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Radical changes, up and down, have taken place in the estimates of growth in total factor productivity in the U.S. made by different economists, or by the same economists at different times. If such estimates provide ‘some sort of measure of our ignorance,’ as Abramovitz once put it, we seemed to be a lot less ignorant in 1927 (when Cobb and Douglas published their famous paper), or in 1967 (when Jorgenson and Griliches published theirs), than we were in the years between (when Schmookler, Abramovitz, Kendrick, and Denison completed their studies), or than we are today (when we have, or will soon have, revised estimates by Denison and by Kendrick, and new estimates by Christensen and Jorgenson). Viewed in this perspective, many questions may be raised about the significance of the current estimates that something like a third or more of the rate of increase in U.S. national output is ‘due’ to increase in productivity, as well as about the concepts, data, and methods that underlie the estimates. A list of particular subjects worth considering for research is given and each is briefly discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to measure the impact of investment in education on U.S. economic growth. Education is treated as an investment in human capital, since benefits accrue to an educated individual over a lifetime of activities. One of the most important benefits is higher income from labor market participation. This is the key to understanding the link between investment in education and economic growth. Our most important finding is that investment in human and nonhuman capital accounts for an overwhelming proportion of the growth of the U.S. economy during the postwar period. Educational investment will continue to predominate in the investment requirements for more rapid growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A random walk with drift is a good univariate representation of US GDP. This paper shows, however, that US economic downturns have been associated with predictable short-term recoveries and with changes in long-term GDP forecasts that are substantially smaller than the initial drop. To detect these predictable changes, it is important to use a multivariate time series model. We discuss reasons why univariate representations can miss key characteristics of the underlying variable such as predictability, especially during recessions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The new economic geography (NEG) has become a mainstay of regional science in the last two decades, as signified by the awarding of Paul Krugman, the Nobel Prize. Yet, most American regional scientists and urban/regional economists do not use NEG in determining regional growth patterns. Instead, they rely on factors such as natural amenity migration, whose roots lie back to the work of Philip Graves in the mid 1970s. Conversely, two of the world's leading economic geographers – Allen Scott and Michael Storper – have strongly argued that job availability not household amenities have determined US regional dynamics. Given the disparity of views over the largest developed economy in the world, we hold a competition to determine which of these leading contenders accurately predict US interregional growth dynamics over the last 40–60 years. The runaway winner of the duel is natural amenity led growth with the crown going to Graves. Implications are drawn for both empirical research and EU economic integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents commentary on the address "Long-Term Trends in the Financing of Regulated Industries, 1870-1950," by Melville J. Ulmer, "Trends in Capital Formation and Financing in Agriculture," by Alvin S. Tostlebee, and Sergei Dobrovolsky's "Capital Formation and Financing Trends in Manufacturing and Mining, 1900-1953," all included within the issue addressing the development of the U.S. capital market. The application of the historical data to the development of other countries is discussed, outlining implications of U.S. economic history on general financial theory.

It has become almost a cliché that measured growth in the U.S. is being overstated. The classic on the subject is by Mishan, who argues persuasively that the (uncounted) externalities from production in industrialized economies are overtaking the production which these economies are counting. But externalities are not the only problems in measuring economic activity and economic growth. Two other problems of equal importance, but more amenable to measurement, are the distinction between final and intermediate production, and the quantification of nonmarket productive behavior. In this paper, we concentrate on one aspect of the measurement of nonmarket behavior—the value of production at home by housewives. Specifically, we will present estimates of the value of home based nonmarket production by housewives. These estimates will then be used to supplement various national product aggregates in order to calculate more accurate growth rates for the U.S. economy. We find that the value of nonmarket production by married women during the 1960's has averaged approximately thirty percent of the GNP and close to 40 percent of the national income. The inclusion of the nonmarket work of housewives in GNP would reduce the measured rate of growth of real GNP per potential worker by about ten percent, the exact amount depending on how the value of nonmarket work is estimated. Our estimates indicate a reduction in the absolute rate of growth of almost 0.25 percent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Considerable attention has been devoted in the past to the methodological issues involved in the measurement and explanation of economic growth. Following the method pioneered by Denison and applied by him to the United States and Western Europe, comparative studies have been made of various other countries; that for Japan is of special interest. The present paper extends the analysis to the Soviet Union. In order to preserve comparability, the analysis follows the Denison methodology exactly, and compares the results with those for the United States, Northwest Europe, and Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely reported that productivity growth is the main contributor to economic growth in U.S. agriculture. This article provides estimates of economic growth since World War II and decomposes that growth into the contributions of input growth and productivity growth. The analysis is based on recently revised production accounts, now spanning the 1948-2013 period. Our findings are fully consistent with those reported in the literature; productivity growth dominates input growth as a source of economic growth in the agricultural sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Has the progress of output convergence changed within the United States? This article examines the output convergence among U.S. states for the last five decades by making several improvements over the extant literature. By applying a battery of convergence tests designed to capture nonlinear transitional dynamics to real output per worker data (i.e., nominal values deflated by state-level price), we find that output convergence has not been a feature of the continental United States since the 1970s. Instead, output convergence has proceeded among four subgroups within which constituent states have certain characteristics in common. Our regression analysis suggests that state-level characteristics related to technology and human capital play a crucial role in accounting for the formation and composition of convergence clubs, in agreement with the recent theoretical models of growth and development (e.g., Aghion et al. 2009; Gennaioli et al. 2013b). The level of technology, proxied by patents, turns out to be a consistently significant determinant even after controlling for endogeneity, suggesting that frictions in the diffusion of technology and human capital may have led to clustering of states with different levels of productivity. Our results therefore cast doubt on the common view that diffusion of knowledge and technology across state borders is frictionless. ( JEL O47, O51) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presidents shape the economy; the economy shapes presidencies. Yet analyses of presidential influence over the economy usually examine this interplay through an excessively narrow focus: the ability of presidents to shape short-term economic outcomes, particularly as these affect their own reelection prospects. Here, drawing on work in comparative political economy, we ask about the capacity of presidents to influence long-term economic developments, particularly the degree to which the economy produces broadly distributed growth. Focusing on the transformation of American tax policy over the last generation, we stress the constraints and opportunities that come from 'durable policy coalitions' of partisans, activists, and organized economic interests seeking enduring shifts in governance. We develop this argument in part through a contrast with the influential views of Larry Bartels, who claims that presidents have a powerful immediate impact on economic inequality. We suggest that presidents are generally much more constrained, while attempting to clarify when and how they make a difference. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We evaluate the predictive power of leading indicators for output growth at horizons up to 1 year. We use the MIDAS regression approach as this allows us to combine multiple individual leading indicators in a parsimonious way and to directly exploit the information content of the monthly series to predict quarterly output growth. When we use real-time vintage data, the indicators are found to have significant predictive ability, and this is further enhanced by the use of monthly data on the quarter at the time the forecast is made. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. economic development in the 19th century was characterized by the westward movement of population and the accumulation of productive land in the West. This article presents a model of migration and land improvement to identify the quantitatively important forces driving these phenomena. The conclusion is that the decrease in transportation costs induced the westward migration, whereas population growth was responsible for the investment in productive land. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, Wynne Godley and Bill Martin examine the growing imbalances in the American economy and the threat they pose to continued growth. They argue that America's expansion has been, and, on present policies, will continue to be overly reliant on a rising stock market and falling private net saving. This process is unsustainable. Other countries which have experienced asset price bubbles and abnormally low and falling private saving have all been severely damaged when the process unwound with net savings rising back to and then above their historic norm. Faced with that type of shock, the same fate could easily await the United States unless its policy toward the dollar and the budget responded in a quite remarkable fashion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comments on an article titled "Investment in Education and U.S. Economic Growth," by D.W. Jorgenson and B.M. Fraumeni. Measurement of investment in human capital; Relationship between measures of schooling quality and subsequent attainment; Output of the educational sector.

The issue of U.S. scientific and technological competitiveness has once again gained the attention of policy makers and of the general public. One can hardly pick up a business or trade journal, or listen to a televised report on the economy that does not talk about some new foreign technological innovation or scientific breakthrough that is seen to reflect U.S.' productive decline in the international economy. When competitiveness is overemphasized in scientific and technological activities, it can lead to problems both in the scientific development of knowledge and in the ability to compete economically. This article serves as a reminder that emphasizing competitiveness as a motivational force in scientific and technological development entails both direct and indirect costs.