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In this paper I examined the relationship between class, religion and political ideology. I proposed to show that religious beliefs and values incorporate elements of class based ideology which then serve to legitimate a militant or submissive world view. Class, in this paper, is defined as a collectivity of individuals who are conscious of their socio-economic status and interests. I distinguish between ascending, retrenching, bourgeois, and the alienated classes. Corresponding to these classes are four types of religions: inclusive and exclusive militant and submissive religions. The religious values which assume theology-like status are as follows. The religions of the ascending classes are primarily inclusive militants emphasizing the values of collectivity, equality and justice. The religions of the retrenching classes are exclusive militants which stress individualism, freedom, and Christian love. Bourgeois religions are inclusive submissive and while they incorporate the values of the above two, they also add the values of charity and decorum. The religions of the alienated classes are exclusive submissive and anti-class although they do manifest a caste-like system with an elitist self concept and a total commitment to the group. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper extends Sigelman's (1977) analyses of cross-national patterns in reported levels of church attendance and subscription to selected religious beliefs. The analyses are extended in these ways: More countries are included in the comparisons; more measures of religious involvement are employed; and the data are for about 15 years later, from the same period in the 1980s, for each country. Also, we present multivariate controlled comparisons across nations, which were not provided in Sigelman's analyses. Among the results is evidence that Americans are comparably high, but not always first, in involvement levels, both before and after controls for six sociodemographic status measures. Nation of residence is considerably stronger than each control variable (educational attainment, employment status, age, marital status, community size, and broad categories of religious affiliation) as a predictor, for all of the measures of religious involvement. The different profiles of the nations on the social status controls, and their effects upon involvement, do not explain the cross-national patterns in involvement. Alternative interpretations of the comparative results are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The effects of current occupational status and intergenerational differences in occupational status upon individual beliefs in doctrinal orthodoxy are examined in light of three hypotheses. A dissociative hypothesis would predict excessively high levels of orthodoxy for mobile persons, suggesting that the consequences of social mobility would work to counteract processes of secularization. An acculturation hypothesis would predict that mobile persons will be intermediate in degree of orthodoxy to persons at their strata of origin and destination, suggesting that in the societal context of an excess of upward over downward mobility, social mobility would generate a net increase in secularization. A cognitive dissonance hypothesis would predict excessively low levels of orthodoxy among mobile persons, suggesting that social mobility reinforces processes of secularization. The data generally best fit a model consistent with the acculturation hypothesis, though sufficient deviations occur to warrant a discussion of the conditions which foster dissociative and dissonance effects as manifested in orthodox religious beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]