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I develop a simple example of a model in which agents have asymmetric information, and preferences that are represented by a nonadditive expected utility function. The a priori uninformed agent, after observing the equilibrium price, has conditional beliefs that remain nonadditive. Then, even when the equilibrium price function is fully revealing (i.e., one-to-one), it may be worthwhile for an a priori uninformed agent to buy 'redundant' private information if he is more confident in that information than in that revealed by the price system.

We study a repeated game where a seller, who has a short-term incentive to supply low quality, is periodically matched with a randomly selected buyer. Buyers observe only the outcomes of their neighbors' games and may receive signals from them. When the buyer population is large, the seller may sell high quality even when each buyer observes her action in any given period with an arbitrarily small probability. When networking among buyers is costly, low quality is always supplied with a positive probability. For this case, we characterize an equilibrium where the seller randomizes between high and low quality.

An agency model which shows that firms outsource to improve managerial incentives is presented. The proposed model, which also assumes that outsourcing strictly dominates in-house production, argues that outsourcing makes a firm significantly better off. However, the benefit of outsourcing is affected by the trade-off between the incremental coordination costs of outsourcing and the improved incentive scheme. Moreover, the optimal contract is associated with whether or not the firm is publicly held.