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Cartels today are prohibited under competition regimes around the world, although seen historically (in Europe at least) as a public good to be tolerated or even encouraged by governments. Despite the prohibition, illegal cartels are still prevalent, and there are circumstances where cartel-like conduct is allowed under competition rules. This article explores the extent to which such conduct can be both subject to one regulatory regime (competition law) while also carrying out regulatory functions, and hence can be construed as transnational private regulatory regimes (TPRERs). There are three categories of cartel-like arrangements: private contractual arrangements that fall outside the realm of competition law; self-regulatory arrangements designed to exclusively advance the interests of regulatees; and hybrid regimes where private arrangements have been co-opted as a form of regulation which operate in the shadow of competition law and are often seen as advancing competition objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the efficiency of partial market liberalization and policy reform with an application to the European dairy sector. In a second best world, partial moves toward market liberalization are not always efficiency improving. We develop a general equilibrium model to investigate the efficiency implications of discrete changes in government policy. The analysis covers price and quantity instruments used in both domestic and trade policy. We derive simple conditions under which partial market liberalization is efficiency improving. We apply the approach to agricultural policy reform in the European dairy sector and identify market liberalization scenarios that are “not” efficiency improving. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]