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Since 1989, no major European merger has been able to go through without EU approval. The introduction of a centralized merger control procedure was another increase in the powers of the Commission’s Directorate‐General for Competition (DG COMP). While some see it playing a neo‐mercantilist role in a positive European integration, others underline its neoliberal ideological roots. Through our analysis of all merger decisions made between 1990 and 2016 (6,161 cases), we instead find evidence for market‐centred negative integration: DG COMP is particularly harsh towards coordinated market economies and targets sectors that have high levels of state intervention, thus thwarting the rise of ‘European champions’. Our interviews with merger experts and the decision citation data further suggest that this market‐centred logic of enforcement is not necessarily driven by ideology, but by the silent logic of bureaucratic autonomy. We thus contribute to the debate on the EU as a supranational force of economic liberalization. Introduction I Conceptual Framework II Data and Variables III Results IV Discussion: The Autonomy of DG COMB Conclusion Supporting Information References Interviews

The declaration of a state of national disaster in South Africa, due to the COVID‐19 pandemic, was followed by excessive‐pricing regulations pertaining to certain consumer and medical products and services. The regulations and their application suggest an intertemporal benchmark to judge excessive pricing, deviating from previous practice. Intertemporal comparisons assume a structural shift during COVID‐19 that changes competitive conditions, related to changes in consumer behaviour. Such comparisons must also account for demand and cost changes. While the COVID‐19 regulations allow for cost‐based price increases, demand‐based increases are not explicitly accounted for, suggesting that the regulations are framed more generally as price‐gouging regulations. The differences between price‐gouging and excessive‐pricing benchmarks depends on the type of disaster‐period demand shock. They are similar following a transitory demand spike, provided sufficient time is allowed for dynamic price behaviour, but differ markedly when demand is elevated for the duration of the disaster period. Applying simple cost‐based comparisons in recently concluded cases against smaller retailers are consistent with excessive pricing, given the presence of a demand spike. To the extent that these involve persistently higher demand, cases against wholesalers and larger retailers will be more complicated, as such demand must be reflected in competitive prices.

First published online: 24 August 2020 This article unifies various approaches to the analysis of exclusive dealing that so far have been regarded as distinct. The common element of these approaches is that firms depart from efficient pricing, raising marginal prices above marginal costs. We show that with distorted prices, exclusive dealing can be directly profitable and anticompetitive provided that the dominant firm enjoys a competitive advantage over rivals. The dominant firm gains directly, rather than in the future, or in adjacent markets, thanks to the boost in demand it enjoys when buyers sign exclusive contracts. We discuss the implication of the theory for antitrust policy.

We analyze collusive outcomes under different pricing schemes in a differentiated product market in which customers have elastic demand. Starting with a situation in which firms can set two‐part tariffs to price discriminate, we consider two policy interventions that ban price discrimination: Firms must set (a) linear prices or (b) fixed fees. We find that collusion at maximum prices becomes harder to sustain under linear prices. By contrast, the analysis shows that the fixed fees policy facilitates collusion at maximum prices. The results have important implications for competition policy.

Regulatory independence has become an international norm over the past decades. Yet, governments in some emerging and developing economies have eschewed the model. We argue that this outcome is shaped by the domestic institutional context; in particular, authoritarianism and traditions of state control over the economy. Analyzing new data on the adoption and operation of independent competition authorities between 1990 and 2017, we find that authoritarianism and, to some extent, state-led economic traditions negatively affect formal adoption. By contrast, these institutional constraints do not have much impact on the start of the operations, which seems to be driven primarily by capacity and economic need. Our findings shed light on domestic institutional constraints on the spread of international norms and the limits of “regulatory transplants” in the Global South.

This paper develops a model that formalizes several connections between mergers, collusion and competition policy. In equilibrium, firms may merge to make collusion sustainable when it cannot be sustained with the original set of firms. A rise in the probability of detecting and prosecuting collusion could induce a wave of mergers, so firms can sustain collusion again. Indeed, mergers could fully neutralize the pro-competitive effect of an improvement in collusion detection and prosecution. From a normative perspective, we show that merger policy is crucial when cost synergies are small (or nonexistent) and the competition authority can only deter collusion by restricting mergers. Finally, we highlight that mergers could be more harmful (less beneficial) than expected if the impact that mergers have on the competition regime is properly considered, which suggests a decomposition of the welfare impact of mergers into unilateral and coordinated effects.

The goal of this paper is to present quantitative tools to manage competition policy analysis in two‐sided platforms, based on a common framework for transaction and non‐transaction platforms. We explore tools for relevant market definition [Critical Loss Analysis and a small but significant non‐transitory increase in price (SSNIP) test], unilateral effects indicators [Upward Pricing Pressure (UPP) and Gross Upward Pricing Pressure Index (GUPPI)] and tests for exclusionary practices. We review dispersed results in the literature and fill the gaps where appropriate. We highlight the required changes from the usual one‐sided market framework and tools. While discussions of antitrust tools can be found in specialized forums devoted to advances in competition policy analysis, we organize the material in an integrated framework.

We analyze public points of interconnection of Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Apple (GAFA) in the global North versus the global South to determine the degree to which their location preferences differ, if at all. We find that there is a statistically significant difference in GAFA locating in the global North versus the global South—a difference based on a country's wealth, specifically as given by per capita GNI. Approximately 38% of countries classified as global North have a GAFA public point of interconnection, while 16% of those classified as global South do. Apple has approximately 92% of its presence in the global North, followed by Amazon (82.5%), Facebook (73%), and Google (72%). Our findings suggest that competition and antitrust policy discussions of digital platforms should include information on the dynamics of interconnection infrastructure distribution, and for that, such information must be available. We also assert that a global consideration of the digital platforms market is necessary. Published version

The lag in the use of microeconomics in consumer protection policy and litigation—as compared with the use of microeconomics in antitrust/competition policy and litigation—has at least three causes: a considerably shorter period of intellectual development; the specific historical origins and culture of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), where this disparity is especially noticeable; and the splintering of consumer protection responsibilities across a very large number of federal and state agencies. This paper will expand on these themes and discuss their implications—including the opportunities for expanded research in the area of consumer protection economics. (JEL B12, B13, B21, D18, L41)

Building on research in supply chain management (SCM) that aids in the workings of society, the authors illustrate how SCM research can advance public policy and law. Using competition policy and antitrust law as an example, they consider how developments in SCM thought and practice augment economic understanding of vertical restraints involving minimum resale price maintenance (RPM). Developments affecting the organization of supply chains; firm-level strategies for the management of retail distribution; and the interactions of supply chain participants are investigated. The findings advance knowledge of the primary procompetitive and anticompetitive theories of RPM found in competition policy and antitrust law. They also illustrate the potential of SCM to expand its reach and impact through studies that address the interplay of SCM and public policy and law.

Competition policy in Canada and elsewhere has changed remarkably over the last 50 yearsin large measure due to advances in economics. In this article, we trace the impact of developments in industrial organization on the three central areas of competition policy: cartels, single firm conduct and mergers. We focus on Canadian competition policy but draw comparisons with developments in the United States and Europe.

Australia's 1990s competition reforms were a model for the rest of the world. But since 2005, these reforms have stalled. The 2015 Competition Policy Review Final Report details an agenda and a process to restart competition policy reform. The strength of the Final Report is its breadth. In particular, it considers the reform of human services in detail. The Final Report's weakness, however, is its failure to address the political barriers to reform and its lack of alternative implementation strategies.

This article reviews the politically most contentious recommendation of the Competition Policy Review Final Report. Section 46 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cwlth), the abuse of market power provision, contains two additional requirements, compared to all other countries in the world, except New Zealand. To prove abuse of market power, it must be demonstrated that the behaviour had that purpose rather than simply having that effect. In addition, it must be proven that the firm with market power ‘took advantage’ of that power. The Final Report recommends removal of these two restrictions. The article also discusses the need to simplify the Act, which is far longer than comparable acts anywhere in the world. The Final Report also shortens drastically the provisions of section 46, giving it a sharper economic focus.

The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) is the most important forum for intergovernmental relations in Australian federalism. Though decision-making processes in intergovernmental relations in Australia have been well documented in recent research, the role of senior officials within the COAG process is less often studied. Though not the primary decision makers, this article suggests senior officials play a significant role in intergovernmental outcomes through advice provision and ‘bargaining in the margins’ of COAG. Case studies of the National Competition Policy and the development of the Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal Financial Relations suggest both the contribution of senior officials and the constraints on their contribution to intergovernmental decision making.

Antitrust rules are fundamentally informed and shaped by economic theories. Given the significance of EU competition policy for the European integration process, it is essential to disentangle the economic theories underlying EU competition law. There is abundant theoretical and empirical literature examining the influence of ordoliberalism on EC/EU competition policy. However, in recent years, ordoliberal principles appear to have been replaced by neoliberalism and efficiency-enhancing rationale in EU competition policy. This article puts forward the idea of clarifying whether the European Commission incorporates Chicago School theory into EU competition law provisions. The analysis is carried out on the basis of the European Commission's guidelines, notices and block exemption regulations. The analysis reveals that the Commission does, to a considerable extent, follow the Chicago School theory. The elements of the Chicago School theory hold strongest in vertical practices; they are somewhat weaker in horizontal practices and in unilateral exclusionary conduct.

This article examines endogenous cartel formation in the presence of a competition authority. Competition policy is shown to make the most inclusive stable cartels less inclusive. In particular, small firms that might have been cartel members in the absence of a competition authority are no longer members. Regarding the least inclusive stable cartels, competition policy can either decrease or increase their size and, in the latter case, the collusive price can rise.

This article takes a new approach to international regulatory cooperation by developing a concept of the depth of cooperation, jurisdictional integration. A dataset of international competition policy agreements is compiled and ranked against an ordinal index of the depth of de jure cooperation in enforcing competition policies. There has been both a deepening and broadening of de jure cooperation over time. Statistical analysis finds that common membership of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development is a strong predictor of the depth of agreements to cooperate in enforcing competition policies; that we can be confident that the depth of agreements is low when signatories' substantive competition laws are dissimilar; and that the depth of de jure cooperation is a strong predictor of whether an agreement is “intergovernmental” or “transgovernmental.” The article puts forward a new way to map and measure international regulatory cooperation, and a new variable for use in research on its causes and consequences.

The article examines the European Commission's use of its legal powers over mergers. It discusses and tests two views. One is that the �neoliberal� Commission has ended previous industrial policies of aiding �national champion� firms to grow through mergers and instead pursues a �merger-constraining� policy of vigorously using its legal powers to block mergers. The other is that the Commission follows an �integrationist policy� of seeking the development of larger European firms to deepen economic integration. It examines Commission decisions under the 1989 EC Merger Regulation between 1990 and 2009. It selects three major sectors that are �likely� for the �merger-constraining� view � banking, energy and telecommunications � and analyses a dataset of almost 600 Commission decisions and then individual merger cases. It finds that the Commission has approved almost all mergers, including by former �national champion� firms. There have been only two prohibitions over 20 years in the three sectors and the outcome has been the creation of larger European firms through mergers. It explains how the Commission can pursue an integrationist policy through the application of competition processes and criteria. The wider implication is that the Commission can combine competition policy with achieving the �industrial policy� aim of aiding the development of larger European firms.

This article evaluates the impact of the introduction of incentive regulation on firms’ advertising spending among the population of local exchange carriers in the United States telecommunications industry between 1988 and 2001. The results show that the hybrid rate of return method and other intermediate incentive schemes have a negative relationship with advertising spending. Conversely, the introduction of pure price caps schemes has had a positive and significant impact on firms’ advertising spending. These results highlight the importance of incentive compatible mechanism design in motivating firms to be market oriented and strive for superior performance. Regulaciones y estrategia: pruebas concernientes a la publicidad El articulo evalua el impacto de la introduccion de una regulacion relativa a los gastos de publicidad de las empresas en el conjunto de los operadores locales del sector de las telecomunicaciones en Estados Unidos entre 1988 y 2001. Los resultados ponen de manifiesto que el metodo de la tasa hibrida de rendimiento de otros sistemas de impulso tienen una relacion negativa con los gastos de publicidad. Inversamente, la introduccion de planes para poner un tope a los precios ha tenido un impacto positivo y significativo sobre los gastos de publicidad de las empresas. Estos resultados ponen el acento sobre la importancia de elaborar mecanismos de impulso compatibles para motivar a las empresas a estar orientadas hacia el mercado y a esforzarse a tener mejores resultados. Regulations et strategie : preuves concernant la publicite L'article evalue l'impact de l'introduction d'une regulation incitative sur les depenses de publicite des entreprises au sein de la population des operateurs de boucle locale aux Etats Unis dans le secteur des telecommunications entre 1988 et 2001. Les resultats indiquent que la methode du taux hybride de rendement et d'autres systemes intermediaires d'incitation ont une relation negative avec les depenses de publicite. Inversement, l'introduction de plans purs de plafonnement des prix a eu un impact positif et significatif sur les depenses de publicite des entreprises. Ces resultats mettent l'accent sur l'importance d’elaborer des mecanismes d'incitation compatibles pour motiver les entreprises a etre orientees vers le marche et a s'efforcer d’etre plus performantes. Regulierung und Strategie: Befund zur Werbung In diesem Beitrag wird die Auswirkung der Einfuhrung von Anreizregulierung im Bereich der Werbeausgaben von Unternehmen an die Kunden von Ortsvermittlungsanbietern im Telekommunikationssektor der USA von 1988 bis 2001 untersucht. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass zwischen der hybrid rate of return Methode und anderen intermediaren Anreizsystemen einerseits sowie Werbeausgaben andererseits eine negative Beziehung besteht. Umgekehrt hatte die Einfuhrung reiner Preisobergrenzensysteme eine positive und signifikante Wirkung auf die Werbeausgaben der Unternehmen. Diese Ergebnisse unterstreichen die Bedeutung anreizkompatibler Mechanismus-Designs, um Unternehmen zu motivieren, sich marktorientiert zu verhalten und bessere Performance anzustreben.

This paper considers a location model to illustrate the effect of zoning on competition. A planner is in charge of designing a city in a circular space where firms and consumers are located on different sides. With this type of market configuration, equilibrium in location under concave transport costs is proved. Then, a welfare function with different weights attached to consumer and firm surpluses is introduced to highlight zoning regulation as an influential competition policy tool. Depending on the regulator's political profiles and the demand, it is shown that zoning can lead to strong, weak, or moderate competition.

An “effects-based” or “economics-based” approach to competition policy requires a theory of harm that causally links a business practice and its allegedly anti-competitive effects and also weighs anti competitive effects against the pro-competitive effects of the practice. This implies a shift away from per se prohibitions of certain practices towards case-by-case analysis – a move that has been hotly debated, especially in Europe. Using a case study of the recently concluded British American Tobacco case, we study the core features of an effects-based approach to vertical restraints. We find the approach followed in the British American Tobacco South Africa case generally consistent with an effects-based analysis, but highlight some limitations.

Microprocessor-maker Intel has been subjected to the highest fine in the history of EU competition policy. Intel operates in a market with one other main supplier, a fact that seemed to provide grounds to those accusing it of abusing a dominant position. The authors argue that, in spite of the limited number of players, the microprocessor market showed the distinctive marks of dynamic competition: ever-lower prices and ever-growing innovation. Political considerations more than sound economic reasoning seem to be behind the EU antitrust decision.

This paper first presents stylized evidence showing how the date of the adoption of competition policy is correlated with country size. Smaller countries tend to adopt competition policy later. We then present a theoretical model with countries of different size, trade costs, and firms competing a la Cournot. In the model we show that reduced trade costs following from increasing globalization affect countries differently depending on their size. This has implications for the incentives to introduce competition policy. The predictions of the model are consistent with the empirical regularity presented. Ce memoire presente certains resultats qui suggerent comment le moment choisi pour adopter une politique de concurrence est co-reliea la taille du pays. Les petits pays tendent a adopter des politiques de concurrence plus tard. On presente un modele theorique avec des pays de tailles differentes, qui ont aussi des couts de commerce differents, et ou les firmes se concurrencent a la Cournot. On montre que la reduction des couts de commerce qui suit une mondialisation croissante affecte les pays d'une maniere differente selon leur taille. Cela a des implications pour les incitations a mettre en place une politique de concurrence. Les predictions du modele sont consistantes avec les regularites empiriques observees.

One of the biggest challenges facing environmental policy makers at present is that of integrating environmental protection goals into economic policy areas. Unless this is genuinely achieved, it is clear that environmental degradation will continue apace. Though one of the EU's most important areas of economic competence is competition policy, many policy makers and commentators reject the notion that environmental concerns should play a significant role in EU competition analysis. In that light, this article addresses two key questions. First, should this approach apply? Second, if not, what are the principles that govern how environmental protection requirements should be taken into account by decision makers applying EU competition law? In answering these questions, the article puts forward three theoretical arguments as to why, and how, the environmental benefits and damage flowing from goods and services should be taken into account by EU competition decision makers, based, respectively, on legal systematic, governance and economic reasoning.

It is often alleged that PTAs involving the EC and the US include a significant number of obligations in areas not currently covered by the WTO Agreement, such as investment protection, competition policy, labour standards and environmental protection. The primary purpose of this study is to highlight the extent to which these claims are true. The study divides the contents of all PTAs involving the EC and the US currently notified to the WTO, into 14 'WTO+' and 38 'WTO-X' areas, where WTO+ provisions come under the current mandate of the WTO, and WTO-X provisions deal with issues lying outside the current WTO mandate. As a second step, the legal enforceability of each obligation is evaluated, and judged on the extent to which the text specifies clear obligations. Among the findings are: (i) EC agreements contain almost four times as many instances of WTO-X provisions as do US agreements; (ii) but EC agreements evidence a very significant amount of 'legal inflation' (i.e. non-legally enforceable provisions) in the WTO-X category, and US agreements actually contain more enforceable WTO-X provisions than do the EC agreements; (iii) US agreements tend to emphasise regulatory areas more compared to EC agreements. © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

The paper analyzes how countries use competition policy as a tool for strategic trade. In the model, two countries export to a third country. Each exporting country is endowed with a set of differentiated products. Each government chooses the number of exporters for its country and the products that each exporter sells in the first period, and a tax policy in the second period. Firms choose prices or quantities independently in the third period. In the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, both countries group all their products within a single firm—the “national champion policy.” We study the implication of different assumptions about the timing of the game.

There has been considerable merger activity in EU energy markets in recent years. It could be argued that competition authorities should be required to take into account potential innovation effects of mergers. In the UK, regulators are now trying to achieve multiple objectives within the current framework. There is a danger that if markets are expected to deliver mutually incompatible objectives they will be unable to achieve any of them.

The emerging knowledge economy has led to an increase of demand and locational competition for highly-skilled labour. Brain competition policy (BCP) is the reaction from national and regional policymakers. In short, BCP refers to the attraction, education and circulation of talent in and between regional and national economies. This new focus on human capital instead of physical capital indicates a paradigmatic shift in innovation policy and regional policy. While most of the contributions to this new policy approach come from the US, it can be demonstrated that different institutions in Europe prevent the simple copying of those strategies. The article contributes to the ongoing paradigmatic shift by conceptualizing a coherent framework for BCP from a European perspective. Abstract La emergente economia del conocimiento ha llevado a un aumento de la demanda y competencia en localizacion de mano de obra altamente especializada. Las politicas de competencia por talento (PCT) son la reaccion nacional y regional de formuladores de politicas. En resumen, PCT se refiere a la atraccion, educacion y circulacion de talento dentro de, y entre, economias regionales y nacionales. Este nuevo enfoque en cuanto a capital humano en lugar de capital fisico indica un cambio paradigmatico en politicas innovadoras y politicas regionales. Aunque la mayoria de aportes a este nuevo enfoque de politicas proviene de los EE.UU., se puede demostrar que las diferentes instituciones europeas impiden el copiar simplemente dichas estrategias. El articulo contribuye al cambio paradigmatico continuo mediante la conceptualizacion de un marco coherente para PCT desde una perspectiva europea.

EU competition policy has become so strongly institutionalized that it is easy to overlook its precarious status in earlier decades. This article argues, first, that the Commission responded to the imperative arising from the extraordinary powers created by the treaty and the novelty of competition policy in post-war Europe by developing a series of myths to provide justification for its prerogatives. Second, these myths have played a key role in securing acceptance of EU policy, though other factors have also been important. Third, the official mythology has been supplemented by an interpretation which has become dominant in the law and political science literatures; namely, that EU competition policy has ordoliberal origins. This article challenges this view.

THE COMPETITION AND REGULATION EUROPEAN SUMMER SCHOOL AND CONFERENCE (CRESSE) is an informal network of academics and professionals with an interest in competition policy and sectoral regulation. It was initiated by Yannis Katsoulacos (Athens University of Economics and Business) in 2005 and has since grown to become an important event in the competition and regulation annual conferences calendar, with the continuous support ofMassimoMotta (EuropeanUniversity Institute, Florence), Patrick Rey (University of Toulouse) and David Ulph (University of St. Andrews). The objective is to provide a forum in which the latest research in the areas of competition and regulation is presented and discussed. CRESSE Conference themes have been ‘Abuses of Dominance’ (2006), ‘Competition and Regulation in Network Industries’ (2007), ‘Competition Policy: Procedures, Institutions, IPR’s’ (2008) and ‘Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy’ (2009). Presentations in the two-day annual Conference include 3–5 invited papers and a limited number (typically 25%–30%) of papers selected from those submitted following a call in the major IO journals. The annual CRESSEConference is held in early July inGreece, the institution responsible for its organization being the Athens University of Economics and Business. CRESSE also organizes an annual summer school in which visiting faculty from a large number of European and U.S. universities provide high quality training topractitioners of competitionpolicy and sectoral regulationwhowish to be up to date with new economic literature and recent legal developments. It is also active in disseminating research in the areas of competition policy and regulation and in contributing, through the organization of special policy sessions and round tables, to public debates on specific policy issues. The annual CRESSE Conference typically has two keynote lectures (the Jean-Jacques Laffont Lecture and theCRESSEConference PolicyLecture)

A number of studies have considered the motivation of managers to follow a merger strategy. However, as far as we are aware none has looked at the influence of competition regulation on merger motives using stock market data and event study techniques. Data drawn from 63 merger cases in the UK between 1989 and 2003 are examined for the stock market's perceptions of what motivated managers to pursue their initial merger bid. The findings suggest that the Synergy and Hubris dominate as motivations for mergers and that, unintentionally, competition policy may help to reduce the number of mergers motivated by Managerialism. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

This paper addresses the following two questions: (i) Is there any evidence that firms, like human beings, prefer to partner with alike? (ii) Is there any relationship between the ex ante technological and product relatedness of merging parties and the postmerger performances? Using data of patent holdings and product portfolios of big pharmaceutical companies, I find that (i) merger deals are more likely to be signed between firms with related technologies and drug portfolios, and (ii) product relatedness and technology relatedness are positively and negatively correlated with postmerger performances, respectively. The analysis suggests that the negative effect of technology relatedness might be driven by a large human capital depreciation following consolidations. The results have important implications for competition policy, which are discussed in the concluding section.

This article addresses the question of whether the modernisation and decentralisation of EC competition law will affect the integration of environmental protection requirements into the framework of Article 81 EC. First, the interface between competition policy and environmental protection at both the constitutional level and operational level is investigated. Following this, the Commission's assessment of environmental benefits under Article 81(3) EC prior to decentralisation and modernisation is explored. It is submitted that the Commission's expansion of its interpretation of the first two positive criteria of Article 81(3) EC allowed environmental objectives and competition goals to be balanced within the framework of Article 81 EC. Finally, this article examines the extent to which the decentralisation and modernisation of Community competition law may impede the integration of environmental protection into the definition and implementation of Article 81 EC.

New data on air fares offered on 29 trans-Tasman and domestic New Zealand routes are analysed to test whether competition between traditional or ‘legacy’ airlines still matters for pricing in the new air travel regime characterised by internet booking systems and competition from low cost carriers. It is found that market structure does indeed still matter. Air fares are significantly lower on those domestic New Zealand routes where Air New Zealand faces competition from Qantas. In addition, on the trans-Tasman routes, the new entrants Virgin (Pacific) Blue and Emirates have put competitive pressure on Air New Zealand and Qantas, but such pressure would not be sufficient to compensate for loss of independent competition between the larger incumbents.

This paper reviews the eighth Trade Policy Review (TPR) for Japan. It begins with an appreciation of its fair and well-balanced work in updating knowledge on the progress of policy reform in Japan. The TPR confirms the recovery of the Japanese economy with some notable improvements in its policy environment, the example of which is competition policy. On the other hand, there still remain notable trade impediments, particularly in agriculture. Some agricultural products are still heavily protected by complicated border measures. This paper provides some supplementary information, namely that the domestic production of most of the heavily protected products, with the exception of rice, are highly concentrated geographically, suggesting the politico-economic background. The rise of regionalism is mentioned as another topical issue in Japan though the characteristics and significance of free trade agreement networking by Japan are not fully discussed by the TPR. The TPR praises Japan's effort in providing the generalised system of preferences (GSP), but this paper offers a somewhat sceptical view of the role of GSP as a useful tool for developing countries. Overall, the TPR for Japan is assessed as a good starting point for dealing with the remaining issues on international commercial policies in Japan.

Australia is continuing to develop a legal and administrative framework for facilitating third party access to important infrastructure. This paper examines the workings of the organisation charged with assessing requests for access—the National Competition Council—in the context of the Council's Final Recommendation on an application by the Fortescue Metals Group for access to the Mt Newman Rail Line, owned and operated by BHP Billiton Iron Ore. The discussion draws on submissions to the Council and the recent literature on rail access in order to critique this decision. It concludes by observing that further research is needed to develop a methodology for a more formal approach to determining certain key questions.

This paper analyses competition and mergers among risk averse banks. We show that the correlation between the shocks to the demand for loans and the shocks to the supply of deposits induces a strategic interdependence between the two sides of the market. We characterise the role of diversification as a motive for bank mergers and analyse the consequences of mergers on loan and deposit rates. When the value of diversification is sufficiently strong, bank mergers generate an increase in the welfare of borrowers and depositors. If depositors have more correlated shocks than borrowers, bank mergers are relatively worse for depositors than for borrowers.

In a model of competition with imperfect consumer price information and incomplete price search, some consumers may end up comparing prices originating from the same supplier: either because one firm sets multiple prices or because a group of firms colludes. This leads to added monopoly power for these firms, and average prices in the mixed strategy equilibrium become higher. There is a shift in welfare from consumers to producers, both with exogenous and endogenous consumer search behaviour. However consumers might search more or less with multiple prices. The implications for the price-setting equilibrium, competition policy and recent judgements are considered.

The use of environmental agreements by companies as a tool to improve environmental protection can be hindered by a strict interpretation of competition rules. This article analyses how the European Commission attempts to reconcile the requirement of environmental protection with anti-trust law, by examining the principles that the Commission has defined in its assessment of packaging waste management systems. Although the Commission has considered that some agreements concluded under these schemes were restrictive of competition, it decided not to prohibit them. This article argues that, although attention is given to environmental considerations, the arguments invoked to justify the exemption of these agreements do not allow for integration of environmental protection, as such, in European competition policy. An alternative would be to apply standards of assessment comparable to those used to justify exceptions to the free movement of goods.

Changes are afoot in Australia's federal arrangements concerning competition policy. While many of the proposals to enlarge the Commonwealth's sphere of influence are played out in the media, other shifts are more subtle. This article examines one of those areas of change. It looks at National Competition Policy and in particular, its regulatory reform components. It argues that the approach adopted in the 1995 agreement, which was characterised by broad principles, meticulous monitoring and substantial financial carrots, has provided the Commonwealth with a useful tool for effectively intervening in areas that have been until now, matters of state responsibility.

The “modernization” reforms of European antitrust are summarized and interpreted. The article uses principal–agent analysis enhanced by socio-institutional insights. The reforms in policy implementation are of historic importance. While they appear to promise decentralization to national competition authorities, more sophisticated analysis points to an increase in the centralized power of the Commission. The novel instrument of a supranational European Competition Network creates a redesigned relationship between the Commission and the member states that carries high risks of incoherence. Modernization driven by a legal epistemic community carries a less obvious risk that increased power of competition policy will unduly reinforce liberal market disciplines through a juridification of the European competition regime.

Recent changes in Australia, such as the new public management and national competition policy, have affected the way that human services are provided and have complicated the role of volunteer coordinators. However, because volunteers are free to choose their level of contribution, it is the volunteers' perspective that is the ultimate yardstick against which their coordination is assessed. The aim of the research examined here was a deeper understanding of women volunteers' and their coordinators' views of their work. The research was conducted within a qualitative paradigm, employing individual and focus group interviews. The analysis identified eight areas of concern for volunteers around their management. The analysis of the coordinators' interviews revealed three coordination styles—horizontal, nurturing, and managerial—of which the managerial was most in conflict with the volunteers' perspective.

This study reviews the progress made in EU accession candidates on competition policy. The analysis shows that institution-building and legislation are well under way and that anti-trust practice is not too lax. Due to the diversity among the accession countries under review, the study finds that the strictly rule-based frame work of the EU might not be the most favourable solution for some candidates: firstly, the small and open economies of most candidates make it particularly difficult to define the ‘relevant market’ in competition cases. Secondly, the traditionally intense vertical integration of production in accession states calls for a reassessment of ‘vertical restraints’. The policy implications of this study suggest that the EU competition task force should take a proactive, case-by-case approach vis-a-vis its new members.