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The sugarcane borer (SCB), Diatraea saccharalis (Lepidoptera: Crambidae), is a key pest of maize in Argentina, and genetically modified maize, producing Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) proteins, has revolutionized the management of this insect in South America. However, field-evolved resistance to some Bt technologies has been observed in SCB in Argentina. Here we assessed a new Bt technology, MON 95379, in the laboratory, greenhouse and field for efficacy against SCB.In a laboratory leaf disc bioassay, both MON 95379 (producing Cry1B.868 and Cry1Da_7) and Cry1B.868_single maize (producing only Cry1B.868) resulted in 100% mortality of SCB. The level of Cry1B.868 in the Cry1B.868_single maize is comparable to that in MON 95379 maize. However, the Cry1Da_7 protein does not have high efficacy against SCB, as evidenced by 20% mortality on Cry1Da_7_single leaf tissue. Total (100%) mortality of SCB in a Cry1B.868_single tissue dilution bioassay indicated that Cry1B.868_single maize meets the criteria to be classified as a high dose. Similar median lethal concentration (LCMON 95379 maize will bring value to maize growers in South America by effectively managing SCB even in locations where resistance to other Bt-containing maize technologies has been reported. © 2022 The Authors. Pest Management Science published by John WileySons Ltd on behalf of Society of Chemical Industry.

BACKGROUND The pyramided genetically modified maize (Zea mays [L.]) event MON 95379, expressing the Cry1B.868 and Cry1Da_7 proteins, was designed to protect against larval feeding damage by the fall armyworm, Spodoptera frugiperda (FAW). Here, we conducted laboratory, greenhouse, and field studies to assess the dose and field efficacy of MON 95379 against FAW and inform the development of insect resistance management plans. RESULTS The Cry1B.868 and Cry1Da_7 proteins were active against susceptible FAW neonates in diet‐incorporation bioassays: median lethal concentration [LC50] (95% CI) = 62.8 (42.6–87.6) μg/ml diet for Cry1B.868 and 9.4 (5.3–18.6) μg/ml diet for Cry1Da_7. In laboratory leaf disc bioassays, MON 95379 maize and experimental maize lines expressing the individual components were effective in controlling susceptible FAW. In whole‐plant assays, MON 95379 controlled FAW resistant to the Cry1A.105 and Cry2Ab2 proteins. Likewise, under field conditions, MON 95379 maize expressing Cry1B.868 and Cry1Da_7 was highly effective at protecting plants against the larval feeding of FAW. CONCLUSIONS The expression of Cry1B.868 and Cry1Da_7 in MON 95379 consistently protected maize plants against larval feeding by FAW and represents an alternative to manage trait resistance issues in South America. © 2021 Bayer Crop Science‐US. Pest Management Science published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Society of Chemical Industry., The pyramided genetically modified maize (Zea mays [L.]) event MON 95379, expressing the Cry1B.868 and Cry1Da_7 proteins was designed to protect against larval feeding damage of the fall armyworm, Spodoptera frugiperda (FAW). The expression of Cry1B.868 and Cry1Da_7 in MON 95379 consistently protected maize plants against larval feeding of FAW and represents an alternative to manage trait resistance issues in South America.

The question of whether devolved assemblies should be established for Scotland and Wales dominated considerable parliamentary time in the 1970s and became a key pillar of the Labour Government’s legislative agenda after the two 1974 General Elections. The main building blocks of the Government’s devolution proposals for Scotland and Wales were in place from 1975 with the publication of the White Paper, Our Changing Democracy. The White Paper outlined proposals for a primary law-making Assembly for Scotland and a Scottish Executive, operating under a ‘conferred powers model of devolution’. For Wales, the Assembly was to be a body corporate (with no split between Executive and Assembly) exercising only executive functions and able only to pass secondary legislation. With some important modifications (including crucially the requirement for a referendum, which was then further amended to require a Yes tally equating to 40% of the electorates in both nations), these proposals were eventually incorporated into law as the Scotland and Wales Acts 1978. While the political debates surrounding devolution in this period are well known, less attention has been paid to the practical plans undertaken by the Civil Service for devolution to become a reality. As this article demonstrates considerable time was spent drawing up, from an early stage, detailed preparations for devolution, particularly in Scotland. In Wales, planning was more tentative, yet nonetheless was taken seriously by Welsh Office. These plans never materialised in the way envisaged, with neither Welsh nor Scottish devolution able to pass the referendum thresholds put in place. However, as this article also demonstrates, both the Scotland and Wales Acts had a constitutional legacy when devolution became reality under New Labour in the late 1990s.

The legislative consent convention forms one of a number of conventions that underpin the UK’s uncodified constitution and has been an important facet of the UK’s territorial governance post‐devolution. It provides that the UK government will not normally seek to legislate on devolved matters, and the devolution settlements, without the consent of the respective devolved legislatures. Commonly referred to as the ‘Sewel Convention’, the convention’s roots are often traced to the commitments made by Lord Sewel during the passage of the Scotland Act 1998. This article demonstrates, however, that the convention has a far deeper history that long predated Lord Sewel’s comments and goes back to the dawn of devolution in the United Kingdom, namely, the Northern Ireland Parliament that existed between 1921 and 1972. The article charts the development of the legislative consent convention from its roots in the failure of the UK government to challenge directly the Northern Ireland government over local government franchise reform in 1921, to its continued survival, even when Stormont collapsed in 1972, and argues that the convention survived owing to its role as a device of convenience and pragmatism for politicians in Westminster.

Interparliamentary relations do not attract much in the way of public or even academic attention. However, they are an aspect of parliamentary life in which there has been a series of experiments by select committees in the House of Commons. While one of the more prominent examples of such experimentation was the international grand committee on Big Data, Privacy and Democracy spearheaded by the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, this article will look at another example of select committee‐led interparliamentary relations, namely the ‘joint inquiry’ conducted by the House of Commons Defence Committee and the Assemblée nationale’s Standing Committee on National Defence into Future Cruise and Anti‐Ship Missiles in 2018.\ud \ud This article, written by an official involved in the inquiry, offers the first reflections on the experience of this joint inquiry, demonstrates how the model undertaken for the inquiry differed from the approaches taken by other select committees involved in interparliamentary working, and explores whether it might offer a blueprint for future joint inquiries.

For as long as devolution has been debated in the UK, there has been fierce discussion as to the representation of the would‐be affected areas at Westminster. That this has been the case is a consequence of Westminster's dual remit as both a state‐wide and a sub‐state legislature. While this dual remit was relatively straightforward when applied to all nations of the UK, it does, however, raise serious questions about the equality of MPs at Westminster in the face of asymmetric devolution that would carve out parliament's remit in some, but not all, parts of the UK. These questions bedevilled Gladstone's Irish Home Rule Bills in the late 19th century and have been a recurrent feature of debate following New Labour's devolution programme in the late 1990s, culminating in the adoption of a system of ‘English Votes for English Laws’ by the house of commons in October 2015. This article looks at this issue through the lens of the ill‐fated Scotland and Wales Bill introduced by the Callaghan government in 1976. It explores the roots of the bill and how, and why, the idea of referring the question of territorial representation, post‐devolution, to a Speaker's conference, came to secure the initial support of cabinet as the best answer to this problem, and why the government swiftly changed its mind. Parliamentary statecraft considerations served to push a Speaker's conference onto the institutional agenda, before ultimately dooming it to failure.

Both during and since the 2016 referendum on the UK's membership of the European Union, concerns were raised as to the absence of contingency planning within Whitehall. This situation was in direct contrast with 1975, when extensive planning took place for the possibility of a vote to leave the European Community. However, there has been little in the way of detailed analysis of the contingency planning undertaken in 1975. Using archival evidence of the Wilson government's preparations, this article highlights the complex challenge that withdrawal would have posed for the UK in 1975, the tensions that existed between the political imperative for a swift withdrawal, in the event of a leave vote, and the civil service's concerns as to whether such a withdrawal was deliverable. Finally, it shows how dependent the UK's position would have been on the approach taken by the other members of the EC.

This thesis offers the first detailed assessment of an event that has hitherto been consigned to the margins of the literature on devolution and territorial reform in the United Kingdom, the Conference on Devolution, 1919-1920. Sitting between October 1919 and April 1920, the Conference on Devolution was arguably one of the two moments in the UK’s constitutional history when the territorial constitution was approached in a holistic fashion by policy makers and political elites (the other occasion being the Royal Commission on the Constitution, 1969-1973). The primary aim of this thesis is to provide the first detailed analysis of the Conference on Devolution, to develop a fuller understanding of why it was established, what it debated and why it failed. Secondary to that objective, this thesis will also assess what relevance the Conference has for students of territorial governance in the UK today, at a time when the UK’s constitution is in flux. In pursuit of these objectives, the thesis utilises the ideas and insights on territorial governance of James Bulpitt and James Mitchell, alongside an extensive catalogue of archival evidence, including the previously unstudied (in the context of the Conference on Devolution) personal papers of the Conference’s Secretary, Gilbert Campion. Using this methodology and archival sources, the thesis offers a considerable revision to previous understandings of the Conference on Devolution. It demonstrates that the Conference’s fatal disagreement on how the devolved legislatures should be composed, was not, as has been previously portrayed, just a disagreement at the latter stages of the Conference’s work, but was instead a cleavage that undercut the entirety of the Conference on Devolution. Finally, the thesis highlights the clear resonance between the issues deliberated by the Conference and many of today’s territorial governance debates.

Amid the fallout from the Scottish independence referendum, a UK constitutional convention has been proposed as a mechanism to take stock not only of the referendum, but also of the past fifteen years of devolution. However, despite longstanding conceptions of British constitutional development, a constitutional convention would not herald a brave new world for the UK's constitution. As the article highlights, in the past hundred years there have been two attempts to treat the territorial constitution in the round: the Speaker's Conference on Devolution, 1919–1920 and the Royal Commission on the Constitution, 1969–1973. This article examines both of these forums, arguing that they provide clear warnings for a future UK constitutional convention, in particular the threat of internal division that any such forum risks facing. A danger that this article highlights is heightened by the associated difficulty of reaching agreement across the UK's ‘state of unions’.