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This article considers the charge that citizens of developed societies are complicit in large‐scale harms, using climate destabilisation as its central example. It contends that we have yet to create a lived morality – a fabric of practices and institutions – that is adequate to our situation. As a result, we participate in systematic injustice, despite all good efforts and intentions. To make this case, the article draws on recent discussions of Kant's ethics and politics. Section 2 considers Tamar Schapiro's account of how otherwise decent actions can be corrupted by others’ betrayals, and hence fall into complicity. Section 3 turns to discussions by Christine Korsgaard and Lucy Allais, which highlight how people can be left without innocent choices if shared frameworks of interaction do not instantiate core ideals. Section 4 brings these ideas together in order to make sense of the charge of complicity in grave collective harms, and addresses some worries that the idea of unavoidable complicity may raise.

Many attempts have been made to formalize ethical requirements for research. Among the most prominent mechanisms are informed consent requirements and data protection regimes. These mechanisms, however, sometimes appear as obstacles to research. In this opinion paper, we critically discuss conventional approaches to research ethics that emphasize consent and data protection. Several recent debates have highlighted other important ethical issues and underlined the need for greater openness in order to uphold the integrity of health-related research. Some of these measures, such as the sharing of individual-level data, pose problems for standard understandings of consent and privacy. Here, we argue that these interpretations tend to be overdemanding: They do not really protect research subjects and they hinder the research process. Accordingly, we suggest another way of framing these requirements. Individual consent must be situated alongside the wider distribution of knowledge created when the actions, commitments, and procedures of researchers and their institutions are opened to scrutiny. And instead of simply emphasizing privacy or data protection, we should understand confidentiality as a principle that facilitates the sharing of information while upholding important safeguards. Consent and confidentiality belong to a broader set of safeguards and procedures to uphold the integrity of the research process.

Background: The aim of this study was to explore whether the IDEFICS intervention had a differential effect on 11,041 children’s weight trajectories depending on their baseline body mass index status. Methods: Two subgroups of children are considered in the present analysis: those who were overweight or obese prior to the intervention and those who were neither overweight nor obese. Results: Among children in all eight countries who did not have prevalent overweight or obesity (OWOB) at baseline, 2 years later, there was no significant difference between intervention and control groups in risk of having developed OWOB. However, we observed a strong regional heterogeneity, which could be attributed to the presence of one distinctly outlying country, Belgium, where the intervention group had increased risk for becoming overweight. In contrast, among the sample of children with prevalent OWOB at baseline, we observed a significantly greater probability of normalized weight status after 2 years. In other words, a protective effect against persistent OWOB was observed in children in intervention regions compared with controls, which corresponded to an adjusted odds ratio of 0.76 (95% confidence interval: 0.58, 0.98). Discussion: This analysis thus provided evidence of a differential effect of the IDEFICS intervention, in which children with overweight may have benefited without having been specifically targeted. However, no overall primary preventive effect could be observed in children without initial overweight or obesity.

Introduction: As considered in the rest of this volume, the effects of the IDEFICS intervention on obesity rates were not encouraging. This paper considers how far findings from the IDEFICS study and similar intervention studies are relevant to the policy process and political decision-making. Methods: The paper offers theoretical and policy-level arguments concerning the evaluation of evidence and its implications for policymaking. The paper is divided into three parts. The first considers problems in the nature and applicability of evidence gained from school- and community-level obesity interventions. The second part considers whether such interventions present a model that policy-makers could implement. The third part considers how we should think about policy measures given the limited evidence we can obtain and the many different goals that public policy must take account of. Results: The paper argues that (1) there are clear reasons why we are not obtaining good evidence for effective school- and community-level interventions; (2) public policy is not in a good position to mandate larger-scale, long-term versions of these interventions; and (3) there are serious problems in obtaining ‘evidence’ for most public policy options, but this should not deter us from pursuing options that tackle systemic problems and have a good likelihood of delivering benefits on several dimensions. Conclusions: Research on school- and community-level obesity interventions has not produced much evidence that is directly relevant to policymaking. Instead, it shows how difficult it is to affect obesity rates without changing wider social and economic factors. Public policy should focus on these.

Introduction: From April 2008 to August 2010 the Identification and prevention of Dietary- and lifestyle-induced health EFfects In Children and infantS (IDEFICS) intervention aimed to encourage healthier diets, higher physical activity levels and lower stress levels among European children and their families. While the intervention was intended to improve children’s health, we also wished to assess whether there were unwelcome aspects or negative side-effects. Therefore all parents of children who participated in the IDEFICS intervention were asked for their views on different aspects of the intervention. Methods: A total of 10,016 parents of children who participated in the IDEFICS survey and who were involved in the intervention were invited to complete a questionnaire on positive and negative impacts of the intervention. Responses to each of the statements were coded on a four point Likert-type scale. Demographic data were collected as part of the baseline (T0) and first follow-up (T1) surveys; intervention exposure data was also collected in the T1 follow-up survey. Anthropometric data was collected in the same surveys, and child’s weight status was assessed according to Cole and Lobstein. After initial review of the univariate statistics multi-level logistic regression was conducted to analyse the influence of socio-economic factors, child’s weight status and intervention exposure on parental responses. Results: In total 4,997 responses were received. Approval rates were high, and few parents reported negative effects. Parents who reported higher levels of exposure to the intervention were more likely to approve of it and were also no more likely to notice negative aspects. Less-educated and lower income parents were more likely to report that the intervention would make a lasting positive difference, but also more likely to report that the intervention had had negative effects. Parents of overweight and obese children were more likely to report negative effects – above all, that ‘the intervention had made their child feel as if he/she was “fat” or “overweight.”’ Conclusion: While the results represent a broad endorsement of the IDEFICS intervention, they also suggest the importance of vigilance concerning the psychological effects of obesity interventions on overweight and obese children.

Who, in particular, may hold us responsible for our moral failings? Most discussions of moral responsibility bracket this question, despite its obvious practical importance. In this article, I investigate the moral authority involved and how it arises in the context of personal relationships, such as friendship or family relations. My account is based on the idea that parties to a personal relationship not only share responsibility for their relationship, but also — to some degree that is negotiated between them — for one another's lives. In sharing these responsibilities, we grant people a particular authority to respond to us. By highlighting the responsibility that we assume when we hold someone responsible, I also suggest that this analysis contains important lessons for thinking about responsibility in other contexts.

Arthur Ripstein's Force and Freedom insists that, ‘Freedom, understood as independence of another person’s choice, is [all] that matters’. In this paper I suggest that this premise leads Ripstein to an instrumentalisation of democracy which neglects a properly public and collective notion of freedom. The paper first criticises Ripstein’s key argument against any extension of public purposes beyond the upholding of persons’ ‘independence of others’ choice’. More constructively, the paper then suggests that a space of public freedom is opened up when people deliberate in order to form and pursue democratic purposes. Citizens may act together to promote ends that they think are worthwhile, without dominating one another or restricting individual freedom.

Scientists working on an obesity intervention project were asked questions, via questionnaire and interviews, relating to ethical and public-policy aspects of tackling childhood obesity. The main areas of enquiry concerned elements responsible for the rise in childhood obesity, key ethical areas of obesity interventions, helpfulness and effectiveness of policy measures, socioeconomic factors, and media coverage and political debate. Key results from this indicate that: there is disagreement about the amount of information about the causes of obesity that is needed before implementing interventions; an improvement in health and nutrition education of both children and adults through positive messages is seen as highly desirable; scientists regard environment, rather than genetics, as playing the major role in rising obesity levels; the level of individual responsibility being placed on parents and children may be unfair and unhelpful; whole-system, long-term and sensitive policy actions are needed rather than relying on quick fixes such as miracle pills; and there are country-specific issues related to rising obesity levels that need to be considered, though the respondents tended to have a great deal of faith in EU-wide interventions.

In this article I discuss Geoffrey Vickers' ideas from the perspective of moral and political philosophy. His thought is presented through three key terms, which I suggest can encapsulate his philosophy: (i) our human capacity to respond aptly to our situation; (ii) the analysis of modern society in terms of institutions; and (iii) the moral importance of responsibility to the maintenance of human culture and cooperation.

In this essay I would like to discuss some continuities and differences between two thinkers, Kant and Nietzsche, whom I take to be among the very greatest of modern moral philosophers. My basic line of argument will be as follows: despite his apparent neglect and occasional dismissals, Nietzsche’s thought reveals a fine appreciation of Kant’s philosophy, and can itself be read as one of the most profound responses to Kant’s ethics that the tradition has so far accorded us. While the differences that I shall mention are easily seen and often taken “as read,” I think the continuities have been too little appreciated, and that very often Kant and Nietzsche are treading the same ground. What I leave open, however, is how far Nietzsche himself should be thought more than an agent provocateur in these matters: he can show us, I think, that certain, fairly systematic aspects of Kant’s morality are unattractive or unconvincing—and this even on rather Kantian premises. But whether a Kantian moralist ought to jump ship with Nietzsche is another matter altogether and not, indeed, a case I wish to propose. For the purposes of orientation, I begin by considering the great apparent gulf between Kant’s and Nietzsche’s enterprises—a gulf so wide that some may suspect I have chosen a rather fruitless topic. I shall also suggest, however, that Kant’s position is not without ambiguity, and this provides, as it were, room for leverage within his philosophy—room indeed exploited by Nietzsche. These explicit differences are grounded in a whole set of largely implicit criticisms on Nietzsche’s part, and it is to what I take to be the overall

L'A. souleve la question du sens chez Kant qui s'inscrit dans la problematique de la liberte de l'agent moral et qui concerne l'ensemble de son projet critique. Examinant la reponse particuliere que fournit Kant en termes d'imperatif categorique, et examinant la question generale du sens des affaires humaines, l'A. montre que la foi kantienne en la raison pratique fait defaut en matiere de sens et de dignite humaine, d'une part, et que l'ambition d'etablir un principe moral theorique empeche Kant de decouvrir le sens empirique de l'activite individuelle et collective, d'autre part