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A decision maker (DM) makes choices from di erent sets of alternatives. The DM is initially fully ignorant of the payo associated to each alternative, and learns these payo s only after a large number of choices have been made. We show that, in the presence of an outside option once payo s are learned, the optimal choice rule from sets of alternatives is one that is as if the DM had strict preferences over all alternatives. Under this model, the DM has preferences for preferences while being ignorant of what preferences are \right".

We hypothesize that if people are motivated by a particular social preference, then choosing in accordance with this preference will lead to an identifiable pattern of eye movements. We track eye movements while subjects make choices in simple three-person distribution experiments. We characterize each choice in terms of three different types of social preferences: efficiency, maxi-min, and envy. For the characterization, we use either the choice data or the eye movement data. The evidence indicates that distributional choices are broadly consistent with the choice rule implied by eye movements. In other words, what subjects appear to be interested in when you look at their choices corresponds to what they appear to be interested in when you look at their eye movements. This correspondence lends credibility to the behavioral relevance of social preferences models.

The aim of this work is to solve the backward problem for a time-fractional diffusion equation with variable coefficients in a general bounded domain. The problem is ill-posed in L-2 norm sense. An iteration scheme is proposed to obtain a regularized solution. Two kinds of convergence rates are obtained using an a priori regularization parameter choice rule and an a posteriori regularization parameter choice rule. Numerical examples in one-dimensional and two-dimensional cases are provided to show the effectiveness of the proposed methods. (C) 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

This paper reports the results of two experiments to investigate the effects of payoff alterations in two-person symmetric games. The initial experiment involved 60 subjects, each of whom could earn from £0 to £15, depending on the interaction of their decisions and the unknown decisions of one other person. All decisions were made without feedback to isolate the impact on subjects' behaviour of the game's parameters. A primary aim was to see if the games had strategically distinct structures, or whether uncertainty over the choice rule of others would influence choice behaviour and lessen this independence. An alternative model of rational choice, making allowance for uncertainty in the decision environment, was proposed to capture subjects' behaviour. The results indicated that the frontiers of most of the games had no impact on choice behaviour other than through the magnitude of the change in payoffs. The model received strong support across an identifiable set of ‘frontierless’ games. However, the variety of games was not sufficient to provide a comprehensive test. A second experiment was recently held to close these gaps. Fifty subjects took part, each of whom earned from A$0 to A$24, averaging A$17. The findings provided broad additional support for the theory.

Is it “fair” for one generation to use up, wholly or to a degree, resources which cannot be replaced? By evaluating projects involving non-replaceable resources with discount rates are future benefits undervalued?Discounted net present value is found to be a poor allocator of scarce resources. Another choice rule, Page and Ferejohn's Dominance Rule, also contains flaws. A “partitioned” approach, dividing the time horizon into sections, is an improvement and has advantages. While this third approach has basic uncertainties, it may be used to meet nondeferrable decisions while problems of equity and preference are being studied.

A review of the relationship between schedule of reinforcement, response rate, and choice suggests that certain unifying concepts from economics can contribute to a more complete science of behavior. Four points are made: 1) a behavioral experiment is an economic system and its characteristics—open or closed—can strongly determine the results; 2) reinforcers can be distinguished by a functional property called elasticity; 3) reinforcers may interact as complements as well as substitutes; 4) no simple choice rule, such as strict matching, can account for all choice behavior.