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Using simulations projecting Chinese economic growth into the future, this paper first examines when China will overtake the USA to become the largest economy. Demographic changes that affect economic growth are taken into consideration in these projections. China is expected to become number one sometime in the mid-2020s, unless its growth rate of gross domestic product per worker declines dramatically, à la the lost decade of Japan. Next, the paper examines whether China becoming the number one economy will mean its currency, the renminbi (RMB), will become the international key currency. According to the basket currency regressions during the period that Chinese currency was gradually appreciating against the US dollar from July 2005 to August 2008, it is shown that the RMB has already acquired a strong influence on the Asian currencies. This shows that the RMB is fast gaining the status of a regional anchor currency for a possible regional joint float. As the Chinese government proceeds with internationalization of its currency, the RMB is expected to gain in the ranking of other aspects of international currency, such as the store of value and the medium of exchange. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research and development (R&D) has a large effect on both state output and total factor productivity in the long run. Our estimates for the private sector of the U.S. states from 1963 to 2007 show that the R&D elasticity averages 0.056-0.143. The implied returns to state Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from R&D spending are 82-211%. There are also positive R&D spillovers, with 70-80% of the total returns accruing to other states. We also find that states with more human capital have higher own- and other-R&D elasticities, and those in lowest tier of economic development have the least own-state R&D elasticity but the highest other-R&D elasticity. In addition, we find that the positive effect of R&D spillovers across states is larger when we consider R&D spillovers across states based on economic similarity of R&D across sectors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives The literature typically undervalues the economy-wide importance of confidence, despite a renewed interest since the recent financial crisis in considering also psychological factors such as confidence. This study empirically assesses whether confidence matters for current real GDP growth in the euro area and the United States in addition to a widely applied and reliable predictor, the Purchasing Managers' Index. Methods We add confidence indicators to a regression of real GDP growth on the composite PMI output index and check for a different impact of confidence during recessions as opposed to expansions by applying smooth transition regressions. Results Confidence matters for economic growth, both in good and bad times. This result is robust across sample periods, models, and proxies for confidence. Conclusions Confidence is essential for assessing the current stage of the business cycle. Analysts should therefore closely monitor sentiment swings, whereas private and public decisionmakers can boost growth by improving confidence in the economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We argue that financial market development contributed to the rise in the skill premium and residual wage inequality in the United States since the 1980s. We present an endogenous growth model with imperfect credit markets and establish how improving the efficiency of these markets affects modes of production, innovation, and wage dispersion between skilled and unskilled workers. The experience of U.S. states following banking deregulation provides empirical support for our hypothesis. We find that wages of skilled workers increased by between 0.5% and 6.3% following deregulation while those of unskilled workers fell by between 3.5% and 8.7%. Similarly, residual (or within-group) inequality increased; the 90-50 percentile ratio of residuals from a Mincerian wage regression and their standard deviation increased by 4.2% and 1.7%, respectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We reconsider the out-of-sample forecasting ability of a large number of financial variables with respect to real output growth over the 1985:1-1999:4 period We show that models including financial variables display almost no forecasting ability relative to an autoregressive benchmark model over this period according to a mean squared forecast error metric. However, tests based on forecast encompassing indicate that many financial variables do, in fact, contain information that is useful for forecasting real output growth over the 1985:1-1999:4 out-of-sample period. Our results suggest that the extant literature exaggerates the demise of the forecasting power of financial variables with respect to real activity since the mid-1980s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]