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Defensive behavior is a central aspect of social life and provides benefits to the self and others. Recent evidence reveals that infants evaluate third parties' prosocial and antisocial actions. Three experiments were carried out to assess toddlers' reactions to defensive and non-defensive events (N = 54). In two experiments, infants' looking times and manual choices provided converging evidence that 20-month-olds understand and evaluate defensive actions, by showing that they prefer the defensive puppet over the non-defensive puppet and that they reason on the bystander puppet's disposition. In the third experiment, toddlers rewarded the defensive puppet rather than the non-defensive puppet, revealing how their evaluations guided awarding behaviors of defensive actions toward the third party. The results support the developmental stability and provide evidence of a rich and well-organized prosociality that before the second year of life proves to be based on some moral principles and linked with a sophisticated psychological reasoning. The findings shed light on the claims that human capacities for the social evaluation of defensive behaviors toward third parties are rooted in evolved cooperative systems.

How does theory of mind become explicit? In this article, we provide a brief overview of theoretical accounts and then review longitudinal findings on the development of theory of mind from infancy to the preschool years. Long‐term predictive relations among conceptually related measures of implicit and explicit theory‐of‐mind reasoning support a conceptual continuity view of the transition from an implicit to an explicit understanding of the mind. We discuss alternative, minimalist accounts of infant psychological reasoning (e.g., two‐systems models, submentalizing theory) and their implications for the development of theory of mind in light of the evidence. Longitudinal findings further support a developmental enrichment view of joint attention as a foundation of theory of mind and early social interaction as a powerful mechanism in the development of this ability. Finally, we highlight the importance of longitudinal data for our understanding of conceptual development from infancy to the preschool years.

Lockhart and Keil have written an interesting monograph focusing on the development of reasoning about medicine, a relatively underexplored area of research with potentially broad implications with respect to the design of more-effective medical interventions. In a set of 15 studies with well over 2,200 participants, they examine how children and adults combine aspects of biological and psychological reasoning to create working models of medicine. Lockhart and Keil explore developmental changes in reasoning about illness and its treatment using medicines in terms of dualism (e.g., psychological vs. physical), spatial proximity, differential timing of effects, potential side effects, and treatment tradeoffs. This commentary highlights the novel contributions of this monograph, examines issues that need additional considerations, and makes suggestions for future research.

This paper examines precursors and consequents of perceived relevance of a proposition A for a proposition C. In Experiment 1, we test Spohn's (2012) assumption that ∆P = P(C|A) - P(C|~A) is a good predictor of ratings of perceived relevance and reason relations, and we examine whether it is a better predictor than the difference measure (P(C|A) - P(C)). In Experiment 2, we examine the effects of relevance on probabilistic coherence in Cruz, Baratgin, Oaksford, and Over's (2015) uncertain "and-to-if" inferences. The results suggest that ∆P predicts perceived relevance and reason relations better than the difference measure and that participants are either less probabilistically coherent in "and-to-if" inferences than initially assumed or that they do not follow P(if A, then C) = P(C|A) ("the Equation"). Results are discussed in light of recent results suggesting that the Equation may not hold under conditions of irrelevance or negative relevance.

A range of formal models of human reasoning have been proposed in a number of fields such as philosophy, logic, artificial intelligence, computer science, psychology, cognitive science, etc.: various logics (epistemic logics; non-monotonic logics), probabilistic systems (most notably, but not exclusively, Bayesian probability theory), belief revision systems, neural networks, among others. Now, it seems reasonable to require that formal models of human reasoning be (minimally) empirically adequate if they are to be viewed as models of the phenomena in question. How are formal models of human reasoning typically put to empirical test? One way to do so is to isolate a number of key principles of the system, and design experiments to gauge the extent to which participants do or do not follow them in reasoning tasks. Another way is to take relevant existing results and check whether a particular formal model predicts these results. The present investigation provides an illustration of the second kind of empirical testing by comparing two formal models for reasoning – namely the non-monotonic logic known as preferential logic; and a particular version of belief revision theories, screened belief revision – against the reasoning phenomenon known as belief bias in the psychology of reasoning literature: human reasoners typically seek to maintain the beliefs they already hold, and conversely to reject contradicting incoming information. The conclusion of our analysis will be that screened belief revision is more empirically adequate with respect to belief bias than preferential logic and non-monotonic logics in general, as what participants seem to be doing is above all a form of belief management on the basis of background knowledge. The upshot is thus that, while it may offer valuable insights into the nature of human reasoning, preferential logic (and non-monotonic logics in general) is ultimately inadequate as a formal model of the phenomena in question.

Engaging in systemic reasoning about ecological issues is critical for early elementary students to develop future understanding of critical environmental issues such as global warming and loss of biodiversity. However, ecological issues are rarely taught in ways to highlight systemic reasoning in elementary schools. In this study, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 44 students from the first through fourth grades. Using an iterative process, we developed an empirically grounded learning progression that captures how elementary students use systemic reasoning to explain interactions in ecosystems. This learning progression contains five reasoning patterns: anthropomorphic reasoning, concrete practical reasoning, simple causal reasoning, semi-complex causal reasoning, and complex causal reasoning. The results also show that many students exhibited mixed-level reasoning, meaning that they used reasoning patterns at multiple levels to construct a single response. We discuss the implications of the study for learning progression research and teaching ecosystems at early elementary grades. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. J Res Sci Teach 53: 1524–1545, 2016

Ranking theory is a formal epistemology that has been developed in over 600 pages in Spohn's recent book The Laws of Belief, which aims to provide a normative account of the dynamics of beliefs that presents an alternative to current probabilistic approaches. It has long been received in the AI community, but it has not yet found application in experimental psychology. The purpose of this paper is to derive clear, quantitative predictions by exploiting a parallel between ranking theory and a statistical model called logistic regression. This approach is illustrated by the development of a model for the conditional inference task using Spohn's (2013) ranking theoretic approach to conditionals.

Theory-of-mind research reveals a puzzling pattern of young children showing implicit “mindreading” success in indirect false-belief tasks well before they can pass explicit tasks where they are asked to make direct predictions about the mistaken agent's belief or behavior. Relevant theorizing has either boosted indirect responses (e.g., eye movements) as showcasing infants' and young children's innate psychological reasoning system or scoffed at indirect responses as reflecting only a shallow causal understanding of behavior. This essay describes new theorizing suggesting that we have not one but two mindreading systems—an implicit efficient system (shared by infants, children, and adults) that supports spontaneous responses such as eye gazing and an explicit flexible system (constructed from age 4 onward) that supports direct verbal responses. This view has inspired cutting-edge research documenting signature limits on the kinds of input that the efficient mindreading system processes. New research shows that the efficient system is set to help young children and adults minimally track facts relating to agents and objects, but not relations between agents and propositions. The flexible system—supporting understanding of belief as such—guides children's direct verbal inferences in a wide range of perspective-taking situations that include ascribing how people interpret a particular object. Future research into the question of how human beings mindread in fast-moving situations will need insight into whether there are systematic patterns of limits on implicit understanding that converge across age groups, multiple paradigms, and diverse populations. Keywords: mindreading; theory of mind; false beliefs; dual process; development

This short article provides an introduction to a special section, consisting of six papers on human evolution and the imago Dei. These papers are the result of dialogue between theologians and philosophers of religion at the University of Oxford and the Catholic University of Leuven. All contributors focus on the imago Dei, and consider how this theological notion can be understood from an evolutionary perspective, looking at a variety of disciplines, including the psychology of reasoning, cognitive science of religion, paleoanthropology, evolutionary psychology, and evolutionary ethics.

The new Bayesian paradigm in the psychology of reasoning aims to integrate the study of human reasoning, decision making, and rationality. It is supported by two findings. One, most people judge the probability of the indicative conditional, P(if A then B), to be the conditional probability, P(B|A), as implied by the Ramsey test. Two, they judge if A then B to be void when A is false. Their three-valued response table used to be called 'defective', but should be termed the de Finetti table. We show how to study general de Finetti truth tables for negations, conjunctions, disjunctions, and conditionals.

This article describes a framework for practical social reasoning designed to be used for analysis, specification, and implementation of the social layer of agent reasoning in multiagent systems. Our framework, called the expectation strategy behavior ESB framework, is based on i using sets of update rules for social beliefs tied to observations so-called expectations, ii bounding the amount of reasoning to be performed over these rules by defining a reasoning strategy, and iii influencing the agent's decision-making logic by means of behaviors conditioned on the truth status of current and future social beliefs. We introduce the foundations of ESB conceptually and present a formal framework and an actual implementation of a reasoning engine, which is specifically combined with a general belief-desire-intention-based practical reasoning programming system. We illustrate the generality of ESB through select case studies, which show that it is able to represent and implement different typical styles of social reasoning. The broad coverage of existing social reasoning methods, the modularity that derives from its declarative nature, and its focus on practical implementation make ESB a useful tool for building advanced socially reasoning agents.

Inductive reasoning is a core cognitive process of fluid intelligence, predicting a variety of educational outcomes. The Cognitive Training for Children (CTC) program is an educational intervention designed to develop children's inductive reasoning skills, with previous investigations finding substantial effects of the program on both inductive reasoning ability and classroom learning. The present study assessed both individual and small-group CTC training against a no-treatment control condition to investigate the effects on inductive and deductive reasoning and mathematics achievement in a primary school-aged Australian cohort. Students who received individual training outperformed those in the control condition on measures of inductive and deductive reasoning, and those in the small-group condition also outperformed the control condition on a measure of inductive reasoning 3 months following training. However, hypotheses regarding transfer effects to mathematics achievement were not supported. Directions for future research, focusing on extended longitudinal studies and motivational variables, are discussed.

— This article reviews recent evidence for the claim that infants possess a theory of mind. Two conceptual systems (CS) of psychological reasoning are distinguished: CS1, underlying the attribution of motivational states such as goals and dispositions, and CS2, supporting a representational theory of mind, that is, an understanding of false belief. There is ample evidence for CS1 even in the 1st year of life, whereas the claim that CS2 is operational in infancy is controversial. The article proposes a lean interpretation of findings on infants’ representation of false belief that assumes that a fast and automatic, but limited and inflexible, social information processing system guides infants’ encoding of belief-based intentional action.

We argue that reasoning has been conceptualized so narrowly in what is known as 'psychology of reasoning' that reasoning's relevance to cognitive science has become well-nigh invisible. Reasoning is identified with determining whether a conclusion follows validly from given premises, where 'valid' is taken to mean 'valid according to classical logic'. We show that there are other ways to conceptualize reasoning, more in line with current logical theorizing, which give it a role in psychological processes ranging from (verbal) discourse comprehension to (nonverbal) planning. En route we show that formal logic, at present marginalized in cognitive science, can be an extremely valuable modeling tool. In particular, there are cases in which probabilistic modeling must fail, whereas logical models do well. WIREs Cogni Sci 2011 2 555-567 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.134 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.

Clinical reasoning in occupational therapy has been described using a variety of images. The present paper aims to give an overview of three major images that have been proposed in the occupational therapy literature since 1982. These are reasoning as information processing, thinking in stories or narrative reasoning, and reasoning as an interpersonal process. These three images are compared with the concept of conditional reasoning.

What accounts for how we know that certain rules of reasoning, such as reasoning by Modus Ponens, are valid? If our knowledge of validity must be based on some reasoning, then we seem to be committed to the legitimacy of rule-circular arguments for validity. This paper raises a new difficulty for the rule-circular account of our knowledge of validity. The source of the problem is that, contrary to traditional wisdom, a universal generalization cannot be inferred just on the basis of reasoning about an arbitrary object. I argue in favor of a more sophisticated constraint on reasoning by universal generalization, one which undermines a rule-circular account of our knowledge of validity.

Infants are sensitive to biological motion, but do they recognize it as animate? As a first step towards answering this question, two experiments investigated whether 6-month-olds selectively attribute goals to shapes moving like animals. We habituated infants to a square moving towards one of two targets. When target locations were switched, infants reacted more to movement towards a new goal than a new location - but only if the square moved non-rigidly and rhythmically, in a schematic version of bio-mechanical movement older observers describe as animal-like (Michotte, 1963). Goal attribution was specific to schematic animal motion: It did not occur if the square moved rigidly with the same rhythm as the animate stimulus, or if the square had the same amount of non-rigid deformation, but in an inanimate configuration. The data would seem to show that perception of schematic animal motion is linked to a system for psychological reasoning from infancy. This in turn suggests that 6-month-olds may already interpret biological motion as animate.

Twelve-month-olds realize that when an agent cannot see an object, her incomplete perceptions still guide her goal-directed actions. What would happen if the agent had incomplete perceptions because she could see only one part of the object, for example one side of a screen? In the present research, 16-month-olds were first shown an agent who always pointed to a red object, as opposed to a black or a yellow object, suggesting that she preferred red over the other colours. Next, two screens were introduced while the agent was absent. The screens were (1) red or green on both sides; (2) red on the front (infants' side) but green on the back (the agent's side) or vice versa; or (3) only coloured red or green on the front. During test, the agent, who could see only the back of the screens, pointed to one of the two screens. The results revealed that while infants expected the agent to continue acting on her colour preference and point to the red rather than the green screen during test, they did so in accord with the agent's perception of the screens, rather than their own perceptions: they expected the agent to point to the red screen in (1), but to the green-front screen in (2), and they had no prediction of which screen the agent should point to in (3). The implications of the present findings for early psychological reasoning research are discussed.

In this paper practical reasoning is understood in the Aristotelian sense as reasoning leading to action or to an intention to do something. Georg Henrik von Wright and a number of other philosophers have tried to assimilate certain forms of such reasoning to deductive reasoning. Many examples of practical reasoning, including some examples given by Aristotle, do not fit a deductive or quasi-deductive model. It is argued that instances of good practical reasoning often resemble abductive rather than deductive or inductive reasoning, and that the principles governing abduction, including the Principle of Economy, are applicable to practical reasoning.

Past research has shown that tendencies to engage in holistic and analytical reasoning are differentially encouraged by East Asian and Western cultures. But little is known about cultural differences in the perceived value of analytic versus intuitive reasoning. In Study 1, Koreans and Americans ranked the importance of traits including ‘intuitive’ and ‘logical’ in work and family contexts. In Study 2, Euro-Canadians and East-Asian-Canadians read scenarios of intuitive versus rule-following business decisions. Relative to Western participants, East Asians rated intuitive reasoning as more important and reasonable than analytic reasoning. Implications for the epistemic status of reasoning modes, culture’s effect on values about reasoning, and multiculturalism are discussed.

This is a critical discussions of attempts to ground the justification of modus ponens (and related rules of inference) on its purported role in constituting the meaning of relevant natural-language terms.

Modern logic provides accounts of both interpretation and derivation which work together to provide abstract frameworks for modelling the sensitivity of human reasoning to task, context and content. Cognitive theories have underplayed the importance of interpretative processes. We illustrate, using Wason's (Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 20 (1968) 273) selection task, how better empirical cognitive investigations and theories can be built directly on logical accounts when this imbalance is redressed. Subjects quite reasonably experience great difficulty in assigning logical form to descriptively in- terpreted rules in this task and materials, though not to deontically interpreted ones. The main em- pirical contrasts in reasoning performance are precisely between these interpretations, so better se- mantic theory can explain the main empirical effects. However, a more adequate notion of logical form than that typically employed in the psychology of reasoning is required, and we offer a richer alternative. Prima facie evidence that subjects do in fact experience the predicted difficulties in interpreting descriptive materials is provided by analyses of socratic tutoring dialogues. Experimental verification that these difficulties do in fact affect subjects' performance in the standard task is provided by six novel experimental conditions each designed to test different aspects of the semantic predictions. The results bear out the predictions. The semantic distinction between descriptive and deontic rules interacts with the task specifics to provide powerful generalisations about reasoning which surface in detailed explanations of many disparate observations. We conclude that semantic analyses have more direct benefits for psychological investigation than is usually credited, and conversely, that the

This paper addresses the apparent mismatch between the normative and descriptive literatures in the cognitive science of conditional reasoning. Descriptive psychological theories still regard material implication as the normative theory of the conditional. However, over the last 20 years in the philosophy of language and logic the idea that material implication can account for everyday indicative conditionals has been subject to severe criticism. The majority view is now apparently in favour of a subjective conditional probability interpretation. A comparative model fitting exercise is presented that shows that a conditional probability model can explain as much of the data on abstract indicative conditional reasoning tasks as psychological theories that supplement material implication with various rationally unjustified processing assumptions. Consequently, when people are asked to solve laboratory reasoning tasks, they can be seen as simply generalising their everyday probabilistic reasoning strategies to this novel context.

Helmut Reich's theory of relational and contextual reasoning is a courageous initiative for the resolution of cognitive conflicts between apparently incompatible or incommensurable views. Built upon Piagetian logico-mathematical reasoning, cognitive complexity theory, and dialectical and analogical reasoning, it includes the development of a both/and logic inclusive of binary either/or logic. Reich provides philosophic, theoretical, and even initial empirical support for the development of this form of reasoning along with a heuristic for its application. A valuable step beyond the limits of binary, static, and formal reasoning, it takes relationship, context, and perspectival variations seriously in an explicitly reflective and iterative system. We can and do address conflicts not resolvable by conventional appeals to logic or evidence, including those at epistemic boundaries or produced by belief-commitment differences. Although this form of reasoning has real promise, including stepping beyond complementarity in the religion-science dialogue, it seems better directed to causally explanatory theories than to other forms of rendering meaning. Finally, its coextension requirement may render it problematic where functionally coherent explananda cannot be identified or are themselves produced or constituted by a belief system.

One of the most debated questions in psychology and cognitive science is the nature and the functioning of the mental processes involved in deductive reasoning. However, all existing theories refer to a specific deductive domain, like syllogistic, propositional or relational reasoning. Our goal is to unify the main types of deductive reasoning into a single set of basic procedures. In particular, we bring together the microtheories developed from a mental models perspective in a single theory, for which we provide a formal foundation. We validate the theory through a computational model (UNICORE) which allows fine-grained predictions of subjects’ performance in different reasoning domains. The performance of the model is tested against the performance of experimental subjects—as reported in the relevant literature—in the three areas of syllogistic, relational and propositional reasoning. The computational model proves to be a satisfactory artificial subject, reproducing both correct and erroneous performance of the human subjects. Moreover, we introduce a developmental trend in the program, in order to simulate the performance of subjects of different ages, ranging from children (3–6) to adolescents (8–12) to adults (>21). The simulation model performs similarly to the subjects of different ages. Our conclusion is that the validity of the mental model approach is confirmed for the deductive reasoning domain, and that it is possible to devise a unique mechanism able to deal with the specific subareas. The proposed computational model (UNICORE) represents such a unifying structure.

How do doctors make decisions? Alison Round explains some of the thought processes that lead to a diagnosis

Fifth and eleventh graders in the United States (N = 169) and Japan (N = 166) were interviewed about their reactions to stories describing various forms of psychological deviance in hypothetical peers. For each story, students were asked if any of the protagonist's behaviours seemed strange or unusual; why these behaviours were strange or unusual; and why the protagonist acted the way he or she did. More Japanese than American students mentioned the psychological reasoning of the individual, and more American than Japanese students mentioned external influences and violation of social norms in explaining and conceptualizing deviant conduct, respectively. Few developmental or gender differences emerged. Results are discussed in terms of the individualism-collectivism paradigm and cultural differences in attributions for success and failure. Des eleves de CM2 et de Premiere aux Etats-Unis (N = 169) et au Japon (N = 166) ont ete questionnes au sujet de leur reaction a des histoires decrivant diverses formes ...

Although humans seem adept at drawing nonmonotonic conclusions, the nonmonotonic reasoning systems that researchers develop are complex and do not function with such ease. This paper explores people's reasoning processes in nonmonotonic problems. To avoid the problem of people's conclusions being based on knowledge rather than on some reasoning process, we developed a scenario about life on another planet. Problems were chosen to allow the systematic study of people's understanding of strict and nonstrict rules and their interactions. We found that people had great difficulty reasoning and we identified a number of negative factors influencing their reasoning. We also identified three positive factors which, if used consistently, would yield rational and coherent reasoning-but no subject achieved total consistency. (Another possible positive factor, specificity, was considered but we found no evidence for its use.) It is concluded that nonmonotonic reasoning is hard. When people need to reason in a domain where they have no preconceived ideas, the foundation for their reasoning is neither coherent nor rational. They do not use a nonmonotonic reasoning system that would work regardless of content. Thus, nonmonotonic reasoning systems that researchers develop are expected to do more reasoning than humans actually do!

This paper argues that in order to encourage the learning of high level cognitive skills through the use of computers, it is necessary to use systems which are adapted to forms of natural human reasoning. This is specifically the case in using modelling programs. Two kinds of such reasoning are identified, both qualitative: reasoning using imagined objects and events, and semi-quantitative reasoning. Modelling systems which support each form are described. Some results of research with them are outlined.

The continued predominance of SL-logic and deductive paradigms in the research on conditional-based reasoning by experimental psychologists is examined and criticized. After recounting the history and influence of the model, I note the emergence of trends in epistemology and other areas of theory that might provide a springboard for the critique of the model, and I argue that a new approach to examining reasoning with conditionals ought to be developed. I conclude that a superior approach would model such reasoning with sociolinguistic, inductive, and neurophysiological parameters, and that it would not involve any comparison of subjects' reasoning with the standard deductive rules of logic.

In many studies, human reasoning has been depicted as “biased” or deviating from normative models in both areas of deductive and inductive reasoning. Two criteria for evaluation of reasoning studies are proposed in this paper. The first criterion concerns the selection and application of normative models against which human performance is assessed. The second criterion concerns the role of conversational factors in the differential selection of information used in the subsequent judgment. These two criteria were applied to studies on two tasks from the fields of deductive and inductive reasoning, the Wason selection task and the base rate fallacy. In view of alternative normative systems, control of the application of the normative models used and the perceived conversational relevance of the information presented in the experimental tasks, the alleged biases have been demonstrated to be largely unsupported. The analysis is consistent with the notion that human reasoning is optimal and rational. The implications of the present account for reasoning experiments are discussed.

Lawson (1992) posited the multiple hypothesis theory to explain the essence of scientific reasoning. According to this theory, the essence of scientific reasoning is “the ability to initiate reasoning with more than one antecedent condition.” The present study tests the assumptions of this theory with high school students in general experience areas and in chemistry. The findings are generally in support of the theory's assumptions. This article also contains a theoretical discussion which points out how the theory needs to be extended before it can justifiably “constitute the core of a viable alternative theory of reasoning.” © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. J Res Sci Teach 34: 1067–1081, 1997.

The reality monitoring model of Johnson and Raye proposes that the phenomenal characteristics of memories for real and imagined events are utilized in reality monitoring judgements. This study examined the reality monitoring strategies utilized by subjects when remembering sexual abuse, and compared them with the strategies utilized for other types of events. Thirty-one subjects described how they knew that four different autobiographical events (a sexual abuse experience, another unrelated trauma experience, a social occasion, and an imagined event) had, or had not, happened. Sexual abuse experiences were found to elicit a unique reality monitoring response profile. This profile suggests that the characteristics of memory for sexual abuse may be more vivid than other memories. In addition, the profile for sexual abuse shows fewer contextual supporting memories than other real memories, and more psychological reasoning responses. The finding that emotional rehearsal can cause fading of perceptual detail was not found to hold for the long-term autobiographical memories that were the object of this study. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Language: en

The economic theory of rationality promises to equal mathematical logic in its importance for the mechanization of reasoning. We survey the growing literature on how the basic notions of probability, utility, and rational choice, coupled with practical limitations on information and resources, influence the design and analysis of reasoning and representation systems.

analogy, and connectionist models-maintain that abstract rules ore not involved in human reasoning, or at best ploy a minor role. Other views hold that the use of abstract rules is o core aspect of human reason- ing. We propose eight criteria for determining whether or not people use abstract rules in reasoning, ond examine evidence relevant to each criterion for several rule systems. We argue thot there is substantial evidence that several different inferential rules, including modus ponens, contractual rules, cousai rules, and the law of large numbers, ore used in solving everyday problems. We discuss the implications for various theoretical positions ond consider hybrid mechanisms that combine aspects of instance and rule models.

This paper briefly summarizes the literatures of reading and reasoning in the last quarter century, focusing mainly on the disciplines of cognitive science, cognitive developmental psychology, linguistics, and educational psychology. These literatures were synthesized to create a framework for defining verbal reasoning in higher education. Eight general cognitive and metacognitive operations were identified (including, for example, evaluating discourse, seeking and solving problems, and monitoring one's comprehension). Several dimensions underlying these operations on which individual skills may vary were identified (such as breadth of understanding, precision of understanding, or familiarity and facility). Finally, these ideal descriptions of verbal reasoning are applied to the assessment of verbal reasoning for selection in higher education. Problems in measurement and unanticipated consequences of measurement are discussed.

Recent studies of deductive reasoning are reviewed with respect to three questions: (i) Do people reason logically? (ii) Is reasoning introspectible? (iii) Is reasoning sequential? It is argued that the evidence of reasoning experiments suggests a negative answer to all three questions. This conclusion is interesting, since the last two questions at least might be answered affirmatively by common sense, and affirmative answers would be more consistent with the assumptions of many psychologists in related fields. The question is raised, however, as to whether experimental studies have good external validity for the measurement of ‘reasoning’ as we would generally understand the term.

Piaget's theory has profoundly influenced science education research. Following Piaget, researchers have focused on content-free strategies, developmentally based mechanisms, and structural models of each stage of reasoning. In practice, factors besides those considered in Piaget's theory influence whether or not a theoretically available strategy is used. Piaget's focus has minimized the research attention placed on what could be called “practical” factors in reasoning. Practical factors are factors that influence application of a theoretically available strategy, for example, previous experience with the task content, familiarity with task instructions, or personality style of the student. Piagetian theory has minimized the importance of practical factors and discouraged investigation of (1) the role of factual knowledge in reasoning, (2) the diagnosis of specific, task-based errors in reasoning, (3) the influence of individual aptitudes on reasoning (e.g., field dependence-independence), and (4) the effect of educational interventions designed to change reasoning. This article calls for new emphasis on practical factors in reasoning and suggests why research on practical factors in reasoning will enhance our understanding of how scientific reasoning is acquired and of how science education programs can foster it.

To test the hypothesis that adolescents classified as formal operational, based upon use of proportional reasoning on the “Pouring Water Task” (Lawson, Karplus, & Adi, 1978) have acquired the mental structures necessary to comprehend hypothetico-deductive arguments of a pattern referred to as “reasoning to a contradiction,” while adolescents classified as concrete operational, based upon use of additive reasoning on the same task have not, a sample of 100 high school students were administered the task and three versions of a problem requiring use of reasoning to a contradiction before, immediately after, and one month after brief verbal instruction in use of that reasoning pattern. Results were generally supportive of the hypothesis as most of the concrete students failed the immediate and delayed posttest problems (62 and 80%, respectively) while most of the formal students succeeded (80 and 71%, respectively). Group differences were significant (p < .001) in both cases. These results suggest that, contrary to those who have argued that content plays a substantial role in logical performance, a general hypothetico-deductive reasoning competence exists in some adolescents and is applicable across a wide variety of task domains. Science instruction which aims to teach this competence is recommended.

Measurements of formal reasoning and principled moral reasoning ability were obtained from a sample of 99 tenth grade students. Specific modes of formal reasoning (proportional reasoning, controlling variables, probabilistic, correlational, and combinatorial reasoning) were first examined. Findings support the notion of hierarchical relationships which exist among those variables. Further results from factor analysis provide evidence that the variables represent specific cognitive structures that are interdependent with each other and precede operations in development. Finally, significant relationships were found to exist between the different modes of formal reasoning and principled moral reasoning. Combinatorial and correlational reasoning were found to significantly account for 22% of the variance in principled moral reasoning. Theoretical and educational implications are discussed.

Although the development of reasoning is recognized as an important goal of science instruction, its nature remains somewhat of a mystery. This article discusses two key questions: Does formal thought constitute a structured whole? And what role does propositional logic play in advanced reasoning? Aspects of a model of advanced reasoning are presented in which hypothesis generation and testing are viewed as central processes in intellectual development. It is argued that a number of important advanced reasoning schemata are linked by these processes and should be made a part of science instruction designed to improve students' reasoning abilities. Concerning students' development and use of formal reasoning, Linn (1982) calls for research into practical issues such as the roles of task-specific knowledge and individual differences in performance, roles not emphasized by Piaget in his theory and research. From a science teacher's point of view, this is good advice. Accordingly, this article will expand upon some of the issues raised by Linn in a discussion of the nature of advanced reasoning which attempts to reconcile the apparent contradiction between students' differential use of advanced reasoning schemata in varying contexts with the notion of a general stage of formal thought. Two key questions will be discussed: Does formal thought constitute a structured whole? And what role does propositional logic play in advanced reasoning? The underlying assumption of the present discussion is that, among other things, science instruction should concern itself with the improvement of students' reasoning abilities (cf. Arons, 1976; Arons & Karplus, 1976; Bady, 1979; Bauman, 1976; Educational Policies Commission, 1966; Herron, 1978; Karplus, 1979; Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972; Moshman & Thompson, 1981; Lawson, 1979; Levine & linn, 1977; Pallrand, 1977; Renner & Lawson, 1973; Sayre & Ball, 1975; Schneider & Renner, 1980; Wollman, 1978). The questions are of interest because to date they lack clear answers, yet clear answers are necessary if we hope to design effective instruction in reasoning.