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Voluntary disclosure and corporate governance variables are considered important mechanisms for the reduction of the information asymmetries and conflicts of interest potentially arising between competing parties of the firms. This paper aims at investigating the relationship between board independence and quality of voluntary financial disclosure and how previous relationship is moderated by the level of ownership concentration. The analysis has been conducted on a sample of Italian non-financial listed companies and the results show that there is a significant positive relationship between board independence and the quality of voluntary financial disclosure. Moreover, our findings reveal that ownership concentration plays a relevant moderating role in that relationship, highlighting the necessity to consider the interaction effects of different governance mechanisms when studying corporate governance effectiveness

The aim of the paper is to analyse the interaction effect corruption play in the relation between ownership structure and firm performance. This paper analyses whether and how the Corruption Perception Index affects the relationship between corporate performance and ownership structure in 2,035 firms operating in eight European countries (Denmark, Sweden, Germany, France, Finland, The Netherland, Italy, and Spain) during 2010-2017 period (10,915 firm year observations). Our findings show that level of corruption perceived by investors is relevant to the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. This result suggests that institutional context variables should be taken into consideration from corporate governance scholars in their empirical investigations. The contribution of the paper is twofold: first, our results evidence the relevant role played by the interaction effects between firm-level and country-level variables; second, it suggests important managerial and policy implications related to the interaction between internal and external corporate governance mechanisms.