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open access article Corporations use global sustainability reporting principles, certifications, guidelines, and indices to promote corporate transparency. However, the effectiveness of adopting these global transparency approaches, either separately or collectively, in increasing firm value is as yet unclear. Thus, we examine whether different global transparency approaches engender different outcomes related to firm value and whether adopting a comprehensive or integrated global transparency approach could better enhance firm value. We use a sample comprising 6,978 firm-year observations of firms listed in the USA (S&P 500), Canada (S&P-TSX 221) and the UK (FTSE 350) from 2013 to 2019. A fixed-effects regression model is then used to examine the primary associations in this study. This technique was complemented by a two-step dynamic generalised method of moment (GMM) model to overcome the expected endogeneity concerns. Our findings indicate that adopting global sustainability reporting principles, certifications, and an integrated global transparency approach are positively attributable to the market value of firms. In contrast, firms’ adoption of international guidelines and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) ratings cannot predict the firm value in the study context. Our evidence implies that firms’ adoption of an integrated global transparency approach adds the most value to those firms when compared to adopting a standalone transparency approach across the three sampled countries. Our study provides practical implications for policymakers and corporate managers and suggests avenues for future studies to build upon our findings.

info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO/Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia/ECO2013-43838-P/ES/DISCRECCIONALIDAD DIRECTIVA Y RESPONSABILIDAD SOCIAL CORPORATIVA: EFECTO EN LA REPUTACION Y EL COSTE DE CAPITAL The European Union has made the fight against climate change and the achievement of a sustainable economy political priorities. To promote the ecological transition of companies and corporate transparency, a broad regulatory framework has been developed. This paper analyses the effect of institutional pressures derived from this regulatory framework on the environmental information disclosed by 832 multinationals in the period 2011–2020. The results reveal a positive global effect, although, at an individual level, this effect is only maintained for the regulations and recommendations related to non-financial information and the European Green Deal. Furthermore, the impact differs depending on the category of environmental information disclosed Consejería de Educacion, Junta de Castilla y Leon, Grant/Award Number: SA069G18; Consellería de Cultura, Educacion e Ordenacion Universitaria, Xunta de Galicia, Grant/Award Number: 2020 GPC GI-2016; Junta de Castilla Leon y Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional, Grant/Award Number: CLU-2019-03 Unidad de Excelencia GECOS; Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovacion, Grant/Award Number: ECO2013-43838P; Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovacion y Universidades, Grant/Award Number: RTI2018-093423-B-I00; Universidad de Salamanca, Grant/Award Number: USAL2017-DISAQ SI

We synthesise the empirical studies on innovation in the accounting, finance, and corporate governance disciplines using Bushman and Smith’s corporate transparency framework as our theoretical lens The review presents competing findings on the association between financial reporting and innovation Most of the reviewed studies fail to address the critical question of how the financial reporting system affects the interactions among financial development, corporate governance and innovation We suggest future research, ranging from enriching the theoretical perspectives to incorporating the future of innovation research in the COVID-19 environment © 2021 Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand

We study how cultural norms from overseas affect corporate transparency. Using cultural background information on board directors, we document that corporations with directors with culture from overseas have greater corporate transparency. Specifically, we show that firms with directors with foreign cultural background have more voluntary information disclosure, more analyst coverage, more accurate earnings forecast and less earnings management. Moreover, these firms are more likely to choose Big 4 auditors. We also find that the relationship between culture from overseas and corporate transparency are more strongly positive when the directors have foreign experience from more incorruptible countries or districts. Our findings provide evidence on how directors spread transparency cultural norms rooted in their hearts to firms in developing countries.

Combining the postulates of the upper echelons theory and the economic theories of information disclosure, one might expect that the effect of chief executive officers' (CEOs') managerial ability on their firms' disclosure policies has both a direct and indirect nature. The latter would be associated with the mediating role of corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance on the relationship between CEOs' ability and corporate transparency. Using a sample of 956 international firms over the period 2006–2014 (6,442 firm-year observations), we examine the role that the CEO ability plays in determining the relevance of CSR disclosures and whether this role is mediated by CSR performance. By proposing several regression models, we document that more able CEOs are more willing to disclose comparable and useful CSR information that favours stakeholder engagement. This relationship is mediated by the impact that CEO's ability has over the implementation of sustainability strategies that improve CSR performance.

Institutional investors show increasing interest in how companies align their corporate social responsibility strategies with the sustainable development goals (SDGs) proposed by the United Nations (UN). The information disclosed in this regard is essential to know and monitor business contribution to the 2030 Agenda. In this paper, we analyze the influence that institutional investors have on the adoption of the disclosure strategy established by UN and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)—GRI-SDG Compass. The results obtained for a sample of 989 international companies, which prepare their sustainability reports following the GRI guidelines, show that ownership by foreign investors, pension funds, and “other” investors boosts the relevance of the information disclosed in relation to the 2030 Agenda. On the contrary, government, financial institutions, and cross holdings have no impact on the information systems developed.

We draw upon the stigma literature and strategic stakeholder management model to develop a framework capable of explaining the link between environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) engagement and financial performance of stigmatized firms, taking stakeholder‐oriented governance and density of local stigmatized firms into consideration. Using a uniquely compiled dataset of Chinese firms specifically monitored by the Ministry of Environmental Protection of China, we conducted propensity score matching analysis to estimate the impact of stigma on corporate financial performance and corporate environmental responsibility. The result shows that the financial performance of stigmatized firms is negatively affected by the stigma label, spurring them to engage in more ECSR than their peers to improve their legitimacy. Though ECSR engagement of stigmatized firms is found to be negatively associated with their financial performance in current study. Our results also confirm that (a) the financial performance of stigmatized firms is positively affected by two proxies for corporate stakeholder‐oriented governance (i.e., institutional ownership and corporate transparency) and negatively affected by the density of local stigmatized firms; (b) corporate stakeholder‐oriented governance compensates for the negative effect of ECSR engagement; (c) high intensity of local stigmatized firms provides focal firms with an opportunity to improve their financial performance through ECSR engagement; and (d) the positive effects of corporate stakeholder‐oriented governance are diminished by the density of local stigmatized firms.

The complexity of the business world and current business models has motivated an increasing number of companies to disclose corporate information through sustainability reports. This reporting and stakeholders engagement may bring shared value to business and society in general although working towards sustainable development goals. This work adopts a new analytical approach by determining the global reporting initiative indicators related to labour practices and decent work, human rights, society, and product responsibility that are reported less frequently by companies. The final objective is to predict the influence that society's cultural values will play as a normative institutional pressure in their evolution. The results obtained for a sample comprising the 201 largest international companies that report in accordance with the recommendations of the G4 Guide in 2015 indicate that more than 50% of these large companies do not report specific mechanisms implemented to avoid violations of human rights and labour rights, or information on incidents related to production and commercial relations. Regulatory pressures associated with cultural values have limited effectiveness as drivers of greater corporate transparency in this area, as they are able to predict a favourable evolution for only 40% of companies that currently do not report.

This study investigated the relationship between corporate efficiency and corporate sustainability to determine whether firms concerned about environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues can also be efficient and profitable. We applied data envelopment analysis to estimate corporate efficiency and investigated the nonlinear relationship between corporate efficiency and ESG disclosure. Evidence shows that corporate transparency regarding ESG information has a positive association with corporate efficiency at the moderate disclosure level, rather than at the high or low disclosure level. Governance information disclosure has the strongest positive linkage with corporate efficiency, followed by social and environmental information disclosure. Moreover, we explored the relationship between particular ESG activities and corporate financial performance (CFP), including corporate efficiency, return on assets and market value. We found that most of the ESG activities reveal a non-negative relationship with CFP. These findings may provide evidence about voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategy choices for enhancing corporate sustainability.

This paper aims to assess the state of the art, the structure and the evolution of the debate on control enhancing mechanisms (hereafter CEMs). It combines bibliometric and qualitative methodologies to analyze 210 articles published in scientific journals up to 2014. The findings show that the academics’ interest has increased over time, and the research has simultaneously developed along two main poles: antecedents and consequences of the proportionality principle. The analyses also reveal that the debate stems from the US studies on the legal principles of disproportionate ownership devices at the end of 19th century, and has been strongly fueled by the ‘law and finance’ theorists. This paper has both theoretical and practical implications. First, it provides insights into underexplored issues where future research efforts could be focused. Second, it supports new policy-making interventions to CEMs and encourages investor regulation and corporate transparency.

This study investigates how the introduction of IFRS 8 affects segment disclosures for a large sample of European firms. In contrast to prior research we focus on geographical segments. Similar to SFAS 131, IFRS 8 aims to improve segment disclosures by requiring a “management approach”, which introduces considerable reporting discretion. We compare a hand-collected sample of restated IFRS 8 segment disclosures with historical IAS 14R disclosures. We find that geographical segments are more disaggregated under IFRS 8, although the number of financial items per segment and the likelihood of reporting segmental earnings decline. More importantly, we document predictable heterogeneity in the disclosure quality of segment information. First, we find that firms reporting poorly under IAS 14 continue to do so under IFRS 8, suggesting more cross-sectional divergence under the latter standard. Second, our results show that the impact of IFRS 8 varies with corporate transparency. Finally, we fail to document any clear economic and informational effects post IFRS 8, even for firms that exhibit disclosure quality improvements. Overall, we provide comprehensive evidence on the effects of IFRS 8 on geographical segment information and show that prior reporting behavior is a useful indicator for the impact of a new standard.

Prior evidence on the relationship between demographic diversity in corporate boards and firm performance is mixed. Some studies have found that the relationship between board attributes and firm performance is driven by a firm's information environment. This study examines whether corporate transparency also impacts the relationship between gender and ethnic diversity of directors and firm performance. To test this hypothesis, I use a Herfindahl Index based on directors� gender and ethnicity to measure board diversity, and an opacity index based on analyst following, analyst forecast error, bid-ask spread, and share turnover to measure corporate transparency. I find that the cost of capital is positively associated with social concentration on corporate boards and that this premium is larger for highly opaque firms. In further analysis, I find that the interaction of corporate information environment and social concentration on boards is more important for operationally complex firms. Compared with simple firms, operationally complex firms pay a greater premium on their capital if they have a socially concentrated board and an opaque information environment.

This study proposes a new corporate transparency index comprising four sub-indices: financial, governance, operational, and social transparency. Using our index, we examine the effects of corporate transparency on firm value and the profitability of 162 Korean venture firms. Results show that corporate transparency is positively associated with firm profitability. Financial transparency is positively related to firm profitability and negatively associated with firm value. Firms with a greater level of governance transparency have a higher firm value and a lower return on assets. Operational transparency is negatively related to firm value. Social transparency is positively associated with firm value and profit.

We find that listed parents’ carve‐outs have investment‐cash‐flow sensitivities 70 per cent lower than unlisted parents’ carve‐outs, on average. Such a finding is stronger when we consider only equity carve‐outs in technological industries. The finding suggests that listed parents are more capable of alleviating the financial constraint of their carved‐out units than private parents. Our further analysis shows that listed parents’ carve‐outs also have a lower cost of equity than their counterparts, but such difference cannot be explained by corporate transparency, as implied by analyst coverage and analysts’ forecast dispersion. Therefore, we argue that the benefits from affiliation with a listed parent to the carve‐out come mainly from the parent’s financial support rather than an increase in corporate transparency.

WeexaminehowCEOpoweraffectstheextentofanalystcoverage.CEOpowercan influence a CEO’s incentives to disclose information. The amount of information disclosed by the CEO in turn influences the information environment, which affects financial analysts’ incentives to follow the firm. Consistent with this notion, we show that firms with powerful CEOs are covered by fewer analysts. In addition, the evidence shows that firms with more powerful CEOs experience less information asymmetry.PowerfulCEOsarewellinsulatedandhavefewerincentivestoconceal information, resulting in more transparency. The information provided to investors directlybythefirmsubstitutesfortheinformationintheanalyst’sreport.Asaresult, the demand for analyst coverage is lower. Our results are important because they show that CEO power affects important corporate outcomes such as corporate transparency and analyst following.

Using a panel data set of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), we find corporate transparency to be positively associated with REIT growth. These results suggest that greater transparency facilitates firm growth by relaxing information-based constraints on external financing. The magnitude of this effect is larger in the equity market than in the debt market. Moreover, the sensitivity of investment to cash flows is decreasing in transparency, evidence that transparency relaxes liquidity constraints. Finally, we find more transparent REITs are less likely to crash.

Strategic corporate and public affairs communication about Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has emerged as a major component of corporate efforts to interact with their stakeholders and society at large. Non-financial reporting, and CSR reporting in particular, is now seen as an essential corporate communication process by most members of a company's stakeholder community. This growth in CSR reporting has been driven by the need to increase corporate transparency and accountability concerning social and environmental issues. Arguably, the European Union is the most progressive region in adopting CSR reporting. Almost all of Europe's top 100 companies report on social and environmental performance, whilst figures for the USA and the rest of the world are much lower. The latest Accountability Rating concludes that ‘Europe leads, America lags’ after measuring companies' social and environmental impacts. The authors argue that visual communication is as important as words and numbers in creating meaning and assess UK and German Companies' non-financial performance. Utilizing a range of research methods including content analysis and semiotic interpretation the authors propose a typology of images used in non-financial reporting. This typology and associated conceptual development can used to more accurately define and interpret CSR and sustainability. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

This paper examines whether a country's corporate transparency environment, which includes the quality of accounting information, contributes to efficient resource allocation. Based on a cross-country study of 37 manufacturing industries in 37 countries, we provide three pieces of related evidence. First, we find the contemporaneous correlations in industry growth rates across country pairs are higher when there is a greater level of corporate transparency in the country pairs, after controlling for country-level economic and financial development. Second, we find the influence of transparency on these correlations is stronger when country pairs are at similar levels of economic development (GDP). Finally, when we control for the level of transparency explained by a country's institutions in place, we find that residual transparency (unexplained by country-level factors) is associated with industry-specific growth rates. Taken together, the results are consistent with corporate transparency facilitating the allocation of resources across industry sectors. © 2009 The Accounting Research Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business.

In the last months of 1997, the value of the Korean currency lost over half its value against the dollar, and the ruling party was swept from power in presidential elections. One of the fundamental causes of this national economic crisis was the widespread failure of Korean companies to earn their cost of capital, which contributed to massive shareholder losses and calls for corporate governance reform. Among the worst performers, and hence the main targets of governance reform, were family-controlled Korean business groups known as chaebol. Besides pursuing growth and size at the expense of value, such groups were notorious for expropriating minority shareholders through “tunneling” activities and other means. The reform measures introduced by the new administration were a mix of market-based solutions and government intervention. The government-engineered, large-scale swaps of business units among the largest chaebol—the so-called “big deals” that were designed to force each of the groups to identify and specialize in a core business—turned out to be failures, with serious unwanted side effects. At the same time, however, new laws and regulations designed to increase corporate transparency, oversight, and accountability have had clearly positive effects on Korean governance. Thanks to reductions in barriers to foreign ownership of Korean companies, such ownership had risen to about 37% at the end of 2006, up from just 13% ten years earlier. And in addition to the growing pressure for better governance from foreign investors, several newly formed Korean NGOs have pushed for increased transparency and accountability, particularly among the largest chaebol. The best governance practices in Korea today can be seen mainly in three kinds of corporations: (1) newly privatized companies; (2) large corporations run by professional management; and (3) banks with substantial equity ownership in the hands of foreign investors. The improvements in governance achieved by such companies—notably, fuller disclosure, better alignment of managerial incentives with shareholder value, and more effective oversight by boards—have enabled many of them to meet the global standard. And the governance policies and procedures of POSCO, the first Korean company to list on the New York Stock Exchange—as well as the recent recipient of a large equity investment by Warren Buffett—are held up as a model of best practice. At the other end of the Korean governance spectrum, however, there continue to be many large chaebol-affiliated or family-run companies that have resisted such reforms. And aided by the popular resistance to globalization, the lobbying efforts of such firms have succeeded not only in reducing the momentum of the Korean governance reform movement, but in reversing some of the previous gains. Most disturbing is the current push to allow American style anti-takeover devices, which, if successful, would weaken the disciplinary effect of the market for corporate control.

Using analysts' forecast error and forecast dispersion of firms covered by the I/B/E/S database, this study examines the change in information asymmetry of Korean firms around the financial crisis of 1997. Results show that the information asymmetry of Korean firms is lower after the financial crisis than before, implying that corporate transparency did, in effect, improve with the change in business environment. In addition, this study finds that chaebol firms have higher information asymmetry than non-chaebol firm, and also that the corporate transparency improvement of chaebol firms is not higher than that of non-chaebol firms in the post-crisis period despite the reforms particularly targeted to chaebol firms after the financial crisis.

This paper focuses on flows to emerging capital mar- kets (ECMs) and examines the importance of corporate transparency and public governance in attracting portfolio flows to ECMs. This paper's empirical investi- gation centers on the hypothesis that ceteris paribus , ECMs with better quality accounting standards and good governance attract higher levels of portfolio equity and bond flows. To assess the incremental impact of each of these factors, a pooled time series, cross-sectional model was econometrically tested for 17 ECMS over the 1998-2002 time period. Our empirical analysis demonstrates a positive association between public governance, corporate transparency, and portfolio flows after controlling for other macroeconomic factors. The results suggest that good public governance and high accounting quality are important determinants of portfolio flows to ECMs. Finally, the paper establishes that while portfolio equity flows are significantly attracted to ECMs with strong democratic institutions, there is no significant association between portfolio bond flows and the presence of democratic institutions.

Sustainable corporate performance (SCP) requires balancing a corporation's economic, social, and environmental performance. This research explores values, beliefs about the importance of SCP, and buying behaviors of supermarket customers from within a stakeholder framework. Beliefs about the importance of SCP (both social and environmental, but not economic) were found to be related to values. Also, it was found that customers' environmentally responsible buying behaviors were related to their beliefs about the importance of environmental SCR However their socially responsible buying was not related to their beliefs about the importance of social SCP. Responsible buying behavior may be facilitated by providing reliable information about environmental and social aspects of products. Marketing professionals have a central role to play in moving towards a greater level of corporate transparency and sustainability. (C) 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Using a unique market setting in Hong Kong, where (i) all firms release earnings and dividend information in the same announcement; (ii) corporate transparency is low; (iii) dividend income is non-taxable and (iv) corporate ownership is highly concentrated, we re-examine the corroboration effects of earnings and dividends. We use the control firm approach to avoid the return estimation bias resulting from observation clustering. We also add in variables and use econometric procedure to control for the potential impacts of earnings management, special dividends and heteroskedasticity. Our findings show that there exists a corroboration effect between the jointly announced signals.

In this paper we study when it is advantageous to improve corporate transparency by allowing shareholders direct access to corporate information and when it is preferable to rely on a reporting system in which shareholders only gain access to information that management chooses to disclose. We show that in an agency model that allows for contract renegotiation, the desirability of a fully transparent reporting regime hinges on the stewardship properties of the information in question. Specifically, information that is mainly useful for predicting future events and of little use for evaluating past actions should only be made available to the public through management's self-interested disclosures. Only if the information is useful for making inference about managerial actions can it be optimal to have full corporate transparency, so that outsiders have independent access to the same information as management.

Corporate governance has received much attention in recent years, partly due to the Asian financial crisis. We review the literature on corporate governance issues in Asia to develop region-specific and general lessons. Much attention has been given to poor corporate sector performance, but most studies do not suggest that Asian firms were badly run. The literature does confirm the limited protection of minority rights in Asia, allowing controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders. Agency problems have been exacerbated by low corporate transparency, associated with rent-seeking and relationship-based transactions, extensive group structures and diversification, and risky financial structures. The controlling shareholder bears some of agency costs in the form of share price discounts and expenditures on monitoring, bonding and reputation building. The Asian financial crisis further showed that conventional and alternative corporate governance mechanisms can have limited effectiveness in systems with weak institutions and poor property rights. Overall, the understanding of the determinants of firm organizational structures, corporate governance practices and outcomes remains limited, however.

The recent economic turmoil in Asia has led to a wider recognition of the importance of corporate transparency and disclosures in financial dealings. The objective of this study is to provide comprehensive and up-to-date evidence of current practice and perceived effectiveness of corporate disclosure of listed companies in an emerging economy—Hong Kong. The study compares the perceptions of chief financial officers (CFOs) and financial analysts about a variety of information flow, disclosure and capital market efficiency issues. It also seeks to determine whether there is a perceived need for increased financial reporting regulations and to what extent this and other alternative means might improve market functioning. While both subject groups believed that a majority of firms only adopt a conservative one-way disclosure strategy and the existence of a communication gap, analysts perceived a much higher need than CFOs for increased financial reporting regulations. Neither group thought that enhancing disclosure requirements alone would suffice to close this gap. Instead, they suggested an improvement in the quality of the communication and disclosure processes through means such as choosing more appropriate communication media, formulating a more proactive disclosure strategy, enhancing investor relationship, and voluntarily reporting more information desired by users.

This article surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEALS WITH the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. How do the suppliers of finance get managers to return some of the profits to them? How do they make sure that managers do not steal the capital they supply or invest it in bad projects? How do suppliers of finance control managers? At first glance, it is not entirely obvious why the suppliers of capital get anything back. After all, they part with their money, and have little to contribute to the enterprise afterward. The professional managers or entrepreneurs who run the firms might as well abscond with the money. Although they sometimes do, usually they do not. Most advanced market economies have solved the problem of corporate governance at least reasonably well, in that they have assured the flows of enormous amounts of capital to firms, and actual repatriation of profits to the providers of finance. But this does not imply that they have solved the corporate governance problem perfectly, or that the corporate governance mechanisms cannot be improved. In fact, the subject of corporate governance is of enormous practical impor