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The possibility of Toxoplasma gondii transmitted from game meat to humans is of public health concern. Here we determined seroprevalence and risk factors associated with T. gondii in large game ungulates that cohabit in Sierras de Cazorla, Segura and Las Villas Natural Park (SCSV-NP) (Southern Spain), a natural park with high human-animal interaction. Antibodies against T. gondii in 328 wild ungulates were assayed by the modified agglutination test (MAT ≥ 1:25). Antibodies were found in 39 (11.9%, 95% CI: 8.4-15.4) wild ungulates, with seroprevalence levels of 20.8% in wild boars (Sus scrofa) (5/24), 19.0% in fallow deer (Dama dama) (12/63), 13.9% in Iberian ibex (Capra pyrenaica hispanica) (14/101), 7.9% in red deer (Cervus elaphus) (6/76), and 3.1% in mouflons (Ovis aries musimon) (2/64). Significantly higher seroprevalence was observed in fallow deer and wild boars compared to mouflons. Animals living close to urban areas (2 km) had 4.6-times higher risk compared to those living at5 km of urban areas. The results indicate high circulation of T. gondii in wild ungulates in SCSV-NP, which is of animal and public health concern. The increased seroprevalence of T. gondii detected in wildlife ungulates living close to urban areas may increase human infection in those areas if meat from infected animals is consumed raw or undercooked.

Human-animal chimeras-creatures composed of a mix of animal and human cells-have come to play an important role in biomedical research, and they raise ethical questions. This article focuses on one particularly difficult set of questions-those related to the moral status of human-animal chimeras with brains that are partly or wholly composed of human cells. Given the uncertain effects of human-animal chimera research on chimeric animals' cognition, it would be prudent to ensure we do not overlook or underestimate their moral status. However, to assess moral status, we first need to determine what kinds of capacities are morally relevant. The standard view holds that it matters, morally, if chimeric animals develop uniquely human cognitive capacities. I argue that this view is mistaken, highlighting three problems with it: that we can think of examples of uniquely human cognitive capacities that are not morally significant, that we can think of examples of morally significant cognitive capacities that are not uniquely human, and that evidence that some cognitive capacity is shared with nonhuman animals does not undermine claims that this capacity is morally significant. We need a better framework for thinking about the moral status of part-human beings.

Research leading to this article was funded by a European Research Council Starting Grant (under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme ERC grant agreement no. 336564) for the project ‘Visual Representations of the Third Plague Pandemic’ at the Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities of the University of Cambridge.

This essay is part of a larger research project on Renaissance attitudes to animals. It considers the extent to which early developments in the new field of comparative anatomy were influenced by Renaissance discussions concerning the nature and capacities of animals, compared to those of humans. It mainly focuses on the writings of Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519), Andreas Vesalius (1514–64), Pierre Belon du Mans (1517–64) and Girolamo Fabrici di Acquapendente (c. 1533–1619), all of whom can be considered as pioneers in the field of comparative anatomy. The insights that they derived from their experience in dissections of animal bodies are examined against the background of changing sensitivities with regard to animals, which have already been observed in other writings of the same period, particularly literary ones. Rather than going into a detailed comparison of anatomical findings, this essay focuses on perceptions that transcended strictly anatomical knowledge, particularly on reflections concerning the animal soul, animal intelligence and animal speech that were expressed in the writings of the above-mentioned protagonists.

Dehumanization is reached through several approaches, including the attribute-based model of mind perception and the metaphor-based model of dehumanization. We performed two studies to find different (de)humanized images for three targets: Professional people, Evil people, and Lowest of the low. In Study 1, we examined dimensions of mind, expecting the last two categories to be dehumanized through denial of agency (Lowest of the low) or experience (Evil people), compared with humanized targets (Professional people). Study 2 aimed to distinguish these targets using metaphors. We predicted that Evil and Lowest of the low targets would suffer mechanistic and animalistic dehumanization, respectively; our predictions were confirmed, but the metaphor-based model nuanced these results: animalistic and mechanistic dehumanization were shown as overlapping rather than independent. Evil persons were perceived as "killing machines" and "predators." Finally, Lowest of the low were not animalized but considered human beings. We discuss possible interpretations.

In "Human-Animal Chimeras: The Moral Insignificance of Uniquely Human Capacities," Julian Koplin explores a promising way of thinking about moral status. Without attempting to develop a model in any detail, Koplin picks up Joshua Shepherd's interesting proposal that we think about moral status in terms of the value of different kinds of conscious experience. For example, a being with the most basic sort of consciousness and sentience would have interests that matter morally, while a being whose consciousness featured the riches of loving affection, say, might have greater moral status and therefore deserve some sort of priority if the interests of the two beings conflicted. This approach represents an improvement over the more common, transparently anthropocentric habits of thinking about moral status, whether in connection with evaluating human-animal chimera research, deciding what one can ethically eat, or pursuing some other moral inquiry.

This series gives readers the opportunity to consider and contribute to discussion of some of the ethical dilemmas that can arise in veterinary practice. Each month, a case scenario is presented, followed by discussion of some of the issues involved. In addition, a possible way forward is suggested; however, there is rarely a cut-and-dried answer in such cases, and readers may wish to suggest an alternative approach. This month’s dilemma, 9Not a dry eye in the house: treating rescue dogs with off-licence cyclosporine9, was submitted and is discussed by David Williams. Readers with comments to contribute are invited to send them as soon as possible, so that they can be considered for publication in the next issue. The series is being coordinated by Steven McCulloch, senior lecturer in human animal studies at the Centre for Animal Welfare, University of Winchester. It aims to provide a framework that will help practising veterinarians find solutions when facing similar dilemmas.

This series gives readers the opportunity to consider and contribute to discussion of some of the ethical dilemmas that can arise in veterinary practice. Each month, a case scenario is presented, followed by discussion of some of the issues involved. In addition, a possible way forward is suggested; however, there is rarely a cut-and-dried answer in such cases, and readers may wish to suggest an alternative approach. This month’s dilemma, ‘Managing a high publicity crowdfunded shelter puppy with head trauma9, was submitted and is discussed by Wesley Cheung and Anne Fawcett. Readers with comments to contribute are invited to send them as soon as possible, so that they can be considered for publication in the next issue. The series is being coordinated by Steven McCulloch, senior lecturer in human animal studies at the Centre for Animal Welfare, University of Winchester. It aims to provide a framework that will help practising veterinarians find solutions when facing similar dilemmas.

This series gives readers the opportunity to consider and contribute to discussion of some of the ethical dilemmas that can arise in veterinary practice. Each month, a case scenario is presented, followed by discussion of some of the issues involved. In addition, a possible way forward is suggested; however, there is rarely a cut-and-dried answer in such cases, and readers may wish to suggest an alternative approach. This month’s dilemma, ‘Blocked cats and limited finances: an ethical obstruction?’, was submitted and is discussed by David Williams. Readers with comments to contribute are invited to send them as soon as possible, so that they can be considered for publication in the next issue. The series is being coordinated by Steven McCulloch, senior lecturer in human animal studies at the Centre for Animal Welfare, University of Winchester. It aims to provide a framework that will help practising veterinarians find solutions when facing similar dilemmas.

This series gives readers the opportunity to consider and contribute to discussion of some of the ethical dilemmas that can arise in veterinary practice. Each month, a case scenario is presented, followed by discussion of some of the issues involved. In addition, a possible way forward is suggested; however, there is rarely a cut-and-dried answer in such cases, and readers may wish to suggest an alternative approach. This month’s dilemma, ‘Disclosing pre-existing veterinary conditions to insurance companies’, was submitted and is discussed by Kathryn Henderson. Readers with comments to contribute are invited to send them as soon as possible, so that they can be considered for publication in the next issue. The series is being coordinated by Steven McCulloch, senior lecturer in human animal studies at the Centre for Animal Welfare, University of Winchester. It aims to provide a framework that will help practising veterinarians find solutions when facing similar dilemmas.

In this essay I argue that one of the things that matters most to Descartes' account of mind is that we use our minds actively. This is because for him only an active mind is able to re-organize its passionate experiences in such a way that a genuinely human, self-governed life of virtue and true contentment becomes possible. To bring out this connection, I will read the Meditations against the backdrop of Descartes' correspondence with Elisabeth. This will reveal that in Descartes' writings there is a crucial connection between the conception of ourselves as dreamers and the idea that we fail to realize our true potential as self-determined, active agents. Dreams, as Descartes conceives them, are passively received mental states that inhibit our freedom to use reason at will. To awaken here takes the form of activating our thoughts, which holds the key to freeing ourselves from the stimulus-response patterns that Descartes takes to be at work in animal conduct. Applied to the Meditations, these insights suggest that this work engages in questions far beyond the epistemological agenda. By activating the mind, the Meditations teach us how to realize our true human potential as virtuous thinkers and passionate agents.

Festivals and carnivals are social-cultural assemblages of human and non-human entities. This paper investigates interactions between humans and animals by focusing on the Scone Racing Carnival, a key event in the Scone and Upper Hunter Horse Festival. This paper contributes to existing studies of non-metropolitan festivals and animal–human relations by questioning how and why non-humans are enrolled in these cultural events, and the impact this has on place identity. The central argument is that the relationship between humans and thoroughbred horses, in particular, has played a significant role in the creation of a distinctive landscape, a regional identity for the Upper Hunter region of New South Wales, and a local identity for Scone. In turn, the carnival has assisted in maintaining an ‘eque-cultural’ identity through the marketing and annual public celebration of human–horse relationships.

This essay examines the photographic documentation of multispecies encounters by fishermen in Illinois and birder-photographers in Qatar. In the examples I illustrate here, photographs of nonhuman species form an important record of events in which humans encounter other species, be it through sight or sound, in the case of birder–photographers, or through the act of catching and sometimes killing and consuming, in the case of fishermen. Examining these photographs for their content, their composition, and their production reveals clues about the encounters between fishermen, birders, and the species they track. What can these images tell us about the ways in which multispecies imaginings, knowledge, and desires are enacted visually? How does engaging with different groups of species—in this case, fish and birds—require different modes of seeing and looking? I suggest in this essay that these photographs play an important role in how these groups both reflect and produce their relationships—and in particular, their encounters—with other species.

New Zealand is an important place for thoroughbred breeding and racing. Most races are on the flat, but jumps racing is conducted in the cooler months. The 2013 National Jumps Day at Te Rapa, Hamilton, was a significant space for the construction of human–animal relations. Drawing on three bodies of accounts, we ask whether social media contributes to the realignment of perspectives or reinforces existing human–animal relations. We explore competing narratives and demonstrate how animals, people, activities and places are constructed, including making animal deaths unrecognisable to perpetuate activities that are questioned by contemporary animal geographies.

Human–animal interactions (HAI), which may lead to human–animal relationships (HAR), may be positive, neutral, or negative in nature. Zoo studies show that visitors may be stressful, may have no effect, or may be enriching. There is also evidence that good HARs set up between animals and their keepers can have positive effects on animal welfare. However, we need to know more about negative HARs, and as a first step we attempt to do this here by considering cases where animals attack people in the zoo. Due to the sensitivity and rarity of these events data appear sparse and unsystematically collected. Here, information available in the public domain about the circumstances of these attacks has been collated to test hypotheses about negative HAIs derived from a model of zoo HARs. The limited data presented here broadly support the zoo HAR model, and suggest that attacks usually happen in unusual circumstances, where there may be a failure by the animal to recognise the HAR, or where the relationship, if there is one, does not hold; and give some support to the prediction that exposure to many keepers may impair the development of a positive HAR. This study may provide useful information for the zoo community to proactively collect systematic standardised records, which will enable a fuller understanding of zoo HARs, upon which appropriate measures might be adopted to build better zoo HARs, which are likely to positively impact zoo animal welfare, and reduce these rare incidences further. Zoo Biol. 34:1–8, 2015. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals Inc.

Infectious diseases pose a serious threat to the wellbeing of both human and animal populations. Here, in the fifth in Veterinary Record's series of articles promoting One Health, Mathew Dixon, Osman Dar and David Heymann examine lessons learned from previous disease outbreaks; they also consider current threats and how a better understanding of underlying risk factors could stimulate a paradigm shift from treatment to prevention of zoonotic infectious diseases.

I examined human-animal relationships (HARs) in zoo-housed orangutans (Pongo abelii) and gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) to see if they followed patterns similar to conspecific relationships in great apes and humans. Familiarity and social relationships guide humans' and great apes' behaviors with conspecifics. Inter-individual relationships, based on shared social history, and "generalized" relationships, based on a history of interactions with relevant classes of individuals, guide behavior with familiar and unfamiliar conspecifics, respectively. I examined whether both familiarity and social relationships similarly guides great apes' cross-species interactions with humans. I used repeated measures MANOVA to compare hourly rates and average durations of ape-initiated human-directed behaviors (HDBs) between familiar and unfamiliar humans and between great ape species. HDB patterns were consistent with familiarity-based HAR predictions, indicating more negative relationships with unfamiliar humans and more positive relationships with familiar humans. Findings for unfamiliar humans are consistent with negative effects of humans on apes' behavior reported in traditional visitor effect studies (VES). However, findings for familiar humans may be overlooked in VES due to pooling across levels of human familiarity or failure to consider humans other than primarily unfamiliar visitors. Additionally, species differences in apes' HDBs suggest that data pooling across species, common in many zoo studies, may mask important differences. These findings have important methodological implications for studies of human-animal interaction as well as for captive animal wellbeing.

We investigate laypeople's beliefs about the causes of and solutions to out-group dehumanization and prejudice. Specifically, we examine whether nonexperts recognize the role that beliefs in the human–animal divide play in the formation and reduction of intergroup biases, as observed empirically in the interspecies model of prejudice. Interestingly, despite evidence in the present study that human–animal divide beliefs predict greater dehumanization and prejudice, participants strongly rejected the human–animal divide as a probable cause of (or solution to) dehumanization or prejudice. We conclude with a meta-analytic test of the relation between human–animal divide and prejudice (mean r = .34) in the literature, establishing the human–animal divide as an important but largely unrecognized prejudice precursor. Applied implications for the development and implementation of prejudice interventions are considered.

PURPOSE: A concept analysis was performed on human–animal interaction (HAI). DATA SOURCE: Nursing, psychology, and behavioral sciences literature. DATA SYNTHESIS: Uses and definitions associated with HAI were used to articulate the attributes, antecedents, consequences, and empirical referents. Model, borderline, and contrary cases were developed. CONCLUSIONS: HAI is operationally defined. IMPLICATIONS FOR NURSING PRACTICE: Including HAI as a health promotion behavior, within a theoretical framework, appears to be a promising intervention and may be linked to physical activity.

This study explores identity in providing voluntary help for endangered animal species. Identity is a cornerstone of social psychological explanations of helping behaviour but has not been understood in relation to human–animal relationships. Open-ended questionnaires were administered to 111 volunteers working in a range of international conservation projects aimed at protecting endangered animals. Participants were asked their reasons for volunteering, choice of project, experiences and expectations. Thematic textual analysis explored common features across the dataset. Themes identified were identifying with animals, humans dominating nature and collective identity with the organization and fellow volunteers. The paper suggests social psychological knowledge about helping behaviour be applied to understand human–animal interactions to offer insight into the conditions under which we will engage with conservational and environmental concerns and provide aid. Social psychology has been slow to apply its knowledge to an examination of human responses to the challenge of loss of biodiversity. To act, humans must identify with those they seek to protect. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

— Research on human–animal interaction (HAI) is a relatively new field of inquiry for developmental scientists seeking to understand the potential role pets play in children’s health and well-being. It has been documented that pets offer a source of emotional support to children. However, most studies focusing on how animals affect children’s health are limited and stop short of providing answers to key developmental questions. Addressing this need, beginning in 2008, scientists at the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, in collaboration with the Waltham Centre for Pet Nutrition, a subsidiary of the Mars Corporation, convened two international conferences of researchers to review the current science on HAI. These groups crafted a research agenda aimed at looking at how animal interaction affects children and promotes optimal development. This article reviews the key themes emerging from the conferences, addresses the application of HAI to child health and development, and discusses the potential of HAI as an important field of inquiry for developmental scientists.

The Human Animal Infections and Risk Surveillance (HAIRS) group is a collaboration between a number of human and animal health organisations within the UK government. The group aims to provide a 'joined-up' response to emerging diseases that threaten the health of people or animals. Here, Dilys Morgan, who chairs the group, discusses its work, highlighting its response to Schmallenberg virus, and shows how a One Health approach can improve government responses to potential crises.

Relationship, connection, and engagement have emerged as key values in recent studies of human–animal relations. In this article, I call for a reexamination of the productive aspects of detachment. I trace ethnographically the management of everyday relations between biologists and the Kalahari meerkats they study, and I follow the animals’ transformation as subjects of knowledge and engagement when they become the stars of an internationally popular, televised animal soap opera. I argue that treating detachment and engagement as polar opposites is unhelpful both in this ethnographic case and, more broadly, in anthropological discussions of ethics and knowledge making. [human–animal relations, science, media, ethics, engagement, detachment]

This article argues that critical psychological engagement with the field of human–animal relations is largely absent, but of potential significance, and begins to outline more concretely what such a perspective might contribute, especially as a form of social psychology. The article provides a brief overview of the emerging psychology of human–animal relations and the extent to which it emphasises situated human–animal interactions in real‐world settings, including from the standpoint of animal participants. Recent elaborations of the “animal turn” outside of the discipline of psychology are considered, as they place fresh emphasis on human–animal interaction and interdependence and might further extend the boundaries of what counts as relations that matter in critical and social psychology. These foundations are argued to offer an invitation to critical psychology to engage more fully in the study of human–animal relations and enliven it as a result.

We consider one of Eric Olson's chief arguments for animalism about personal identity: the view that we are each identical to a human animal. The argument was originally given in Olson's book The Human Animal. Olson's argument presupposes an epistemological premise which we examine in detail. We argue that the premise is implausible and that Olson's defense of animalism is therefore in trouble.

Relations between humans and nonhuman animals are morally significant, intense, enduring, and pervasive. Presented here are current perspectives on social and psychological aspects of human–animal interactions. The articles in this issue focus on three broad themes—attitudes toward the use of other species, the effects of relationships with companion animals on human health and well-being, and the ethical and policy implications of our interactions with other species. The article represent a mix of theory, qualitative and quantitative empirical approaches, review, and policy recommendations on a topic that has historically been neglected by social scientists.

The creation of chimeras by introducing human stem cells into nonhu- man animals has provoked intense concerns. Addressing objections that appeal to human dignity, I focus in this essay on stem cell research intended to generate human neurons in Great Apes and rodents. After considering samples of dignity- based objections from the literature, I examine the underlying assumption that nonhuman animals have lower moral status than personsFwith particular attention to what it means to speak of higher and lower moral statusFbefore evaluating the chimera research in question. I argue that (1) such experiments involving Great Apes should be prohibited out of respect for the research subjects and (2) such experiments involving rodents may or may not be permissible, depending on how we answer unresolved questions regarding rodents' moral status. In the end, concerns about human dignity prove insignificant.

The present study queried a random, university faculty sample as to their reasons for owning pets. Mere pet ownership was not correlated with self-reported health, happiness, or quality of work life in this sample. Five dominant reasons were given for pet ownership. Women were more likely than men to self-report reasons related to social support for pet ownership, including that a pet helped them get through hard times and that they would be lonely without a pet. Men were more likely to report pragmatic reasons, such as the pet facilitating exercise or serving a useful function. Beliefs in the positive effects of pets on health were typical. Those beliefs in the health promoting aspects of pets are suggested as a link to human health and a promising area for future research.

Domesticated animals are universally familiar. How, when, where and why they became domesticated is less well understood. The genetic revolution of the past few decades has facilitated novel insights into a field that previously was principally the domain of archaeozoologists. Although some of the conclusions drawn from genetic data have proved to be contentious, many studies have significantly altered or refined our understanding of past human animal relationships. This review seeks not only to discuss the wider concerns and ramifications of genetic approaches to the study of animal domestication but also to provide a broader theoretical framework for understanding the process itself. More specifically, we discuss issues related to the terminology associated with domestication, the possibility of domestication genes, and the promise and problems of genetics to answer the fundamental questions associated with domestication.

“To summarize, the human animal has two categories of needs. One set stems from his animal disposition, that side of him previously referred to as the Adam view of man; it is centred on the avoidance of loss of life, hungec pain, sexual deprivation, and on other primary drives, in addition to the infinite varieties of learned fears that become attached to these basic drives. The other segment of man's nature, according to the Abraham concept of the human being, is man's compelling urge to realize his own potentiality by continuous psychological growth.”

Nicholson, N. Managing the Human Animal: Why People Behave the Way They Do in Corporate Services

Review of Nicholson, N. (2000). Managing the Human Animal: Why People Behave the Way They Do in Corporate Settings, Texere Publishing, 316pp. ISBN 1587990318. Evolutionary psychology (EP) has had considerable exposure in academic and popular circles in recent years. Now EP has reached the shores of management and organization behavior. Its agent is Nigel Nicholson, who pitches the book as part conventional academic tome, part pop management best seller. The arguments expand on Nicholson's (e.g. 1997) earlier attempts to persuade us that EP is a radical and challenging perspective that will allow organizations to manage with the grain of human nature.

Lynne Rudder Baker’s “The Ontological Status of Persons” is a sophisticated attempt to answer the difficult, perennial philosophical question, “What is the relationship of human beings to the natural world?“ According to Baker’s double-stranded answer, our having reflective consciousness implies that we are not identical with our bodies, yet we are physical beings who are united with our bodies in a strong metaphysical sense. This answer combines dualistic and materialistic elements in an extremely interesting and novel way. Baker calls the view that we are essentially animals Animalism. The animalist maintains that each of us is identical with a human animal. Baker argues that if Animalism is correct, then we have ontological significance in virtue of our being human animals or organisms, but not in virtue of our being persons. Baker opposes Animalism with the Constitution View. This view implies that we are essentially persons, but only accidentally animals. A further implication is that none of us is identical with a human animal; rather each of us is constituted by a human animal. According to the Constitution View, we have ontological significance in virtue of being persons, but not in virtue of being animals. On the plus side, Baker’s metaphysical theory that some physical objects constitute others accommodates our intuitive or folk-ontological beliefs about the existence and persistence conditions of statues and statue-shaped pieces of bronze, credit cards and credit card-shaped pieces of plastic, and so on. On the minus side, as Baker acknowledges, there is a worry that this metaphysical theory multiplies physical objects unnecessarily. According to Baker’s Constitution View, person is a primary-kind. Such a kind, she says, need not be a kind of a broader kind such as animal. I’m not sure exactly what Baker means by this. In particular, I wonder if she doubts Chisholm’s view that, necessarily, a person is a kind of substance. Baker defends the view that there are primary-kind properties that m essential to one thing and accidental to another. Baker’s view is illustrated by

The concept of self discovery within a constructivist framework is difficult to explain given the central assumption of constructivism that self is a created construct rather than an entity to be discovered. Two problems are identified as impediments to constructivist accounts of the self discovery experience: first, their failure to adequately account for the embodied experience of self, and second, the difficulties inherent in using self as a noun to express a process. It is proposed that if self is considered as a verb, as the action of a body-subject, the verbal contortionism of referring to self as a process in a language that places self as an entity may be overcome. The notion of self as verb places the individual firmly in the role of active embodied participant in the experience of self. The metaphor of “self'” as “dance” is explored to emphasize the materiality of the human animal that is argued to be central to the experience of self discovery.