Search

Israel is suspected to be endemic for hepatitis E virus (HEV) because of its geographic location and the large-scale immigration from endemic countries. Although no cases of local HEV infection have been diagnosed, a serological survey would provide indirect evidence for such infection. We examined sera from 1,416 healthy subjects, including 1,139 Jews from various regions of Israel and 277 Arabs, most of whom reside in the West Bank of the Jordan River. In addition, we tested 13 non-A, non-B, and non-C viral hepatitis patients. Sera were screened for antibody to hepatitis E virus (anti-HEV) by a newly developed enzyme immunoassay (EIA) and by immuno-blots for both IgG and IgM anti-HEV activity. Positive samples were confirmed by neutralization. The seroprevalence found by EIA was 2.81% and 1.81% in the Jewish and Arab populations, respectively. More than a 2-fold higher prevalence in males compared to females and an increase with age were found in both populations. However, these differences were nonsignificant. The geographical distribution was even throughout the country, except for two clusters of 3 and 4 seropositive individuals possibly reflecting past foci of infection. Eight of 37 ElA-positive sera were positive for IgG, and 3 were positive for IgM by the immunoblot assay. Among hepatitis patients (9 acute and 4 chronic), one patient with chronic hepatitis was positive for both IgG and IgM. Our study provides indirect evidence that Israel is endemic for HEV. The lack of outbreaks may be attributed to generally good hygienic conditions and a controlled potable water supply, while unrecognized sporadic cases may be due to the unavailability of diagnostic tests. © 1995 Wiley-Liss, Inc.

Though less frequent with the years, intermittent calls for ‘reflation’ to stimulate the economy can occasionally still be heard from Keynesian economists and politicians. Eli Schwartz, Professor of Economics at Leghigh University, Pennsylvania, examines the effects of inflation, anticipated and unanticipated, on participants in the economy. Professor Schwartz argues that, in spite of the short-term political benefits, the longer-term costs are so high that less myopic politicians may perceive the electoral advantages in tackling inflation.

1) The corporate income tax is regressive between shareholders since the imputed burden is ordinarily a larger share of a poorer stockholder's total income than of a richer stockholder's income.1 2) Variations between corporations' dividend policy can have an independent effect on the relative tax burdens of individual shareholders who would otherwise be in the same bracket. 3) The corporate tax can distort the corporation's choice between debt and equity financing. 4) The separate tax on corporation income may encourage retained earnings over dividends thereby retarding capital mobility and distorting the individual choice between consumption and savings.

I. INTRODUCTION IN BOTH ECONOMICS AND finance there hardly exists a complete model of the optimum capital structure of the firm. Many of the concepts needed to construct such a model are available in the literature, but in most cases the authors have been content to set up and use only such partial constructs as would serve their larger purposes.' The present article is an attempt to develop a self-contained theory of the financial structure of the individual firm. It has been said that the problem of the capital or financial structure is a firm, not a plant, decision. The underlying notion is that, whereas the optimum output (a plant function) is uniquely determined if demand and costs are known, financing is, in large part, a matter of the individual taste for risk and is therefore an ownership or firm decision, for which a unique solution may not be possible. I should like to present the contrary view, that there is perhaps a single optimum capital structure for any given firm or that, at the least, the range of rational capital structures is narrowly bounded. In the real world, uncertainty and lack of knowledge as to the relevant variables may make this optimum solution a difficult achievement. Under cer* The author is indebted to Professor Elmer C. Bratt for valuable criticism on an earlier draft of this paper. He is very grateful to Professor Herbert Fraser, of Muhlenberg

Professor Eli Schwartz of Lehigh University reviews the theories of Pigou, Simons, Keynes and Hansen concerning unemployment. He concludes that we are in a‘Pigovian’world where unemployment is due to defects in the labour market.

Reviews in The Economis Journal reveal the unwillingness of economists hostile to the market to acknowledge the failure of collectivist policies. Professor Schwartz here replies to Keith Middlemas.