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The "Trojan Horse" scandal laid bare an anxiety at the heart of the British security establishment; an anxiety that brings together questions of identity, values, and security within the demand to manage radicalization. It is an anxiety that, I will argue, reveals a novel conceptualization of threat that has driven the UK's security and communities policies within the "war on terror." This conceptualization emerges within Prevent, the UK's counter-radicalization strategy. Yet, I argue, the extensive literature on Prevent has failed to adequately articulate this underlying, core logic. To date, the Prevent literature has effectively demonstrated the ways in which Muslim communities in the United Kingdom have been policed through British counter-radicalization policy. Yet, this analysis struggles to explain the expansion of Prevent into a wider range of "extremist" spaces. In this article, I contend that it is more useful to situate Prevent as a particular conception of power; a logic and an analysis of threat that demands new forms of government intervention. To do so, this article provides a genealogical reading of Prevent, locating it as a radical extension of state security ambitions to intervene early, making explicit a vision of security in which life as a process of becoming is produced as an object of management. The paper draws out the ramifications of this analysis to think through fundamental shifts in the principles and practices of contemporary security aspirations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on UK government counter‐terrorism measures has claimed that Muslims are treated as a 'suspect community'. However, there is limited research exploring the divisive effects that membership of a 'suspect community' has on relations within Muslim communities. Drawing from interviews with British Muslims living in Leeds or Bradford, I address this gap by explicating how co‐option of Muslim community members to counter extremism fractures relations within Muslim communities. I reveal how community members internalize fears of state targeting which precipitates internal disciplinary measures. I contribute the category of 'internal suspect body' which is materialized through two intersecting conditions within preventative counter‐terrorism: the suspected extremist for Muslims to look out for and suspected informer who might report fellow Muslims. I argue that the suspect community operates through a network of relations by which terrors of counter‐terrorism are reproduced within Muslim communities with divisive effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to examine the new Prevent Strategy 2011 in the United Kingdom and critically analyze its impact upon British Muslim communities. The U.K. government's controversial Prevent Strategy 2011 has come under fierce opposition, with critics arguing that it will not actually prevent extremism but risks labeling the Muslim community as a 'suspect' community. Following the British government review of counterterrorism policies and strategies in 2010, the article examines the key question: Will the new Prevent policy actually work? Recent studies show that previous Prevent policies have risked alienating the Muslim community ( Kundnani). Indeed, the new Prevent Strategy 2011 also has the risk of the depoliticization of Muslim communities from wider civic society and risks creating a mosaic for extremist ideologies. The article argues that, in practice, Prevent is not particularly efficacious, and that the new strategy risks further marginalizing and stigmatizing Muslim communities. Related Articles [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the implementation of the UK's ' Prevent Strategy' for countering terrorist risks and threats. Informed by qualitative data, it critically assesses the perception and reception 'on the ground' of Prevent Strategy policies amongst those individuals who are, in many ways, the focus of such interventions. It is found that there are a number of grievances held, though three are of particular concern and revolve around funding issues, confusion of the overarching aims of the strategy, and suspicions of intelligence gathering and spying within Muslim communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]