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The article presents a discursive analysis of Great Britain's Conservative Party 2011 Green Paper "One World Conservatism: A Conservative agenda for international development." It offers a comparison of the conception of development in that paper with the 1997 Labour Party White Paper which launched the development of the Department for International Development (DFID). The discourse used to describe Britain's role in promoting global development and reducing poverty is examined.

Copyright of Regional Science Policy & Practice is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article deals with the implementation of the rule by the Advisory Council on Public Records under the provisions of the Public Records Act of 1967 in Great Britain. Most contemporary historians saw the First World War as a historical watershed from which time onwards the activity and potential role of governments in influencing British economic and social development were much enhanced. As a result, particular areas of historical research, such as diplomatic history and historical studies of social and economic policy, were given enormous stimulus. For all historians access to records is essential. New records are almost always welcome and any restriction on access to information is generally deplored or regretted. In the initial euphoria at the release of so much new material comparatively little attention was paid to the status of the public records as research evidence. In 1970, however, doyen of British interwar historians, the late G. L. Mowat, referred to a part of the new material with characteristic shrewdness.

This paper revisits the UK productivity puzzle using new data on outputs and inputs and clarifying the role of output mismeasurement, input growth and industry effects. Our data indicate an implied labour productivity gap of 13 percentage points in 2011 relative to the productivity level on pre‐recession trends. We find that: (a) the labour productivity puzzle is a TFP puzzle, since it is not explained by the contributions of labour or capital services; (b) the reallocation of labour between industries deepens rather than explains the puzzle (i.e. there has been a reallocation of hours away from low‐productivity industries and toward high productivity industries); (c) capitalization of R&D does not explain the productivity puzzle; (d) assuming increased scrapping rates since the recession, a 25% (50%) increase in depreciation rates post‐2009 can potentially explain 15% (31%) of the productivity puzzle; (e) industry data show that 35% of the TFP puzzle can be explained by weak TFP growth in the oil & gas and finance sectors; and (f) cyclical effects via factor utilization could potentially explain 17% of the productivity puzzle. Continued weakness in finance would suggest a future lowering of TFP growth to around 0.8% p.a. from a baseline of 0.9% p.a. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the dynamic relationship between interest rates, inflation and economic growth using a long dataset for the UK. The approach adopted enables us to identify structural breaks in the dynamic system (vector autoregression (VAR)). We find interest rates respond much more strongly to growth and inflation over recent decades, and forecast error variance decomposition analysis indicates there is increasing interconnectedness between the variables in recent years. Economic policymakers need to carefully monitor the linkages between these variables and be prepared to adjust their monetary policy tools when faced with structural changes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is concerned with the estimation of an econometric model designed to test the Modigliani-Miller (henceforth MM) hypothesis. The primary interest is not in the theoretical validity of the hypothesis. The major sources of theoretical disagreement with Modigliani and Miller arise from the key role they impute to the arbitrage process and the effect of leverage on the expected value of the returns to equity through the increased probability of bankruptcy. These issues have occasioned a number of important contributions in recent years (see especially [2] and [23]). The first section of the paper provides a skeletal outline of the MM hypothesis and discusses the problems of formulating an appropriate econometric model. In the second section an econometric model is developed, which, while drawing on the ideas of several
1 This study is part of a continuing program of research into company financial behavior financed by a grant from the Social Science Research Council. I am indebted to Mrs. Eileen Sutcliffe of the Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of York, and Milton Chen of New York University for assistance with data collection and computer processing, and to the personnel of the SRC Atlas Computer, Chilton, the University of York Computer Center and the New York University School of Commerce Computer Center.
2 References in square brackets are listed on pp. 161-2, below.
3 In terms of the implicit aggregation procedures, the old Liquidity-Preference/ Loanable-Funds controversy has yet to be satisfactorily resolved.
different writers, has certain elements of originality in the way it seeks to incorporate growth and leverage. Finally, in the third section the results of the econometric tests are evaluated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As Arbo and Benneworth (2007) have alerted us, higher education institutions are now expected not only to conduct education and research, but also to play an active role in the development of their economic, social and cultural surroundings. They call this the ‘regional mission’ of HEIs. This paper is concerned with cultural engagement. Research on universities’ cultural engagement in their regions and the impact of that engagement is still in its infancy, partly because there are different understandings of ‘culture’ and of what ‘engagement’ entails. In this paper, qualitative data from the reports of mixed teams of academics and regional administrators involved in a large international project designed to improve universities’ regional engagement are analysed and discussed. The on-going study — PASCAL Universities' Regional Engagement (PURE) — investigates the role of HEIs in their regions across in a variety of fields such as the economy, community development, the environment and others. This article analyses the data from the study to identify the different perspectives universities and regions have of cultural engagement. The aim here is to demonstrate the value of PURE in facilitating the development of mutual understanding both between universities through a common language and between universities and their regions in respect of mutual expectations. For example, particularly difficult to de-construct is universities’ engagement with disadvantaged communities (Doyle, 2007) but Powell's (2009) work suggests that universities might engage more broadly and effectively ‘through better knowledge sharing and co-creation with business and community partners’ to become ‘real drivers of creative change in developing socially inclusive projects’. Others have written about the educational role of universities in developing a ‘lifelong learning culture’ in their region (European Universities’ Charter on Lifelong Learning, 2008). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Numerous Acts of Parliament changed the financing of transport infrastructure in eighteenth-century England. This paper examines the economic effects of turnpike acts, which greatly improved road infrastructure by introducing tolls. It shows that turnpike trusts increased property income in local areas by at least 20 per cent. The findings shed light on why local property owners promoted and managed turnpikes. They also show that turnpike trusts accounted for at least 20 per cent of the total growth in real land rents between 1690 and 1815, and added at least 1.65 per cent to national income in 1815. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research on local and regional economic development has focused upon transformations in local governance and institutional capacity. It has been argued that local authorities have ceded power to other actors and institutions involved in economic development and regeneration, and that the success of local and regional economic development is closely related to the strength of ‘institutional capacity’ within an area. In this paper, we examine these claims with reference to the operation of EU Structural Funds in the Humber Sub-region of the UK. Previous research on local governance and institutional capacity has had a limited empirical focus, drawing conclusions from studies of either economically ‘successful’ regions or regions undergoing regulatory and institutional transformation and precluding analysis of the nature and conditions of local governance and institutional capacity in less developed regions. Our case study evidence not only suggests that arguments about the declining influence of the local state are overdrawn, but also indicates a need for more nuanced accounts of the role of institutional capacity in regional development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The reforms instituted by the Broadcasting Act 1990 led to a period of turbulence and upheaval within broadcasting with results that were at best unintended and, at worst, seriously undermined the ideal of public service broadcasting. A Hayekian economic perspective would suggest that the reforms failed because they did not go far enough in the direction of full `marketization'. The paper develops an alternative perspective, based on an adaptation of systems theory within the context of law and economics. This approach offers a broader methodological foundation for the understanding of `economic law' and a different normative perspective on the broadcasting reforms. It is suggested that the difficulty with these reforms was not their failure to go further in the direction of the market, but rather their lack of clarity in articulating a clear alternative to the market as the basis for the organization of television production. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article paper is concerned with the similarity of the growth performance of the British economy during the nineteen-twenties and nineteen-thirties and with the usefulness of the "new-old" industry dichotomy in illuminating the trends of the inter-war period. The inter-war years emerge as a period of growth almost as rapid as any of comparable length in British measured history. The exact rating of the performance naturally varies slightly with the growth criterion adopted and the termini used for the other periods; the simplest way to establish the validity of the conclusion and at the same time leave it open to the reader's judgment is to draw in the inter-war trends on the Matthews graph. The similarity of the growth performance in the nineteen-twenties and nineteen-thirties is largely maintained even when activity is divided into Goods production and Service production. Services get their unity partly from their physical intangibility as final products, partly from supposed differences in income demand elasticities or productivity improvement possibilities, partly, and increasingly, from the statistical difficulties of arriving at satisfactory real output series.

Late Victorian Britain was very important in the development of British dominance in light consumer goods industries, such as fermented liquors and spirits; detergents and perfumery; bicycles and other carriages; paper, stationery, and bookbinding; and games of all kinds and sports goods. Firms developed technology-based innovations and marketing-based innovations, creating abnormal peaks of trademark registrations in certain industries. This article investigates those peaks and shows that factors usually pointed out as explaining British economic decline in heavy industries did not impact on the development of light consumer goods industries, and on the contrary encouraged their fast growth during this period. Trademark registrations are shown to provide new insights into the debate on British relative decline, when combined with other industry and firm-level data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of the change in individual earnings has occurred at the top. This paper provides new evidence about the earnings distribution in the UK. The evidence is new in that it provides detail about what has happened within the top 10%, covering groups such as the top 1% and the top 0.5%. The aim is to set the recent rise in top earnings in historical perspective, and to make international comparisons. The evidence is new in that it covers the whole of the postwar period, allowing a contrast to be drawn with the 'golden age' of the 1950s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines major privately owned British railway companies before the First World War. Quantitative evidence is presented on return on capital employed (ROCE), total factor productivity (TFP) growth, cost inefficiency, and speed of passenger services. There were discrepancies in performance across companies but ROCE and TFP typically fell during our period. Cost inefficiency rose before 1900 but then was brought under control as a profits collapse loomed. Without the discipline of either strong competition or effective regulation, managerial failure was common. This sector is an important qualification to the conventional wisdom that late Victorian Britain did not fail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research investigates the characteristics of 354 directors of Britain's largest companies. Three sections of independent variables were analysed: those relating to the economic environ; those relating to the domestic environ—family background and educational experiences; those relating to self-concept. Directors were categorized according to the economic performance of their industries—GOGOs (industries in growth); YOYOs (industries in turbulence); and DODOs (industries in decline). Several differences emerged between the characteristics of directors and the economic success of their industries for which they were strategically influential. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to investigate appropriate methods of modelling the business cycle theory of trade union growth, and to develop and estimate a specification of the business cycle model. In so doing, the paper draws on the important pioneering work of Bain and Elsheikh (1976) for the United Kingdom. (The results of extension of the Bain and Elsheikh model to 1980 are shown in Appendix A.). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to provide additional empirical evidence on the hypothesis that only unanticipated money growth affects real variables by applying a framework similar to Barro's to the United Kingdom. Differences in institutional arrangements between the United States and United Kingdom preclude an exact replication of Barro's model.
Before proceeding to test the hypothesis that only unanticipated money growth has real effects, movements in money supply growth must first be decomposed into expected and unexpected components. Accordingly, Section II presents our specification of the policy rule for money supply growth for the United Kingdom from 1946-1977. Measures of anticipated and unanticipated money supply growth also are presented. Sections III and IV examine the empirical relationships between unanticipated money growth and two real variables: the unemployment rate and real output, respectively. Section V is devoted to an investigation of the relationship between unanticipated money growth and the price level. The conclusions of the paper are presented in Section VI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a restatement of the economists N.F.R. Crafts and C.K. Harley's views on the output growth and the British industrial revolution. Authors stress that the considerable volume of work since their original papers does not provide any serious quantitative challenge to their main findings nor does it go any distance towards reinstating economists P. Deane and W.A. Cole's view, which was the previous orthodoxy. The authors accept that measurement of growth yields only a range of best guess estimates. Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate the degree of uncertainty. The authors have made revisions to their earlier estimates in the course of the paper; these are generally fairly small and tend to reduce slightly the estimated growth rates. They demonstrate that total factor productivity estimation is much less problematic than the critics claim. They also accept that their approach to the industrial revolution has been shaped by the pursuit of particular questions and that other approaches are both valid and potentially important. Finally, they reaffirm the importance of the industrial revolution as an historical discontinuity.

The Glorious Revolution has been linked with Britain's economic development in the eighteenth century. This article argues that it contributed to the early transport revolution. First, it shows that the regulatory environment became more favourable for undertakers, with their rights being better protected. Second, it shows that investment in improving roads and rivers increased substantially in the mid-1690s shortly after the Glorious Revolution. Regression analysis and structural breaks tests confirm that there was a change in investment even after controlling for other determinants of investment. The results have implications for debates on the role of political change in British economic growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using industry data for the United States and the United Kingdom, we provide new evidence on the impact of information and communications technology (ICT) capital on real output growth. The traditional industry panel data analysis fails to find a positive contribution. We argue that this is due to heterogeneity across industries, particularly in the time dimension. Pooling the data for the two countries and using a dynamic panel data estimation method yield a positive and significant effect of ICT on output growth. Individual country estimates suggest a strong impact in the United States, while results are less conclusive in the United Kingdom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kaldor (1966) asserted that the slow rate of economic growth of the United Kingdom was due mainly to the shortage of labor resulting from "economic maturity". Kaldor (1975), in a subsequent comment on Rowthorn's (1975a) article, abandoned this reasoning and presented the strict Verdoorn law as
(1) p=+q with >0
and his own presentation of Verdoorn's law as
(2) e=+q with 0<<1 and e=q-p
where p is the rate of growth of productivity, q is the rate of growth of output, e is the rate of growth of employment, and ,, and are parameters.
The main purpose of this paper is to argue that both sets of results are subject to simultaneous equations bias and that mis-specification of estimated equations leads to incorrect estimates and wrong conclusions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been much speculation about the meaning of the residual factor in economic growth. Few economists would defend it as a perfect measure of technical change, preferring to hedge their bets by describing it as part of the growth of output not explained by the growth in the labour force and capital accumulation. Others have been more forceful in their opposition claiming that the residual merely shows the degree of our inability to measure accurately, and the omission of relevant variables, and have demonstrated their views. The view of the present author is that, while the residual when properly measured must theoretically be zero, a detailed examination of the residual as normally measured is useful in providing information on the causes of economic growth and possibly thereby producing policy implications for raising the growth rate. Therefore, this paper seeks to establish how much of the residual can be explained by incorrect measurement and specification, and to see what implications for policy, if any, can be drawn. The analysis is carried out for Great Britain. Manufacturing over the period 1956-65 and provides estimates of the residual at successive stages of purity.

The long relative decline of Great Britain's industrial economy has produced a voluminous literature, both polemical and academic, seeking to illuminate its causes. Recent contributions have stressed the deleterious effects of inappropriate and inconsistent government policies, in particular the deadweight of an inefficient public sector, and the contempt for industrial production on the part of a Treasury-dominated civil service elite obsessed with macroeconomic issues. They have also cited the anti-modernization ethos of the post-1945 political consensus. In a longer term perspective great stress has also been laid on the socio-cultural environment antipathetic to the industrial spirit, which, supposedly, had animated the business and investing classes in the pre-1850 phases of industrialization. The purpose of this paper is to examine the validity of the new institutional approach as an explanation of Great Britain's relative economic decline in the twentieth century. The discussion will focus on economists B. Elbaum and W. Lazonick thesis as a reference point for assessing alternative formulations of institutional rigidities.

The article criticizes the exchange rate crisis of July 1917 in Great Britain. Interest in economist J.M. Keynes has, not unnaturally, centered on the development of his theories and their influence on policy-makers and the years before 1919 have not attracted the same attention as the later period. It has been taken for granted that the practical problems of the war years must have influenced Keynes's development. Keynes's main duties during the war were concerned with external finance, essential in particular to Britain's overseas purchases. In this capacity he had to come to terms with Britain's growing dependence on the U.S. and the influence that the latter could bring to bear on the British exchange rate. It has been noted that Keynes was deeply committed to the policy of the peg, that is, to paying out the gold necessary to keep up the exchange rate of the pound against the dollar; this contrasts with the attitude he assumed in the 1920s against the return to the gold standard at the prewar parity of 4.86.

The article presents abstracts of issue articles on topics including demographic findings of China's 2010 census, the relation between economic development and child malnutrition in sub-Saharan Africa, and the relation between educational attainment and cohabitation in Great Britain.

The article discusses the method of control of capital issues adopted by Great Britain. The author states that an increasing number of economists have focused their interest on the problems associated with secular acceleration. These problems include a long-run tendency for planned investment to exceed planned savings, rather than on the main concern of the 1930's, which was secular stagnation. The article also discusses the scope of controls, the argument of the "bonus-issue," and problems with hiring and purchasing.

Abstract: Clark's claims about the scale of English agricultural output from the 1200s to the 1860s flout historical and geographical reality. His income‐based estimates start with the daily real wages of adult males and assume that days worked per year were constant. Those advanced in British economic growth make no such assumption and instead are built up from the output side. They correlate better with population trends and are consistent with an economy slowly growing and becoming richer. Clark's denial that such growth occurred, his assertion that substantially more land must have been under arable cultivation, his belief that conditions of full employment invariably prevailed in the countryside at harvest time, his concern that the wage bill would have exceeded the value of output in British economic growth, his refusal to consider the possibility that the working year was of variable length, and his assertion that output per acre must have been equalized across arable and pasture are all shown to be figments of his ‘Malthus delusion’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A review of several articles for the period 400-1100 AD is presented including one by Naismith on currency, link social and economic developments among the English, one by Lane on urban life at Wroxeter into the 6th and 7th centuries, and one by Lavelle on the policy of King Eadwig.

Rapid expansion of the labour supply and robust business investment means that potential output is likely to have grown strongly last year. Therefore, based upon the latest data for GDP, we estimate that the output gap only narrowed very slightly in 2014, ending the year at 4% of potential output., The prospects for potential output growth are favourable, with the labour supply set to be boosted by sustained strength in inward migration and the staged increase in the State Pension Age, and robust growth in business investment continuing to deepen the capital stock., This will provide the conditions for relatively strong growth and low inflation over the medium term, with GDP growth expected to average 2.6% a year from 2015-19. This is some way below the average of the decade prior to the financial crisis, but it would represent a clear step up on the average growth rate achieved between 2007-14., Our estimate of the output gap is much larger than that of the OBR. This suggests that the UK's structural deficit is smaller and that the degree to which fiscal policy needs to be tightened may not be as great as the OBR estimates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses newspaper advertisements to chart the changes in speeds and fares of stage coaches, identifying the main periods of increasing speeds among London coaches as the 1760s-80s and 1810s-20s, separated by a period when speeds declined. It then measures productivity growth. Fares of London coaches in 1835-6 were about 27 per cent of what they would have been but for improvements in horses, vehicles, and roads from 1750, and the two main periods of productivity growth correspond to those of rising speeds. Speeds and productivity of regional coaches increased more smoothly. The rising productivity firmly identifies road transport as one of the modernizing sectors of the economy. New figures are put forward for the growing number of London and regional coaches, indicating rapid growth in passenger miles. While turnpike trusts had little impact before the 1750s, their increasing effectiveness, together with the use of steel springs and improved horses, was crucial to the rising productivity of the 1760s-80s, and even more so to that of the 1810s-20s. The cross roads were apparently poorer than London roads in the late eighteenth century, but thereafter the gap narrowed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic growth and change in eighteenth-century Britain, both the expansion of pre-industrial commercial society and the industrial revolution itself, have been explored using a variety of approaches. This article highlights a relatively ignored aspect of the problem, arguing that the state, politics, and political economic ideology played a central role. In particular, the early eighteenth-century political victory of a version of political economy associated with the Whig party, which centred on manufacturing and consumption, was a prerequisite for the economic developments later in the century. The article begins by describing a political economy of manufacturing and its rival, a political economy of re-exporting associated with the Tory party. It then explains how and why a political economy of manufacturing became dominant, examining both political elites and ordinary voters and petitioners. The growth of manufacturing and consumption must be understood, therefore, as political as much as economic events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The imposition of the world's first modern income tax in 1799 prompted a revival of interest in national accounting. This article examines the extent to which William Pitt the Younger, who proposed the new tax, modelled his estimates of national wealth on those produced a century earlier by the pioneers in this field, Sir William Petty, Charles Davenant, and Gregory King. In addition, the calculations of Benjamin Bell and Henry Beeke, two of Pitt's contemporaries, are analysed in detail to highlight the fragility of these contemporary estimates of national income. This analysis has important implications for economic historians who have used this material to try to establish the structure and growth of national output. National accountants during the long eighteenth century were not, for the most part, concerned with structural change. Rather, their descriptions of economic structure should be understood as reflecting a particular set of a priori claims about what they deemed to be the proper mode and distribution of taxation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the composition and geographies of individual wealth holding in England and Wales in the late nineteenth century. It draws on various forms of death duty records to determine the individual ownership of wealth including both personal property and real estate. By combining information on these different kinds of property, it is possible to explore how different strata of wealth holders accumulated specific forms of wealth at the time of their death. The article then examines how the composition of that wealth varied according to the wealth holder's location in the urban hierarchy and distance from London. It points out important geographical differences in both the scale and nature of wealth holding and raises questions about the implications of these findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rapid rise of England's colonial commerce in the late seventeenth century expanded the nation's resource base, stimulated efficiency improvements across the economy, and was important for long-term growth. However, close examination of the interests at play in England's Atlantic world does not support the Whiggish view that the Glorious Revolution played a benign role in this story. In the decades after the Restoration, the cases of the Royal African Company and the Spanish slave trade in Jamaica are used to show that the competition between Crown and Parliament for control of regulation constrained interest groups on either side in their efforts to capture the profits of empire. Stuart 'tyranny' was not able to damage growth and relatively competitive (and peaceful) conditions underpinned very rapid increases in colonial output and trade. The resolution of the rules of the Atlantic game in 1689 allowed a consolidated state better to manipulate and manage the imperial economy in its own interests. More secure rent-seeking enterprises and expensive wars damaged growth and European rivals began a process of catch-up. The Glorious Revolution was not sufficient to permanently halt economic development but it was sufficient to slow progress towards industrial revolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers an examination of the patterns and motivations behind parish apprenticeship in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century London. It stresses continuity in outlook from parish officials binding children, which involved placements in both the traditional and industrializing sectors of the economy. Evidence on the ages, employment types, and locations of 3,285 pauper apprentices bound from different parts of London between 1767 and 1833 indicates a variety of local patterns. The analysis reveals a pattern of youthful age at binding, a range of employment experiences, and parish-specific links to particular trades and manufactures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a long-term growth outlook for Great Britain. It states that there was a potential output growth due to several factors such as net inflows of migrants, a decrease in the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU), and shift to high value-added sectors. It notes the existence of a link between demand shifts and NAIRU changes via hysteresis, profile changes in age affecting a potential output growth, and growth from capital stock expansion.

We analyze the impact of volatility per se on real exports for a small open economy concentrating on Irish trade with the United Kingdom and the United States. An important element is that we take account of the time lag between the trade decision and the actual trade or payments taking place by using a flexible lag approach. Rather than adopting a single measure of risk, we adopt a spectrum of risk measures and detail varied size characteristics and statistical properties. We find that the ambiguous results found to date may be due to not taking account of the timing effect, which varies substantially depending on which volatility measure is used. ( JEL C32, C51, F14, F31) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents forecasts on the economic recovery and growth in Great Britain through 2006. Performance of gross national product in the third quarter of 2003; Comparison of growth in the U.S. and in Britain in the 1990s; Level of demand for exports in continental Europe.

Copyright of Canadian Journal of Economics is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Presents a study which developed tests for multiple forecast encompassing which are robust to properties expected in the forecast errors and applied the tests to forecasts of growth and inflation in Great Britain. Importance of forecast evaluation; Conclusion.

Copyright of Population & Development Review is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Population & Development Review is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Sterling has now appreciated by over 25% since the second half of 1996. A key issue affecting the UK economy is the extent to which this will reduce growth this year and in 1999. When can we expect to see the net trade position deteriorate and to what extent? In this article, Paul Robson and James Nixon argue that business survey evidence implies that the current strength of Sterling is likely to lead to falling manufacturing exports over the course of this year. This combined with increased import penetration should be sufficient to cool the economy and remove the need for a further interest rate rise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports on the campaign for companies in Great Britain to adopt employee participation schemes to gain a competitive edge. The establishment of an environment of mutual trust can secure loyalty and commitment to the goals of the organization. The Trades Union Congress has stated that securing the motivation of employees as a requirement for economic success does not provide a framework.

This article focuses on the impact of economic conditions on the industrial relations in Great Britain. The year 1988 was a year of strong economic growth. Most macroeconomic forecasts at the end of 1987, including those of the Treasury. had been anticipating a significant slowdown of economic expansion in the year to come. Outside the labour market, inflation began to rise somewhat by the mid-year and the current account of the balance of payments went steadily deeper into deficit. Most of the labour market indicators in 1988 show a continuation of trends that started earlier and accelerated in 1987. The rate of decline in unemployment seems to have peaked in the second half of 1987 but was still high in 1988, unemployment is estimated to have fallen by almost 360,000, nearly 12 per cent of the total, in the first ten months of 1988. Firm official estimates for the number of self-employed go upto June 1987. Estimates for more recent periods are based on the assumption that the average rate of increase between 1981 and 1987 has continued.

This article explores why Great Britain became an industrialized and urbanized economy long before France. On the eve of the Great War, agriculture, according to official censuses of population, continued to provide employment for up to 41 per cent of the workforce in France and generated around 35 per cent of the country's national income. In Britain only 8 per cent of the workforce could be officially classified as employed on the land, and agriculture accounted for a mere 5 per cent of gross domestic product. Around 1911, 35 per cent of the population of France resided in towns containing populations of 3,000 and above, while the comparable proportion for Britain was 78 per cent. Structural change in France was in large measure predetermined by a combination of geographical endowments and a system of property rights inherited from its feudal past. Both constraints, operating within the context of pre-chemical and pre-mechanical agricultural systems, so limited the scale and scope of French endeavours to follow the path taken by Britain between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, became almost irrelevant to conditions in France.

The article explores the historical origins of the depressed areas in Great Britain before 1914. The depressed areas are those regions of Britain whose persistent economic difficulties have, for most of this century, constituted the regional problem. This is examined through an analysis of alternative sources of early regional unemployment statistics. Patterns of unemployment in the pre-1914 period are then related to census-derived statistics of regional growth and employment structure. Before 1914, the north was the region of high growth, based on the prosperity of the export-oriented industries created by the industrial revolution, especially engineering, shipbuilding, textiles and mining. Unemployment was primarily a problem of the south, with its stagnant agricultural sector and of London, where the old handicraft industries were making their final stand. Following the war, shifts in world trade caused a sudden drop in export demand, mainly affecting the staple industries of the north. This shift in trade was a clear exogenous shock to the British regional economic system, causing a sudden drop in demand for labour in previously prosperous areas and a reversal in the pre-war pattern of unemployment.

The article focuses on the economic, social, and political changes that occurred as European societies ceased to be primarily agrarian in economic structure and devoted proportionately more of their resources and labor to the production of non-agricultural commodities and services. Industrialization is not identical either with economic growth or economic development, although it is closely associated with both. The process of economic growth, including in the modern era the special case of industrialization, involves the interaction of four broad classes or categories of factors--population, resources, technology, and institutions. In conclusion, there was not one model for industrialization in the nineteenth century. Coal and human capital were the two basic ingredients, but in combination with one another and with other elements they produced a variety of patterns of industrialization. The customary depiction of an industrial revolution in Great Britain and its repetition in continental Europe and elsewhere distorts the historical record.

The article focuses on the effect of rearmament policy on the economic condition of Great Britain in 1930s. The author remarks that the role of rearmament in the interwar economy has aroused little controversy. It was claimed that Britain's rearmament programme is the greatest public works programme ever devised in time of formal peace. Nevertheless, the rearmament boom is generally regarded as having had a beneficial effect on the level of economic activity, especially during the minor slump of 1937-8. According to the author, no great speed for the general tenor of the programme was gradual, limited by the belief of the government that financial and economic risks were more dangerous than military uncertainties, and were likely to be accentuated by increased public expenditure. The major advantage of rearmament over an alternative public works strategy based on the construction industry appears to have been its strong linkages to the staple industries and, through this, to the depressed regions.

The article discusses the total factor productivity growth in Great Britain after 1870. The confusion over which industries witnessed entrepreneurial shortcomings remained until the use by new economic historians of geometric and arithmetic total factor productivity indexes to test directly Aldcroft's hypothesis that Britain's rate of technical progress was inferior to that of America or Germany. Productivity indexes measure output per unit input. Unlike partial productivity indexes, principally the output-labor ratio, total factor productivity indexes measure the rate of growth of output not accounted for by the growth of all factor inputs. After subtracting the rate of growth of weighted factor inputs from the rate of growth of output, what is left unexplained is labelled technical change or productivity. In this case, the index is a residual and, more properly, has been called a measure of our ignorance. By comparing total factor productivity growth in Britain after 1870 with best practice American efficiency growth, both lagging British productivity and the entrepreneurial failure thesis were subjected to an unambiguous test.