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Triggered by the recent inquiries into the Fukushima nuclear disaster, this article reflects on the challenges of developing and operating risk regulation and crisis management regimes in an era of highly complex and tightly interconnected socio-technical systems. These challenges are not just technical and professional but fundamentally institutional and cultural. The article identifies three key paradoxes and challenges of contemporary risk and crisis management, signals a range of recurrent problems in governments' efforts to cope with these challenges, problematizes current patterns of societal learning from crises, and sketches an agenda for public administration research in this area.

The February 2009 bushfires have prompted a debate with regard to contemporary arrangements for dealing with large-scale disasters. In this article, we seek to contribute to that debate by culling lessons learned from the literature on crisis and disaster management. We discuss what constitutes an effective disaster response system, we identify some key barriers to the effective functioning of such a system, and offer some suggestions for improvement.

Crisis management (prevention, preparedness, response, and reconstruction) is a tough task for political and bureaucratic leaders. This article documents the persistent tensions between the expectations and realities of crisis leadership. It explores the popular notion that crises provide key opportunities for reform. The very occurrence of a crisis is then thought to expose the status quo as problematic, making it easier to gain momentum for alternative policies and institutions. We argue that the opportunities for reform in the wake of crisis are smaller than often thought. The prime reason is that the requisites of crisis leadership are at odds with the requirements of effective reform.

Books reviewed in this essay: K.J. Bade and M. Weiner (Eds), Migration Past, Migration Future: Germany and the United States R. Munz and M. Weiner (Eds), Migrants, Refugees, and Foreign Policy: U.S. and German Policies Towards Countries of Origin K. Hailbronner and D.A. Martin (Eds), Immigration Admissions: The Search for Workable Policies in Germany and the United States K. Hailbronner, D.A. Martin and H. Motomura (Eds), Immigration Controls: The Search for Workable Policies in Germany and the United States P. Schuck and R. Munz (Eds), Paths to Inclusion: The Integration of Migrants in the United States and Germany

Bureaucratic politics—for example, the “political” interaction between individuals and organizations in the executive branch of government—is a potentially significant force affecting the course and outcomes of governmental policymaking processes. In this article, an empirical and normative model and operationalization of bureaucratic politics is developed, treating it as a variable rather than as an immutable (and by definition problematic) property of policy decision-making. A conceptual model, linking the nature and intensity of bureaucratic politics in advisory systems to the characteristics of the political leaders served by them, is also developed. On the basis of earlier studies of presidential leadership (e.g., Preston, 1996), the leader's need for power, cognitive complexity, and prior policy experience/expertise are hypothesized to affect the organization and operation of the advisory system in terms of bureaucratic politics. Using Hermann's (1983) Personality Assessment-at-a-Distance (PAD) coding technique, theoretical assertions are illustrated in a detailed case study of two critical episodes in U.S. decision-making in the conduct of the Vietnam war in 1965 and 1968.

This article describes and reflects upon practical experiences in using simulations to increase the crisis preparedness of policy makers and government agencies in the Netherlands. Basic issues in crisis simulation design are discussed in view of the various functions that simulations may perform in crisis management planning. A concrete example of simulation is provided to explain its design and modus operandi. The article concludes with a number of practical recommendations.

There is a systematic deflation in governmental rhetoric of the developments that call attention to the unequal distribution of goods and services and a systematic inflation of the forms of threat that legitimize and expand authority. The latter are defined as crises, the former as problems. As crises recur and problems persist, so does a governmental dramaturgy of coping. (Edelman, 1977: 49) This article proposes a more power-critical approach to the analysis of crisis management and, in this respect, explores the possible contribution of research on political and organizational symbolism. Viewed in terms of symbolic action, attention is drawn to the opportunity spaces that crises entail for policy makers and other crisis actors. To exploit these, it is important for decision elites to influence collective definitions of the situation in such a way as to highlight preferred courses of action and to selectively obscure alternative interpretations. Three types of symbolic ‘crisis handling devices’ (framing, ritualization and masking) are presented and illustrated. In conclusion, the need for a broader perspective on the nature of the politics of crisis management is emphasised.

Bureau-political tensions and competition are an often neglected, yet crucial element in crisis management. Bureau-politics in crisis management runs counter to pervasive notions that portray centralization and concentration of power as the dominant mode of administrative response to crisis. This article presents empirical evidence suggesting the importance of bureau-politics in the planning, response and post-crisis stages of crisis management at both strategic and operational levels of action. Again contrary to conventional wisdom, it is argued that such interagency tensions may fulfill various positive functions: they put crisis agencies to the test; they serve to counteract ‘groupthink tendencies; they foster a certain degree of openness; and they may facilitate democratic control of far-reaching crisis management policies.