuitively lacking knowledge-how to φ. John Bengson and Marc Moffett and Carlotta Pavese have embraced precisely this strategy and have thus claimed, for different reasons, that anti-intellectualism is defective on the grounds that possessing the ability to φ is not sufficient for knowing how to φ. We investigate this strategy of argument-by-counterexample to the anti-intellectualist's sufficiency thesis and show that, at the end of the day, anti-intellectualism remains unscathed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the connection of skill to knowledge, virtue and intelligent action which are central themes of philosophical inquiry. Topics discussed include the dependence of knowledge on skill, the connection between knowledge and skill in the history of philosophy, theory of the nature of skill, skills as a kind of disposition to know and distinction between skill and virtue.

The aim of this study was to present the functionality and design of nursing care robots as depicted in pictures posted on social media. A netnographic study was conducted using social media postings over a period of 3 years. One hundred and Seventy-two images were analyzed using netnographic methodology. The findings show that nursing care robots exist in various designs and functionalities, all with a common denominator of supporting the care of one's own and others' health and/or well-being as a main function. The results also show that functionality and design are influenced by recent popular sci-fi/cartoon contexts as portrayed in blockbuster movies, for example. Robots'designs seem more influenced by popular sci-fi/cartoon culture than professional nursing culture. We therefore stress that it is relevant for nursing researchers to critically reflect upon the development of nursing care robots as a thoughtful discussion about embracing technology also might generate a range of epistemological possibilities when entering a postmodern era of science and practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Gilbert Ryle's distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that faces a significant challenge: accounting for the unity of knowledge. Jason Stanley, an 'intellectualist' opponent of Ryle's, brings out this problem by arguing that Ryleans must treat 'know' as an ambiguous word and must distinguish knowledge proper from knowledge-how, which is 'knowledge' only so-called. I develop the challenge and show that underlying Ryle's distinction is a unified vision of knowledge as 'a capacity to get things right', covering both knowledge-how and knowledge-that. I show how Ryle specifies the general notion into knowledge-how and knowledge-that and discuss the mutual interdependence exhibited by the two forms of knowledge. Ryle's positive view of knowledge, properly understood, emerges as an important, neglected, alternative which should be brought back into the ongoing conversation about practical and theoretical knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To clinically and contextually implement the theoretical and factual knowledge of care and caring that has been developed in the last 30 years is seen as a great challenge in caring science research. Emphasis has been put on problem-solving research methodologies and action research in hopes of narrowing the divide between caring theory and clinical practice. Thus, the intention is now to further action research towards a hermeneutic approach and to put emphasis on hermeneutic application where theory and praxis become one through human dialogue. This article highlights hermeneutic application research as an alternative methodology within participatory-oriented research which presents a new opportunity to unite clinical practice and caring theory. The aim is to contribute to the development of the hermeneutical application research design in its epistemological, ontological and ethical perspective, by articulating and clarifying the central foundations in the application. On the basis of Gadamer's hermeneutical thinking and Levinas ethical thinking, the central foundations in the application research are ethics, creation of a hermeneutical room, dialogue and common understanding and appropriation and action. When theoretical understanding turns into praxis, knowledge also becomes activity and theory and practice become one. Application thus realises the basic idea that praxis and theory are one, and thus, theory of caring can only become evident and implemented in a clinical practice through moments when the participants find a common understanding and consensus on the knowledge of care and caring. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Open-mindedness is widely valued as an important intellectual virtue. Definitional debates about open-mindedness have focused on whether open-minded believers must possess a particular first-order attitude toward their beliefs or a second-order attitude toward themselves as believers, taking it for granted that open-mindedness is motivated by the pursuit of propositional knowledge. In this article, Rebecca Taylor develops an alternative to knowledge-centered accounts of open-mindedness. Drawing on recent work in epistemology that reclaims understanding as a primary epistemic good, Taylor argues for an expanded account of open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue motivated by the pursuit of both knowledge and understanding. Incorporating understanding allows for a more robust account of open-mindedness that better accommodates common usage, avoids common criticisms, and better explains the widespread acceptance of open-mindedness as an important intellectual virtue. Taylor also identifies the connections between open-mindedness and several other intellectual virtues, including intellectual humility, intellectual courage, and intellectual diligence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examined 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds' understanding of general knowledge (e.g., knowing that clocks tell time) by investigating whether (1) they recognize that their own general knowledge has changed over time (i.e., they knew less as babies than they know now), and (2) such intraindividual knowledge differences are easier/harder to understand than interindividual differences (i.e., Do preschoolers understand that a baby knows less than they do?). Forty‐eight 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds answered questions about their current general knowledge (‘self‐now’), the general knowledge of a 6‐month‐old (‘baby‐now’), and their own general knowledge at 6 months (‘self‐past’). All age groups were significantly above chance on the self‐now questions, but only 5‐year‐olds were significantly above chance on the self‐past and baby‐now questions. Moreover, children's performance on the baby‐now and self‐past questions did not differ. Our findings suggest that younger preschoolers do not fully appreciate that their past knowledge differs from their current knowledge, and that others may have less knowledge than they do. We situate these findings within the research on knowledge understanding, more specifically, and cognitive development, more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Making good decisions depends on having accurate information - quickly, and in a form in which it can be readily communicated and acted upon. Two features of medical practice can help: deliberation in groups and the use of scores and grades in evaluation. We study the contributions of these features using a multi-agent computer simulation of groups of physicians. One might expect individual differences in members' grading standards to reduce the capacity of the group to discover the facts on which well-informed decisions depend. Observations of the simulated groups suggest on the contrary that this kind of diversity can in fact be conducive to epistemic performance. Sometimes, it is adopting common standards that may be expected to result in poor decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Robust Virtue Epistemology ( RVE) maintains that knowledge is achieved just when an agent gets to the truth through, or because of, the manifestation of intellectual virtue or ability. A notorious objection to the view is that the satisfaction of the virtue condition will be insufficient to ensure the safety of the target belief; that is, RVE is no anti-luck epistemology. Some of the most promising recent attempts to get around this problem are considered and shown to ultimately fail. Finally, a new proposal for defending RVE as a kind of anti-luck epistemology is defended. The view developed here turns importantly on the idea that knowledge depends on ability and luck in a way that is gradient, not rigid, and that we know just when our cognitive success depends on ability not rather, but more so, than luck. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Open-mindedness is an under-explored topic in virtue epistemology, despite its assumed importance for the field. Questions about it abound and need to be answered. For example, what sort of intellectual activities are central to it? Can one be open-minded about one's firmly held beliefs? Why should we strive to be open-minded? This paper aims to shed light on these and other pertinent issues. In particular, it proposes a view that construes open-mindedness as engagement, that is, a willingness to entertain novel ideas in one's cognitive space and to accord them serious consideration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Children can selectively attend to various attributes of a model, such as past accuracy or physical strength, to guide their social learning. There is a debate regarding whether a relation exists between theory‐of‐mind skills and selective learning. We hypothesized that high performance on theory‐of‐mind tasks would predict preference for learning new words from accurate informants (an epistemic attribute), but not from physically strong informants (a non‐epistemic attribute). Three‐ and 4‐year‐olds (N = 65) completed two selective learning tasks, and their theory‐of‐mind abilities were assessed. As expected, performance on a theory‐of‐mind battery predicted children's preference to learn from more accurate informants but not from physically stronger informants. Results thus suggest that preschoolers with more advanced theory of mind have a better understanding of knowledge and apply that understanding to guide their selection of informants. This work has important implications for research on children's developing social cognition and early learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT This paper aims at reconstructing the ethical issues raised by Spinoza's early Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. Specifically, I argue that Spinoza takes issue with Descartes' epistemology in order to support a form of 'ethical intellectualism' in which knowledge is envisaged as both necessary and sufficient to reach the supreme good. First, I reconstruct how Descartes exploits the distinction between truth and certainty in his Discourse on the Method. On the one hand, this distinction acts as the basis for Descartes' epistemological rules while, on the other hand, it implies a 'morale par provision' in which adequate knowledge is not strictly necessary to practice virtue. Second, I show that Spinoza rejects the distinction between truth and certainty and thus the methodological doubt. This move leads Spinoza to substitute the Cartesian Cogito with the idea of God as the only adequate standard of knowledge, through which the mind can attain the rules to reach the supreme good. Third, I demonstrate that in the Short Treatise Spinoza develops this view by equating intellect and will and thus maintaining that only adequate knowledge can help to contrast affects. However, I also insist that Spinoza's early epistemology is unable to explain why human beings drop conceive of the idea of God inadequately. Thus, I suggest that in his later writings Spinoza accounts for the insufficiency of adequate knowledge in opposing the power of the imagination and passions by reconnecting the nature of ideas with the mind's conatus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background There has been increasing interest in growth approaches to students' academic development, including value-added models, modelling of academic trajectories, growth motivation orientations, growth mindsets, and growth goals. Aims This study sought to investigate the relationships between implicit theories about intelligence (incremental and entity theories) and growth (personal best, PB) goals - with particular interest in the ordering of factors across time. Sample The study focused on longitudinal data of 969 Australian high school students. Method The classic cross-lagged panel design (using structural equation modelling) was employed to shed light on the ordering of Time 1 growth goals, incremental theories, and entity theories relative to Time 2 (1 year later) growth goals, incremental theories, and entity theories. Results Findings showed that Time 1 growth goals predicted Time 2 incremental theories (positively) and entity theories (negatively); Time 1 entity and incremental theories negatively predicted Time 2 incremental and entity theories respectively; but, Time 1 incremental theories and entity theories did not predict growth goals at Time 2. Conclusion This suggests that entity and incremental theories are negatively reciprocally related across time, but growth goals seem to be directionally salient over incremental and entity theories. Implications for promoting growth goals and growth mindsets are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Habermasian concept of 'interest' has had a profound effect on the characterization of scientific disciplines. Going beyond issues unrelated to the theory itself, intra-theoretical interest characterizes the specific ways of approaching any science-related discipline, defining research topics and methodologies. This approach was developed by Jürgen Habermas in relation to empirical-analytical sciences, historical-hermeneutics sciences, and critical sciences; however, he did not make any specific references to health sciences. This article aims to contribute to shaping a general epistemological framework for health sciences, as well as its specific implications for the medical and nursing areas, via an analysis of the basic knowledge interests developed by Habermas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background Cattell's Gf- Gc distinction is quite generally recognized. However, the developmental part of the Gf- Gc theory of intelligence has not gained the same recognition. Results are inconsistent, but recent discussions emphasize the importance of homogeneity of samples with regard to education and language when investigating the developmental Investment theory. Aims The aim of this study was to investigate the influence of Gf and Gc on the development of knowledge and skills in a sample of children in compulsory school who are homogenous with regard to level of education, age, and cultural background. Sample Totally, 9,002 individuals from the evaluation through follow-up database born in 1972 and who left compulsory school in 1988 were included. These individuals were followed up in Grades 3, 6, and 9. Methods Structural equation modelling was used, and autoregressive path models were fitted. All modelling was performed using Mplus version 6.1. Results In the first step, a path model with a simplex structure was defined. However, a second model with direct relations of Gf on Gc in Grades 6 and 9 had better model fit, suggesting a continuous influence of Gf on Gc. However, no direct influence of Gf was found for the subject grades. Conclusion Due to the continuous influence of Gf on the measures of Gc throughout compulsory school, support for Cattell's (1987) Investment theory was found. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Epistemic curiosity (EC) is the desire to obtain new knowledge capable of either producing positive experiences of intellectual interest (I-type) or of reducing undesirable conditions of informational deprivation (D-type). Although researchers acknowledge that there are individual differences in young children's epistemic curiosity, there are no existing measures to assess the I- and D-type constructs of EC in early childhood. The aim of this study was to develop and validate parent-report scales that reliably assessed early expressions of I- and D- type EC in young children. To develop the I/D-Young Children (I/D-YC) scales, 16 potential items were administered to 316 parents of children aged 3 to 8. These items were adaptations of an existing adult self-report measure of EC as well as newly developed items. Confirmatory factor analyses demonstrated that a 10-item 2-factor (5 I-type, 5 D-type) model had the best fit. Construct validity analyses and psychometric data indicated that our newly developed I/D-YC scales are valid and reliable measures of individual differences in early expressions of I- and D-type EC. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors reflect on how socio-material perspectives on learning and knowledge can be used to overcome dated philosophical assumptions and educated students in more engaging ways. It cites the study "Socio-Material Theory: An Alternate View of Interprofessional Team Learning" by M. Oates. The authors suggest that subjects and disciplines are evolving cultural tools and argue against the assumption that objective and settled truths are being taught.

The metaparadigm concept of person as a core emphasis for nursing theorizing has attracted considerable attention in western literature, but has received less attention in the context of eastern philosophical contexts. In this philosophical inquiry, we sought to clarify the concept of what it is to be a human being according to ideas deriving from Islamic tradition, drawing on concept analysis as general approach to advance an understanding of how nursing within an Islamic context might operationalize metaparadigm conceptualization. Specifically, we considered person as human being on the basis of its definition, attributes/characteristics and boundaries to explore the anatomy of the concept in this context. Our analysis revealed that Islamic thought is relevant to two distinct understandings of the holistic concept of human being. Reciprocal interaction worldview organizes the dimensions of being human (cognitive, emotion, social and spiritual) into a whole. Simultaneous action worldview emphasizes that the human is a coherent and unified creature in harmony with the universe. In Islamic thought, these two worldviews are integrated and operate concurrently. Nurse-patient interactions arising from an integrated perspective that aligns both of these worldviews will allow for informed applications of knowledge to practice and enhanced patient care. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to queer evidence-based practice by troubling the concepts of evidence, knowledge and mental illness. The evidence-based narrative that emerged within biomedicine has dominated health care. The biomedical notion of 'evidence' has been critiqued extensively and is seen as exclusive and limiting, and even though the social constructionist paradigm attempts to challenge the authority of biomedicine to legitimate what constitutes acceptable evidence or knowledge for those experiencing mental illness, biomedical notions of evidence appear to remain relatively intact. Queer theory offers theoretical tools to disrupt biomedical norms and challenges biomedical normativity to indicate how marginalisation occurs when normative truths about mental health classify those who differ from the norm as 'ill' or 'disordered'. Queer theory's emphasis on normativity serves the political aim to subvert marginalisation and bring about radical social and material change. Reference will be made to mental health subjects within each discourse by indicating how the body acts as a vehicle for knowing. Deleuzian notions of the rhizome are used as metaphor to suggest a relational approach to knowledge that does away with either/or positions in either biomedical, or queer knowledge to arrive at a both/and position where the biomedical, constructionist and queer are interrelated and entangled in needing the other for their own evolution. However, queer does not ask for assimilation but celebrates difference by remaining outside to disrupt that which is easily overlooked, assumed to be natural or represented as the norm. The task of queer knowledge is to do justice to the lives lived in the name of evidence-based practice and demands that we consider the relations of power where knowledge is produced. This pursuit creates different knowledge spaces where we identify new intersections that allow for socially just understandings of knowing or evidence to emerge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses several arguments that support the theory of constrastivism. He examines how such arguments were challenged in different ways through published criticisms of constrastivism and outlines its theoretical advantages. However, the author asserts that despite the theoretical benefits of the theory, there are compelling reasons that made it false.

The article focuses on the principles formulated by Dickie, Schroeder and Stalnaker about practical knowledge. It mentions on the objections formulated by Dickie that knowledge is propositional while he defends on the anti-intellectualism of skilled action. It adds that ascription of knowledge is also the result of shifting components and is usually if the highest importance.

The article presents the author's insights on the book "Know How," by Jason Stanley, which is the defense of a thesis that Stanley calls intellectualism. The author states that most of the discussion in epistemology presupposes an intellectualist conception of knowledge wherein knowledge is justified true belief. Furthermore, the putatively Fregean or neo-Fregean notion of a mode of presentation by Gottlob Frege, as Stanley explains it, is discussed.

The article presents information on strategies that nurses can use to retain clinical credibility after being promoted to senior nursing positions including nurse educators and nurse managers. Debates within the nursing profession over what the exact roles of nurses in senior positions should be are discussed. In the article the author offers her opinions on clinical credibility among nurses in senior nursing positions.

This paper raises questions about the epistemological foundations of evidence-based medicine ( EBM). We argue that EBM is based upon reliabilist epistemological assumptions, and that this is appropriate - we should focus on identifying the most reliable processes for generating and collecting medical knowledge. However, we note that this should not be reduced to narrow questions about which research methodologies are the best for gathering evidence. Reliable processes for generating medical evidence might lie outside of formal research methods. We also question the notion of the knower that is assumed by EBM. We argue that EBM assumes an enlightenment conception of knowers as autonomous, substitutable individuals. This conception is troubled by the way that clinicians learn the role of anecdote in health care and the role of patient choice, all of which bring into play features of clinicians and patients as situated individuals with particular backgrounds and experiences. EBM's enlightenment conception of the knower is also troubled by aspects of the way evidence is produced. Given these limitations, we argue that EBM should retain its reliabilist bent, but should look beyond formal research methodologies in identifying processes that yield reliable evidence for clinical practice. We suggest looking to feminist epistemology, with its focus on the standpoints of individual situated knowers, and the role of social context in determining what counts as knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Section 1 articulates a genus-species claim: that knowledge is a kind of success from ability. Equivalently: In cases of knowledge, S's success in believing the truth is attributable to S's ability. That idea is then applied to questions about the nature and value of knowledge. Section 2 asks what it would take to turn the genus-species claim into a proper theory of knowledge; that is, into informative, necessary and sufficient conditions. That question is raised in the context of an important line of objection against even the genus-species claim; namely, that there is no way to understand the attribution relation so that it does all the work that it is supposed to do. Section 3 reviews several extant proposals for understanding the attribution relation, and argues that none of them are adequate for answering the objection. Section 4 proposes a different way of understanding the relation, and shows how the resulting view does resolve the objection. Section 5 completes the new account by proposing a way to understand intellectual abilities. Section 6 briefly addresses Barn Façade cases and lottery propositions. Section 7 briefly addresses a question about the scope of knowledge; in particular, it shows how the new view allows a neo-Moorean response to skepticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Knowledge seems to be a good thing, or at least better than epistemic states that fall short of it, such as true belief. Understanding too seems to be a good thing, perhaps better even than knowledge. In a number of recent publications, Duncan Pritchard tries to account for the value of understanding by claiming that understanding is a cognitive achievement and that achievements in general are valuable. In this paper, I argue that coming to understand something need not be an achievement, and so Pritchard's explanation of understanding's value fails. Next, I point out that Pritchard's is just one of many attempts to account for the value of an epistemic state - whether it be understanding, knowledge, or whatever - by appeal to the notion of achievement or, more generally, the notion of success because of ability. Tentatively, I offer reasons to be sceptical about the prospects of any such account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

NAIRN S. Nursing Inquiry 2012; 19: 6-17 A critical realist approach to knowledge: implications for evidence-based practice in and beyond nursing This paper will identify some of the key conceptual tools of a critical realist approach to knowledge. I will then apply these principles to some of the competing epistemologies that are prevalent within nursing. There are broadly two approaches which are sometimes distinct from each other and sometimes inter-related. On one side, there is the view that all healthcare interventions should be judged on the principles of randomised controlled trials and the other is a preoccupation with language in which healthcare interventions are subjected to a discursive interrogation. These debates are configured through the idea of a hierarchy of knowledge that is accorded uncritical acceptance by some and virulent distaste by others. I will argue that the notion of hierarchy is problematic and is largely argued for in unproductive epistemological terms. What is required is a shift towards a theory that emphasises the contextual nature of the ways that knowledge is produced and disseminated. In other words, there is no single hierarchy of knowledge, but there are multiple hierarchies of knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

DEFORGE R and SHAW J. Nursing Inquiry 2012; 19: 83-95 Back- and fore-grounding ontology: exploring the linkages between critical realism, pragmatism, and methodologies in health & rehabilitation sciences As two doctoral candidates in a health and rehabilitation sciences program, we describe in this paper our respective paradigmatic locations along a quite nonlinear ontological-epistemological-axiological-methodological chain. In a turn-taking fashion, we unpack the tenets of critical realism and pragmatism, and then trace the linkages from these paradigmatic locations through to the methodological choices that address a community-based research problem. Beyond serving as an answer to calls for academics in training to demonstrate philosophical-theoretical-methodological integrity and coherence in their scholarship, this paper represents critical realism and its fore-grounding of a deeply stratified ontology in reflexive relation to pragmatism and its back-grounding of ontology. We conclude by considering the merits and challenges of conducting research from within singular versus proliferate paradigmatic perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article the author comments on views given on his article on knowledge by acquaintance. The author says that the objectual knowledge is knowledge by acquaintance, where acquaintance needs an encounter in experience that allows for a good look at the thing. He also says that knowledge has a nature which partly involves knowledge by acquaintance.

The article reports that there is a common epistemic standard for assertion and practical reasoning. An assertion may be criticised as rude, immoral, imprudent, or irrelevant. Both assertion and practical reasoning may be further criticised on the ground that one is not in a sufficiently good epistemic position to assert the proposition.

The authors comment on the article by Stephen Henry on the video elicitation study investigating tacit clues in doctor-patient interaction published within the journal. The authors cite two ways in which notion of tacit knowledge may be used, noting their objections on Henry's expression of Tacit Knowing, particularly referring to its semi-mysticism. The significant of trust in the doctor-patient relationship and the risk of assimilating tacit knowledge in clinical practice is examined.