Search

This paper augments a relatively standard dynamic general equilibrium model with financial frictions in order to quantify the macroeconomic effects of the credit deepening process observed in many Latin American (LA) countries in the last decade, most notably in Brazil. In the model, a stylized banking sector intermediates credit from patient households to impatient households and firms. The key novelty of the paper, motivated by the Brazilian experience, is to model the credit constraint faced by (impatient) households as a function of future labor income. In the calibrated model, credit deepening generates only modest abovetrend growth in consumption, investment, and GDP. Since Brazil has experienced one of the most intense credit deepening processes in Latin America, it is argued that the quantitative effects for other LA economies are unlikely to be sizeable.

We study the development of bank lending in the U.S. after four large jumps in uncertainty using an event study approach. We find that more liquid banks reduce lending less than banks with smaller liquidity ratios after a surge in uncertainty. Lending by smaller banks is also less responsive to increases in uncertainty. Banks with a higher capitalization ratio keep up lending to a greater extent, but the effect is only significant for banks which are not part of a multi-bank holding company. This heterogeneity across banks suggests that declines in bank lending following increases in uncertainty are partly the result of a reduced supply of bank loans.

Based on Aghion et al. (2005), this article provides new insights regarding whether financial development can affect economic growth non-linearly by adopting the concept of threshold effects. The empirical approach adopted in this article allows for the finance-growth relationship to be piecewise linear with a set of indicators including access to finance acting as a regime-switching trigger. Using cross-country observations from 144 countries stretching from 1985 to 2009, strong evidence of threshold effects in finance-growth link is found. It is suggested that financial development in general, and access to finance in particular, is among the important forces contributing to crosscountry (non)-convergences in growth rates.

Dynastic management is the inter-generational transmission of control over assets that is typical of family-owned firms. It is pervasive around the world, but especially in developing countries. We argue that dynastic management is a potential source of inefficiency: if the heir to the family firm has no talent for managerial decision-making, meritocracy fails. We present a simple model that studies the macroeconomic causes and consequences of this phenomenon. In our model, the incidence of dynastic management depends on the severity of asset-market imperfections, on the economy’s saving rate, and on the degree of inheritability of talent across generations. We therefore introduce novel channels through which financial-market failures and saving rates affect aggregate total factor productivity. Numerical simulations suggest that dynastic management may be a substantial contributor to observed cross-country differences in productivity.

This paper is focused on the macroeconomic aspects of Shackle’s theory of decisions under uncertainty and, more particularly, of his theory of capital and interest. The paper starts by arguing that Shackle’s general approach stems from the identification of, and conflict between, two Paradigms: the Economics of Uncertainty and Expectations (EUE), which was developed in the “years of high theory”, and General Equilibrium Theory (GET). The paper brings out some flaws in Shackle’s view of this conflict and highlights the insights and advances by which Shackle identifies and strengthens the major features of the EUE Paradigm. Amongst these features is the focus on historical time, on expectations and their failures, on money as a store of value, on ex ante and ex post magnitudes, on macroeconomic equilibrium and disequilibrium, on economic fluctuations. The paper argues that, while clarifying or criticizing in his brilliant manner many or some parts of the Keynesian theory of interest or of the Austrian theory of capital, Shackle fails to highlight the difference between the theory of interest as such (the old Austrian theory) and the theory of the money rate of interest (the Keynesian theory) as well as the difference between the theory of capital in the context of logical time (the old Austrian approach) and the theory of capital in the context of historical time (Hayek’s and Shackle’s own approach)