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In this paper, I claim that live uterus donors ought to be considered for the possibility of compensation. I support my claim on the basis of comparable arguments which have already been applied to gamete donation, surrogacy, and other kinds of organ donation. However, I acknowledge that there are specificities associated with uterus donation, which make the issue of incentive and reward a harder ethical case relative to gamete donation, surrogacy, and other kinds of organ donation. Ultimately, I contend that while reimbursement for the costs incurred by live uterus donors should be treated as a necessary ethical minimum, how much further we ought to remunerate uterus donations remains an open question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evidence suggests that one reason doctors provide certain interventions in assisted reproductive technologies (ART) is because of patient demand. This is particularly the case when it comes to unproven interventions such as 'add‐ons' to in vitro fertilisation (IVF) cycles, or providing IVF cycles that are highly unlikely to succeed. Doctors tend to accede to demands for such interventions because patients are willing to do and pay 'whatever it takes' to have a baby. However, there is uncertainty as to what moral weight should be placed on patient‐led demands in ART, including whether it is acceptable for such demands to be invoked as a justification for intervention. We address this issue in this paper. We start by elucidating what we mean by 'patient‐led demand' and synthesise some of the evidence for this phenomenon. We then argue that a doctor's professional role morality (PRM) yields special responsibilities, particularly in commercialised healthcare settings such as ART, because of the nature of professions as social institutions that are distinct from markets. We argue on this basis that, while there may be reasons (consistent with PRM) for doctors to accede to patient demand, this is not always the case. There is often a gap in justification between acceding to patient‐led demands and providing contested interventions, particularly in commercial settings. As a result, acceding to demand in such settings needs a strong justification to be consistent with PRM. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Novel assisted reproductive technologies (ART) are poised to present our society with strange new ethical questions, such as whether lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) couples should be allowed to produce children biologically related to both parents, or whether trans‐women who want to experience childbirth should be allowed to receive uterine transplants. Clinicians opposed to offering such technologies to LGBT couples on moral grounds are likely to seek legal shelter through the conscience clauses enshrined in U.S. law. This paper begins by briefly discussing some novel ART on the horizon and noting that it is unclear whether current conscience clauses will permit fertility clinics to deny such services to LGBT individuals. A compromise approach to conscience is any view that sees the value of respecting conscience claims within limits. I describe and critique the constraints proposed in the recent work of Wicclair, NeJaime and Siegel as ultimately begging the question. My purpose is to strengthen their arguments by suggesting that in the controversial situations that elicit claims of conscience, bioethicists should engage with the metaphysical claims in play. I argue that conscience claims against LGBT individuals ought to be constrained because the underlying metaphysic—that God has decreed the LGBT lifestyle to be sinful—is highly implausible from the perspective of a naturalized metaphysic, which ought to be the lens through which we evaluate conscience claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent paper published in this journal, Thomas S. Petersen makes a qualified defense of what he calls ‘the Claim from Adoption’, according to which, ‘instead of expending resources on bringing new children [in developed countries] into the world using reproductive technology and caring for these children, we ought to devote these resources to the adoption and care of existing destitute children’. My purpose in this paper is not to discuss Petersen’s argument in favor of that claim. Rather, I want to show that, even if the Claim from Adoption might be, other things being equal, true, it is not true all things considered. What is, all things considered, true is a much more complex set of statements, including a general prima facie obligation to adopt, as well as an obligation by the state of developed countries to discourage procreation and promote adoption of destitute children. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reproductive tourism is a manifestation of a larger, more inclusive trend toward globalization of capitalist cultural and material economies. This paper discusses the development of cross-border assisted reproduction within the globalized economy, transnational and local structural processes that influence the trade, social relations intersecting it, and implications for the healthcare systems affected. I focus on prevailing gender structures embedded in the cross-border trade and their intersection with other social and economic structures that reflect and impact globalization. I apply a social connection model of responsibility for unjust outcomes and consider strategies to counter structural injustices embedded in this industry. The concluding section discusses policy reforms and proposals for collaborative action to preclude further injustices and extend full human rights to all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Innovation is a key driver of care provision in assisted reproductive technologies (ART). ART providers offer a range of add‐on interventions, aiming to augment standard in vitro fertilization protocols and improve the chances of a live birth. Particularly in the context of commercial provision, an ever‐increasing array of add‐ons are marketed to ART patients, even when evidence to support them is equivocal. A defining feature of ART is hope—hope that a cycle will lead to a baby or that another test or intervention will make a difference. Yet such hope also leaves ART patients vulnerable in a variety of ways. This article argues that previous attempts to safeguard ART patients have neglected how the use of add‐ons in commercial ART can exploit patients' hopes. Commercial providers of ART should provide add‐ons only free of charge, under a suitable research protocol. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: The aim of this study was to address current gaps in knowledge regarding the appropriateness and quality of counselling provided to egg donors in the UK. Methods: The present study used a cross‐sectional, qualitative design. Semi‐structured interviews were carried out with 29 UK egg donors to explore their experiences of egg donation and the counselling received. Results: Of the 29 participants, 24 had received counselling. The remaining five did not receive counselling because they were either not accepted as a donor (n = 4) or were offered, but chose not to take up the session (n = 1). The findings are presented in relation to five themes: feeling supported via counselling; feeling well‐informed; welcoming an individualised approach; the counselling setting; and thinking about the future. Conclusion: Egg donors in this study had varying experiences of counselling offered to them as part of the egg donation process in the UK. Implications: The findings indicate that there are some aspects of counselling in the UK that could be improved, including the routine offering of counselling throughout the egg donation process and the tailoring of counselling to meet egg donors' individual needs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because many involuntarily childless people have equal interests in benefitting from assisted reproductive technologies like in vitro fertilization as a mode of treatment, we have normative reasons to ensure inclusive access to such interventions for as many of these people as is reasonable and possible. However, the prevailing eligibility criterion for access to assisted reproductive technologies—'infertility'—is inadequate to serve the goal of inclusive access. This is because the prevailing frameworks of infertility, which include medical and social infertility, fail to precisely capture and unify the relevance of certain involuntarily childless experiences as warranting assisted reproductive technology (ART) treatment. I argue that the least we can do for those who have an interest in accessing ARTs is to conceptualize involuntarily childless experiences in dialogue with interactionist and ecological models of disability, to outline a unified and more inclusive eligibility criterion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

New biotechnologies such as assisted conception are socially embedded artefacts that raise context‐specific ethical, moral and social anxieties. In contexts where the regulations of these profitable developments are limited or ambiguous, and competition between private facilities is high, individual doctors become morally and socially responsible for determining the parameters of administering such therapies. Ethnographic research at two private fertility centres in Colombia reveals that doctors do not determine boundaries based on monetary gain but rather personal morals, social norms and professional obligations. Medical professionals hold diverse perceptions of assisted conception, and often struggle to make decisions regarding who should access such therapies, who are ideal gamete donors and the fate of extra embryos. The complexity of these perceptions applied in a context of limited regulation and the competition of private medicine impacts the praxis of assisted conception. As doctors determine the boundaries of their practice they not only create variation between clinical practices, but also make moral decisions regarding who should be parents, how families should be formed and the significance of embryos. Thus, in navigating their everyday practices, doctors also shape the social world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent article in this journal, Abram Brummett argues that new and future assisted reproductive technologies will provide challenging ethical questions relating to lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) persons. Brummett notes that it is likely that some clinicians may wish to conscientiously object to offering assisted reproductive technologies to LGBT couples on moral or religious grounds, and argues that such appeals to conscience should be constrained. We argue that Brummett's case is unsuccessful because he: does not adequately interact with his opponents' views; equivocates on the meaning of 'natural'; fails to show that the practice he opposes is eugenic in any non‐trivial sense; and fails to justify and explicate the relevance of the naturalism he proposes. We do not argue that conscience protections should exist for those objecting to providing LGBT people with artificial reproductive technologies, but only show that Brummett's arguments are insufficient to prove that they should not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: Fetuses conceived by assisted reproductive technology (ART) and those that are small-for-gestational age (SGA) show cardiovascular remodeling in utero; however, these two conditions are often associated. We aimed to evaluate the differential effect of ART and SGA on fetal cardiac remodeling.Methods: This was a prospective cohort study of term singleton pregnancies seen at our department between April 2011 and September 2013. The cohort was divided according to fetal growth and mode of conception into the following four groups: 102 appropriate-for-gestational-age (AGA) fetuses conceived spontaneously (controls), 72 AGA fetuses conceived by ART (ART-AGA), 31 SGA fetuses conceived by ART (ART-SGA) and 28 SGA fetuses conceived naturally (Spont-SGA). SGA was defined as birth weight < 10th centile. Fetal echocardiography was performed at 28-32 weeks to assess cardiac dimensions, geometry and function.Results: ART fetuses had dilated atria (mean left atrium-to-heart area ratio: controls, 15 ± 2.7%; ART-AGA, 18 ± 4.1%; Spont-SGA, 14 ± 3.7%) and more globular ventricles (left ventricular sphericity index: controls, 1.77 ± 0.2; ART-AGA, 1.68 ± 0.2; Spont-SGA, 1.72 ± 0.2), with normally sized hearts. In contrast, SGA fetuses had enlarged hearts (cardiothoracic ratio: controls, 24 ± 3%; ART-AGA, 24 ± 4%; Spont-SGA, 29 ± 6%), preserved atrial size, more globular and concentric hypertrophic ventricles (left ventricle relative wall thickness: controls, 0.48 ± 0.17; ART-AGA, 0.54 ± 0.13; Spont-SGA, 0.63 ± 0.23). Both ART and SGA fetuses had decreased longitudinal motion (tricuspid annular ring displacement: controls, 6.5 ± 0.8 mm; ART-AGA, 5.5 ± 0.7 mm; Spont-SGA, 5.9 ± 0.6 mm) and impaired relaxation (left isovolumetric relaxation time: controls, 47.0 ± 7.3 ms; ART-AGA, 50.0 ± 7.9 ms; Spont-SGA, 49.5 ± 9.3 ms). ART-SGA fetuses presented a combination of features from both ART and SGA groups.Conclusion: SGA and conception with ART were associated with distinct patterns of fetal cardiac remodeling, supporting the concept that they are independent causes of cardiac programming. Copyright © 2016 ISUOG. Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]