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Copyright of Regional Science Policy & Practice is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Regional Science Policy & Practice is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This study contributes to a small, but growing stream of literature exploring the contagious nature of corruption by examining the rate at which the correlation between countries' corruption measures decays as the geographical distance between country capital cities increases. Focusing on countries in Africa and the Middle East and using historical data from Transparency International to measure perceived levels of country corruption and the great circle distance (in miles) between country capitals, the results of this analysis indicate that corruption is contagious and can spread beyond its neighbour's borders. The rate at which corrupt practices are adopted decays as the distance between the countries' capitals increases and the first order conditions suggest that corrupt practices can spread and impact practices beyond 2700 miles. The results also suggest that reducing corruption within a nation's borders can be viewed as a positive externality as reductions in corruption levels can spillover to other countries and help to lower corruption within a larger geographical region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is African politics characterized by concentrated power in the hands of a narrow group (ethnically determined) that then fluctuates from one extreme to another via frequent coups? Employing data on the ethnicity of cabinet ministers since independence, we show that African ruling coalitions are surprisingly large and that political power is allocated proportionally to population shares across ethnic groups. This holds true even restricting the analysis to the subsample of the most powerful ministerial posts. We argue that the likelihood of revolutions from outsiders and coup threats from insiders are major forces explaining allocations within these regimes. Alternative allocation mechanisms are explored. Counterfactual experiments that shed light on the role of Western policies in affecting African national coalitions and leadership group premia are performed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]